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Iran

Expected Council Action
Issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme will be in the minds of Council members during June following the release on 26 May of the most recent report from the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei. However, no Council action is currently anticipated. Discussions are expected within the E3+3 (France, Germany and the UK plus China, Russia and the US) both on the IAEA report and on prospects for resumption of direct negotiations with Iran.

Also in June, the chairman of the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee is expected to brief the Council on progress in compliance by member states with sanctions imposed in resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. (The 1737 committee was established in December 2006 after the Council adopted resolution 1737 imposing measures against Iran.)

Key Recent Developments
The ElBaradei report on implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreement and resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803 in Iran, noted that:

• Iran has continued to refuse to suspend uranium enrichment activities. (To the contrary, it installed new cascades and new generation centrifuges.)
• Iran has not implemented the Additional Protocol to the NPT providing enhanced access to the IAEA to nuclear sites.
• Iran failed to answer questions related to alleged “weaponisation” studies on the alleged “Green Salt Project”—a high explosives testing and missile re-entry vehicle project that could have a military nuclear dimension. (Iran publicly maintains that the allegations were baseless and that data had been fabricated.) The IAEA still considers this programme of serious concern.
• The role of a 1987 document received from Pakistan (which describes a process that may be used to make the fissile core for nuclear weapons), and procurement activities of military-related institutions remain outstanding issues. Although Iran submitted responses which are currently being assessed by the IAEA, it has not provided the IAEA with sufficient information, access to documents and to individuals necessary to support initial explanations.
• The IAEA confirms, however, that it has been able to verify the continued non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, and that it has not detected the use of nuclear material in connection with alleged weapons studies.

The report will be discussed by the IAEA Board of Governors which will hold its regular session from 2 to 6 June.

The Speaker of the Iranian parliament and former Iranian nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said that the report was ambiguous and that it had been influenced by US disinformation about Iran’s nuclear programme.

In a letter to the UN Secretary-General on 13 May, Iran affirmed that it was ready to negotiate with the E3+3 without preconditions on issues of mutual interest. The letter included a package of proposals for negotiations on long-term cooperation in the political, security, economic and nuclear fields. An important element is a proposal to bolster democracy in the region and prevent terrorism. In its section on nuclear issues, the letter did not include an offer to suspend uranium enrichment, but mentioned the possibility of “improved supervision by the IAEA” and the establishment of “enrichment and nuclear fuel production consortiums in different parts of the world, including Iran.” At press time, the E3+3 had not reacted to this offer.

The E3+3 foreign ministers met in London on 2 May and agreed to put a new proposal to Iran with the condition that Iran suspends uranium enrichment. The proposal may reinforce the existing package of incentives introduced in 2006 by the E3+3. At press time, there were indications that EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana would go to Iran to present the proposal during June.

On 3 March, the Council adopted resolution 1803. New mandatory measures included:

• a travel ban on some individuals already subject to assets freeze (in annex II);
• additional names of entities subject to assets freeze (in annex III); and
• an embargo on nuclear-related dual-use items, with the exception of items used in light-water reactors and when the use is necessary for technical cooperation with the IAEA. (Previous measures related to dual-use items were only discretionary.)

New discretionary measures were also included:

• an invitation to all states to inspect cargoes to and from Iran if there are reasonable grounds to believe that they may contain prohibited items. (This measure is conditioned by the need to respect national legal authorities and legislation, and international law. It is also accompanied by a request to submit to the Council within five days a written report on each inspection including, in particular, information on the grounds for inspection.);
• vigilance in granting export credits to Iran; and
• vigilance over the activities of financial institutions with Iranian banks.

During a briefing to the Council on 17 March, the Chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee Belgian Ambassador Johan Verbeke said that since December the Committee had received two additional reports on implementation of resolutions 1737 and 1747 . He noted that resolution 1803 would broaden the scope of the Committee’s mandate to include measures imposed in resolutions 1747 and 1803.

Key Issues
The main issue for the Council in June is whether it will have any role to play at least in the short term. There seems to be a preference within the E3+3, as well as within the Council as a whole, not to discuss at this stage another round of sanctions against Iran (notwithstanding the IAEA conclusions about Iran’s non-compliance with previous resolutions). By contrast, the issue will first be addressed by the IAEA Board of Governors—with, perhaps, the possibility of another Board resolution reinforcing its previous request to Iran to provide the necessary information to resolve outstanding issues, implement the additional protocol and suspend uranium enrichment activities with the aim of re-establishing confidence.

A related issue is whether talks between Solana and Iranian nuclear negotiator Said Jalili will resume, bearing in mind the 13 May Iranian proposal and the soon to be unveiled E3+3 proposal. For this reason also, Council members are likely to want to defer consideration of the IAEA report pending conclusions about the likely prospects for those talks.

Another issue raised recently by Larijani is the “bouncing” of the issue between various forums. The Europeans and the US have in the past tended to push the E3+3 for discussions on further sanctions regardless of whether or not there is progress in talks with Solana, keeping the “dual track” approach in play.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Resolution 1803 showed that consensus within the Council on sanctions against Iran is difficult to maintain. Previously, Qatar in 2006 had voted against resolution 1696 which requested Iran to implement steps to re-establish confidence and threatening sanctions. In March 2008, Indonesia abstained in the vote on resolution 1803 arguing that confidence was being re-established as a result of progress in the cooperation between Iran and the IAEA and that additional sanctions would therefore be counterproductive. Libya, South Africa and Vietnam voted in favour but expressed similar reservations. Vietnam introduced several amendments, including language strengthening the role and authority of the IAEA. Indonesia’s abstention suggests that consensus on a fourth sanctions resolution at this stage would be even harder to obtain.

South Africa seems to believe that Iran should be allowed uranium enrichment if it follows the steps required by the IAEA to re-establish confidence. South Africa disagrees that suspension should be a goal in itself as opposed to means to re-establish confidence.

It seems that the P5 continue to favour an approach that combines firmness and dialogue with Iran. The US and the Europeans will likely want to push for additional sanctions in the event that current diplomatic initiatives stall—and perhaps even before. China and Russia may be more inclined to wait for further clarification by Iran of the remaining outstanding issues—the next IAEA report on Iran compliance will likely be presented to the next Board meeting on 22-26 September.

Full forecast

Useful Additional Sources

• 13 May Iranian Offer for “Constructive Negotiations”
  http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/IranProposal20May2008.pdf
• Statement of the E3/EU + 3 on resolution 1803, 4 March 2008 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Infoservice/Presse/Meldungen/2008/080304-ErklaerungIran Resolution.html  
• Peter Crail, “IAEA: Iran Work Plan Progress Incomplete,” Arms Control Today, March 2008
  ../..//www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_03/IAEA.asp

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