The United Kingdom will preside over the Council in April. It is unclear whether any thematic debates will take place. Press reports have indicated a possibility of the Council’s holding a thematic debate on the impact of climate change on security issues, but no decision had been taken at press time. Climate change has been one of the issues Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has singled out as his priority early on in this tenure.

Open meetings of the Council in April will include the monthly briefing on the Middle East. There will also be several meetings adopting resolutions renewing mandates: on Georgia, renewing the mandate of UNOMIG; on the DRC renewing the mandate of MONUC; on Western Sahara renewing MINURSO’s mandate; and on Sudan, renewing the UNMIS mandate.

A private briefing by the Secretary-General on his trip to the Middle East is expected. It will provide an important focus for discussions on Lebanon and Darfur in particular. Similarly, the new Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, is expected to brief the Council on his trip to the conflict-torn Darfur region.

Consultations are expected on:
- Kosovo
- Burundi
- Chad and the Central African Republic
- Darfur
- Somalia
- Lebanon (reports on resolutions 1559 and 1701, respectively)
- Liberia (with a possibility of a resolution should the Council decide to end diamond sanctions); and
- The North Korea sanctions.

Important matters pending before the Council include:
- Implementation of the phased approach for Darfur as agreed in Abuja in November 2006 is lagging. In early March, Sudan responded to the heavy support package with a large number of objections. A more detailed AU-UN agreement on the hybrid operation as endorsed by the Council on 19 December is still pending.
- No action, as envisaged in resolution 1706 on Darfur, has been taken to impose “strong effective measures, such as asset freeze or travel ban, against any individual or group that violates or attempts to block the implementation of the [Darfur Peace] Agreement or commits human rights violations.” A number of proposals are being considered but divisions remain.
- Action on the Secretary-General’s recommendations for a peacekeeping force in Chad and the Central African Republic is still awaited, because of Chad’s concerns with the proposed robust military component.
- On Somalia, the Council is still to act on its threat “to consider taking measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful dialogue process, overthrow the Transitional Federal Institutions by force, or take action that further threatens regional stability” made in resolution 1744.
- On the DRC, the Council is still to consider imposing individual sanctions under resolutions 1596, 1649 and 1698 against armed groups’ commanders that recruit children and/or refuse to disarm. There seems to be strong momentum for that in April.
- The Council is still waiting for the Secretary-General’s recommendations on the status of the Sheb’a Farms. In his last report on implementation of resolution 1701 (issued on 14 March), the Secretary-General mentioned good progress on the cartographic analysis of the status of the farms, and said that the technical work would be completed by the next reporting period in mid-June.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- The 2005 World Summit requested reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
Kosovo
The Secretary-General’s Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari is expected to brief the Council early in the month. The United Kingdom, having played a key role in the formulation of resolution 1244 in 1999, would probably like to see significant progress on Kosovo during its presidency. Russia would prefer to delay Council action and give time for further negotiation. At this stage it is impossible to predict whether the Council will do anything in April beyond receiving the report and the briefing and consulting on timing and process. However, it is likely that a draft resolution will begin to circulate at least amongst small groups.

Western Sahara
The renewal of the MINURSO mandate in Western Sahara has been routine, with six-month extensions being expected and the stalemate on the ground continuing. This April, however, Council members may receive a Moroccan plan for extended autonomy for Western Sahara. This document has been expected since Morocco announced the possibility more than a year ago. The document has been informally presented in a number of capitals. But it remains unclear whether it will be formally transmitted to the Council and if it is, whether Council members will have sufficient time to study it before MINURSO’s mandate expires at the end of the month. Another issue outside the recent routine is growing concern about the human rights situation. A recent report by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights revealed severe cases of violations by Morocco in Western Sahara as well as breaches by Polisario in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria. Parallels with the Kosovo dossier may also play a role in how the parties and some Council members view any Moroccan proposal.

Democratic Republic of the Congo
After a two-month technical rollover of the mandate of MONUC, the Council will again face the question of how to preserve the very fragile peace in the DRC. There have been several troubling developments, including clashes between supporters of President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba in the capital late in March and the displacement of thousands of people in the country. The Council will need to face the question of whether any reduction in the size of MONUC would be prudent at this stage. Examples of other missions prematurely downsized, notably that in Timor-Leste, will be on members’ minds. The issue of sanctions to target peace spoilers, which has been on a back-burner for months, may also receive renewed attention.

Lebanon
The Council postponed its consideration of the 1701 report, originally planned for March, until April, in order to hear the Secretary-General’s observations on his Middle East trip prior to that discussion. Much will depend on the outcome of the Arab League Summit and on whether any of the current diplomatic initiatives will be successful in brokering a political agreement between the government and the opposition. If that fails and the crisis worsens, the Council may decide to look for ways to pressure the factions, keeping within the spirit and language of resolution 1701 which gives it a role in seeking long-term solutions. The Council will also need to decide what to do about various instances of violations of resolution 1701 described in the most recent Secretary-General’s report.

Iran
In mid-March the P5 plus Germany agreed on a draft resolution tightening sanctions on Iran by imposing a ban on arms sales and expanding the list of individuals and entities subject to asset freeze. The P5 strategy of working sequentially, first between themselves and only subsequently with the E10, received a setback when South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar asserted the right for negotiating space and incorporation of their own ideas in the resolution, delaying adoption by several days. On Saturday, 24 March, the resolution was unanimously adopted with minor changes to the original draft, such as reference to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction and additional language on resuming negotiations in good faith and coming to a long-term agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. This seems to signal that incremental pressure will continue until Iran is ready to make a significant compromise to open the way for negotiations. However, Iran declared the resolution illegal and said it would reduce cooperation with the IAEA in response to it.

Darfur
The Council seems to be very close to the end of the road in trying to deal with Sudan over the implementation of the AU agreed package of support for AMIS and deployment of a robust hybrid operation. Work is actually underway by a number of members on a sanctions package and this seems increasingly likely to dominate discussions on Sudan and Darfur during April.

Kosovo
Expected Council Action
Martti Ahtisaari, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, completed his final recommendations in late March. On 26 March, the Secretary-General transmitted Ahtisaari’s final proposal to the Council along with Ahtisaari’s conclusions and recommendations and his own letter supportive of both documents. In early April Ahtisaari is expected to present both documents in closed consultations of the Council. Discussions on how to proceed commenced in late March in the context of finalising the monthly programme of work and will probably continue into April. On substance, it seems likely that some Council members will begin drafting a new resolution in April, but it is uncertain when it will be considered in detail.

Key Recent Developments
Ahtisaari held his final meeting on the future status process for Kosovo with representatives from Belgrade and Pristina on 10 March. This was the culmination of two intense weeks of consultations on Ahtisaari’s initial proposal. Ahtisaari and his team held 17 rounds of direct talks and made 26 missions to Belgrade and Pristina in 13 months while trying to come to a negotiated agreement.

Following the 10 March meeting, Ahtisaari incorporated 11 pages of amendments into his final package, which he presented to the Secretary-General on 15 March. In his report, Ahtisaari recommended independence, supervised by the international community, and asked the Council to endorse the Kosovo Status Settlement proposal upon which independence will be based.

The Contact Group on Kosovo (the US, the UK, France, Italy, Russia and Germany) was briefed by Ahtisaari on 9 March. At the time of writing, the Group was expected to meet on 28 March in London to discuss both issues of procedure and substance concerning the final status package.

In the latest UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) report published on 9 March, the Secretary-General said that Kosovo needed clarity on its future and called on the international community to move towards a timely conclusion of Kosovo’s future status political process.

On 9 March the Serbian foreign minister warned that Kosovo’s independence could lead to nationalists loyal to the late Slobodan Milosevic rising up again.
NATO has said it is ready to continue providing security in Kosovo under the Ahtisaari plan to protect both Serbs and ethnic Albanians. The EU has given support to the proposal. However, two EU members, Greece and Slovakia, seem to support further negotiations before the Council comes to a decision. EU preparation to replace UNMIK seems to be well advanced.

Russia is concerned that the Council should not rush into a decision on the Ahtisaari proposals. It considers that there is still room for a negotiated solution.

Options
Once it receives Ahtisaari’s report the Council has several options:
- moving toward discussion of a draft resolution that would impose the Ahtisaari recommendations;
- holding an initial round of general discussions in informal consultations on reactions to the Ahtisaari recommendations, but deferring consideration of specific proposals for Council action for a short period (e.g. 21 days) pending further consultations in the Contact Group and with the parties;
- deciding after initial general reactions in informal consultations to establish a high-level Council working group, with a mandate for a fixed period, to meet with the parties in a sustained and intensive process to discuss elements that might be generally agreeable for a draft resolution;
- deferring action on the Ahtisaari recommendations for a longer period (e.g. ninety days) to allow for bilateral and regional discussions and to give the Contact Group additional space to explore a negotiated outcome; and

Status Update since our March Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in our March Forecast are covered in the relevant briefs in this issue. However, other interesting Council developments in March included:

