The Middle East, including the Palestinian Question
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council will hold its quarterly open debate on “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question” (MEPQ). The expected briefers are Deputy Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator at the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO) Ramiz Alakbarov and Board of Peace (BoP) High Representative to Gaza Nickolay Mladenov.
Key Recent Developments
July’s meeting will take place eight months after the adoption of resolution 2803 of 17 November 2025, which endorsed the US-brokered “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”. The peace framework established the current ceasefire in Gaza, secured the release of all hostages, and endorsed the BoP—chaired by US President Donald Trump—as a “transitional governance administration” in the enclave. It also authorised the deployment of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) to monitor the ceasefire and oversee other commitments under the Comprehensive Plan, including Hamas’ disarmament and the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).
On 15 May, the BoP submitted its first biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2803, covering the period from 17 November 2025 to 14 May 2026. The report presented the Gaza ceasefire, the return of all hostages, and increased humanitarian assistance as significant achievements, while asserting that Hamas’ refusal to decommission its weapons and “permit a genuine civilian transition in Gaza” was the principal obstacle to fully implementing the Comprehensive Plan. Hamas has reportedly rejected disarmament proposals because it considers Israel in breach of its own ceasefire obligations by continuing hostilities in Gaza and maintaining restrictions on humanitarian aid.
A central element of the BoP report—and of Mladenov’s 21 May briefing to the Council—was a 15-point roadmap that Mladenov and the guarantor states (Egypt, Qatar, Türkiye, and the US) have presented to the parties. It recognises the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG)—the local governing body comprising Palestinian technocrats established in January under BOP oversight—as the sole legitimate transitional authority and requires Hamas to cease all military, policing, and administrative activity under the principle of “one authority, one law and one weapon”. The roadmap’s core provision is the phased, internationally verified decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons, matched by a staged withdrawal of the IDF to Gaza’s perimeter and reconstruction in certified decommissioned areas. According to the report, talks on the roadmap had not been finalised by the end of the reporting period, and the NCAG has been unable to enter Gaza, although it has prepared the transition’s administrative architecture and vetted civilian police candidates, which Egypt is expected to train.
Regarding the ISF, the report notes personnel pledges from Albania, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Morocco; a site survey completed in late April; and phased deployment “anticipated” but conditioned on progress in decommission Hamas’ weapons. At the time of writing, media reports indicated that Greece had also agreed to participate, and that a small number of Moroccan planning officers had arrived in Israel to join ISF planning—a tentative operational step for a force whose deployment has otherwise stalled. The report estimates first-year humanitarian needs in Gaza at roughly $3.1 billion and cites $17 billion in reconstruction pledges, against recovery needs that the UN, EU, and World Bank have jointly assessed at $71.4 billion.
Despite the ceasefire, hostilities in Gaza have continued and the humanitarian situation remains dire. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), citing local health authorities, more than 1,000 Palestinians had been killed since the ceasefire was announced on 10 October 2025. Nearly all of Gaza’s 2.1 million people remain displaced and are being compressed into increasingly limited spaces by repeated expansions of the territory held by Israel: in late April, the IDF reportedly issued maps showing that they controlled 64 percent of the territory, having advanced past the initial “yellow line” demarcating the approximately 50 percent of Gaza’s territory that Israel was allowed to hold during the first phase of the ceasefire. On 28 May, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to seize control of 70 percent of the enclave.
Humanitarian operations have been further strained by fuel shortages, border closures, and persistent restrictions on the entry of certain goods, including items considered “dual use”. In May, the Israeli High Court upheld new registration requirements that Israeli authorities had introduced in 2025 for international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). Several dozen aid groups, including Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Oxfam, had refused to comply with the new measures—which include a requirement to submit complete staff lists to Israeli authorities—contending that they violate humanitarian principles. Israel subsequently revoked their licences, citing security concerns. The Court, which had previously issued a temporary injunction suspending enforcement of the new measures, gave the de-licenced organisations 30 days to comply with the new screening protocols or cease operations.
On 18 June, at the request of the Council’s ten elected members, the Council held a briefing on the humanitarian situation in Gaza (S/PV.10177). At that meeting, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher acknowledged certain improvements in the humanitarian situation following the ceasefire but emphasised that needs remain immense and that persistent challenges continue to constrain the response, warning that Gaza is being held together by “humanitarian workarounds”. He also noted that the UN’s OPT Flash Appeal was only 24 percent funded.
Meanwhile, the situation in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, continues to deteriorate. In past months, the territory has seen increasing settler violence and settlement expansion, deteriorating economic conditions, and the imposition of administrative measures deepening Israeli control over the territory. On 4 June, at Bahrain’s request, Council members convened for closed consultations to discuss these developments. In that session, it seems that nearly all Council members expressed concern that Israel’s actions in the West Bank—which observers have described as a policy of “de facto annexation”—were jeopardising the viability of the two-state solution. The US, however, apparently blocked draft press elements affirming the Council’s opposition to annexation, despite reiterating its own opposition in this regard. On 29 June, the Council held its quarterly meeting (S/PV.10186) on the implementation of resolution 2334 of 23 December 2016, which demanded that Israel cease all settlement activity in the OPT and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians.
