West Africa and the Sahel
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council will hold an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, on West Africa and the Sahel. The Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), Leonardo Santos Simão, is expected to brief.
Key Recent Developments
On 19 February, the Council agreed to issue a letter responding to the Secretary-General’s 20 January letter recommending the extension of UNOWAS’ mandate. In its letter, the Council extended UNOWAS’ mandate until 31 January 2029 and expressed its intention to convene two regular UNOWAS briefings annually, while noting that additional briefings could be requested as needed. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit two annual reports on UNOWAS’ activities. The Council welcomed the Secretary-General’s decision to conduct an independent strategic review of UNOWAS’ mandate and activities and requested that the review be finalised and submitted by 30 September.
On 25 April, fighters from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda-affiliated group, and Tuareg separatists belonging to the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) launched coordinated attacks across several locations in Mali, including Bamako, Kati, Gao, Mopti, and Sévaré. The attacks marked one of the most significant escalations in Mali’s security crisis in recent years, highlighting the growing operational capabilities of armed groups in the country. Simultaneously, JNIM reportedly carried out a series of attacks in southern Mali that killed several senior military officials, including Defence Minister General Sadio Camara, who was killed in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (IED) attack targeting his residence in Kati, near Bamako.
Following the attacks, media reports citing the Africa Corps—the successor to the Wagner Group, which reportedly operates under the direct oversight of the Russian Ministry of Defence—indicated that its forces had withdrawn from the northern town of Kidal pursuant to an agreement with the FLA that guaranteed their safe passage from the area. The FLA subsequently claimed control of Kidal and called for the complete withdrawal of Africa Corps personnel from Mali. Reports suggest that the remaining Africa Corps forces have largely consolidated around Bamako following their withdrawal from northern Mali. The FLA has also reportedly expanded its presence in and around Gao.
In the weeks that followed, JNIM reportedly expanded its operations across central and northern Mali, carrying out attacks against military installations, imposing blockades on key transport routes, including those leading to Bamako, and increasing pressure on government-controlled areas. On 6 May, the group launched a series of attacks, including an arson attack on trucks carrying food supplies to the capital. The campaign appeared designed to further isolate Bamako and disrupt supply chains. The attacks were reminiscent of JNIM’s fuel blockade of Bamako, which has reportedly been in place since September 2025 and has disrupted access to fuel and other essential goods.
Meanwhile, fighters affiliated with Islamic State in the Sahel Province (ISSP) reportedly entered Mali’s northeastern town of Ménaka in the aftermath of the 25 April attacks before subsequently withdrawing, after which Malian forces reasserted control over the area.
In response to the deteriorating security situation, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger reportedly conducted coordinated air strikes against suspected terrorist positions in Mali. These countries formed the collective defence arrangement, Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in 2023, and formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in January 2025.
On 15 May, Security Council members issued a press statement condemning the terrorist attacks in several locations across Mali on 25 April and in the days that followed, including 6 May. They underlined the need to hold perpetrators, organisers, financiers, and sponsors of these acts of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice.
According to media reports, on 18 June, gunmen attacked Niamey’s international airport, which was later claimed by JNIM. Nigerien authorities said that 11 members of the armed forces and two civilians were killed in the attack, while 22 of the assailants were killed by security forces. The airport reportedly serves as a military base and hosts facilities associated with the AES. The attack followed a similar assault on the airport in January, which was carried out by ISSP.
Nigeria has intensified military operations against Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) in the country’s northeast amid persistent insecurity in the Lake Chad Basin region. These have included a series of air and ground operations targeting suspected militant strongholds. On 16 May, US Africa Command (AFRICOM), in coordination with the Nigerian forces, conducted an operation in northeastern Nigeria that killed multiple Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) leaders, including Abu-Bilal al-Minuki, who served as the second-in-command of ISIL globally. On 18 May, AFRICOM and Nigerian forces conducted additional strikes targeting ISIL militants in the country’s northeastern region.
