Iran: Briefing on the 1737 Sanctions Committee*
Tomorrow morning (12 March), the Security Council is expected to hold an open briefing on the work of the 1737 Sanctions Committee concerning Iran. The US—the Council president in March—intends to convene the meeting under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item. No briefer is expected.
Background
The 1737 Sanctions Committee was established by resolution 1737 of 23 December 2006, which required it to report to the Council every 90 days on its activities. Prior to the agreement on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme, which the Council endorsed through resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, the Committee briefings took place every three months under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
Resolution 2231 suspended all prior sanctions resolutions on Iran, including resolution 1737, rendering defunct the 1737 Committee and its reporting requirement. Subsequently, the Council held biannual briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231, which also took place under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
In September 2025, the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the deal’s “snapback” mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to do so and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. On that date—absent an activation of the snapback—resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.
By contrast, the E3 and like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and therefore that only specific paragraphs of resolution 2231 related to the suspension of sanctions have expired. As such, they maintain that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been re-activated and that the Security Council’s 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored.
Tomorrow’s Meeting
Given their rejection of the validity of the sanctions regime, China and Russia objected to the proposal by the US—as Council president in March—to resume the reporting by the Committee and include its 90-day briefing in this month’s provisional programme of work. The programme was therefore not adopted. Instead, the US circulated an informal “plan of work” that included the meeting. Since the disagreement regarding the 1737 Committee has also prevented the Council from agreeing on this year’s allocation of subsidiary body chairs, as China and Russia do not accept that the Committee has been reactivated, the US in its capacity as Council president assumed the functions of Committee Chair this month and intended to deliver the briefing on the Committee’s report, which must be agreed by consensus.
To this end, the US circulated a draft report to Committee members and placed it under a “no objection procedure” (NOP) until Monday (9 March). It seems that the draft report covered the entire six-month period from 27 September 2025—when most Council members argue that the Committee was re-established—until yesterday (10 March), since no report was presented on the Committee’s first 90-day period that ended in December 2025. The draft report apparently stated that the Committee did not hold meetings during the reporting period but did receive nine asset freeze exemption requests, which it considered and did not object to. In each of those cases, it seems that China and Russia sent communications reiterating their position that they do not recognise the 1737 Committee and do not consider themselves bound by the sanctions regime.
For this same reason, China and Russia also objected to the draft report. There is consequently no Committee report on which to brief, but the US still decided to proceed with tomorrow’s meeting. Council members are expected to focus on the Iranian nuclear issue as well as the broader crisis in the Middle East triggered by the joint Israeli-US strikes on Iran that began on 28 February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against Israel and regional countries hosting US military bases and assets.
The Council previously met to discuss the escalation in a 28 February emergency briefing. Today (11 March), the Council adopted resolution 2817, presented by Bahrain on behalf of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)—which comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—as well as Jordan. The resolution condemns Iran’s strikes against these countries; determines that these acts constitute a breach of international law and a serious threat to international peace and security; deplores that civilian objects have been targeted and that the attacks resulted in civilian casualties; and demands that Iran immediately halt the attacks against these countries and fully comply with its obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL). The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). It was co-sponsored by 135 UN member states. An alternative draft resolution proposed by Russia failed to be adopted because it did not garner the nine favourable votes required for adoption. It received four votes in favour (China, Russia, Pakistan, and Somalia), two votes against (Latvia and the US), and nine abstentions.
At tomorrow’s meeting, the US may reiterate its messaging from the 28 February briefing, describing the Iranian nuclear programme—as well as the country’s ballistic missile programme and support for regional militant groups—as a threat to international peace and stability. The US may maintain that its ongoing joint military operation with Israel is a legitimate response to this threat, aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear programme, dismantling its missile capabilities, and disrupting its support for proxy forces. It may call on the international community to support these efforts and welcome the adoption of resolution 2817 in this regard. The US may also emphasise its position that the UN sanctions regime on Iran is in effect and legally binding on all member states following the triggering of the snapback mechanism.
European Council members are also likely to echo their previous messaging concerning the Iranian nuclear programme. They may call on Iran to assure the international community of the programme’s exclusively peaceful nature, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been unable to verify, and express concern about Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium, for which they argue there is no civilian justification. Like the US, these members are expected to reiterate that the 1737 sanctions regime is operational and legally binding. Regarding the regional crisis, these members are also likely to welcome the adoption of resolution 2817 while calling for restraint, de-escalation, and a return to diplomacy. Additionally, they may express alarm at the apparent targeting of civilian objects and call for all parties to uphold their obligations under international law, including IHL.
Other members, such as China and Russia, are likely to repeat their condemnation of the US-Israeli military operation as an unprovoked escalation and a violation of international law. They may blame the US for not exhausting diplomatic solutions to the Iranian nuclear issue and for undertaking military operations while the countries were still engaged in bilateral talks to address it. While also calling for de-escalation, these members may express support for Iran’s right to self-defence and reiterate their criticism of resolution 2817 as unbalanced. They may also regret the fact that the Russian-proposed draft resolution on the Middle East crisis was not adopted. Regarding the snapback, China and Russia are likely to maintain that its invocation was null and void, and they may therefore object to holding tomorrow’s meeting under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item. In this regard, they could raise a point of order prior to the meeting—as they did during the Council’s most recent biannual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 in December 2025—or they could call for a procedural vote on the agenda.
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Post-script: On 12 March, the Security Council held an open briefing on the work of the 1737 Sanctions Committee under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item. Prior to the meeting, Russia raised a point of order reiterating its position that “Non-Proliferation” had been removed from the Council’s agenda. The Russian representative said that “we cannot agree to today’s agenda proposed by the US presidency” and “demand that the issue of holding the meeting be put to a procedural vote”. The US subsequently put the provisional agenda to a vote. The agenda was adopted with 11 votes in favour, two against (China and Russia), and two abstentions (Pakistan and Somalia).