The developments in the OPT have unfolded against a shifting regional backdrop. On 17 June, the US and Iran signed an interim agreement to end the war that began with joint US-Israeli strikes in February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation against the region. Among other provisions, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) provided for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, a waiver of US sanctions on Iranian oil, and a 60-day negotiating period on a final agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, as well as a cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, where Israel has occupied territory and conducted large-scale military operations targeting Hezbollah. On 21 June in Switzerland, Iran and the US held the first round of negotiations on the final agreement anticipated by the MoU. The countries subsequently exchanged limited strikes, however, and the status of negotiations remained unclear at the time of writing.
Key Issues and Options
An underlying concern for Security Council members and the broader international community is that the regional crisis in the Middle East—now in a fragile de-escalation phase—will continue to draw attention away from the Palestinian question, even as developments in Gaza and the West Bank erode the prospects for a two-state solution.
With regard to Gaza, a central issue is how to translate the strained ceasefire into tangible progress toward the second phase of the Comprehensive Plan, which remains stalled. Eight months after the adoption of resolution 2803, the interlocking steps that it envisaged—the decommissioning of Hamas’ weapons, the deployment of the ISF, a phased IDF withdrawal, and the eventual transfer of authority to a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA)—have yet to advance. Questions also persist over the benchmarks for the transition and the process by which the PA will assume its governing responsibilities.
With the BoP’s next biannual report not due until November, Council members could request more regular briefings from the BoP, the ISF, or other actors involved in implementation. They could also respond to the requests that the BoP directed to the Council in its May report, including calling on member states to accelerate the disbursement of pledged funds to the transitional structures. Members could additionally consider a visiting mission to the OPT to conduct more assertive oversight of the implementation of resolution 2803 and its other decisions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including resolution 2334.
A related issue is the persistent humanitarian crisis in Gaza and the constrained operating environment for relief efforts amid continued insecurity and access restrictions. With the UN’s OPT Flash Appeal only a quarter funded, members could press for unimpeded humanitarian access and the removal of obstacles to the work of UN agencies and INGOs, while encouraging contributions to recovery and reconstruction.
The deterioration in the occupied West Bank is another pressing issue. For many members, settlement expansion, settler violence, and Israeli administrative measures reinforce the view that an approach focused narrowly on Gaza will be insufficient unless it is tied to a credible political horizon that preserves the unity of the OPT and the viability of the two-state solution. Council members could use the open debate to reiterate opposition to unilateral measures, call for compliance with international law, and stress that transitional arrangements for Gaza should not deepen the fragmentation of Palestinian governance or territory. They could also encourage closer alignment between the implementation of resolution 2803 and other multilateral frameworks, including the New York Declaration that the General Assembly endorsed in September 2025.
Council Dynamics
The adoption of resolution 2803 marked a rare moment of convergence in the Council, driven by broad regional backing for the US-brokered Comprehensive Plan and the priority that many members placed on consolidating the Gaza ceasefire. Eight months on, that convergence has given way to more familiar divisions over the pace and direction of implementation. Members continue to support preserving the ceasefire, sustaining humanitarian access, and advancing the transitional framework, but the US diverges from the rest of the Council on where responsibility for the stalemate lies and on how assertively the Council should engage to preserve the territorial integrity of the OPT and the long-term prospects for a two-state solution.
The US, as penholder for resolution 2803 and chair of the BoP, has emphasised Hamas’ refusal to disarm as the principal obstacle to progress and has been protective of the framework that it brokered. As Israel’s closest ally on the Council, it has also continued to oppose products that it perceives as critical of the country, including by blocking the proposed draft press elements on the West Bank during the 4 June consultations.
Most other members stress that implementation of the Comprehensive Plan cannot rest on Palestinian obligations alone, pointing to Israel’s continued military expansion and humanitarian restrictions. They also continue to express grave concern about accelerating settlement expansion in the West Bank, emphasising Palestinian self-determination, the centrality of the PA, and the unity of the OPT. At July’s open debate, China and Russia in particular—the two members that abstained on resolution 2803—may maintain their criticism of what they regard as selective or imbalanced Council engagement through the transitional structures that the resolution endorsed.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 17 November 2025S/RES/2803 | This resolution endorsed the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict”, welcoming the establishment of a Board of Peace (BoP) and authorising the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza. The resolution received 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). |
| 23 December 2016S/RES/2334 | This resolution condemned Israeli settlements and called for immediate steps to prevent violence against civilians, including acts of terror. It was adopted with 14 votes in favour and a US abstention. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 15 May 2026S/2026/418 | This was a letter from the Permanent Representative of the US addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the first biannual report of the Board of Peace (BoP), submitted pursuant to resolution 2803 of 17 November 2025. |
