December 2008 Monthly Forecast

Posted 26 November 2008
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MIDDLE EAST

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
Early in December, the Council will receive a report from the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others. The Council is expected to receive a public briefing from the Chief Investigator, Daniel Bellemare, and hold consultations, on 16 December. The Council may also receive a report from the Secretary-General on the Lebanon Special Tribunal (unconfirmed at press time) possibly with an indication that the tribunal is ready to start its activities pending a transition period (while activities are being transferred from Beirut to The Hague, where the tribunal is to be based). The Council is likely to discuss a brief technical extension of UNIIIC (as its mandate is due to expire on 31 December) until the transfer can be completed.

Key Recent Developments
A report from the Secretary-General on implementation of resolution 1701 was issued on 18 November. The Secretary-General said that although the political climate has improved over the past months, thanks to implementation of elements of the Doha agreement, a number of security incidents have continued to threaten Lebanon’s stability. Positive developments included:

  • the exchange of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah in July;
  • the establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Syria and their agreement to address border delineation and security; and
  • the absence of discovery of new military infrastructure or of arms smuggling into the area of operations of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL (although Israel maintains that Hezbollah is building military capacity north and south of the Litani river).

Remaining challenges include:

  • Israel’s control of Ghajar, which continues to be a source of tension;
  • continued intrusions into Lebanese airspace by Israeli aircraft in high numbers;
  • continued threat to stability posed by armed groups operating inside Lebanon and concerns that Hezbollah may have sought to upgrade its military capabilities;
  • the porous nature of Lebanon’s border with Syria and potential for breaches of the arms embargo;
  • continued incidents involving unexploded ordnance and the absence of progress in receiving from Israel data on munitions fired in the 2006 conflict;
  • the absence of answer from Israel and Syria on the provisional definition of the Sheb’a Farms;
  • repeated exchange of threats between Israel and Hezbollah; and
  • incidents of restrictions of UNIFIL’s freedom of movement.

The Secretary-General also reaffirmed that disarmament should take place through a Lebanese-led political process, and that regional parties with ties to Hezbollah and other groups should respect the arms embargo. The Council heard a briefing on Lebanon and had consultations on this report on 26 November. At press time it was unclear whether the Council would adopt a presidential statement.

An important development was the visit to Damascus on 18 November of UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband, who held talks with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He is the first high-level British minister to visit Damascus since former Prime Minister Tony Blair held talks with President al-Assad in October 2001. It seems that Syria’s agreement to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon influenced the UK’s decision to visit Syria. In an interview before his visit, Miliband said that while Syria had a potential role to play in stability in the Middle East, it could also be a force for instability.

The second round of the Lebanese national dialogue took place on 5 November. In a statement following the meeting, leaders said they agreed to have Lebanese President Michel Suleiman conduct more contacts and consultations among them until the next round, which they agreed would be held on 22 December. It seems that the parties ran into difficulties on the format of the talks (whether to expand the number of participants, apparently demanded by the opposition). Hezbollah’s disarmament as part of the national defense strategy remains a major point of contention. While the majority leaders support placing this on the agenda of the talks, Hezbollah says it is not up for discussion while Israel poses a threat to Lebanon.

On 26 October, Hezbollah’s leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah met majority leader Saad Hariri for the first time since the 2006 war with Israel. This marked a breakthrough in relations between the two opponents. In a joint statement issued by the two leaders, they reaffirmed the need to prevent tensions and reinforce dialogue, and said that they would remain in mutual contact, and said that they would encourage dialogue “by taking steps to calm the situation in the media and in the street”.

On 31 October the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) again called on donors to urgently respond to the $43 million appeal for funds issued in September to help the 27,000 refugees displaced from the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon in 2007. So far, it seems that only the US and Norway have contributed $4.3 million and $500,000 respectively.

On 30 October, the Council heard a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Terje Rød-Larsen for Implementation of Resolution 1559 and held consultations on this issue. It seems that a few members questioned the need to have two parallel tracks—1559 and 1701—since many issues overlap. topfull forecast

Options
Options regarding UNIIIC include:

  • not prolonging the Commission’s mandate if the tribunal is ready to commence activities;
  • extending the Commission’s mandate for a few months depending on how long it takes the tribunal to be fully operational (Chief Investigator Daniel Bellemare, or the Secretary-General in his report on the tribunal, are likely to provide indications); and
  • extending the Commission’s mandate for the customary additional six months.