- **Small Arms**: The lapsed draft resolution on small arms circulated in March 2006, compounded by the lack of Council action on this issue, has left the Secretariat for some time without a mandate to produce periodic reports. However, a draft presidential statement is currently in circulation and will possibly be adopted by month’s end. The draft statement calls for a report from the Secretary-General on small arms within the next six months.
- **Women, Peace and Security**: On 7 March, the eve of International Women’s Day, the Council adopted a presidential statement condemning violence against women and girls in conflict. In addition, the statement reaffirmed women’s role in peacebuilding and stressed the importance of increasing women’s participation in decision-making in peacekeeping operations as well as at the national and local levels. (S/PRST/2007/5)
- **Iraq**: On 7 March the Council held consultations on the latest UNMOVIC report (S/2007/106). South Africa, Council president in March, announced to the media that the US and UK are drafting a resolution to terminate the mandate which may be circulated in the coming weeks. On 15 March the Council was briefed on UNAMI and the MNF (SC/8971). The Secretary-General’s latest report was also under consideration (S/2007/126).
- **Great Lakes Region**: Ibrahima Fall, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, briefed the Council on 9 March prior to the expiration of his office’s final mandate on 31 March. Fall stressed that quick implementation of the December 2006 Nairobi Security Pact and the establishment of a regional secretariat were vital goals and the Council should support efforts toward ratifying the Pact (SC/8968).
- **Côte d’Ivoire**: The Council issued a press statement (SC/8970) on 14 March in support of the 4 March agreement (S/2007/144) signed by Côte d’Ivoire’s president and opposition leader in Ouagadougou. The Secretary-General’s latest report recommended engaging with the parties on the UN’s role in helping implement the Ouagadougou agreement (S/2007/133).
- **West Africa**: The Council held consultations on 16 March to discuss the 13 March report from the Secretary-General on cross-border issues in West Africa, originally expected at the end of 2006 (S/2007/143). With little time for Council members to analyse the report and form positions, the consultations yielded no outcome. It is unclear when and in what context the Council will consider the issue again. (Please see our 15 March Update.)
- **Uganda**: On 22 March the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, Joaquim Chissano, briefed the Council under the agenda item “Great Lakes Region (LRA)” on the latest developments in the peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA. The Council adopted a presidential statement expressing support for the Special Envoy and the resumed peace talks (S/PRST/2007/6). (Please see our 20 March Update.)
- **Afghanistan**: On 23 March the Council extended UNAMA’s mandate for 12 months in resolution 1746 as recommended in the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2007/152). A briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative Tom Koenigs and Antonio Maria Costa of UNODC on 20 March urged the Council to support the Afghanistan National Development Strategy and the Secretary-General’s recommendations to address corruption in government institutions, border control and the drug trade.
- **Iran**: On 24 March the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1747 tightening sanctions on Iran and requesting a report from the IAEA within sixty days.
- **Regional Organisations, Chapter VIII**: On 28 March the Council will hold an open debate, initiated by the March presidency of South Africa and chaired by the South African foreign minister, on the relationship between the UN and regional organisations (S/2007/148). A presidential statement is expected to place particular emphasis on the relationship between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council in light of current peace and security challenges in Africa. (Please see our 23 March Update.)
- **Guinea-Bissau**: On 29 March the Council will hold consultations on the latest UNOGBIS report from the Secretary-General (S/2007/158). The potential instability stemming from a recent no-confidence motion by Guinea-Bissau’s parliament against the prime minister will be on Council members’ minds as they consider the report.
- **Liberia**: On 30 March the Council is expected to renew UNMIL’s mandate. The Secretary-General’s latest report recommended a one-year extension and continued cooperation between UNMIL and UNOCI (S/2007/151).
- **Zimbabwe**: At press time OCHA was expected to brief the Council on the humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe. South Africa, as president of the Council for March, seemed less convinced that there were international peace and security implications but did not oppose the Council being briefed.
applying some of the Ahtisaari recommendations immediately and deferring other elements for consideration after a defined period (e.g., six months) and establishing a negotiating process for the interim period.

**Key Issues**

The key issue which is emerging for April is timing. It seems likely that this will be played out initially in the discussions in late March and first days of April on the Programme of Work for the month of April.

On the one hand, there is a risk of violence if the Council takes too long to make a decision. As the Secretary-General has pointed out, radical groups could exploit public dissatisfaction with delays in the process. This could lead not only to inter-ethnic violence but also to violence directed against the international presence in Kosovo.

On the other hand, a peremptory Council decision to impose an outcome without even tacit Serbian support could be equally destabilising and could lack the legitimacy and effectiveness necessary for a long-term solution.

The second key issue is the substantive question of principle that continues to concern many Council members. Can the Council impose a decision effectively shrinking the territorial boundaries of a member state either directly, or by affecting the constitutional order within a state, so that a geographical unit of the state could unilaterally determine an independent status for itself? A related question is whether the Council should do so given the potential precedent for other regions where breakaway groups are demanding independence. (In April there are two other situations on the Council’s agenda, Western Sahara and Georgia, where similar issues are in play and where the repercussions of the Kosovo decision could have some impact.)

The third issue is whether there is any realistic prospect that some delay for further discussion and negotiations might produce consent or at least tacit acquiescence. If so, what face-saving changes or substantive alterations might need to be incorporated in any Security Council resolutions?

Finally, in the background, there is the issue of how UNMIK would cope if the security situation deteriorates. UNMIK has downsized significantly pending the status decision. If a decision on Kosovo is likely to be delayed then the Council may have to consider equipping UNMIK for a more unstable security situation.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

In the last month there have been a number of closed-door informal meetings on Kosovo led by the P3 (the US, the UK and France), which advocate for moving forward quickly towards the status decision. The UK will be both president of the Council and of the Contact Drafting Group in April, and it seems likely that they will take the lead in drafting a resolution.

On the other hand, Russia would like to see the Council viewing Ahtisaari’s package as one further step in a process that should continue until both sides can agree on a solution. Their position was asserted very strongly during and after the discussion of the UNMIK report in March with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative, Joachim Rücker, on the receiving end of very blunt comments. Russia seems to prefer to continue discussions elsewhere rather than moving to the Council in April. China is also partial to a longer timeline for the Council’s final decision to give the parties more time to come to a negotiated solution.

Some of the elected members, including Indonesia and some African members are concerned about what they perceive as unnecessary haste to make a decision on Kosovo. The implications for territorial integrity are clearly a worry for them.

**Underlying Problems**

The final status recommendation could have human rights implications. Forced displacement is possible if the situation turns violent. Some human rights groups are also concerned that while Ahtisaari’s package deals comprehensively with the rights of the Serbian minorities, there are other minorities like the Roma, Bosnians and Turks whose concerns have been neglected.

**UN Documents**

Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FYR) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.
- S/PRST/2004/13 (30 April 2004) reaffirmed strong support for the policy of “standards before status.”

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports/Letters**

- S/2007/168 and add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting Ahtisaari’s report on Kosovo’s future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.
- S/2007/134 (9 March 2007) was the latest report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK.
- S/2007/130 (6 March 2007) was the letter reporting on the operations of the Kosovo Force from 1 to 31 December 2006.

**Darfur/Sudan**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to take up in April a response to Sudan’s negative stance on peacekeeping in Darfur. A briefing by Under Secretary-General John Holmes on his visit to the region on 21-22 March may also

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

Joachim Rücker (Germany)

**UNMIK**

- Size of UNMIK mission: 37 military observers, 2,028 police, 506 international staff; 146 UN volunteers
- Size of OSCE mission: 252 international staff, 768 local staff
- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

**KFOR (NATO FORCE)**

General Roland Kather (Germany)

**Size and Composition of Mission**

- Size: 16,300 troops
- NATO Countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- Non-NATO Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Mongolia, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine
stress the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation. At press time, members were awaiting results of a number of diplomatic initiatives. These include the visits of UN envoy Jan Eliasson to the region and by the presidents of Nigeria and South Africa to Sudan, and the Secretary-General’s attendance at the Arab League Summit on 28-29 March.

Discussions on sanctions are likely. The upcoming briefing of the Sanctions Committee’s Panel of Experts will provide a focus. It is unclear whether and when Council action on sanctions will be considered. At press time, the UK seemed ready to present a draft resolution.

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), which expires on 30 April. The regular Secretary-General’s report is due.

**Key Recent Developments**

Open conflict between rebels and the government (including the Janjaweed) and targeting of civilians continue. Reports suggest a further upsurge in intercommunal violence. Camps for the internally displaced are reaching full capacity. Two AU Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) soldiers were killed.

On 6 March, the Secretary-General sent a letter to Khartoum with the terms of reference of an AU-UN joint special representative. It also contained the operation’s initial framework, including:
- **mandate:** protection of civilians and tasks assigned by the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and existing AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) decisions;
- **size:** 19,000-20,000 troops, 3,772 police officers and 19 formed police units, preferably African; and
- UN funding, with the understanding that financial management and oversight mechanisms will be put in place and the AU will be responsible for prior liabilities.

An AU-UN draft agreement on a joint concept of operations and mission plan is well developed.

Khartoum replied to the 24 January heavy-support proposal with complaints that it “reveals the existence of essential differences in the understanding of the nature and objectives” of UN support. The response contained many objections based on the position that “the [DPA] is the framework and reference” for support packages.

In particular, the government objected to:
- the three engineering companies;
- the light aviation unit and helicopters for protection of civilians;
- an air reconnaissance unit;
- moving AMIS into three sectors (involving deployment of two additional AMIS battalions as authorised by the AU PSC); and
- deploying police in areas controlled by the government.

The letter seems to ignore the November AU agreement on the phased approach. Nor does it refer to the fact that AMIS already has a protection of civilians mandate as established by the AU PSC in June 2006 following the signing of the DPA.

Sudan stressed that the UN should provide only “technical, logistical and financial expertise and civil and military consultants” and that AU forces must remain under AU command and control. It suggested that the AU-UN-Sudan tripartite mechanism be used to harmonise positions. This mechanism operates by consensus.

At a Sanctions Committee meeting in early March, there was a preliminary exchange of ideas on the possibility of sanctions. The EU called for new Council measures and the US continued to signal unilateral sanctions.

The Secretary-General considered Khartoum’s response “not satisfactory” and underlined that the proposal was done in accordance with the [November 2006] Addis Ababa and Abuja Agreements, and was not a matter to “revisit or reinterpret”.

Council consultations were held on 19 March with a briefing by Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno. He stressed that there is still a “long way to go” and that the Council must play a role in overcoming Sudan’s misgivings.

UN envoy Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on 6 March on his efforts alongside AU envoy Salim A. Salim to re-energise the political process. Eliasson reportedly stressed the need for an immediate ceasefire and guarantees of humanitarian access.

