Central African Republic
Expected Council Action
In July, the Security Council is expected to vote to extend the 2745 sanctions regime, which expires at the end of the month, and renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2745 Sanctions Committee, which expires on 31 August.
Key Recent Developments
On 23 June, Special Representative and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) Valentine Rugwabiza briefed the Council, focusing on recent political developments in the CAR since the Council’s last meeting on this file in February. These include the completion of the country’s combined local, legislative, and presidential elections; the inauguration of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra; the formation of a new government; and the installation of a new legislature. (For more information, see our 22 June What’s in Blue story.)
Following the conclusion of the national electoral processes, MINUSCA is undergoing a reconfiguration “to evolve gradually towards a phase of supporting the Central African authorities in order to consolidate the gains made in terms of security, peace, access, and State authority”, according to a 6 May briefing by the mission’s spokesperson. The mission has prioritised facilitating the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants from two armed groups—the Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) and l’Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC)—which last year decided to rejoin the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR-RCA). According to the Secretary-General’s June report, 1,331 former combatants have been disarmed and demobilised since July 2025.
The country’s security situation remains relatively stable, and the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants have contributed to the improved security situation, according to the Secretary-General’s latest report. However, parts of the country in the northwest and east continue to face some level of insecurity due to armed group activity, cross-border security dynamics, criminality, and transhumance-related tensions between herders and farmers.
The report also refers to the continued threats in the western and central parts of the country posed by armed groups, which remain outside the peace process. In this regard, it cites several incidents involving these groups, which targeted the national defence forces [Les Forces armées centrafricaines (FACA)], displaced people, and disrupted local electoral campaigns. Additionally, it mentions the obstruction of freedom of movement and transhumance-related activity caused by residual combatants who remain outside the disarmament process in the centre of the country. In the southeast, violence perpetrated by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG)—a predominantly ethnic Azande militia accused of committing serious human rights violations—remains a major concern.
The Secretary-General’s report documents renewed activities by Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) combatants, a Ugandan armed group that continues to operate in the CAR. Additionally, the CAR continues to face security challenges in the northeast with persistent cross-border activities linked to the conflict in Sudan. The Secretary-General’s report also describes clashes between self-defence groups and Sudanese armed elements associated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the parties to the Sudanese conflict.
Human Rights-Related Developments
In a 1 June press release, Aristide Nononsi, the Independent Expert on the human rights situation in the CAR, expressed grave concern over persistent violence, insecurity, and human rights violations in several parts of the country. He cited reports of violence against civilians, forced displacement, conflict-related sexual violence, and human rights violations committed both by armed groups and during certain security operations. In light of these findings, Nononsi urged national authorities and international partners to continue their efforts to protect civilians and strengthen the rule of law, justice, and reconciliation. Among other matters, he called for stronger independence and support for national human rights institutions, including the National Human Rights Commission and the Truth, Justice, Reparations and Reconciliation Commission (CVJRR).
Sanctions-Related Developments
Following the adoption of resolution 2789 of 29 July 2025, which last renewed the 2745 sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts, Russia put a six-month hold on the appointment of panel members. After Russia lifted its hold, three members of the panel were appointed in February. Two members began their work on 2 March, while the third member commenced work on 6 April.
Although the panel was expected to submit a midterm report no later than 31 January, it was unable to do so because of delays in the appointment of its members. The panel submitted a brief midterm report on 8 June, explaining the circumstances that had prevented it from meeting the deadline.
The panel conducted a visit to the CAR in March and April and presented its final report and recommendations to the Committee in advance of the 15 June deadline. The 2745 Sanctions Committee considered the report on 5 June. At the time of writing, the final report had not been published.
Key Issues and Options
The most immediate issue for Council members in July is the renewal of the 2745 sanctions regime. Last year, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2789, which renewed the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts. The negotiations in July are not expected to be contentious. A possible option for Council members would be to renew the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another twelve months.
A key issue for Council members is how to support the CAR in consolidating its political and security gains to ensure long-term peace and stability. One option would be for Council members to reiterate support for ongoing efforts to implement security sector reform, DDR, and justice and rule of law reforms, as well as the promotion of economic recovery and development. Another key issue for Council members in the coming months is the reconfiguration of MINUSCA, including the possible gradual, phased, and responsible transfer of tasks to the CAR government or the UN country team. Following the submission of the report by 15 September—requested in resolution 2800 of 13 November 2025 renewing the mission’s mandate, a possible option for the penholder would be to organise an informal briefing by the Secretariat to discuss its recommendations ahead of the mission’s mandate renewal in November. Despite improvements in the country’s overall peace and security situation, another important issue is the ongoing insecurity linked to armed group activity that persists in parts of the CAR. Council members remain particularly concerned about the security situation along the country’s borders, including the spillover effects of the conflict in Sudan.
The UN’s liquidity crisis and its impact on the mission’s operational capacity remain an ongoing concern. In June, Rugwabiza updated Council members on the contingency measures implemented by the mission to mitigate the impact of the liquidity crisis. Members are expected to closely monitor these contingency measures.
Council Dynamics
Council members support MINUSCA’s work and appreciate its contribution to stabilising the country. They also recognise that the CAR has entered a new phase of consolidation that requires building the country’s capacity to gradually assume security responsibilities. In this regard, they may continue to underscore the importance of ensuring that this process consolidates the gains made in recent years and avoids any possibility of reversal.
However, most members are concerned about the impact of the UN’s liquidity crisis on the mission’s work. During the February Council meeting, Pakistan, a major troop-contributing country (TCC) to MINUSCA, drew attention to the financial burden on TCCs due to the delayed reimbursement of personnel costs. Reimbursements for troop and police were made through 31 December 2025, while reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment were made through 30 June 2025, according to the Secretary-General’s latest report on MINUSCA.
At the February meeting, the US—which abstained on resolution 2800—maintained that MINUSCA should discontinue activities it considered no longer necessary and transfer responsibilities to the CAR authorities or other stakeholders where possible. During the negotiations, it pushed for a larger reduction in troop levels than what was ultimately agreed, given progress on the ground. For its part, China stressed that the Council needed to make a realistic assessment of the situation in the country in close consultation with the CAR government and consider optimising MINUSCA’s mandate and size at the appropriate time to steadily advance its transition.
France is the penholder on the CAR and CAR sanctions.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 13 November 2025S/RES/2800 | This resolution renewed the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) for one year until 15 November 2026. |
| 29 July 2025S/RES/2789 | This resolution extended the sanctions measures imposed on armed groups operating in the Central African Republic (CAR) until 31 July, and the mandate of the Panel of Experts monitoring the implementation of these measures until 31 August. |
| Security Council Meeting Records | |
| 23 June 2026S/PV.10181 | This was an open briefing on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). |
| Secretary-General’s Reports | |
| 15 June 2026S/2026/494 | This is the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). |
