In Hindsight: A Second Year of Delays in the Allocation of Subsidiary Body Chairs
In the past two years, Council members have taken an unusually long time to reach agreement on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs. In 2025, the presidential note on the allocation was issued on 29 May, shortly before the General Assembly held elections for the next cohort of elected Council members. This year, disagreements have persisted even after the 3 June elections, making it the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979. This delay has placed significant strain on the work of subsidiary bodies. An added complication is that the lack of clarity on the available positions may delay the negotiations of the incoming members on the 2027-2028 subsidiary body chair positions.
This In Hindsight explores the reasons for the current impasse, discusses the prolonged delay’s ramifications on the Council’s work, and proposes potential modifications to the subsidiary body allocation process.
The Appointment Process
The chairs of the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies, which include sanctions committees and working groups, are responsible for several important aspects of the work of these bodies, including chairing meetings, briefing the Council on the work of the relevant subsidiary body, and managing relevant casework, such as listing and delisting requests. The Council’s subsidiary bodies have traditionally been chaired by elected members (E10), with a few exceptions.[1]
The 2017 version of Note 507 on working methods stipulates that members “should make every effort” to provisionally agree on appointing the chairs by 1 October each year and, with that deadline in mind, should start an informal consultation process “as soon as possible” after the Security Council elections. The newly elected members are to be consulted as part of the process, which should be undertaken in a “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way”.
As a result, the incoming five elected members (I5) now first agree on the list of chairs for available subsidiary bodies among themselves and the continuing E10 members before the chair of the Working Group on Documentation and Procedural Questions (IWG) transmits it to the permanent members (P5) for final approval. Members tend to view the list of chairs as a package deal, which means that it can only be finalised once agreement has been reached on who will chair each body. If agreement has been reached by the end of the year, a Note by the President listing the bureaux of the Council’s subsidiary bodies with its chairs and vice-chairs is published in early January of the following year.
In practice, the target of provisionally agreeing on chairs and vice-chairs by 1 October has never been met. For instance, prolonged negotiations over the allocation of chairs in 2021 and 2023 led to final decisions in early January and late January of the following years, respectively. As noted above, the negotiations on the 2025 allocations also took an unusually lengthy period of time, only concluding in late May of that year.
In 2023, after negotiations on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs continued into January, Council members adopted a presidential note (S/2023/615) outlining a contingency measure intended to ensure the continuous functioning of the subsidiary bodies. The note decided that if members are unable to agree on appointing chairs by 1 January, then the responsibilities of all chairs will devolve to the president of the Council during January. This contingency measure, which was included in the 2024 version of Note 507 on working methods, was implemented for the first time in 2025. Although the 2023 note did not stipulate what should happen if members were unable to agree by the end of January, there appears to have been an informal agreement among Council members that the Council presidents during the ensuing months would also fulfil this role.
(For background and more information on the appointment process, see the In Hindsight on the delay in allocation of subsidiary body chairs in our May 2025 Monthly Forecast.)
Developments in 2026
Soon after their election in June 2025, the then I5 members—Bahrain, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Latvia, and Liberia—began negotiating the allocation of subsidiary body chairs for 2026. After a suggested allocation was agreed upon among the I5 and the continuing E10 members, the proposed list was presented by October 2025 to the P5 members, who conveyed their response only in late December 2025. It seems that the US expressed opposition to Colombia’s bid to chair the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee. This position apparently stemmed from tensions at the time between US President Donald Trump and Colombian President Gustavo Petro Urrego, which have abated this year.
To facilitate consensus, Colombia agreed in December 2025 to relinquish its request to chair the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee. At that point, several Council members apparently believed that agreement on the allocations could be achieved by January; however, a more intractable disagreement emerged over the 1737 Sanctions Committee concerning Iran.
The disagreement stems from disputes among Council members over the triggering of the “snapback” mechanism to reimpose the UN sanctions on Iran that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme and resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015 had suspended. China and Russia have contested the legal and procedural validity of the invocation of the snapback mechanism and argued that all Security Council sanctions on Iran were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. On the other hand, the P3 members (France, the UK, and the US) and other like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and have maintained that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been re-activated and that the Security Council’s 1737 Sanctions Committee has been restored. (For more information, see our 11 March What’s in Blue story.)