The situation in south Sudan remains fragile. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was reviewed at a donors’ conference on 19-21 March, with special attention on spill-over effects from Darfur. CPA implementation is moving slowly and faces considerable difficulties with:

- setting up key commissions and related legislation;
- increasing the pace of southern development;
- progress with victims’ compensation, new oil contracts and transfer of oil revenues;
- disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and
- following up on the Abyei boundary issue.

### Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

The report of the high-level mission on Darfur was released on 7 March. Indonesian Ambassador Marakim Wibisono withdrew from the mission once it became clear that Khartoum would not issue visas.

The report notes gross and systematic human rights violations from all sides and that Khartoum “has manifestly failed to protect the population of Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation of the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has become evident and urgent.” It recommends, *inter alia*, the establishment of a strong human rights monitoring mechanism, the full implementation of the phased approach and of the Security Council sanctions regime.

The Human Rights Council opened its fourth session on 12 March. The Secretary-General underscored existing pressure on the Council saying that the “world is watching to see whether this young Council will live up to its promise”.

Sudan, Russia, China as well as the Arab Group, the Asian Group and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference opposed consideration of the report. Western and several African states, notably Zambia, Nigeria and various others supported it. At press time, two draft resolutions have been circulated: one critical of Sudan presented by Germany and a much milder one by Algeria. The Council was expected to take action by 30 March.
Options
The Security Council could:

- continue with diplomatic pressure on Sudan to realise its November 2006 commitments;
- add a sanctions dimension, perhaps with the extension of the arms embargo to the entire Sudan and strengthening of the no-fly zone; and
- reopen the agreement on a phased approach to a hybrid operation (this option is highly unlikely).

Adopting a wider sanctions package may in the short-term stiffen Sudan’s resolve. It may also suggest that the viability of a negotiated approach has been exhausted for the time being. Strengthening and enforcing a no-fly zone presents huge challenges, particularly with obtaining assets from willing member states and cooperation from neighbouring countries, especially Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic.

Another option is to tailor a milder sanctions package limited to additions to the targeted sanctions list. In practice, unilateral sanctions now seem increasingly likely.

Other options are:

- finalising and formally endorsing the hybrid operation proposal;
- endorsing reactivation of the Darfur peace process, perhaps with a deadline for an immediate ceasefire and increases in humanitarian access to be verified by the sanctions Panel of Experts; and
- threatening meaningful sanctions in case the deadline is not observed.

Key Issues
Khartoum’s response to the heavy support package seems to signal that Sudan has no intention of honouring the earlier agreement on the deployment of a robust hybrid operation with protection of civilians at its core. It also suggests that Khartoum intends to prevaricate by indefinitely blocking implementation of the phased approach.

The issue for the Council is therefore whether and when alternative avenues of Council action should be explored; bearing in mind that punitive measures could render the phased approach impossible and undermine UN peacemaking efforts in the short-term.

A parallel issue is how to re-establish a peace process in Darfur, and whether to focus on this as a means to make progress with the phased approach. (However in 2005, the same was being said about the Abuja peace negotiations.)

A third issue is the future of UNMIS. It involves reconciling support for the CPA with the possibility that this has provided Khartoum with additional leverage to undermine Council pressure on Darfur and to pursue a military policy.

There are also a number of open issues on the phased approach, in particular:

- finalising the hybrid operation proposal, including AU-UN agreement on mandate, size, cost, command and control, and ensuring that UN accountability, procurement and managerial standards are in place, particularly in view of the need to secure funding commitment from the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee; and
- encouraging UN troop generation for the heavy support (2,250 troops and 675 police) and the hybrid operation (17,300 military and 5,000 police).

Council Dynamics
Members appear divided on how best to react to Khartoum’s misgivings about the phased approach. The US and the UK in particular, alongside France, Ghana, Italy and Panama seem to support sanctions.

These members do not appear to have given up the phased approach. But there is a perception that Sudan’s response made it clear that stronger pressure—including sanctions—is needed since Khartoum appears to be ready to indefinitely stall fulfilling its commitments.

Most members have indicated that reopening the phased approach is unacceptable.

China, Russia, South Africa, Qatar and Indonesia continue to be reluctant about sanctions. These members seem to prefer allowing more time for Khartoum to clarify the substance of its concerns and continue with dialogue. There may also be pressure to delay action until (if and when) there is consensus that the Panel has been able to demonstrate violations of resolution 1591.

On the other hand, Khartoum’s most recent response may have proven to be too much for even some of these members, especially revisiting the already agreed approach. China has expended political capital in this regard. Interestingly, it removed Sudan from a list of countries for financial incentives for Chinese companies to invest in early March.

It remains to be seen whether these members will agree that quiet diplomacy may still yield results in terms of a clear agreement from Khartoum that is consistent with its existing commitments.

UN Documents

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) set a mandate for UNMIS in Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions in Darfur.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/RES/1590 (24 March 2005) established UNMIS.</td>
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<th>Selected Presidential Statement</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/2007/104 (23 February 2007) was the latest monthly report on Darfur at press time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2006/591 (28 July 2006) and Add. 1 (28 August 2006) and S/2006/645 (10 August 2006) made recommendations for UNMIS’ mandate in Darfur and for UN assistance to AMIS.</td>
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<tr>
<td>A/HRC/4/80 (7 March 2007) was the report of the Human Rights Council’s high-level mission to Darfur.</td>
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<td>S-4/101 (13 December 2006) was the Human Rights Council Darfur decision.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2006/961 (6 December 2006) contained the 30 November AU PSC communiqué endorsing the phased approach.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S/2006/795 (2 October 2006) was the latest Panel of Experts’ report.</td>
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For full historical background, please see our February, July and January 2006 and March 2007 Forecasts.
Other Relevant Facts

UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Vacant

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
Jan Eliasson (Sweden)

UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost
- Maximum authorised strength: up to 27,300 military and 6,015 police
- Strength as of 28 February 2007: 9,336 military and 642 police
- Key troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, Egypt and China
- Cost: 1 July 2006-30 June 2007 $1,126.30 million (excludes Darfur)

UNMIS: Duration
24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2007

AU Special Envoy
Salim A. Salim

AMIS: Size and Composition
- Total authorised strength: about 10,000 military and 1,500 police
- Strength as of 1 September 2006: 5,703 military and 1,425 police
- Key troop contributors: Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal

AMIS: Duration
25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 1 July 2007

Chad/Central African Republic

Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to continue discussions of the proposed UN operation in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). Members seem to have adopted a wait-and-see approach for the time being, as Chad and the Secretariat are expected to consult with a view to agreement on the proposed operation’s size and structure.

A briefing by Under Secretary-General John Holmes on the humanitarian situation in the region in April may be a basis for Council members to review the protection needs of civilians and assess the respective responsibilities.

Key Recent Developments
Despite some progress with peace talks involving some of the rebel groups in Chad and the CAR, the security situation in both countries continues to present grave threats to civilians.

In Chad, there are now 120,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs), plus 200,000 Darfuran and 46,000 CAR refugees. Humanitarian access is constrained and diminishing. The implementation of a peace accord signed in late December under Libyan auspices between the government and one of the rebel groups, the United Front for Change (FUC), seems to have made progress with the appointment of FUC leader Mahamat Nour Abdelkerim as defence minister, but violence continues.

In the CAR, hit-and-run rebel attacks continued. The situation in the northwest seems to be worsening. CAR forces with French support managed to regain control over the northeastern town of Birao from the rebel group Union des forces démocratiques pour le rassemblement (UFDR). It is unclear whether UFDR leaders, currently in prison in Benin, will sign on to a peace agreement concluded in early February between the government and other rebel leaders in Libya.

Chad has blocked the deployment of the UN advance mission approved by the Council on 16 January and so far opposes a UN operation with a robust military component. N’Djamena prefers instead a civilian presence consisting of police and gendarmes in refugee and IDP camps.

At Council consultations on 23 March, Chad reiterated that position but indicated willingness to reach a negotiated agreement on the proposed operation’s size and structure.

Chadian and Sudanese representatives reportedly met on 10 March in Tehran to continue talks to normalise bilateral relations. It was reportedly agreed that an Iranian technical assistance team on regional issues would go to Chad and Sudan. The meeting came as the latest in a series of efforts, particularly from Libya, to improve Chadian-Sudanese relations. However, in the absence of improvements in the situation on the ground, deep scepticism remains.

Options
In the absence of Chad’s consent to the operation, available options for the Council include:
- actively engaging with Chad to reach a negotiated outcome;
- upping the ante by authorising a robust operation and inviting consent (along the lines of resolution 1706); and
- authorising an essentially civilian operation.

The first option could be undertaken by the Council Working Group on Peacekeeping. The second option runs the risk of initiating a deadlock similar to the one regarding Darfur. The third option runs the risk of not only creating an ineffective and dangerous operation, but also encouraging behaviour similar to that of Chad and Sudan in the future.

Other options include:
- adopting a wait-and-see approach while supporting a firm engagement of Chad by key players, especially some of the P5 and the Secretariat;
- adopting a resolution simply affirming the Council’s willingness to authorise a robust operation; and
- reinforcing the view that the establishment of a political process is an important step towards regional and domestic stability and for the mission’s exit strategy.

Key Issues
The key issue is how best to address Chad’s concerns about a UN operation.

It in turn raises a number of related issues, including:
- whether key Council members—France in particular—will be willing to push N’Djamena to accept the force with the kind of robustness recommended by the Secretary-General;
- how best to address the opposition of regional players to robust peacekeeping in Chad and Darfur, particularly from Libya, Sudan and Eritrea;
- whether to make concessions on the military component’s size; and
- the wider questions that the precedents in Darfur and Chad may create for future UN peacekeeping.