Key Issues
A main issue is whether the Council will respond to the 1701 report, perhaps welcoming developments and addressing remaining challenges for implementing the resolution—and whether endorsing recommendations made by the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) in August will add value to the 1701 process at this stage. Increasing divisions on 1701 issues, coupled with some loss of momentum in the Council, have resulted in a perception of the Council distancing itself from the 1701 process.

There are indications that the tribunal is ready to start operations. However, the main issue is whether the Secretary-General will announce that the tribunal will be operational as soon as UNIIIC’s mandate has expired, or whether a transition period while activities are transferred from UNIIIC to the tribunal will be needed. For the Council, this means that UNIIIC’s mandate will need to be correspondingly prolonged and that the Lebanese government will have to request the extension.

A related issue is Syria’s continued cooperation with the investigation. The provisions of resolution 1636 (adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) regarding Syria’s cooperation with UNIIIC may be uncertain after the tribunal takes over. Resolution 1636 requested Syria to:

  • detain Syrian officials or individuals whom UNIIIC suspects of involvement in Rafik Hariri’s assassination, and make them fully available to the Commission; and
  • cooperate with the Commission fully and unconditionally on that basis.

The resolution also gave UNIIIC the authority to determine the location and modalities for interviewing Syrian officials and individuals it deems relevant to the inquiry. A question therefore is whether the absence of such provision for the tribunal will pose problems for the investigation, which will most likely continue for some time before indictments are issued.

Likewise, there is a question on the application of aspects of the sanctions regime (travel ban and assets freeze) established under resolution 1636. It targeted individuals designated by UNIIIC as suspects in the assassination, and it remains unclear whether and how it will continue to apply. 

Council Dynamics
France has the lead on Lebanon and, at press time, members were waiting to see whether it would introduce a draft statement in response to the 1701 report. While a majority of members would support a reaffirmation of basic principles of resolution 1701, such as Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity, addressing substantive issues (violations of Lebanese territory by Israel, arms smuggling, disarmament and the Sheb’a Farms, for example) usually proves difficult because of differing views on what the priorities are. For instance, for South Africa, Libya and Indonesia, Israeli overflights continue to pose a threat to Lebanon’s stability; while for the US the issues of arms smuggling and disarmament are crucial for Lebanon’s stability.

Discussions on a rollover for UNIIIC are unlikely to be controversial. The Council is likely to agree to follow recommendations by the Secretary-General or the Chief Investiga

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UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

  • S/RES/1815 (2 June 2008) extended UNIIIC’s mandate until 31 December 2008.  
  • S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the special tribunal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and specified that the Tribunal shall commence functioning on a date to be determined by the Secretary-General in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, taking into account progress in the investigation. 
  • S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and for a long-term solution, imposed an arms embargo on Lebanon and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL. 
  • S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006) requested the Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Lebanese government aimed at establishing a tribunal of an international character and submit a report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution. 
  • S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005) urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the assassination. 
  • S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005) established UNIIIC to investigate the 14 February 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. 
  • S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government’s control over Lebanese territory, and free and fair presidential elections. 

Latest Presidential Statement on Resolution 1701

Latest Reports

  • S/2008/715 (18 November 2008) was the latest 1701 report.
  • S/2008/582 (25 August 2008) was the latest LIBAT report.
  • S/2008/210 (28 March 2008) was the latest UNIIIC report.
  • S/2008/173 (12 March 2008) was the latest report on the tribunal.

Latest Letter

  • S/2008/698 (11 November) was a letter from Lebanon on Israeli violations.

Other Relevant Facts

UNIIIC Commissioner and Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal

Daniel Bellemare (Canada) 

Special Tribunal’s Registrar

Robin Vincent (UK)

Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559 

Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway) 

UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Michael C. Williams (UK)

UNIFIL Force Commander

Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

Size and Composition of UNIFIL

  • Authorised: 15,000 troops
  • Current (11 November 2008): 12,770 military personnel
  • Troop Contributors: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, El Salvador, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey.

Cost

1 July 2008 – 30 June 2009: $680.93 million (A/C.5/62/30)

Useful Additional Resources

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