The Red Sea
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to consider renewing the monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, originally mandated by Security Council resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. Resolution 2812 of 14 January most recently extended the reporting obligation until 15 July.
The Council adopted resolution 2722—co-authored by Japan and the US—in response to Houthi attacks on shipping. The resolution demanded that the Houthis immediately cease all attacks on merchant and commercial vessels and took note of the right of member states, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels from attacks, including those that undermine navigational rights and freedoms. It also requested the Secretary-General to submit written monthly reports to the Council “on any further Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea to inform the Council’s future consultations”. It was adopted with 11 votes in favour and four abstentions (Algeria, China, Mozambique, and Russia). The resolution has been renewed four times, in six-month intervals, with the last three renewals (2025-2026) having been co-authored by Greece and the US.
Background and Key Recent Developments
The Houthis—an Iran-backed Yemeni rebel group also known as Ansar Allah—took control over northern Yemen and the capital Sana’a in 2014, triggering a civil war against the internationally recognised Yemeni government. The war has continued to this day.
In response to the Israel-Hamas war that broke out on 7 October 2023, and in what they characterised as support for Palestinians in Gaza, the Houthis started to use their geographic position and significant drone and ballistic missile arsenal to project military power into the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and against Israel. Over the course of two years, the group launched multiple attacks targeting Israel and shipping in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, including on commercial ships that were both affiliated and not affiliated with Israel. In response, Israel, the UK, and the US bombed several targets located in Houthi territory. The group temporarily paused its attacks following the October 2025 US-brokered Gaza ceasefire agreement.
The Houthis resumed attacks on Israel following the start of the Israel-US war with Iran, which began on 28 February. On 8 June, the group also threatened to resume targeting Israeli-linked ships in the Red Sea. The next day (9 June), the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, warned that continued escalation in the region would trigger a coordinated response by the Axis of Resistance—Iran-backed armed groups which include Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and various Iraqi militias—aimed at establishing a new “security belt” extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital shipping waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Like the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on vessels transiting through Bab el-Mandeb could have wide-scale implications for shipping and the global economy.
Following announcement of the 14 June memorandum of understanding consolidating the ceasefire between Iran and the US, there have been no further Houthi attacks against Israel, and the group has not resumed attacks on maritime navigation.
The latest monthly report from the Secretary-General, dated 9 June, said that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) indicated that no new incidents occurred during the reporting period of 9 May to 9 June. The 10 October 2025 report from the Secretary-General is the most recent one containing information regarding confirmed Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels. It reported on the 31 August 2025 attack on the Liberia-flagged Scarlet Ray and the 29 September 2025 attack on the Netherlands-flagged Minervagracht vessels. It further said that responsibility for both attacks was confirmed by statements from the Houthis.
Key Issues and Options
The central issue facing the Council is whether to renew the monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, against a backdrop of changed but still uncertain circumstances. Although no new incidents have been reported in 2026, continued Houthi threats to resume targeting Israeli-linked shipping and the IRGC’s warnings underscore that the conditions that gave rise to the resolution have not been resolved. The situation therefore remains fluid, and the reporting mechanism continues to serve an important monitoring function.
In this regard, a likely option for the Council is to extend the reporting requirement for a further six months.
Another option is for Council members to use the renewal as an opportunity to address the broader question of long-term sustainable security in the Red Sea. Council members could consider including language reiterating the call for diplomatic efforts towards an inclusive political process in Yemen under UN auspices, while also emphasising that any solution must also involve regional security guarantees, including the safety and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. However, given divisions that have characterised Council votes on resolution 2722 and all its renewals, reaching agreement on any additional language beyond a straightforward renewal could prove difficult.
Council Dynamics
There is no consensus among Council members on how to address the issue of maritime security in the Red Sea. Members who abstained on resolution 2722 believed at the time that the text insufficiently reflected the link between the Red Sea crisis and the war in Gaza. Despite a ceasefire having been announced in Gaza, the Houthis continue to frame their threats and strikes as a reaction to Israeli attacks against Iran and any of its proxies.
Furthermore, China and Russia have expressed reservations about maintaining the issue prominently on the Council’s agenda, particularly where it intersects with military action undertaken by some member states, which they argue risks exacerbating tensions and undermining the political track. Following the adoption of resolution 2722, Russia argued that the language used on states’ rights to defend their vessels lacked a clear basis in international law. In contrast, the UK and the US argued that the rights of states to defend their vessels are in accordance with states’ inherent right to self-defence in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In a statement before the adoption of the resolution’s most recent renewal (resolution 2812), Russia said that it would not block the resolution “owing solely to the requests of regional stakeholders”.
Similarly, the Council’s five permanent members remain divided on how to approach the Houthis. France, the UK, and the US have argued that the Council needs to increase pressure on the group—which they believe is obstructing a political process and fostering instability in Yemen—including by strengthening the Yemen sanctions regime. The US has adopted a particularly hawkish position on the Houthis, unilaterally sanctioning the group and rebuking Iran’s support for it. Conversely, China and Russia have argued that expanding the Yemen sanctions regime would escalate tensions and undermine prospects for a negotiated settlement.
The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Greece and the US are the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 14 January 2026S/RES/2812 | This resolution extends the Secretary-General’s monthly reporting requirement on Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea until 15 July 2026. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 14 January 2026S/PV.10089 | This was the meeting record and explanation of votes for the adoption of resolution 2812 on Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. |