Another key issue is how to maintain momentum for firmly encouraging a domestic political process in Chad. This seems to have become sidelined as a result of Chad’s opposition to the operation. This in turn raises questions related to any future mission’s viability and exit strategy.
Council and Wider Dynamics
The Council now seems focused on how to encourage Chad to consent to the UN operation. At press time, members seemed convinced that no operation can be deployed without a military component to back up the civilian presence.

France and some African members seem to be advancing the idea of adopting a resolution indicating the Council’s support for a future operation. There also seems to be preliminary interest within the Council in sending another technical assessment mission in light of the 23 March consultations.

Positions are yet to be tested should N’Djamena’s opposition to the military component continue. It is possible that the same divisions in the Council on Darfur could be mirrored in Council dynamics on Chad. In particular, some, such as China, Russia, Qatar, Indonesia, Congo and South Africa, may be uncomfortable with going so far as to repeat the 1706 model. France has publicly supported a united international diplomatic effort to bring about consent.

Members are aware of the influence of regional players on Chad’s position. Libya, Sudan and Eritrea appear to have a wider agenda against UN deployments in the region and are highlighting various meetings and manoeuvres to suggest that the security situation is improving in the region.

The Chadian government, observers note, has little incentive to consent to a robust operation. The deployment of a UN mission could expose or constrain Chadian support for Darfuri rebels and lead to pressure for reforms in the country’s domestic political situation, including on human rights violations.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was the new report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was the latest BONUCA report.
- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.

Historical Background
February 2007 The Secretary-General presented finalised options on a UN operation in Chad and the CAR. In Libya, Chad and Sudan agreed to re-energise the Tripoli Agreement and the CAR government and the UFDR signed a peace deal. Chad opposed the deployment of the UN advance mission and of an operation with a robust military contingent.

January 2007 The Council requested finalised options on a UN operation in Chad and the CAR.

December 2006 Cautioning against deployment without a political process, the Secretary-General unveiled preliminary options on a UN operation in Chad and CAR. Chad signed a peace deal with the FUC under Libyan auspices.

August 2006 The Council adopted resolution 1706.

June 2006 A Council mission visited Chad and Sudan. Chad requested to brief the Council on Sudan’s support for Chadian rebels.

April 2006 Chadian rebels attacked N’Djamena.

8 February 2006 Chad and Sudan signed the Tripoli Agreement.

Late 2005 Spill-over from the conflict in Darfur into Chad increased significantly. Chadian rebels began an offensive against the government in the east. Chad and Sudan openly traded accusations of rebel support.

Other Relevant Facts
CAR: Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Lamine Cissé (Senegal)

BONUCA: Size and Composition
- Current strength: 380 troops
- Contributors: Gabon, Republic of Congo and Chad

FOMUC: Duration
October 2002 to present; mandate expires 30 June 2007

Lebanon
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to take up Lebanon twice during April. Consultations on the Secretary-General’s report on the implementation of resolution 1701 were postponed from March to early April, so as to hear the Secretary-General’s account of his visit to the region. For further details visit our March Forecast.

In the second half of April, the Council is expecting the Secretary-General’s report on implementation of resolution 1559.

Both reports are expected to be discussed in informal consultations and presidential statements are likely in both cases.

Key Recent Developments
The report on implementation of resolution 1701 was released on 14 March. It noted the following.
- The near full deployment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).
- Violations of the Blue Line by both sides during the 7 February incident.
- An increase of Israeli over-flights of Lebanese airspace. (Israel claims these flights are justified because the captured Israeli soldiers have not been released and the arms embargo is not fully implemented.)
- UNIFIL and the LAF had not detected illegal transfers of arms south of the Litani River.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1706 (31 August 2006) mandated a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR and requested recommendations.

Selected Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) renewed BONUCA.
Hezbollah openly acknowledges conducting armed activities.

Israel has briefed UNIFIL several times on alleged serious breaches of the arms embargo on the Syrian-Lebanese border. (This is denied by Lebanese officials and remains to be verified.)

Israel’s failure to provide detailed data about the location of cluster munitions used during last summer’s conflict.

A lack of progress on the release of Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah.

Analysis of cartographic material on the status of the Sheb’a Farms is currently underway. The technical work is expected to be completed by mid-June.

The Secretary-General suggested that the Council consider an independent assessment mission to assess options for monitoring the Syrian-Lebanese border. He also urged neighbours, Syria in particular, to do everything they can to help implement resolution 1701.

The current political crisis in Lebanon entered its fourth month in March. Two core issues continue to divide the majority and the opposition: establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and power sharing between the opposition: establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and power sharing within the government. (The opposition is demanding a veto power in the cabinet.)

The president of parliament Nabih Berri, representing the opposition, and the majority leader Saad Hariri opened a political dialogue on 8 March. There seems to be some optimism that a solution to the political crisis could be found before or at the Arab League Summit on 28-29 March in Riyadh.

There has been supportive diplomatic activity in the region reinforcing efforts to find a solution to the Lebanese domestic crisis.

On 3 March, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad met with Saudi King Abdullah in Riyadh. The meeting did not produce a specific outcome but it seems to have been a helpful development.

On 12 March, the EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana went to Lebanon, then to Saudi Arabia and Syria. He stressed that the solution to the current political stalemate had to be a Lebanese one.

Finally, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Iraq, Egypt, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon (but not Syria).

On 21 March, Serge Brammertz, the head of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) on the Hariri assassination, presented his report to the Council. He was optimistic that the Commission would have a “unifying theory” soon for all bombings in Lebanon, but that it was unlikely that the work would be completed by the next reporting period in June. He also noted progress on the motives behind the Hariri assassination, and on the identity of the suicide bomber. Brammertz also cleared away a negative element which has been in the air since January. He noted that the ten previously uncooperative states had responded positively to his requests for cooperation and all outstanding matters were resolved. At press time Council consideration of a resolution to extend the UNIIIC mandate by twelve months seems to be proceeding smoothly—another positive sign.

Finally, Syrian members of the Islamic militant group Fatah al-Islam, based in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon have confessed to the bombing of two buses in February. There have been tensions between this group and refugees in the camp.

Options

The Council has the following options:

- use the early April session to approve a presidential statement designed to positively reinforce the current momentum;
- defer until later in the month how to take up the more difficult aspects of resolutions 1559 and 1701 (when it might be much clearer whether current efforts are bearing fruit);
- apply a strict approach (especially if progress is minimal) to compliance by all parties—in a balanced way—with resolutions 1559 and 1701;
- take up the Secretary-General’s proposal for an independent assessment mission to analyse how better to prevent breaches of the arms embargo;
- urge Israel to phase out its over-flights and perhaps set a series of benchmarks for this.

Key Issues

The main issue at press time is whether the Arab League Summit and other current diplomatic initiatives will help broker a political agreement between the opposition and the Lebanese government. The related issue for the Council is whether to delay taking stock of progress toward the implementation of resolutions 1559 and 1701 until later in April.

The second issue is what to do if there is no progress—or if the domestic crisis worsens. It remains to be seen whether the Council would be ready to pressure Lebanese factions to find an agreement. In the past, both the Council and the Secretary-General seemed to believe that progress could only take place through a political process. But resolution 1701 put the Council and the Secretary-General more squarely in the spotlight, giving them both an important role in finding a “long-term solution”.

As a longer-term goal, the Council will also be looking at the issue of progress on disarming militias.

The fourth issue, and perhaps also one for later in April, is what to do about the incidents described in the report on resolution 1701, including the Israeli over-flights, the delay in delineation of the Syrian-Lebanese border, the reports of arms moving across the border and Blue Line violations. It remains to be seen whether the 1559 report will provide more evidence. A related issue is how to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border. The possibility of deploying UN peacekeepers along the border was raised in the press recently, but the Lebanese government has not made that request yet and Syria had already indicated in the past that it would object.

Finally, there is the impact of the sanctions resolution on Iran. The resolution prohibits Iran selling or exporting any substantial arms. This will restrict the flow of arms to Hezbollah and place additional pressure on Syria to not only stop any smuggling across its borders but prevent entry of Iranian arms cargos to its territory.

Council Dynamics

Council members are hopeful that a Lebanese political agreement can be found. Many expressed such expectation during the 14 March briefing on the Middle East.

Most members still prefer that the issues of disarmament and presidential elections be
addressed in the framework of a Lebanese political dialogue. As long as there are signs of progress there is some reluctance to put pressure on the parties at this stage.

However, the arms embargo breaches are progressively becoming a bone of contention. The US tends to share Israel’s concerns and Russia tends to support Syria. If the Secretary-General’s report again contains unverified information about arms smuggling into Lebanon, as in the last 1559 report, Russia and possibly others may protest that in the absence of evidence, it should not be mentioned in the report.

**UN Documents on Implementation of Resolution 1559**

### Resolutions

- **S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006)** encouraged Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border and called for further efforts to disband and disarm Hezbollah and to restore fully Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory.
- **S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004)** urged all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias to be disbanded and disarmed. It also supported the extension of the Government of Lebanon’s control over all Lebanese territory and a free and fair electoral process.

### Secretary-General’s Reports on Implementation of Resolution 1559

- **S/2006/832 (19 October 2006)**
- **S/2006/248 (19 April 2006)**
- **S/2005/673 (26 October 2005)**
- **S/2005/272 (29 April 2005)**
- **S/2004/777 (1 October 2004)**

### Presidential Statements on Implementation of Resolution 1559

- **S/PRST/2006/43 (30 October 2006)**
- **S/PRST/2006/3 (23 January 2006)**
- **S/PRST/2005/26 (22 June 2005)**
- **S/PRST/2005/17 (4 May 2005)**
- **S/PRST/2004/36 (19 October 2004)**

**Security Council Resolution**

- **S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006)** called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL and extended the mandate until 31 August 2007.

