Somalia
Expected Council Action
The Council expects the report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, due by 20 April. It is likely to include:
-
developments on an all-inclusive political process and reconciliation; and
-
recommendations on the UN’s further engagement in Somalia, stabilisation and reconstruction and possibly the feasibility of transition from the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a UN operation.
A Council statement expressing support for AMISOM and noting the eventual start of the national reconciliation conference, scheduled for 16 April, is possible. It seems unlikely in April, however, that members will want to take up the issue of authorising AMISOM’s transition to a UN force.
The sanctions committee awaits the midterm briefing by the Monitoring Group in late April. After some delay, it is possible that the committee will also hold an exchange of views between the Monitoring Group and states identified in the Group’s reports as having violated the arms embargo.
Key Recent Developments
Insurgent attacks continued in March, leading some 40,000 residents of Mogadishu to flee violence in the capital and prompting widespread criticism of human rights violations committed by all sides. In early March, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) announced a plan to stabilise Mogadishu in thirty days, but scepticism remains.
Ethiopian, TFG forces and, more recently, AMISOM contingents have been targeted in attacks. Media reports have suggested that these attacks were perpetrated by remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) and warlords seeking to regain territorial control and discredit the TFG.
In consultations on 13 March, the Council expressed concern with the attacks and underlined the need for the Somali political process to be as representative and inclusive as possible.
The TFG unveiled plans to hold a national reconciliation conference with AU support involving about 3,000 delegates on 16 April. Apparently the agenda will not include power-sharing, and it is unclear whether UIC members will attend. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General, François Lonseny Fall, recently called on members of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, in particular Yemen, to contribute to efforts to encourage moderate UIC members to attend.
The first contingent of 1,700 Ugandan troops operating under AMISOM was deployed on 6 March as Ethiopian troops continued to withdraw. Burundi has pledged about 1,600 troops, Nigeria and Ghana 850 each, and Malawi an unknown number. AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit reportedly stated in early March that AMISOM would remain in Somalia for “five, six or seven months, and it would be followed by a larger United Nations operation.”
Concern remains about AMISOM’s future and, in particular, its exit strategy. Volatile operating conditions, the lack of positive prospects for national reconciliation in the short run and regional divisions on AMISOM’s deployment (in particular Eritrea’s misgivings about the operation) seem to have increased perceptions that AU forces are a partial, pro-TFG presence. The powerful Hawiye clan, one of the leading groups in the Mogadishu area, has announced its opposition to the TFG and the AMISOM presence.
Observers have noted with concern AMISOM’s loose command-and-control structures and its lack of unified command. The AU issues only guidelines to national contingents serving in AMISOM.
Against the backdrop of the recent attacks, some AU members have apparently been consulting on the possibility of a change in strategy. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni recently said that Ugandan troops serving under AMISOM will engage in training Somali forces, but that they will not forcibly disarm militias.
-
authorising AMISOM’s transition to a UN force. This option seems unlikely at this point in light of recent security developments and the prospects for national reconciliation;
-
signalling that the authorisation of a UN force is likely to be affected by the results of a credible, all-inclusive national conference, including power-sharing and security arrangements;
-
delaying a decision on transition and focusing on strengthening UN peace support activities short of a peacekeeping operation and closely monitoring developments on the political process and AMISOM; and
-
imposing targeted sanctions against peace-spoilers (if any are identified).
Key Issues
The key issue for Council members is how best to encourage an all-inclusive political process including power-sharing. A related concern is the lack of clarity on the upcoming national conference’s agenda, especially the possibility that power-sharing may not be discussed. Another is the TFG’s apparent reluctance to include UIC elements in the reconciliation process and to make positions in the government and parliament available for an eventual power-sharing deal.
The second issue is AMISOM’s lack of sufficient troops and funding and its loose command-and-control structures, which raises questions about AMISOM’s long-term viability.
The third issue is whether-and when-AMISOM should become a UN operation. There are related concerns that the transition, without a political process in place, may reduce pressure on the TFG to move towards broadly-based reconciliation.
Other issues are:
-
guaranteeing the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and
-
addressing the regional dimension of the situation in Somalia, especially the movement of refugees, arms and combatants, and related violations of the arms embargo.
Council Dynamics
Until recently, Council members have focused primarily on balancing the imperatives of improving security in the immediate future and establishing a credible political process. Council discussions in March focused more on the establishment of a credible political process as a key condition for security. They seem to have crystallised around the need for broad-based national reconciliation, particularly including moderate UIC members.
Positions on the transfer from AMISOM to a UN operation are unclear. African members, the US and others such as Indonesia seem likely to continue to push for transition.
Other members may continue to be reluctant to authorise the transfer. They are likely to be concerned with the lack of security and absence of a political environment conducive to UN peacekeeping, in particular a political process with a good prospect of success.
There seems to be no momentum for creating a targeted sanctions list. Some members, in particular the US and UK, appear to be uncomfortable with putting emphasis on violations of the embargo, and prefer a broader focus on reconciliation and security.
| Selected Security Council Resolutions |
|
| Latest Secretary-General’s Report |
|
| Latest Monitoring Group’s Report |
|
| February 2007 | The Council authorised AMISOM. |
| December 2006-January 2007 | Ethiopian and TFG forces overran the UIC. |
| October-November 2006 | The UIC encircled the TFG at its sole outpost, Baidoa. Ethiopian troops began amassing along the border. |
| 25 September 2006 | The UIC took control of Kismayo. |
| Early June 2006 | The UIC seized control of Mogadishu and Jowhar. |
| 10 October 2004 | The TFG was established. |
| November 1994 | The Council decided to terminate UNOSOM II by March 1995. |
| October 1993 | 18 US Rangers were killed and mutilated, 75 were wounded. The US announced withdrawal from Somalia by March 1994. |
| June 1993 | Pakistani troops were attacked, 24 were killed. |
| March 1993 | UNOSOM II was established. |
| December 1992 | The Council authorised UNITAF. |
| April 1992 | UNOSOM I and a sanctions committee were established. |
| January 1992 | The Council imposed an arms embargo. |
| 1991 | Civil war broke out; Somaliland declared independence. |
| Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| François Lonseny Fall (Guinea) |
| Chairman of the Sanctions Committee |
| Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa) |
Useful Additional Sources
-
Africa: Confronting Complex Threats by Kwesi Aning, International Peace Academy, March 2007