China and Russia have reiterated on numerous occasions that they do not recognise the 1737 Committee and do not consider themselves bound by the Iran sanctions regime. They have therefore conveyed that they would not accept having the 1737 Committee as part of the subsidiary body allocation. The P3 and other like-minded Council members who believe that the 1737 Committee has been reactivated insist that it should be part of the package. The dynamics surrounding this issue have been further complicated by the crisis in the Middle East triggered by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel and regional countries.
Starting in late March, with agreement on the allocations remaining elusive, Colombia hosted several informal meetings of the Council’s political coordinators (PCs) to discuss possible solutions to the impasse. Some of these meetings were only among the E10, while others involved all 15 members. It seems that Colombia, which also served as the E10 coordinator in March, has been entrusted with a coordinating role on the subsidiary body allocation negotiations in light of its constructive approach to resolving the earlier impasse over the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee.
Based on the discussions at the informal meetings, and input from members such as Denmark and Latvia, Colombia as facilitator presented a plan to address the disagreement over the 1737 Committee, which apparently consisted of four steps:
- The holding of an informal meeting among the 15 Council PCs to agree on the next steps of the process. During this meeting, there would be an informal verbal agreement on who will chair the 1737 Committee.
- The holding of a meeting of the respective E10 and P5 coordinators with the Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) to verbally convey what Council members agreed to in the first step.
- The holding of a meeting of the 1737 Committee, during which its chair would be appointed. This step of the plan was apparently based on a 1998 Presidential Note (S/1998/1016), which determined that “the bureau of each sanctions committee shall be appointed by that committee, following consultations between Council members, either at its first meeting if that meeting takes place in January, or in writing at the instance of the Presidency of the Council under a no-objection procedure”.
- After the holding of the 1737 Committee meeting, a Note by the President will be issued, detailing the allocation of all subsidiary body chairs save for the 1737 Committee, since that chair would have already been in place by that point.
It seems that most Council members agreed to the proposed plan. This represented a concession from the P3 members, who had been strongly opposed to de-coupling the 1737 Committee from the rest of the allocation. China and Russia, however, were apparently uncomfortable with the proposal as it involved convening a meeting of the 1737 Committee.
As the elections for the next cohort of elected Council members approached, the E10 members collectively called for closed consultations on the subsidiary body allocations for 21 May. During that meeting, it seems that Denmark (the E10 coordinator at the time) delivered a joint statement on behalf of the E10, which emphasised the urgency of resolving the issue, noting that the lack of agreement is undermining the Council’s credibility and integrity, as well as its ability to fulfil its responsibilities under the UN Charter. The meeting did not result in progress on the matter, however.
At the time of writing, it did not appear that Council members were discussing any new bridging proposals. It seems that some members believe that a political solution to the conflict in Iran would help settle questions relating to the 1737 Sanctions Committee, thereby facilitating agreement on the subsidiary body allocations. A memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed between Iran and the US on 17 June offers only a glimmer of hope, however, as it defers agreement on matters relating to Iran’s nuclear programme until the signing of a “final deal” and as ongoing exchanges of fire between the US and Iran test the ceasefire agreed by the countries.
Effects of the Impasse on the Security Council and its Subsidiary Bodies
As in the first five months of 2025, Council presidencies this year have continued to perform certain tasks of subsidiary body chairs, in line with the contingency measures outlined in the 2023 presidential note on the matter. This has entailed only carrying out select, urgent duties of the subsidiary body chairs, due partly to the amount of work involved in addition to their responsibilities as president. Some members also apparently think that if these bodies conduct their business as usual, there will be less pressure to reach agreement on the allocation of chairs.
Tasks carried out by presidencies have included the chairing of informal consultations to give members the opportunity to discuss the reports of the Panel of Experts (PoEs) assisting those committees. Between March and the end of June, seven such meetings took place, namely those of the 1267/1989/2253 Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee, the 2653 Haiti Sanctions Committee, the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee, the 2140 Yemen Sanctions Committee, the 2745 Central African Republic (CAR) Sanctions Committee, and the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee.
Council presidents have also generally processed requests for exemptions to measures imposed by the Council’s sanctions regimes and new designation requests. At times, the president has briefed the Council on the work of subsidiary bodies. For instance, in March, the US delivered the annual report on the work of the 1540 Committee, whereas the UK and China delivered briefings on the 90-day reports regarding the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in February and May, respectively.
There have been instances, however, in which some members chose not to perform certain duties because of their national positions. For instance, Colombia scheduled a briefing on the work of the 1737 Committee in early June, which required the circulation of the Committee’s report under a no-objection procedure in late May to allow members sufficient time to review the report. China, however, preferred not to do so during its presidency due to its position on this committee, resulting in Colombia circulating the text once it took over as president in June.