**Latest Presidential Statement**

- **S/PRST/2006/52 (12 December 2006)** welcomed the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1701 and reiterated its support for the current Lebanese government.

**Latest Report of the Secretary-General on Resolution 1701**

- **S/2007/147 (14 March 2007)**

**Selected UN Documents on UNIIIC**

### Security Council Resolutions

- **S/RES/1686 (15 June 2006)** extended UNIIIC’s mandate by one year.
- **S/RES/1664 (29 March 2006)** requested negotiation with Lebanon on a tribunal of international character.
- **S/RES/1644 (15 December 2005)** authorised expanded technical assistance to Lebanon and extended UNIIIC’s mandate until 15 June 2006.
- **S/RES/1636 (31 October 2005)** urged Syria to cooperate with the investigation and established sanctions against suspects in the Hariri assassination.
- **S/RES/1595 (7 April 2005)** established UNIIIC.

**Latest UNIIIC Report**

- **S/2007/150 (15 March 2007)**

**Other Relevant Facts**

### Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559

- **Terje Røed-Larsen (Norway)**

### Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon

- **Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)**

### UNIFIL Force Commander

- **Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)**

**Size and Composition of UNIFIL**

- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (as of 15 March 2007): 12,764 military personnel, including 176 staff officers, 10,828 troops and 1,474 maritime task force
- Troop-contributing countries:

**Useful Additional Sources**


**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

**Expected Council Action**

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by 15 April. It is unclear whether downsizing will be mandated. A further technical rollover is an option.

Progress is possible with targeted sanctions under resolutions 1596 and 1649. Members expect the second Group of Experts’ mid-term report by 20 April. The Sanctions Committee may also meet with the Group and the Secretariat to discuss conclusions of their reports on economic sanctions.

**Key Recent Developments**

The situation in the DRC remains fragile. Violent incidents were reported in February and March. Recruitment of child soldiers and widespread human rights violations by militia and Congolese security forces continue.

Supporters of President Joseph Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba clashed in western DRC in early February, leaving 77 dead, and again in late March in Kinshasa. In eastern DRC, fighting between Congolese armed forces and the *Forces démocratiques pour
la libération du Rwanda (FDLR) flared, leading to the displacement of 10,000 persons.

The March report of the Secretary-General on MONUC contained recommendations on MONUC’s post-transition mandate:
- contributing to security sector reform (SSR);
- building a stable environment and protecting civilians;
- consolidating democracy;
- safeguarding human rights; and
- providing support for the upcoming local elections.

Cautioning against immediate drawdown in view of the fragile security situation and upcoming elections, the report recommended a strength of 17,030 troops, 760 observers, 391 police advisers and 750 formed police until 31 December 2007. Drawdown benchmarks would be recommended in November 2007.

The latest report of the Group of Experts to the Sanctions Committee in late November 2006 indicates that there is a “clear geographical correlation” between militia activity and the exploitation of natural resources in eastern DRC. The report also underlined challenges from the lack of security and transparency, and widespread extortion from government officials.

The Group recommended:
- imposing reporting obligations on Kinshasa regarding natural resources;
- appointing a steering committee to oversee the formation of a control system, including a certification scheme; and
- establishing a new targeted sanctions regime on the basis of violations of relevant Congolese law.

The Secretariat’s 9 February report on the effects of economic sanctions, however, concluded that targeted measures specifically for the DRC would have only marginal effect given the weak regulatory environment, the possible lack of enforcement and the availability of other agents to fill the vacuum. It cautioned against sanctions given that the government has only recently been elected and that there could be negative effects for local miners.

Instead, the report recommended public and private efforts to:
- promote SSR and good governance;
- ensure transparent and law-abiding business practices;
- spearhead the formation of a cross-border commission; and
- protect local miners.

**Options**
Options include:
- approving the Secretary-General’s recommendations on force strength;
- authorising more substantial downsizing to commence immediately;
- endorsing a consolidation period of two to three years—on the model of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)—then phasing down according to progress with future benchmarks on security, governance and the consolidation of state authority;
- revising MONUC’s mandate along the lines proposed by the Secretary-General in his MONUC report;
- including assistance with natural resources management and good governance in the new MONUC mandate (commodity sanctions are unlikely, and there is some scepticism on the feasibility of the recommendations from the Group of Experts);
- expressing support for regional cross-border cooperation on the illicit movement of combatants and resources as well as the return of foreign militia within the framework of the Great Lakes Conference; and
- including additional names in the targeted sanctions lists. At press time, it seems that France, the UK and the US may propose a new list under resolutions 1596 and 1649.

**Key Issues**
The key issue for the Council is how best to assist the Congolese government consolidate state authority, reform the security sector and improve governance.

A related issue therefore is the size and future mandate of MONUC. This will likely involve agreeing on a framework for MONUC’s future exit strategy while avoiding hasty cutbacks that could undermine the mission’s success.

A related key issue is whether and when to start downsizing MONUC, especially the supplemental contingents authorised in resolutions 1621, 1635 and 1736. Much will depend on assessments of the security situation in the DRC, bearing in mind that the electoral process will not be finalised until local elections later in the year, but members will be mindful of current global demands on peacekeeping resources.

Another concern is foreign combatants, especially whether to impose targeted sanctions under resolution 1649 and how best to continue to encourage countries in the region to cooperate.

A final issue is how best to proceed in light of the recommendations of the Group of Experts and the Secretary-General’s report on sanctions.

**Council Dynamics**
There is unity among Council members to continue MONUC as a robust operation. Most, especially African members, seem wary of cutbacks and would support maintaining MONUC’s size.

Other members, while sympathetic to the challenges confronting the DRC, would be mindful of the need to contain costs. It is unclear whether the US will push for immediate downsizing (particularly regarding the additional contingents) or accept current levels in the short run.

Most will want to be clear about the exit strategy before renewing MONUC and will look for a framework in that regard.

Discussions on the sanctions reports indicate that most Council members appear sympathetic to the view that there is a powerful link between natural resources and militia activity. However, there seems to be general scepticism about the appropriateness of commodity sanctions and the feasibility of the Group of Experts’ recommendations.

Most members seem more sympathetic to the Secretary-General’s observations and that the solution lies with the Congolese government and with international assistance. But there is also underlying concern with the possibility that the Secretary-General’s report may be used to discredit sanctions in general as a policy instrument.
Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1742 (15 February 2007) renewed MONUC until 15 April.
- S/RES/1736 (22 December 2006) temporarily re-hatted UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB) troops to MONUC.
- S/RES/1635 (28 October 2005) and 1621 (6 September 2006) authorised temporary increases in MONUC.
- S/RES/1565 (1 October 2004) revised MONUC’s mandate set forth in resolutions 1493 and 1291.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/156 (22 March 2007) was the latest MONUC report.
- S/2007/68 (8 February 2007) was the report on economic sanctions.
- S/2006/310 (22 May 2006) was a report on foreign armed groups.

Other Relevant Documents

- SC/8949 (7 February 2007) was the press statement expressing concern with the violence in western DRC.
- S/2007/40 (25 January 2007) was the latest Group of Experts report.

For full historical background, please refer to our April and September 2006 and February 2007 Forecasts.

Western Sahara

Expected Council Action
The mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) expires on 31 April. The Council is expected to renew it for six months and to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on MINURSO, which is due mid-April. The Council might also discuss a Moroccan plan for extended autonomy to Western Sahara.

Key Recent Developments
In his October report, the Secretary-General clarified that his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, Peter van Walsum, was advocating direct negotiations between the parties because the Council had made clear in resolutions 1495 and 1541 that any solution had to be “on the basis of agreement between the two parties.” However, this did not mean that Van Walsum supported Morocco’s arguments. He explained that the UN could not support a plan that excluded a referendum with independence as a possible option.

The Secretary-General called on the two parties, Morocco and the Polisario Front, to enter into negotiations without preconditions and avoid extending the stalemate. Morocco has continued to develop its plan for a solution based on autonomy. In February, it sent a ministerial delegation to all members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) as well as Germany (which currently holds the EU presidency) and the UN Secretary-General to present “elements” of a possible autonomy plan for Western Sahara.

In early 2006 Morocco established a Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS, Conseil royal consultatif pour les affaires sahariennes), comprising all Moroccan political parties as well as Sahrawi leaders, but not the Polisario. Elected representatives for women, youth groups and civil society were also involved.

According to Moroccan official statements, the proposal, which would reflect the expectations of all CORCAS members, would respect Moroccan sovereignty and national unity and take into account social and cultural specificities of Western Sahara. It is also claimed that it would comply with “international standards for autonomy”, providing the Sahrawis with real authority in the legislative, executive and judicial fields. However, the plan has not been finalised yet. In part this may be because the CORCAS process has encountered tremendous difficulties. It may also be that Morocco is reluctant to finalise the proposal in the absence of clear signals that it would succeed.

In a memorandum to the Council on 13 February, Polisario said that the Moroccan autonomy plan would violate the principle of self-determination, and it would therefore not be acceptable. Algeria issued a declaration on 28 February along similar lines.

The Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy has been unable to travel to the region but had some contacts with the Group of Friends and Morocco in New York. It is unlikely that he will make new recommendations on the political process.

Options
The Council has the following options:
- a simple six-month renewal of the MINURSO mandate;
- renewing the mandate for a shorter period (perhaps two or three months) to bring pressure on the parties to make progress;
- endorsing the Secretary-General’s recommendations and urging the parties to resume direct negotiations without preconditions; and
- including language on the need to respect human rights in Western Sahara.

Given that the Moroccan plan is not officially before the Council, reference to it in the resolution does not seem a likely option.

The most likely option seems an extension without change for six months.

Key Issues
Morocco’s autonomy plan has been in the works for more than a year. For the Group of Friends, the issue has been how much caution to maintain while the plan remains vague.
The second issue is whether Morocco will present a plan in sufficient time for the Group of Friends and others to assess it, and also give Polisario reasonable time to review it and respond before the expiry of the mandate.