Key Issues and Options
The expanding and evolving threat posed by terrorist groups across West Africa and the Sahel remains a key concern for Council members, as the region continues to experience an increase in the frequency, scale, and sophistication of terrorist attacks. The escalation of attacks by terrorist and armed groups, coupled with their increasing use of advanced weaponry, ability to conduct coordinated attacks against strategic military and civilian targets, and capacity to contest and hold territory, underscores the growing operational capabilities of these groups and the limitations of existing regional security arrangements.
The latest security developments in Mali and their implications for the wider sub-region are likely to remain an issue of concern for Council members. These events have heightened concerns about the risk of cross-border spillover, the expansion of terrorist networks, and the further deterioration of security across West Africa and the Sahel.
Members could consider convening closed consultations or a meeting under “any other business” to respond promptly and effectively to developments. Members might find value in organising informal briefings with expert analysts to examine emerging trends in the region. They could also adopt a presidential statement to reaffirm their commitment to addressing the evolving challenges in the region, underscoring the importance of a coordinated regional and international response.
Another key issue for the Council is how to support effective regional counter-terrorism efforts in the face of an increasingly complex security landscape and constrained financial and operational resources. Regional mechanisms continue to face significant challenges, including political divisions, fragmented security architectures, limited intelligence-sharing, and persistent funding constraints, all of which have complicated coordinated responses to the growing terrorist threat.
One option for Council members would be to encourage greater dialogue and practical cooperation among regional and subregional actors, including AES, ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and the UN, with a view to strengthening intelligence-sharing, border security, and coordinated counter-terrorism efforts. Members may wish to build on the informal interactive dialogue held on 14 July 2025 on enhancing regional counter-terrorism cooperation in West Africa and the Sahel by convening an open debate to assess evolving regional security dynamics, identify gaps in existing counter-terrorism mechanisms, and explore ways to strengthen cooperation among regional organisations and international partners.
An underlying key issue is the structural conflict drivers in the Sahel, such as poor governance, underdevelopment, severe humanitarian conditions, and climate change, which remain key challenges in promoting regional security and sustainable economic development. One option for Council members would be to strengthen collaboration with the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) to support locally-led initiatives that promote good governance and enhance regional and cross-border cooperation, including within the framework of the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel (UNISS).
Council Dynamics
There is broad concern among Council members about the deteriorating security and humanitarian situation in West Africa and the Sahel, particularly the expanding threat posed by terrorist groups and the growing risk of regional expansion. Council members also continue to support the preventive diplomacy and good offices role of UNOWAS and recognise the importance of strengthening cooperation with regional organisations. Several members have underscored the need for the Council to maintain sustained attention on the region, including by exploring ways to support regional efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism while addressing the underlying drivers of insecurity.
During negotiations on the renewal of UNOWAS’ mandate earlier this year, some members, including France, advocated increasing the frequency of Council briefings on UNOWAS to three per year to enable closer monitoring of developments in the region, while others, including Russia, favoured maintaining the existing reporting cycle of two briefings annually.
Council members continue to hold differing views on the broader security context in the Sahel, their respective approaches to engaging with the region, and the role of external security partners. The US and European members have expressed concern over Russia’s growing influence and its engagement with military juntas. The withdrawal of Western military assistance has also created a security vacuum in the region, inducing several Sahelian countries to pursue alternative partnerships, most notably with Russia.
Russia, in contrast, has maintained that the current security challenges are rooted in Western interference in the region and has called for collective international support for the AES countries. Moscow has also expanded its footprint in the region through bilateral defence agreements and the deployment of the Africa Corps. However, Russian forces deployed in the region have increasingly come under attack, demonstrating the precariousness of the operating environment. Recent developments in Mali, particularly following the 25 April attacks, have also raised broader questions about the effectiveness of relying predominantly on external security partners to address the region’s evolving terrorist threat.
Liberia and Denmark are the co-penholders on UNOWAS.
| Security Council Letters | |
| 19 February 2026S/2026/83 | The letter extended UNOWAS’ mandate until 31 January 2029 and expressed the Council’s intention to convene two regular UNOWAS briefings annually, while noting that additional briefings could be requested as needed. |
| Security Council Press Statements | |
| 15 May 2026SC/16360 | The press statement condemned the terrorist attacks in several locations across Mali on 25 April and in the days that followed, including 6 May. |
