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Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected in December to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which expires on 31 December and take stock of the situation in eastern DRC in the light of the ongoing crisis and its decision to expand MONUC. Possible options are discussed below.

The Security Council’s Sanctions Committee on the DRC expects to consider the report of the Group of Experts monitoring the sanctions regime in early December. The mandate of the Group of Experts and the sanctions regime which expire on 31 December are also expected to be renewed.

Key Recent Developments
Recent violence in eastern DRC and the attendant humanitarian crisis, along with the latent threat that the hostilities could spawn ethnic violence or another major regional conflict, resulted in a flurry of international diplomatic activity by the UN and African regional initiatives. The Security Council on 20 November acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and adopted a resolution authorising a temporary increase of MONUC’s troop size by up to 3085 additional personnel, in line with recommendations made by the Secretariat in briefings on 3 October when it warned about the possible outbreak of hostilities.

The Council also:

• stressed that the temporary increase was intended to enable MONUC to enhance its capacity to protect civilians;
• emphasised the importance of MONUC implementing its mandate in full, including through robust rules of engagement;
• expressed strong support for MONUC’s efforts to restore peace in the Kivus, welcomed the appointment of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo by the Secretary-General as his Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and called on all parties to cooperate with him in finding a political solution to the crisis; and
• expressed concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation and urged all parties to ensure timely, safe and unhindered humanitarian access and to comply fully with their obligations under international law.

On 24 November the Secretary-General submitted recommendations on MONUC’s future mandate and reconfiguration. At press time the Council was scheduled to begin considering the report on 26 November.

On 11 November the Council was briefed by Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, on his recent visit to the DRC. Le Roy reiterated the Secretary-General’s request for additional peacekeepers for MONUC.

The Secretary-General and Obasanjo, attended a summit on 7 November in Nairobi with key regional players including presidents Joseph Kabila of the DRC and Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Jakaya Kikwete of Tanzania (president of the AU) to deliberate on the DRC problem. The summit called for an urgent end to hostilities and requested Obasanjo and former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mpaka to help seek a political solution. The summit also indicated its willingness to contribute African peacekeepers to pacify eastern DRC. It was unclear whether this was intended as additional contingents under the UN mandate or something quite separate.

The Executive Secretary of the Southern African Development Community indicated after a regional summit in South Africa on 9 November that it would send military advisers to help the DRC “if and when necessary”.

Congolese rebel chief Laurent Nkunda refused to recognise the Nairobi talks, called for direct negotiations with Kabila, and later said he would fight African peacekeeping troops if attacked. Obasanjo met Nkunda on 16 November, with the latter pledging to observe a ceasefire and subsequently announcing that his forces would retire from the frontlines to create a zone of separation between the belligerent forces to allow in humanitarian aid. On 24 November Obasanjo spoke to the media at the UN after providing an update to the Secretary-General on his mediation work, which he indicated had resulted in his contacting leaders in Luanda, Kinshasa, Nairobi, Kampala and Kigali, as well as Nkunda. He announced that the second phase of his work will begin on 28 November with the objective of getting the DRC government and Nkunda’s faction to begin initial dialogue.

The EU held a ministerial meeting on 3 November on the DRC. However the possibility of sending a temporary EU multinational force to bolster MONUC, mooted earlier by current EU chair France, did not gain support.

On 7 November the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, issued a statement on the DRC expressing concern about the recent escalation of violence and “noting the history of loss of life in the region over at least the past 15 years, including on the basis of ethnicity.” He has since embarked on a visit the region to assess developments.

On 18 November the International Criminal Court (ICC) decided to proceed with the trial of former Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga accused of using child soldiers. (The ICC trial chamber had suspended the trial on 13 June because of concerns about his fair trial since his defence had been unable to gain access to possibly exonerating information. Lubanga remained in custody as the prosecution appealed the decision.)

The northern Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continued its violent campaign in northeastern DRC, with reports by human rights and humanitarian agencies of attacks and scores of abductions in villages in the Orientale province in November. A major incident reportedly took place on 1 November when DRC government forces clashed with LRA fighters in Dungu resulting in the deaths of three government soldiers and the LRA abducting 36 boys and 21 girls.

Key Issues
The key issue is the huge impact of the fighting on civilians and the risk of the violence playing into wider ethnically based violence. A second key issue is the risk of a return to regional conflict in light of reports of Angolan military support for the DRC government (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe backed the DRC government during the 1998-2003 war, while Rwanda and Uganda supported the RCD Goma rebel faction.)

