In Hindsight: Impact of a Delay in Subsidiary Body Chairs Appointments
The chairs of the Security Council’s subsidiary bodies, which include sanctions committees and working groups, are responsible for several important aspects of the work of these bodies, including chairing meetings, briefing the Council on the work of the relevant subsidiary body, and managing subsidiary body casework, such as listing and delisting requests. At the time of writing, Council members are yet to reach agreement on selecting the chairs of the subsidiary bodies for 2025, which has had an impact on both their work and the Council as a whole. This In Hindsight provides an overview of the process for appointing chairs of subsidiary bodies, discusses how the Council has attempted to manage the current impasse, and describes some of the adverse consequences arising from the delay.
The Appointment Process
The Council’s subsidiary bodies have generally been chaired by elected members, with a few exceptions. For many years, the process of selecting subsidiary body chairs was shrouded in secrecy, with the permanent members (P5) deciding how to allocate these positions, generally with minimal consultation. The process was also often concluded shortly before elected members were to begin their term, leaving little time for a handover. By 2015, elected members had become increasingly frustrated with not having any input in this process and pushed for a change in the system, arguing that they should have a say in a decision that affects them directly, as well as more time to prepare before joining the Council.
This led to a change in the process for appointing the chairs, which was first formalised in a 2016 presidential note concerning transitional arrangements for newly elected members (S/2016/619) and eventually incorporated into the 2017 version of Note 507 on working methods. In accordance with this process, members “should make every effort” to provisionally agree on appointing the chairs by 1 October each year and, with that deadline in mind, should start an informal consultation process “as soon as possible” after the Security Council elections. The newly elected members are to be consulted as part of the process, which should be undertaken in a “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way” and chaired by two members of the Council “working in full cooperation”. Although not explicitly stated in the Note, the understanding was that these two members would be the Chair of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG) and the P5 coordinator, a position that rotates quarterly.
In the last few years, elected members have had a greater say in the process. Generally, the incoming five elected members (I5) have first agreed on the list of chairs for available subsidiary bodies before having the IWG chair present the list to the P5 coordinator. While the I5 have had more choice in the matter since 2016, the process still requires a final stamp of approval from the permanent members.
Although the current process for appointing chairs contemplates that members will provisionally agree by 1 October, in practice, this deadline has not yet been met. In recent years, there have been a couple of occasions when the chairs were agreed to in early and mid-October, as happened following the elections in 2019 and 2022. However, prolonged negotiations over the allocation of chairs in 2021 and 2023 led to final decisions in early January and late January of the following years. The list of chairs is agreed as a package deal, which means that it is not finalised until members have agreed on who will chair each body. Once there is agreement, the list of chairs and vice-chairs for each year is published in a Note by the President, which requires consensus among Council members before it can be issued.
There are a number of reasons why this process has been so protracted in some years. While in the past, elected members saw the chairing of subsidiary bodies as largely a technical task, in recent years, many recognise that chairing a subsidiary body that aligns with their priorities could create opportunities for showcasing those aims and highlighting the work they are doing to pursue them. For example, India, as chair of the counter-terrorism committee in 2022, held a meeting of the committee in Delhi, which led to the adoption of the Delhi Declaration on countering the use of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes.
Some subsidiary bodies have been fought over because the priorities of elected members have overlapped. When this happens, the member that steps aside tends to want another body that might fit their objectives, which can lead to reopening negotiations on positions where there had been agreement. Occasionally, a member who has not got what it wants has refused to chair any subsidiary bodies, resulting in some members taking on an unusual number that year. On the opposite end of this spectrum, some subsidiary bodies have been considered undesirable, either because they involve a significant amount of work or because they can be politically sensitive. In such cases, it can be difficult to find a member willing to take them on.
Permanent members have also, at times, opposed certain elected members taking on particular roles, often without explanation. Moreover, the solutions proposed by members to try and resolve their differences have sometimes been contentious. In 2023, for example, the process was delayed because at least one permanent member was opposed to a footnote specifying that then-incoming member Japan would chair the IWG in 2024 following the departure of Albania, which held the chair in 2022 and 2023. Footnotes in the presidential note announcing subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs, which are a new development, were used in 2021 and 2022 to indicate how some positions would be filled in the future, and were reluctantly agreed to by the permanent members. In 2023, agreement was only reached when the footnote was removed. Subsequently, the E10 and the I5 reiterated their unanimous support for Japan assuming this position in 2024 in a letter to the President of the Council.