A further important issue will be whether Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon will support any plan in his report on current information. This seems unlikely unless the parties agree to it as Ban’s predecessor, Kofi Annan, had already stated that the UN could not welcome a solution that did not include self-determination with independence as an option. A related issue is whether Ban will even mention the existence of this plan. To do so might serve as a basis for pressing the parties to reengage. But given the Polisario and Algerian statements in February, this seems unlikely.

An issue that may come up in April or perhaps at a later stage is the possibility to expand the MINURSO mandate to include responsibilities to contribute to the promotion and protection of human rights.

A final issue which is likely to be unspoken but in the back of many Council members’ minds is the fact that similar issues arise in both the Kosovo and Western Sahara dossiers.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

During consultations before the last extension of MINURSO’s mandate in October, Denmark and Argentina reportedly wanted to include a provision on the situation of human rights in Western Sahara. These were described in a confidential report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights referred to in the last MINURSO report. This report, which was leaked and is available on the internet, revealed severe cases of violations by Morocco in Western Sahara and breaches of freedom of association, movement, expression and assembly by Polisario in the Tindouf refugee camps in Algeria.

Morocco, Polisario and others such as France were unwilling to go beyond a simple rollover of MINURSO, so this provision was not included. Another proposal that the Council should urge the parties to launch negotiations without preconditions was also resisted by both parties and Algeria.

In its previous resolution on Western Sahara, the Council was unable to tackle the substantive issues due to divisions among its members.

New Council members like Indonesia and South Africa seem to be influenced by established UN principles of self-determination in the context of the decolonisation process and are therefore likely to be reluctant to impose any outcome on Polisario.

Members of the Group of Friends on the Council seem to agree on the need to have sufficient time to evaluate the content of any plan. All seem to agree the plan has to be realistic, but they seem to have different expectations about what is realistic depending on their different interpretations of the concept of self-determination. France supports Morocco and considers that self-determination can occur within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. The US tends not to specify whether self-determination should necessarily include independence as an option. Russia seems to believe that since Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara has not been recognised by the International Court of Justice in its 1975 advisory opinion, self-determination must include all options for the people of Western Sahara including independence. South Africa seems to share a similar position.

France and the US seem to believe that it would be helpful for Morocco to present its plan. This plan, or some variant of it, might then become a basis for renewed negotiations between the parties, if Polisario can be persuaded to reconsider its position. However, the US is unlikely to support the plan to the point of imposing it on Polisario as it believes that it has to be acceptable to both parties.

In the light of all the above it is not surprising that there are differences on how to deal with the MINURSO mandate. The US may continue to toy with the idea of withdrawing support for a renewal of MINUSRO as a lever to compel the parties to negotiate. Other members are hesitant about this and may be opposed to a total withdrawal of the force.

Despite differing positions, there is a consensus that previous Council principles should not change:

- any solution should include provisions for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara;
- any solution should be mutually acceptable; and
- the Council would not impose any solution on the parties.

In the absence of negotiations between the parties, it seems that the process is condemned to stall further. Most Council members hope that the position of the parties will change and provide a window of opportunity.

**Underlying Problems**

Morocco is claiming that until the problem of Western Sahara is resolved, there is a risk of terrorist spill-over activities from Algeria and Mauritania.

**UN Documents**

- Latest Security Council Resolution
  - S/RES/1720 (31 October 2006) rolled over the MINURSO mandate for an additional six months.

- Latest Secretary-General’s Report
  - S/2006/817 (16 October 2006)

- Selected Letters to the President of the Council
  - S/2007/55 (31 January 2007) and S/2007/56 (5 February 2007) was an exchange of letters between the president of the Council and the Secretary-General on the appointment of Julian Harston as the new Special Representative for Western Sahara and Head of MINURSO.

- Other Related Documents
  - A/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
  - Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (16 October 1975)

For historical background and a fuller list of documents, please refer to our January 2006 Forecast.
The United Nations and Western Sahara:

Abkhazia.

It expects to be briefed by the Georgian officials, three Russian helicopters had fired into the Kodori Gorge.

The report is expected to cover steps taken for six months. Possible, though less likely, is a shorter period to put pressure on the parties to make greater progress. Another option is for the Council to request the Secretary-General to propose ways of bringing about a comprehensive political solution.

Key Issues

The short-term main issue is the lack of confidence between the two sides which means that the conditions are not there for a credible political process. Sustained dialogue is essential for progress.

A related issue of concern is continuing violence, which raises the question whether a stronger stand might be necessary.

Useful Additional Sources

- The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-Ending Affair by Anna Theofiliopoulos, United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 166, July 2006

Georgia

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) which expires on 15 April.

By 3 April, the Council should receive the Secretary-General’s report on the situation in Abkhazia. It expects to be briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Georgia, Jean Arnault, on 10 April. The report is expected to cover steps taken to meet the provisions of resolution 1716, which expressed concern about Georgian actions in the Kodori Valley.

Key Recent Developments

Tense relations between Georgia and Russia were further strained when, according to Georgian officials, three Russian helicopters had fired into the Kodori Gorge.

Russia denied this. A fact-finding team comprising representatives of UNOMIG, Georgia and Abkhazia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force was sent to the Upper Kodori Valley on 13 March. Initial evidence suggests that Russian gunships may have been involved.

Abkhazia held a parliamentary election on 4 March but failed to form a government when only 18 members were elected in the 35-seat parliament. Runoff elections were held on 18 March. Although recognised by Russia some, including the US, Georgia and the EU, regard the elections as illegitimate.

Sporadic violence continues. On 5 January, one policeman was killed and another wounded in an attack on the Georgian village of Garmukhar. UNOMIG condemned the attack, stressed the need for both sides to cooperate to prevent further violence and increased the number and frequency of patrols. However, at press time, UNOMIG had participated in only two joint patrols with CIS forces in the Kodori Valley since October. Joint patrolling is an important element in determining what is happening in the Kodori Valley and requires cooperation with the Georgian authorities.

On 12-13 January in Geneva, the Group of Friends (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US and, in New York, Slovakia) met with representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia. The two parties were urged to engage on security issues in the northwest and cooperate to reduce tensions. Both sides indicated willingness to move forward.

Options

The most likely option is a mandate renewal for six months. Possible, though less likely, is a shorter period to put pressure on the parties to make greater progress. Another option is for the Council to request the Secretary-General to propose ways of bringing about a comprehensive political solution.

A major concern will be achieving a smooth mandate renewal. In January 2006, Russia’s objections to traditional language reaffirming Georgian sovereignty and territorial integrity led to a two-month technical roll-over. In October the renewal resolution required complex negotiations, and the Group of Friends was clearly divided for some time. This month, there will be little time between the release of the Secretary-General’s report and Council discussions, which could further complicate negotiations.

A more substantive issue is Georgia’s continued request for international peacekeepers to replace CIS forces. But there is little appetite in the Council to take up this issue.

An issue in the back of many minds will be comparisons between Abkhazia and the Council’s upcoming decisions on Kosovo. Russia maintains that if Kosovo is given independence then others seeking self rule should be able to follow. Georgia says the Kosovo comparison is invalid. But clearly some in Abkhazia might see Council-approved independence in Kosovo as a green light to take that route.

Council and Wider Dynamics

Most members prefer to focus on maintaining the status quo and ensuring the security situation does not deteriorate. When the mandate was last renewed, some members questioned Georgia’s intentions after it launched a special operation in the Kodori Valley. However, now most members have a more positive assessment of the Georgian position. Some new members like South Africa and Indonesia are paying special attention to the issue of territorial integrity.

Underlying Problems

Tens of thousands of people were displaced from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s. While the Georgian government has been developing an internally displaced persons (IDPs) strategy, there was no significant repatriation to Abkhazia in 2005-2006. Poor living conditions among IDPs may create unrest in the future.
Security Council Report

UN Documents

Latest Security Council Resolution


Selected Letters

- S/2007/74 (9 February 2007) was the letter from Georgia regarding Georgia’s adherence to the requirements of resolution 1716.
- S/2007/9 (8 January 2007) was the letter from Georgia on the attack on the Georgian Interior Ministry’s checkpoint near Gamsukhuri.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

- S/2007/15 (11 January 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report.

For historical background and a more complete list of documents please see our January, March, July and October 2006 Forecasts and the 12 October 2006 Update.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Jean Arnault (France)

UNOMIG: Size and Composition

- Authorised strength as of 31 January 2007: 139 total uniformed personnel, including 127 military observers and 12 police
- Key troop contributors: Germany, Pakistan and Bangladesh

Duration

August 1993 to present

Cost

1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: $33.38 million (gross)

Other Facts

Size of CIS troops: about 1,800 Russian troops

Useful Additional sources

- Press Statement of the Meeting of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General in Geneva on 12-13 February 2007

Somalia

Expected Council Action

The Council expects the report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, due by 20 April. It is likely to include:

- developments on an all-inclusive political process and reconciliation; and
- recommendations on the UN’s further engagement in Somalia, stabilisation and reconstruction and possibly the feasibility of transition from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a UN operation.

A Council statement expressing support for AMISOM and noting the eventual start of the national reconciliation conference, scheduled for 16 April, is possible. It seems unlikely in April, however, that members will want to take up the issue of authorising AMISOM’s transition to a UN force.

The sanctions committee awaits the mid-term briefing by the Monitoring Group in late April. After some delay, it is possible that the committee will also hold an exchange of views between the Monitoring Group and states identified in the Group’s reports as having violated the arms embargo.

Key Recent Developments

Insurgent attacks continued in March, leading some 40,000 residents of Mogadishu to flee violence in the capital and prompting widespread criticism of human rights violations committed by all sides. In early March, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) announced a plan to stabilise Mogadishu in thirty days, but scepticism remains.

