Darfur/Sudan
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to take up in April a response to Sudan’s negative stance on peacekeeping in Darfur. A briefing by Under Secretary-General John Holmes on his visit to the region on 21-22 March may also stress the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation. At press time, members were awaiting results of a number of diplomatic initiatives. These include the visits of UN envoy Jan Eliasson to the region and by the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa to Sudan, and the Secretary-General’s attendance at the Arab League Summit on 28-29 March.
Discussions on sanctions are likely. The upcoming briefing of the Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts will provide a focus. It is unclear whether and when Council action on sanctions will be considered. At press time, the UK seemed ready to present a draft resolution.
The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which expires on 30 April. The regular Secretary-General’s report is due.
Key Recent Developments
Open conflict between rebels and the government (including the Janjaweed) and targeting of civilians continue. Reports suggest a further upsurge in intercommunal violence. Camps for the internally displaced are reaching full capacity. Two AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) soldiers were killed.
On 6 March, the Secretary-General sent a letter to Khartoum with the terms of reference of an AU-UN joint special representative. It also contained the operation’s initial framework, including:
-
mandate: protection of civilians and tasks assigned by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and existing AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decisions;
-
size: 19,000-20,000 troops, 3,772 police officers and 19 formed police units, preferably African; and
-
UN funding, with the understanding that financial management and oversight mechanisms will be put in place and the AU will be responsible for prior liabilities.
An AU-UN draft agreement on a joint concept of operations and mission plan is well developed.
Khartoum replied to the 24 January heavy-support proposal with complaints that it “reveals the existence of essential differences in the understanding of the nature and objectives” of UN support. The response contained many objections based on the position that “the [DPA] is the framework and reference” for support packages.
In particular, the government objected to:
-
the three engineering companies;
-
the light aviation unit and helicopters for protection of civilians;
-
an air reconnaissance unit;
-
moving AMIS into three sectors (involving deployment of two additional AMIS battalions as authorised by the AU PSC); and
-
deploying police in areas controlled by the government.
The letter seems to ignore the November AU agreement on the phased approach. Nor does it refer to the fact that AMIS already has a protection of civilians mandate as established by the AU PSC in June 2006 following the signing of the DPA.
Sudan stressed that the UN should provide only “technical, logistical and financial expertise and civil and military consultants” and that AU forces must remain under AU command and control. It suggested that the AU-UN-Sudan tripartite mechanism be used to harmonise positions. This mechanism operates by consensus.
At a Sanctions Committee meeting in early March, there was a preliminary exchange of ideas on the possibility of sanctions. The EU called for new Council measures and the US continued to signal unilateral sanctions.
The Secretary-General considered Khartoum’s response “not satisfactory” and underlined that the proposal was done in accordance with the [November 2006] Addis Ababa and Abuja Agreements, and was not a matter to “revisit or reinterpret”.
Council consultations were held on 19 March with a briefing by Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. He stressed that there is still a “long way to go” and that the Council must play a role in overcoming Sudan’s misgivings.
UN envoy Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on 6 March on his efforts alongside AU envoy Salim A. Salim to re-energise the political process. Eliasson reportedly stressed the need for an immediate ceasefire and guarantees of humanitarian access.
The situation in south Sudan remains fragile. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reviewed at a donors’ conference on 19-21 March, with special attention on spill-over effects from Darfur. CPA implementation is moving slowly and faces considerable difficulties with:
-
setting up key commissions and related legislation;
-
increasing the pace of southern development;
-
progress with victims’ compensation, new oil contracts and transfer of oil revenues;
-
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and
-
following up on the Abyei boundary issue.
| Related Developments at the Human Rights Council |
|
The report of the high-level mission on Darfur was released on 7 March. Indonesian Ambassador Marakim Wibisono withdrew from the mission once it became clear that Khartoum would not issue visas. The report notes gross and systematic human rights violations from all sides and that Khartoum “has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation of the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has become evident and urgent.” It recommends, inter alia, the establishment of a strong human rights monitoring mechanism, the full implementation of the phased approach and of the Security Council sanctions regime. The Human Rights Council opened its fourth session on 12 March. The Secretary-General underscored existing pressure on the Council saying that the “world is watching to see whether this young Council will live up to its promise”. Sudan, Russia, China as well as the Arab Group, the Asian Group and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference opposed consideration of the report. Western and several African states, notably Zambia, Nigeria and various others supported it. At press time, two draft resolutions have been circulated: one critical of Sudan presented by Germany and a much milder one by Algeria. The Council was expected to take action by 30 March. |
Options
The Security Council could:
-
continue with diplomatic pressure on Sudan to realise its November 2006 commitments;
-
add a sanctions dimension, perhaps with the extension of the arms embargo to the entire Sudan and strengthening of the no-fly zone; and
-
reopen the agreement on a phased approach to a hybrid operation (this option is highly unlikely).