2025: The Story So Far
Thus far in 2025, Council members have not been able to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs, making it the longest period with no subsidiary body chairs and vice-chairs since this decision was first recorded in a presidential note in 1979. The negotiations have been particularly difficult and protracted, with significant differences emerging between and within different groupings in the Council at various times, including among the incoming members for 2025, within the current E10, and between the current E10 and the P5.
Although negotiations among the incoming members began immediately following their election to the Council in June 2024, they apparently continued for several months before agreement was reached. A proposed allocation of chairs was sent to the elected members on behalf of the I5 in early October 2024. It seems there was disagreement over the I5 proposal and, before that disagreement was resolved, it was forwarded to the permanent members. Apparently several permanent members also disagreed with some of the suggested allocations in the I5 proposal, further complicating the negotiations.
Negotiations have continued over the ensuing months with a number of proposals discussed by members. The feedback from the P5 has led to the need to reshuffle some of the allocations, which has had a cascading effect, requiring a number of members to be willing to relinquish their preferred bodies. Another issue has been the competition over several bodies, including the IWG and the Informal Working Group on General Sanctions.
It appears that the current E10 were able to achieve consensus in mid-April and subsequently forwarded a revised proposal to the P5. Members discussed this proposal under “any other business” on 17 April. During the discussion, one permanent member apparently expressed opposition to certain elements of the proposed allocation. At the time of writing, members were still working to reach consensus on this issue and resolve the impasse.
A table setting out the allocation of subsidiary body chairs as at 31 December 2024 can be found at the end of this In Hindsight.
How has the Impasse Impacted the Council and its Subsidiary Bodies?
After negotiations on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs continued into January in 2023, Council members adopted a presidential note (S/2023/615) in August 2023 outlining a contingency measure intended to ensure the continuous functioning of its subsidiary bodies: if members are unable to agree on appointing chairs by 1 January, then the responsibilities of all Chairs will devolve to the President of the Council during January.
This contingency measure, which was included in the 2024 version of Note 507 on working methods, was implemented for the first time this year when Algeria, the President of the Council in January, carried out some of the duties of the subsidiary body chairs in its capacity as president, such as signing formal letters. Although the August 2023 presidential note did not stipulate what should happen if members were unable to agree by the end of January, there appears to have been informal agreement that the Council presidents during the ensuing months would also fulfil this role. As a result, the presidencies of China, Denmark, and France have continued to perform certain tasks of subsidiary body chairs. While in this capacity, they cannot convene formal or informal meetings, they are able to hold informal consultations.
These members have, however, only carried out select duties of the subsidiary body chairs during their presidencies, due partly to the amount of work that this would involve in addition to their responsibilities as president. Instead, there appears to be an understanding that presidents of the Council will primarily handle urgent responsibilities of subsidiary body chairs during their presidencies until the chairs have been appointed, unless another member objects. On 7 March, for example, Denmark convened informal consultations of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee so that members could discuss a report of the Ombudsperson regarding a delisting request. Similarly, the presidents of the Council have also generally processed requests for exemptions to the measures imposed by the Council’s sanctions regimes, which are handled by the sanctions committees. At times, the president has briefed the Council on the work of subsidiary bodies. In February, for example, China delivered the briefing on the 90-day report regarding the work of the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee in closed consultations, which is ordinarily provided by the chair of that committee. In addition, Council presidents have sometimes facilitated the publication of reports of experts assisting the sanctions committees, as was the case in February, when China handled the administrative steps that enabled the release of the latest report of the Monitoring Team assisting the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, including by coordinating a written no objection procedure regarding the publication of the report. This was also the case in April when France chaired informal consultations of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee to give members the opportunity to discuss a report of the panel of experts assisting that committee, a discussion that is necessary before the report can be published.
Although contingency measures such as these have prevented the work of the Council’s subsidiary bodies from grinding to a halt, they have not been implemented consistently. There are, for example, a number of reports of experts assisting sanctions committees that have not been published because a member was not comfortable with a president fulfilling the role of the chair, including on the Central African Republic and Haiti files. Moreover, mandated briefings to the Council regarding the work of subsidiary bodies have not always been delivered, as happened in March, when a proposed briefing by Denmark on the activities of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee did not go ahead after another elected member expressed reservations.
There is also a raft of other subsidiary body work ordinarily facilitated by the chairs of these bodies that is not taking place. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has been unable to formally consider reports from the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in four country situations—Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and Myanmar—which has prevented it from negotiating its conclusions based on these reports. The Counter-Terrorism Committee, which was already delayed in completing its 2024 programme of work, has not been able to make headway on resolving its backlog. Sanctions committees have also been unable to receive briefings from UN agencies on relevant issues, or from the experts assisting them in between the publication of their reports, and the broader UN membership has not had the benefit of briefings organised by these committees on the reports of the panel of experts.