Ethiopian, TFG forces and, more recently, AMISOM contingents have been targeted in attacks. Media reports have suggested that these attacks were perpetrated by remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and warlords seeking to regain territorial control and discredit the TFG.

In consultations on 13 March, the Council expressed concern with the attacks and underlined the need for the Somali political process to be as representative and inclusive as possible.

The TFG unveiled plans to hold a national reconciliation conference with AU support involving about 3,000 delegates on 16 April. Apparently the agenda will not include power-sharing, and it is unclear whether UIC members will attend. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, François Lonseny Fall, recently called on members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, in particular Yemen, to contribute to efforts to encourage moderate UIC members to attend.

The first contingent of 1,700 Ugandan troops operating under AMISOM was deployed on 6 March as Ethiopian troops continued to withdraw. Burundi has pledged about 1,600 troops, Nigeria and Ghana 80 each, and Malawi an unknown number. AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit reportedly stated in early March that AMISOM would remain in Somalia for “five, six or seven months, and it would be followed by a larger United Nations operation.”

Concern remains about AMISOM’s future and, in particular, its exit strategy. Volatile operating conditions, the lack of positive prospects for national reconciliation in the short run and regional divisions on AMISOM’s deployment (in particular Eritrea’s misgivings about the operation) seem to have increased perceptions that AU forces are a partial, pro-TFG presence. The powerful Hawiye clan, one of the leading groups in the Mogadishu area, has announced its opposition to the TFG and the AMISOM presence.

Observers have noted with concern AMISOM’s loose command-and-control structures and its lack of unified command. The AU issues only guidelines to national contingents serving in AMISOM.

Against the backdrop of the recent attacks, some AU members have apparently been consulting on the possibility of a change in strategy. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently said that Ugandan troops serving under AMISOM will engage in training Somali forces, but that they will not forcibly disarm militias.
Options

Options include:
- authorising AMISOM’s transition to a UN force. This option seems unlikely at this point in light of recent security developments and the prospects for national reconciliation;
- signalling that the authorisation of a UN force is likely to be affected by the results of a credible, all-inclusive national conference, including power-sharing and security arrangements;
- delaying a decision on transition and focusing on strengthening UN peace support activities short of a peacekeeping operation and closely monitoring developments on the political process and AMISOM; and
- imposing targeted sanctions against peace-spoilers (if any are identified).

Key Issues

The key issue for Council members is how best to encourage an all-inclusive political process including power-sharing. A related concern is the lack of clarity on the upcoming national conference’s agenda, especially the possibility that power-sharing may not be discussed. Another is the TFG’s apparent reluctance to include UIC elements in the reconciliation process and to make positions in the government and parliament available for an eventual power-sharing deal.

The second issue is AMISOM’s lack of sufficient troops and funding and its loose command-and-control structures, which raises questions about AMISOM’s long-term viability.

The third issue is whether—and when—AMISOM should become a UN operation. There are related concerns that the transition, without a political process in place, may reduce pressure on the TFG to move towards broadly-based reconciliation.

Other issues are:
- guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and
- addressing the regional dimension of the situation in Somalia, especially the movement of refugees, arms and combatants, and related violations of the arms embargo.

Council Dynamics

Until recently, Council members have focused primarily on balancing the imperatives of improving security in the immediate future and establishing a credible political process. Council discussions in March focused more on the establishment of a credible political process as a key condition for security. They seem to have crystallised around the need for broad-based national reconciliation, particularly including moderate UIC members.

Positions on the transfer from AMISOM to a UN operation are unclear. African members, the US and others such as Indonesia seem likely to continue to push for transition.

Other members may continue to be reluctant to authorise the transfer. They are likely to be concerned with the lack of security and absence of a political environment conducive to UN peacekeeping, in particular a political process with a good prospect of success.

There seems to be no momentum for creating a targeted sanctions list. Some members, in particular the US and UK, appear to be uncomfortable with putting emphasis on violations of the embargo, and prefer a broader focus on reconciliation and security.

UN Documents

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) authorised AMISOM.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

**Latest Monitoring Group’s Report**
- S/2006/913 (21 November 2006)

Historical Background

**February 2007** The Council authorised AMISOM.

- **December 2006-January 2007** Ethiopian and TFG forces overran the UIC.
- **October-November 2006** The UIC encircled the TFG at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethiopian troops began amassing along the border.
- **25 September 2006** The UIC took control of Kismayo.
- **Early June 2006** The UIC seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar.
- **10 October 2004** The TFG was established.

- **October 1993** 18 US Rangers were killed and mutilated, 75 were wounded. The US announced withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994.
- **June 1993** Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 were killed.

**March 1993** UNOSOM II was established.

**December 1992** The Council authorised UNITAF.
- **April 1992** UNOSOM I and a sanctions committee were established.

- **1991** Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence.

Other Relevant Facts

- **Special Representative of the Secretary-General**
  François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

- **Chairman of the Sanctions Committee**
  Dumsani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

Useful Additional Sources

- **Africa: Confronting Complex Threats** by Kwesi Aning, International Peace Academy, March 2007

Liberia

Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to review Liberia diamond sanctions by 20 April. A briefing by the chair of the Liberia Sanctions Committee (1521 Committee) is likely. Preceding the review, the Committee expects a briefing by the Panel of Experts. The Kimberley Process is also expected to inform the Committee of its assessment of Liberia’s progress towards joining the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. Depending on these reports, the Council may choose to take action ranging from a press statement encouraging Liberia’s further progress to a resolution lifting the sanctions prior to their current expiration in June.

Key Recent Developments

In its December 2006 report, the Panel of Experts said that while progress continued in Liberia, the country was “not yet in a
position to demonstrate the internal controls necessary for the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme’ and that lifting diamond sanctions, as imposed by resolution 1521, was not warranted. The Panel pointed out that certain components, such as a diamond valuation scheme, were still missing and that other components required stronger leadership from the government—particularly the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy—to function coherently in a durable and credible fashion.

Having considered the Panel’s findings, the Council on 20 December 2006 adopted resolution 1731, renewing diamond sanctions for six months with a review after four months. This was intended to allow the Liberian government sufficient time to meet the benchmark set in resolution 1521 for lifting of sanctions by establishing a transparent and internationally verifiable certificate of origin regime for trade in Liberian rough diamonds with a view toward joining the Kimberley Process.

Resolution 1731 requested the Panel of Experts to report to the Council through the Sanctions Committee by 6 June and provide it with informal updates in the meantime. The resolution also requested that the Panel undertake a follow-up assessment mission to Liberia and neighbouring countries to investigate implementation of resolution 1521, but at this time no travel appears to be planned.

At press time, the Panel’s evaluation remains unclear. Considering the remaining challenges that the report of the Panel of Experts described in December, it is possible that Liberia does not yet meet the criteria set in resolution 1521 and that lifting of the sanctions is not yet warranted. But this remains to be seen.

Options
Depending on the findings of the Panel of Experts and the information received from the Kimberley Process, the Council may choose one of the following options.

- If the benchmarks set in resolution 1521 have been achieved, the Council may adopt a resolution lifting Liberia’s diamond sanctions.
- If progress is substantial, but still lacking some essential elements, the Council may opt for a supportive message to the Liberian government in the form of a press statement.

Key Issues
Considering the role that diamonds have played in fuelling conflict in the region, the key issue for the Council will be to ensure that Liberia establishes a transparent and verifiable certificate of origin regime to enable it to join the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme.

Council Dynamics
Members generally agree that compliance with resolution 1521 is necessary before sanctions are lifted. The findings of the Panel of Experts as well as the Kimberley Process appear to carry much weight.

Underlying Problems
Liberia’s fragile stability continues to be threatened by disenfranchised ex-combatants, youth unemployment and problems with the rule of law.

UN Documents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1731 (20 December 2006) renewed diamond sanctions for six months.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1689 (20 June 2006) renewed sanctions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1647 (20 December 2005) renewed sanctions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1521 (22 December 2003) established the 1521 Committee, requested the appointment of a Panel of Experts and established the sanctions regime.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Latest Secretary-General’s Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/2007/151 (15 March 2007) was the latest report on the UN mission in Liberia.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Latest Report of the Panel of Experts</th>
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<td>• S/2006/976 (13 December 2006)</td>
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For background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our October and December 2006 and March 2007 Forecasts.

North Korea

Expected Council Action
The Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK, or North Korea) will give its second briefing to the Council in April. Resolution 1718, which in October expressed grave concern over North Korea’s nuclear test and set up the Sanctions Committee, requires a report every ninety days.

No Council action is expected unless there is a major setback in the six-party talks such as failure by North Korea to meet the mid-April deadline for shutting down its Yongbyon reactor.

Key Recent Developments
In February the six-party talks among the US, Russia, South Korea and North Korea produced a breakthrough. On 13 February Pyongyang agreed to close its Yongbyon reactor within sixty days, in return for 50,000 tons of fuel aid or equivalent economic aid. It also agreed to discuss with the other parties a list of its nuclear programmes.

Working groups were set up under the February agreement to consider denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula, normalisation of DPRK-US relations, normalisation of DPRK-Japan relations, economic and energy cooperation and a Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism. The US and Japan working groups began bilateral discussions. In March the US/North Korean talks resolved outstanding issues relating to DPRK funds frozen in a Macau bank. The Japan-DPRK discussions on the question of abducted Japanese nationals made no progress.

IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei visited North Korea on 13 March to discuss the return of inspectors (expelled by North Korea in 2002) and monitoring of the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor.

The sixth round of six-party talks on 19 March in Beijing reviewed progress made in the working groups and next steps.

All UN member states were required by resolution 1718 to report to the Council by 14 November on implementation of the resolution. By mid-March only about seventy countries and the EU had reported. While the Sanctions Committee was able to speedily adopt lists of prohibited trade items in nuclear, chemical and biological...
weapons, work on negotiating standard guidelines for the conduct of its work has been delayed. At this point, no Council member state has proposed that any entities or individuals be designated for targeted sanctions.