The “bare-minimum” approach to the functioning of subsidiary bodies has numerous immediate and long-term effects. Sanctions committees have been unable to receive briefings from UN agencies on relevant issues or from the experts assisting them in between the publication of their reports, and the broader UN membership has not had the benefit of briefings organised by many of these committees on the reports of the PoEs.
Regarding working groups, the effects have been particularly pronounced in the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, one of the Council’s busiest subsidiary bodies. With only half a year to negotiate conclusions on the Secretary-General’s country reports in 2025, the Working Group was only able to adopt conclusions on one report, on the DRC. There is a backlog of seven reports published in 2025 for which it has not adopted conclusions—Burkina Faso, Mali, Yemen, South Sudan, Myanmar, Syria, and Somalia—which would make it difficult to achieve the general aim of 14 conclusions adopted over a two-year period. The delayed adoption of conclusions weakens an important tool for accountability that helps compel conflict parties to end and prevent violations against children.
The Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa has not yet been able to meet to discuss the next annual joint consultative meeting with the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), which is scheduled to take place in New York in October. Given the lack of agreement on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, Greece (which will serve as the Council president in October) and Somalia requested meetings under “any other business” in April and June, respectively, to discuss preparations for the meeting.
More broadly, this situation hinders continuity in the Council’s work. The chairing of a subsidiary body allows a Council member to gain in-depth knowledge on a given file, including through visits to concerned countries. Chairs often use this expertise to inform their work on the file, including during negotiations on relevant Council resolutions. Additionally, whereas presidencies perform only necessary technical tasks related to the functioning of a subsidiary body, a chair is more likely to follow up on issues to ensure smooth operations.
Possible Recourses
Over the years, several interlocutors have made suggestions on how to reform the process of allocations of subsidiary bodies, including SCR; Loraine Sievers, co-author of “The Procedure of the UN Security Council” (4th Edition); and the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency (ACT) Group. Developments in the past two years have brought into sharp focus the need to urgently consider such proposals to facilitate the continued functioning of these bodies.
One option is to only discuss the seats that become available each year, with continuing Council members retaining their chair and co-chair positions, and without opening up the whole allocation for discussion. This would also preclude the option of split terms, which has been a contentious issue in past negotiations. It would mean that those bodies that have chairs from the year before could continue operating, even if agreement on the chairs of remaining bodies is being negotiated. While there are advantages to this, some members may argue that there may be less incentive to resolve any issues concerning the positions available in a given year.
A way to address an impasse over chairs of the remaining subsidiary bodies would be to have in each subsidiary body at least one vice-chair that remains in the Council, who would assume the responsibilities of the departing chair if there was no decision by 1 January. This would also require making the role of the vice-chair, which to date has been largely symbolic, more robust, in order to allow the vice-chair to perform the more substantive chairing duties on short notice. Such an outcome could be beneficial in general, as vice-chairs could help the chairs manage their busy workloads throughout the year. With a number of vice-chair positions held by P5 members, this arrangement would also address the issue of equitable distribution of labour and burden-sharing among the Council’s permanent and elected members.
Another option is to “automate” the process of allocations, including by determining subsidiary body allocations according to alphabetical order, regional rotation, or by a randomised draw. While this would remove the problem of agreeing on subsidiary bodies and would facilitate earlier preparation and smooth functioning of the bodies from the start of the year, some members may not be keen on a system that does not allow for some choice. In this regard, it could mean that members might be asked to chair committees not aligned with their interests and capacities.
Developments over the past two years have also demonstrated the need to better codify what is expected from presidencies serving as interim chairs, as well as to clarify that such arrangements extend beyond January. A presidential note expanding on contingency measures in the event of a prolonged delay in the appointment of the chairs and vice-chairs could be considered to that end.
In conclusion, while the work of subsidiary bodies is often less visible, their activities are vital to the Council’s ability to fulfil its mandate to maintain international peace and security. A continued impasse over the allocation of subsidiary body chairs can promote an impression that these bodies are not significant in the eyes of the Council and deprive the body of well-functioning monitoring, reporting, and accountability tools that are a mainstay of its efforts to maintain international peace and security. Increased flexibility and creativity will be required to get these essential bodies back on track.
[1] For instance, the UK chaired the 1267 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in 1999 and the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee from 2001 to 2003, whereas France chaired the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict from 2005 to 2008.