Adopting a wider sanctions package may in the short-term stiffen Sudan’s resolve. It may also suggest that the viability of a negotiated approach has been exhausted for the time being. Strengthening and enforcing a no-fly zone presents huge challenges, particularly with obtaining assets from willing member states and cooperation from neighbouring countries especially Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic.
Another option is to tailor a milder sanctions package limited to additions to the targeted sanctions list. In practice, unilateral sanctions now seem increasingly likely.
Other options are:
-
finalising and formally endorsing the hybrid operation proposal;
-
endorsing reactivation of the Darfur peace process, perhaps with a deadline for an immediate ceasefire and increases in humanitarian access to be verified by the sanctions Panel of Experts; and
-
threatening meaningful sanctions in case the deadline is not observed.
Key Issues
Khartoum’s response to the heavy support package seems to signal that Sudan has no intention of honouring the earlier agreement on the deployment of a robust hybrid operation with protection of civilians at its core. It also suggests that Khartoum intends to prevaricate by indefinitely blocking implementation of the phased approach.
The issue for the Council is therefore whether and when alternative avenues of Council action should be explored; bearing in mind that punitive measures could render the phased approach impossible and undermine UN peacemaking efforts in the short-term.
A parallel issue is how to re-establish a peace process in Darfur, and whether to focus on this as a means to make progress with the phased approach. (However in 2005, the same was being said about the Abuja peace negotiations.)
A third issue is the future of UNMIS. It involves reconciling support for the CPA with the possibility that this has provided Khartoum with additional leverage to undermine Council pressure on Darfur and to pursue a military policy.
There are also a number of open issues on the phased approach, in particular:
-
finalising the hybrid operation proposal, including AU-UN agreement on mandate, size, cost, command and control, and ensuring that UN accountability, procurement and managerial standards are in place, particularly in view of the need to secure funding commitment from the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee; and
-
encouraging UN troop generation for the heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 military and 5,000 police).
Council Dynamics
Members appear divided on how best to react to Khartoum’s misgivings about the phased approach. The US and the UK in particular, alongside France, Ghana, Italy and Panama seem to support sanctions.
These members do not appear to have given up the phased approach. But there is a perception that Sudan’s response made it clear that stronger pressure-including sanctions-is needed since Khartoum appears to be ready to indefinitely stall fulfilling its commitments.
Most members have indicated that reopening the phased approach is unacceptable.
China, Russia, South Africa, Qatar and Indonesia continue to be reluctant about sanctions. These members seem to prefer allowing more time for Khartoum to clarify the substance of its concerns and continue with dialogue. There may also be pressure to delay action until (if and when) there is consensus that the Panel has been able to demonstrate violations of resolution 1591.
On the other hand, Khartoum’s most recent response may have proven to be too much for even some of these members, especially revisiting the already agreed approach. China has expended political capital in this regard. Interestingly, it removed Sudan from a list of countries for financial incentives for Chinese companies to invest in early March.
It remains to be seen whether these members will agree that quiet diplomacy may still yield results in terms of a clear agreement from Khartoum that is consistent with its existing commitments.
| Selected Security Council Resolutions |
|
| Selected Presidential Statement |
|
| Selected Secretary-General’s Reports |
|
| Other |
|
For the full historical background, please see our February and July 2006 as well as our March 2007 Forecasts.
Other Relevant Facts
| UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| Vacant |
| Special Envoy of the Secretary-General |
| Jan Eliasson (Sweden) |
| UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost |
|
| UNMIS: Duration |
| 24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007 |
| AU Special Envoy |
| Salim A. Salim |
| AMIS: Size and Composition |
|
| AMIS: Duration |
| 25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 1 July 2007 |