**Options**
The most likely option is that the Council will be briefed by the Sanctions Committee chairman, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, and take no further action.

**Key Issues**
The only practical issue for the Council at this stage is how the Sanctions Committee should carry forward its mandate without jeopardising progress of the six-party talks.

But a key issue on the minds of members will be whether North Korea will fulfil its commitments to shutdown the reactor.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
China and the US are working together on this issue in the Council and appear to have similar goals for the six-party talks.

The Sanctions Committee has met regularly since October. While members agree on the need to carry out its mandate, some have felt a special need for caution over the last few months to avoid any risk of jeopardising the six-party talks which were at a very delicate stage. This led to unusually protracted discussions on the Committee’s guidelines and other matters. It is likely this dynamic will influence Committee deliberations through April.

**Underlying Problems**
The World Food Programme said that 37 percent of children under age six and one-third of women are malnourished. South Korea is resuming fertiliser shipments that may help curb food shortages in 2008, but the drop in foreign aid last year makes starvation in the north a concern. The suspension of UNDP projects, after criticism of the organisation for making payments to DPRK in hard currency and hiring government officials, may have an impact on various projects covering economic and social development, environment and food management.

**UN Documents**
Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over North Korea’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a Sanctions Committee.

Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over North Korea’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.

Selected Letter

- S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the letter from Japan requesting a meeting of the Council after North Korea launched ballistic missiles.

Other

- S/AC49/2006/48 through S/AC49/2007/20 were letters submitting reports from UN member states on implementing resolution 1718.
- Briefing to the UN Security Council by Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia and 2006 Chair of the Sanctions Committee, 11 January 2007 (http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/selc_docs.shtml)

**Useful Additional Source**

For historical background please refer to our November 2006 and January Forecasts.

**Burundi**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council is expected to consider the Secretary-General’s first report on the UN Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB). The Secretary-General’s Executive Representative for Burundi, Youssef Mahmoud, may also brief the Council. No formal action is expected, but a press statement is a possible outcome. BINUB’s mandate expires on 31 December.

**Key Recent Developments**
BINUB commenced work on 1 January. In a press statement on 21 December 2006, the Council stressed the office’s critical role during the peace consolidation phase. The Council noted that despite progress, many challenges remain, especially with regard to:
- the rule of law;
- human rights; and
- the implementation of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.

BINUB replaced the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), the peacekeeping mission whose mandate expired on 31 December 2006. Outstanding peace and security issues at that time involved delays with the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and the refusal of the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL) to join the ceasefire monitoring team. The AU Special Task Force, set up under the Ceasefire Agreement, will now provide security for returning FNL commanders and combatants. A South African battalion, previously deployed with ONUB, has remained under the AU force. Recently, South Africa approved an AU request to deploy an additional 1,100 troops.

Five of seven suspects (including former President Domitien Ndayizeye) arrested in August for allegedly planning to kill President Pierre Nkurunziza and overthrow the government, were acquitted in January. (There had been widespread international concern about the government’s handling of the alleged coup, in particular allegations of torture used to obtain confessions.)

**PBC Developments**
The Peacebuilding Commission has started a series of informal thematic discussions to develop an integrated peacebuilding strategy for Burundi by mid-2007. The peacebuilding strategy would become the principal framework for Burundi’s relationship with the PBC, recording the commitments made by the parties and serving as a type of compact. It will provide benchmarks by which the PBC can monitor progress and identify peacebuilding gaps at the country level.
The discussions are open to relevant stakeholders (civil society, the private sector and international actors) and will focus on issues in the priority areas identified in the December country-specific meetings. The first thematic discussion for Burundi on 27 February focused on good governance.

A Burundi donors’ roundtable was held on 14-15 March in Bujumbura. The PBC’s next formal country-specific meeting on Burundi and its next visit to the country are expected to take place in April.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council is that peace consolidation in Burundi continues to move forward. With the recent political changes and developments on the Ceasefire Agreement, it appears that progress is being made. Challenges remain, particularly in human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. The Council will watch developments closely, but in first instance will rely on the Peacebuilding Commission to address these issues.

Members will be looking to see whether BINUB is meeting benchmarks set out in the 14 August addendum to the Secretary-General’s June report. These include the implementation of the political and military aspects of the Ceasefire Agreement, the establishment of a human rights commission, and the creation of a comprehensive civilian disarmament program.

Council Dynamics
Council members agreed on BINUB’s mandate without much difficulty. Unless the situation deteriorates, Council members are likely to adopt a “hands-off” approach, particularly given the Council’s heavy agenda in April.

Underlying Problems
Heavy rains last December severely affected agricultural production, leaving Burundi on the verge of a food crisis, which could threaten stability.

UN-Burundi negotiations to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Court Chamber have not moved beyond a preliminary stage since the Council made its request in resolution 1606 of June 2005, while challenges in the area of transitional justice and human rights violations appear to have increased.

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UN Documents

Selected Resolutions

- **S/RES/1719 (25 October 2006)** established BINUB.
- **S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005)** requested the Secretary-General to start negotiations on transitional justice mechanisms in Burundi.

Selected Secretary-General’s Report

- **S/2006/994 (18 December 2006)** was the last report on BINUB.

Selected Letters

- **S/2006/1020 (18 December 2006)** was the letter from the Secretary-General appointing Youssef Mahmoud as his Executive Representative for Burundi and head of BINUB.
- **S/RES/1606 (20 June 2005)** requested the Secretary-General to start negotiations on transitional justice mechanisms in Burundi.

Other Selected Document

- **SC/8921 (21 December 2006)** was the press statement commending ONUB for its work and stressing the challenges remaining for Burundi.

Other Relevant Facts

**Executive Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of BINUB**

Youssef Mahmoud (Tunisia)

**Size and Composition of Mission (1 January 2007)**

- Total authorised strength: 448 personnel (141 international civilian personnel, 235 local civilian personnel, seven military observers, 14 police and 51 UN volunteers)
- Strength as of 1 January 2007: 641 personnel (242 international civilian personnel, 308 local civilian personnel, no military observers, 11 police and eighty UN volunteers)

**Duration**

January 2007 to present

**Recommended Budget**

33.1 million

For background and a more complete list of documents, please consult our March, June, September and December 2006 Monthly Forecasts and our 23 October 2006 Update.
### Notable Dates for April

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<th>Reports Due in April</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 April</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) S/RES/1716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid April</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) S/RES/1714</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid April</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) S/RES/1720</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 April</td>
<td>SG semi-annual report on resolution 1559 (Lebanon/Syria) S/PRST/2004/36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>SG report on progress by Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions toward an all-inclusive political process and on the recent Technical Assessment Mission S/RES/1744</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on UNMIN is likely to be discussed in May (UN Mission in Nepal) S/RES/1740</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG regular report on UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) S/RES/1741</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG regular report on BINUB (UN Integrated Office in Burundi) S/RES/1719</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>SG monthly report on Darfur S/RES/1590</td>
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### April 2007 Mandates Expire

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tr>
<td>15 April</td>
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<td>30 April</td>
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### April 2007 Other Important Dates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Important Date</th>
<th>Relevant Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 March-3 April</td>
<td>Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, will visit Sudan, Chad and the CAR. He is likely to brief the Council when he returns.</td>
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<tr>
<td>23 March-2 April</td>
<td>The Secretary-General will visit the Middle East (Egypt, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia) and participate in the Arab League Summit in Riyadh on 28-29 March. He will brief the Council upon his return. Included in these early April discussions with the Council will be the Secretary-General’s report on resolution 1701 (Lebanon) which was postponed from 27 March to early April (S/2007/147).</td>
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<td>9 April</td>
<td>Presidential elections in Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>13 April</td>
<td>Resumption of peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA have tentatively been scheduled to take place in Juba.</td>
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<td>16 April</td>
<td>A Somali national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu is being planned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17-18 April</td>
<td>A UNHCR-sponsored international conference at the ministerial-level on the situation of Iraqi displacement will be held in Geneva.</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 April</td>
<td>The Security Council will review the Liberian diamond sanctions (S/RES/1731).</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 April</td>
<td>A donor conference for the Iraq Compact is being planned.</td>
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Also expected in April:
- The North Korea Sanctions Committee will report to the Council in early April (S/RES/1718).
- The Panel of Experts mid-term briefing to the Sudan Sanctions Committee originally expected in late March may be pushed to mid-April.
- The Somalia Sanctions Committee is expected to receive the Monitoring Group’s mid-term briefing in late April (S/RES/1724).
- The preliminary proposal from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Future Status Process for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari, was submitted to the Security Council in March. It is expected to be introduced by Ahtisaari in early April.
- The Peacebuilding Commission’s next round of country-specific meetings are expected in April for Burundi and in April or May for Sierra Leone.
- Parliamentary elections in Chad are scheduled for April.
- The Security Council will review the Liberian diamond sanctions (S/RES/1731).

Important Dates over the Horizon

- The Council is tentatively planning visiting missions for 2007. West Africa (including Côte d’Ivoire), Timor-Leste, Central Africa and the Middle East have all been discussed as possibilities.
- Human Rights Council elections are scheduled for May and its fifth session is scheduled for 5-11 June.
- A Council open debate on Protection of Civilians is expected in June.
- The Special Court for Sierra Leone has reported that Charles Taylor’s trial at The Hague will begin in June.
- Election of Nepal’s constituent assembly is expected in June.
- Parliamentary elections in Timor-Leste are expected in June.
- Elections in Sierra Leone are expected in July.
- The Secretary-General’s next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- Resolution 1721 called for presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire by 31 October. But the 4 March Ouagadougou agreement between the parties calls for elections to be held within ten months.
- Local elections in the DRC are expected in the second half of 2007.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected in late 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.

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