The flow-on effects of delays and inconsistencies in the work of the Council’s subsidiary bodies are significant for both the Council and member states more broadly. To take one example, reports of experts assisting sanctions committees are a crucial source of information for member states, many of which rely on these reports and use them to inform their decision-making. Delaying publication deprives these states of this information and can mean that the reports are not entirely up to date, which could limit their utility. Moreover, these delays have the potential to affect mandate renewals, particularly where the Council would ordinarily refer to these reports in the relevant resolution.
The delays also have implications for the Council’s working methods and its overall workload. Even if the allocation of chairs is agreed in the coming weeks, Council members will face a significant backlog and may not have sufficient time to give due attention to the work required before the end of the year, particularly given UN budgetary constraints that have limited the number of meetings that the Council and its subsidiary bodies can hold each week. In addition, members have sometimes been forced to grapple with procedural irregularities that are time-consuming to manage, which has added a further layer of complication to the Council’s work.
It should be noted that not all subsidiary bodies have been affected by the impasse. In this regard, the Military Staff Committee (MSC)—which advises and assists the Security Council on all military requirements for maintaining international peace and security and is made up of only the permanent members—has not been affected, with its chair rotating monthly. In addition, the informal expert groups on the protection of civilians; women, peace and security; and climate, peace and security have been able to operate without interruption in 2025. This is because they are not included in this process of allocating subsidiary body chairs as they are not formal subsidiary bodies.
Reflections
Overall, the failure to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs has significantly hampered the Council’s work and led to inconsistencies that have arguably damaged its credibility. It has also not been helpful for E10 unity for elected members to be competing among each other for these positions for such a prolonged period of time. It is therefore important for members to seriously reflect on how a similar situation can be avoided in the future.
One option is to cease treating the allocation of subsidiary bodies as a package deal in circumstances where the Council has been unable to reach agreement by January in a given year. This could allow those bodies which are not contentious to continue their work. Among the subsidiary bodies in this category would be those with chairs from the year before. While this might lead to fewer options for members that are willing to compromise and could create the impression that the Council is paying more attention to some files than others, this seems preferable to the current situation.
Members could also consider whether they could allocate the chairs by adopting a resolution rather than issuing a presidential note. It is unclear if such a resolution would be considered procedural and therefore not subject to a veto by the permanent members. However, members are likely to be wary of institutionalising this option as the norm and are aware that it could create tensions between the E10 and I5 members. Members may therefore prefer to keep it in reserve when there are long delays in appointing the chairs.
Providing members with a clear understanding of the role of the chair of each available subsidiary body shortly after the June elections through briefings by the Secretariat could help facilitate a smoother appointment process. For smaller delegations, chairing sanctions committees may appear daunting, and exposure to the work of the committees could help dispel their doubts. Note 507 includes acknowledgement of this and requests the Secretariat “to consider further measures to provide incoming Chairs and their staffs with additional substantive and methodological briefings on the work of relevant subsidiary bodies.”
Another option would be to have the penholders of country-specific issues, which generally are permanent members, chair the subsidiary bodies of those issues until agreement is reached. It is unlikely that permanent members will want to perform this task for too long as they have been clear that they prefer elected members to take on the responsibility of chairing the subsidiary bodies.
Time is running out for the Council to salvage the work of its subsidiary bodies in 2025, particularly given that Security Council elections will take place in early June. If no decision is made by the time elections are held, the negotiations for the allocation of subsidiary bodies in 2026 will be due to begin at a time when the allocation for 2025 has not been agreed. This has the potential to further muddy an already complicated situation and make it even harder for members to agree on a way forward for the remainder of 2025. It could also complicate the negotiations concerning the allocation of chairs in 2026.
The inability of members to agree on subsidiary body chairs this deep into the year has consequences that will reverberate through the year. While the work of subsidiary bodies is often less visible, their activities are nonetheless vital to the Council’s ability to fulfil its mandate to maintain international peace and security. Late agreement on the chairs of sanctions committees could further weaken this important Council tool, which has already been diminished in recent years. Additionally, the working groups on significant thematic issues, such as children and armed conflict, peacekeeping and working methods, have been essential to the advancement of these issues in the Council. Increased flexibility and willingness to compromise will be required to resolve the current impasse and get these essential bodies back on track.
2024 Subsidiary Body Chairs Allocation
