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Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action
The report of the Secretary-General on the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is expected by 30 November, and the Council is expected to discuss it in December. The Under Secretary-General for Field Support, Susana Malcorra, and the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Alain Le Roy, are expected to brief the Council on efforts to expedite the deployment of UNAMID. A briefing by the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno-Ocampo, on his work in Sudan is also expected.

It is unclear whether any formal Council action will arise from these briefings.

Key Recent Developments
Fighting between government forces, militias and armed opposition groups, coupled with interethnic conflicts has increased the numbers of persons in Darfur needing humanitarian support to over 4.7 million, of whom 2.7 million are internally displaced (representing an increase in internally displaced of 200,000 from July). Humanitarian access is increasingly constrained as aid workers and international peacekeepers continue to be targeted.

The total number of UNAMID personnel killed since operations were launched on 31 December rose to 16 after two UNAMID peacekeepers were killed in October. On 9 November a UNAMID patrol was ambushed in west Darfur.

The Sudanese government seems to be feeling increased pressure to seek a political solution in Darfur. During the first meeting of the tripartite (Sudanese government, AU and UN) committee for the deployment of UNAMID on 7 October, the government agreed to measures to facilitate deployment of UNAMID. This included ensuring government helicopters were not painted white (like UN equipment); approving use of Darfur airports from 7am to 7pm leading to 24-hour access; escorting UNAMID convoys every 48 hours; expediting visas for UNAMID personnel and establishing an office in El Fasher to ensure local implementation of national decisions. A second tripartite meeting was held on 17 November to review progress.

At the conclusion on 12 November of the Sudan People’s Forum, a government initiative intended to advance a political settlement for Darfur, Bashir announced an immediate unconditional and unilateral ceasefire in Darfur with the caveat that an effective monitoring mechanism was in place and observed by all parties. Darfur rebel groups boycotted the forum and have not agreed to the ceasefire. On 14 November rebels accused the Sudanese military of bombing north Darfur in breach of the ceasefire. Further, on 20 November fighting between government troops and rebels erupted in north Darfur and on 21 November there were reports of government troops attacking rebels in south Darfur.

The forum recommended the government cease hostilities and declare a unilateral ceasefire and support UNAMID and peace talks mediated by AU-UN Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé. It also called for a compensation fund for internally displaced persons and refugees, the creation of an additional vice-president position to be filled by a Darfurian and the restoration of Darfur to one administration area.

On 15 November the Dakar Contact Group, formed in March to follow up implementation of measures to normalise relations between Chad and Sudan, met in N’Djamena to further discuss deployment of a Chad-Sudan border observation mission. This followed the exchange of ambassadors between Chad and Sudan the previous week and an agreement on concrete steps for full normalisation of relations. An AU mission chaired by former Burundian president Pierre Buyoya is currently working on recommendations to address the root causes of tension between the two countries.

On 17 November Sudan extended the moratorium facilitating humanitarian aid to Darfur until 2010. The moratorium of 3 July 2004 allegedly removes obstacles to humanitarian work.

In his 20 October report on UNMIS, the Secretary-General said he had received warnings of possible serious consequences for the mission if Bashir was indicted by the ICC. During the UNMIS briefing to the Council on 5 November, the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Edmond Mulet, said the request for an arrest warrant could potentially derail the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the north and south. He expressed concern UN staff members may be expelled. In October, Bashir said his prosecution would have a catastrophic impact on stability in the entire region.

In October, Sudanese officials announced the new special prosecutor for Darfur (appointed in August) had completed investigations into the actions of Ali Kushayb, a former Janjaweed commander and one of the two individuals already subject to an ICC arrest warrant. It remains unclear whether or when he might stand trial. During a meeting of Arab justice ministers in Cairo on 12 October, the ministers said Bashir’s arrest warrant should be channelled through Sudanese legislation and offered to assist modifying Sudan’s penal codes to incorporate crimes that are part of the ICC’s jurisdiction. The status of the earlier proposal of the AU Commission to form a panel of lawyers to conduct investigations in Sudan is unclear.

On 15 October the pre-trial chamber of the ICC requested the Chief Prosecutor submit additional supporting materials in relation to Bashir by 17 November. On 20 November the Prosecutor requested arrest warrants for three rebels leaders believed to be responsible for attacks against AU peacekeepers in Haskanita in south Darfur in 2007 which killed 12 peacekeepers.

Key Issues
A key question is whether any Council member will introduce a resolution seeking a one year suspension of ICC proceedings against Bashir. A key consideration is whether the interaction between judicial and political processes and the related tensions will advance or hinder the recent improvements in Khartoum’s cooperation with UNAMID.

Another key issue is whether Khartoum is genuinely committed to end the conflict in Darfur and whether it implements commitments made in October to expedite the deployment of UNAMID and honours promises made at the conclusion of the Sudan People’s Forum, beginning with the ceasefire.

Another question is whether initiatives to seek a political solution can be translated into a successful new framework involving substantive rebel participation and unity.

Another issue is UNAMID’s lack of critical resources which continues to hinder its ability to discharge its mandate leaving the people of Darfur, humanitarian agencies and UNAMID itself vulnerable.

Options

Options include:

• requesting the Secretariat include in future reports to the Council comprehensive benchmarks of performance over time by Khartoum, rebel groups and other key stakeholders in terms of pledges made and the status of their implementation;
• more active practical support by Council members in their national capacity for the Secretariat to encourage generation of key assets for UNAMID;
• a statement reinforcing support for the peace talks led by Joint Chief Mediator Djibril Bassolé and welcoming the outcome of the Darfur People’s Forum and encouraging swift implementation, particularly of the ceasefire; and
• reminding the parties on the need to cooperate with the ICC under resolution 1593 (which referred the situation in Darfur to the Court in 2005).

Another option for the Council is to resume discussion of ICC proceedings in Sudan.

Council Dynamics

The new approach adopted by the Secretariat on expediting UNAMID’s deployment via the tripartite meeting mechanism seems to have provided some members with renewed optimism but it seems that this optimism could quickly erode should Khartoum fail to honour its commitments.

Some members—including the US, France, UK and Libya—have individually expressed support for the overall leadership of Bassolé in securing a lasting peace settlement in Darfur. The EU has also called on Sudanese authorities and rebel groups to cooperate actively with Bassolé.

Despite a spike of diplomatic activity in late October and early November on the ICC issue, the restoration of diplomatic ties between Sudan and Chad, Bashir’s peace initiative and his undertaking to cooperate on the UNAMID deployment, Council divisions on the possible suspension of ICC proceedings against Bashir remain. Some members fear the possible indictment of Bashir would undercut the recent political efforts particularly of Bassolé and Khartoum and the progress in Chad/Sudan relations. At press time, France, the UK and the US seemed unconvinced that Bashir has yet had a radical change of attitude and that Council deferral of ICC action would be justified.

UN Documents

Other Relevant Facts

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