A related major issue is the regional nature of the situation and the need, in order to find solutions, to progress issues involving not only DRC and Rwanda but also the unresolved status of minorities in eastern DRC and the future of the Rwandan Hutu exiles in DRC.

Another major issue for the Council is containing renewed attacks by the LRA.

Related issues include the MONUC mandate and whether the UN forces could—or should—have used more robust force to protect civilians and their role vis-à-vis the DRC military.

Other issues concern the renewal of the mandates for the Group of Experts, and the sanctions regime (covering arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze) which all end on 31 December.

Options
Options for the Council include:

• deciding to send a small, high-level Council mission to the region with a simple but open-ended mandate to persuade the parties to deal with the underlying causes (in practice this includes Kinshasa making the necessary political concessions to reduce the vulnerability of the Tutsi minority, Kigali making the necessary concessions to reintegrate Hutu exiles not indicted for genocide and ensuring that the remainder are disarmed and cantoned in DRC pending judicial action against them—a commitment involving some shuttle diplomacy and perhaps a sequence of visits would be needed and no doubt a succession of meetings with Nkunda as well);
• encouraging the ongoing Secretary-General’s good offices efforts, by involving Special Envoy Obasanjo directly with the mission;
• making reference to the role of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide and welcoming his visit to the area and his advice;
• reenergising efforts to deal with the LRA, in line with options in the separate brief in the Forecast on Northern Uganda and LRA-Affected Areas;
• in their national capacities encouraging UN and especially EU members to rapidly send in troops either as part of the additional temporary MONUC reinforcement or as a multinational force to help contain the situation until the authorised additional MONUC forces arrive in the DRC; and
• mobilising influential global and regional institutions to exert leverage on both DRC and Rwanda to cease any support and assist in demobilising rival rebel groups as a longer term political solution, and to avoid a descent into wider regional war.

On the sanctions-related issues, one option is simply renewing the Group of Experts’ mandates, as well as the sanctions regime, without modifications. Another option is to request the Sanctions Committee to explore possible measures against commanders responsible for allowing attacks on civilians. (The Committee has been slow to develop lists of individuals to be targeted with sanctions for recruiting and using child soldiers, and targeting women or children for violence in line with resolution 1698 of July 2006 and 1807 of March 2008.)

Council Dynamics
The UK, US and France seemed to eventually overcome their perennial differences about MONUC and agreed to support additional troops and resources for MONUC in eastern DRC. The force of the outcry of international public opinion seemed to play a key role along with the unsettling prospect of involvement of African regional actors. The persistent efforts by the Secretariat to get the Council to strenthen MONUC also appears to have been catalytic in galvanising Council members to act. Members are conscious however that it is an entirely different question how soon the additional troops will actually be available on the ground, with estimates ranging to several months.

At this stage, members seem ready to maintain MONUC’s current deployment level when it comes up for renewal on 19 December and to maintain the additional capacity because of concerns about the eastern DRC security situation and the risk that premature withdrawal might preclude long-term stability.

Differences may still need to be resolved however regarding MONUC’s mandate. In the past some members have stressed the need to protect civilians. Reports of predatory misconduct by the DRC army against civilians will be of further concern in this regard. This may lead into discussion as to whether the language in the resolution 1794 (which Kinshasa seems to see as a decision that MONUC should fight on their side) needs to be revisited. Another related issue may arise from calls by France that the rules of engagement (ROE) should be changed to allow more robust UN action. In general a majority of Council members seem likely to feel that neither the mandate nor the ROE need to be changed but it may be that there will be interest in the Secretary-General providing some greater clarity about what MONUC’s mandate and ROE means.

Some members are also questioning the positions of various regional actors including the value of an African peacekeeping force, which might unwittingly draw in neighboring armies resulting in a repeat of the 1998-2003 DRC-regional war.

The DRC Sanctions Committee members (comprising all 15 Council members) seem generally comfortable with the current mandate of the Group of Experts and the sanctions regime and are likely to renew it. However with violence escalating in the eastern parts of the DRC, including against children, women and innocent civilians, some members appear more ready to consider the possibility of taking action against those believed to be responsible.

Other Relevant Facts

Full forecast

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