Kosovo
Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, completed his final recommendations in late March. On 26 March, the Secretary-General transmitted Ahtisaari’s final proposal to the Council along with Ahtisaari’s conclusions and recommendations and his own letter supportive of both documents. In early April Ahtisaari is expected to present both documents in closed consultations of the Council. Discussions on how to proceed commenced in late March in the context of finalising the monthly programme of work and will probably continue into April. On substance, it seems likely that some Council members will begin drafting a new resolution in April, but it is uncertain when it will be considered in detail.
Key Recent Developments
Ahtisaari held his final meeting on the future status process for Kosovo with representatives from Belgrade and Pristina on 10 March. This was the culmination of two intense weeks of consultations on Ahtisaari’s initial proposal. Ahtisaari and his team held 17 rounds of direct talks and made 26 missions to Belgrade and Pristina in 13 months while trying to come to a negotiated agreement.
Following the 10 March meeting, Ahtisaari incorporated 11 pages of amendments into his final package, which he presented to the Secretary-General on 15 March. In his report, Ahtisaari recommended independence, supervised by the international community, and asked the Council to endorse the Kosovo Status Settlement proposal upon which independence will be based.
The Contact Group on Kosovo (the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) was briefed by Ahtisaari on 9 March. At the time of writing, the Group was expected to meet on 28 March in London to discuss both issues of procedure and substance concerning the final status package.
In the latest UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) report published on 9 March, the Secretary-General said that Kosovo needed clarity on its future and called on the international community to move towards a timely conclusion of Kosovo’s future status political process.
On 9 March the Serbian foreign minister warned that Kosovo’s independence could lead to nationalists loyal to the late Slobodan Milosevic rising up again.
NATO has said it is ready to continue providing security in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan to protect both Serbs and ethnic-Albanians. The EU has given support to the proposal. However, two EU members, Greece and Slovakia, seem to support further negotiations before the Council comes to a decision. EU preparation to replace UNMIK seems to be well advanced.
Russia is concerned that the Council should not rush into a decision on the Ahtisaari proposals. It considers that there is still room for a negotiated solution.
Options
Once it receives Ahtisaari’s report the Council has several options:
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moving toward discussion of a draft resolution that would impose the Ahtisaari recommendations;
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holding an initial round of general discussions in informal consultations on reactions to the Ahtisaari recommendations, but deferring consideration of specific proposals for Council action for a short period (e.g. 21 days) pending further consultations in the Contact Group and with the parties;
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deciding after initial general reactions in informal consultations to establish a high-level Council working group, with a mandate for a fixed period, to meet with the parties in a sustained and intensive process to discuss elements that might be generally agreeable for a draft resolution;
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deferring action on the Ahtisaari recommendations for a longer period (e.g. ninety days) to allow for bilateral and regional discussions and to give the Contact Group additional space to explore a negotiated outcome; and
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applying some of the Ahtisaari recommendations immediately and deferring other elements for consideration after a defined period (e.g. six months) and establishing a negotiating process for the interim period.
Key Issues
The key issue which is emerging for April is timing. It seems likely that this will be played out initially in the discussions in late March and first days of April on the Programme of Work for the month of April.
On the one hand, there is a risk of violence if the Council takes too long to make a decision. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, radical groups could exploit public dissatisfaction with delays in the process. This could lead not only to inter-ethnic violence but also to violence directed against the international presence in Kosovo.
On the other hand, a peremptory Council decision to impose an outcome without even tacit Serbian support could be equally destabilising and could lack the legitimacy and effectiveness necessary for a long-term solution.
The second key issue is the substantive question of principle that continues to concern many Council members. Can the Council impose a decision effectively shrinking the territorial boundaries of a member state either directly, or by affecting the constitutional order within a state, so that a geographical unit of the state could unilaterally determine an independent status for itself? A related question is whether the Council should do so given the potential precedent for other regions where breakaway groups are demanding independence. (In April there are two other situations on the Council’s agenda, Western Sahara and Georgia, where similar issues are in play and where the repercussions of the Kosovo decision could have some impact.)
The third issue is whether there is any realistic prospect that some delay for further discussion and negotiations might produce consent or at least tacit acquiescence. If so, what face-saving changes or substantive alterations might need to be incorporated in any Security Council resolutions?
Finally, in the background, there is the issue of how UNMIK would cope if the security situation deteriorates. UNMIK has downsized significantly pending the status decision. If a decision on Kosovo is likely to be delayed then the Council may have to consider equipping UNMIK for a more unstable security situation.
Council and Wider Dynamics
In the last month there have been a number of closed-door informal meetings on Kosovo led by the P3 (the US, the UK and France), which advocate for moving forward quickly towards the status decision. The UK will be both president of the Council and of the Contact Drafting Group in April, and it seems likely that they will take the lead in drafting a resolution.
On the other hand, Russia would like to see the Council viewing Ahtisaari’s package as one further step in a process that should continue until both sides can agree on a solution. Their position was asserted very strongly during and after the discussion of the UNMIK report in March with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Joachim Rücker, on the receiving end of very blunt comments. Russia seems to prefer to continue discussions elsewhere rather than moving to the Council in April. China is also partial to a longer timeline for the Council’s final decision to give the parties more time to come to a negotiated solution.
Some of the elected members, including Indonesia and some African members, are concerned about what they perceive as unnecessary haste to make a decision on Kosovo. The implications for territorial integrity are clearly a worry for them.
Underlying Problems
The final status recommendation could have human rights implications. Forced displacement is possible if the situation turns violent. Some human rights groups are also concerned that while Ahtisaari’s package deals comprehensively with the rights of the Serbian minorities, there are other minorities like the Roma, Bosnians and Turks whose concerns have been neglected.
| Security Council Resolution |
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| Selected Presidential Statements |
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| Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/Letters |
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Other Relevant Facts
| Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Joachim Rücker (Germany) |
| UNMIK |
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| Cost |
| US$2.218 billion for fiscal year 2006/2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures) |
| KFOR (NATO FORCE) |
| General Roland Kather (Germany) |
| Size and Composition of Mission |
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