Lebanon
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to renew for another six months the mandate of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) of the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others. This expires on 15 June. The Council received a letter from the Lebanese government on 16 May expressing the hope that the Council would extend the mandate until 31 December. Given the indications of support for the tribunal also from the newly elected Lebanese president, Michel Suleiman, renewal is likely to be uncontroversial.
Key Recent Developments
After six days of negotiations mediated by an Arab League delegation headed by Qatar, an agreement was reached in Doha on 21 May between Lebanon’s ruling majority and the opposition to end the political crisis over the formation of a unity government and the election of a new president. Pursuant to the agreement, the consensus candidate, army commander Michel Suleiman, was duly elected by parliament on 25 May, breaking a six month impasse. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah later reiterated previous commitments not to use force to achieve political goals. On 28 May, president Suleiman appointed incumbent Fuad Siniora as prime minister after the parliament majority gave Siniora its backing. He will be tasked to form a unity government.
Under the Doha agreement:
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the Hezbollah-led opposition will obtain 11 cabinet seats and veto power on government decisions;
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the ruling majority will have 16 cabinet seats and choose the prime minister;
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the president will nominate ministers for the three remaining cabinet seats;
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the new president will be elected immediately;
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the use of weapons in internal conflicts will be banned;
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opposition protest camps in central Beirut will be removed;
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a new electoral law will be approved, dividing the country into smaller electoral districts to better represent each community;
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a new government will be formed after the next parliamentary elections in 2009; and
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state authority should be reinforced over Lebanon’s entire territory to guarantee the security of the state and of Lebanese citizens.
On 22 May, the Council, in a presidential statement, welcomed and strongly supported the Doha agreement.
The Doha agreement is a departure from the previous Arab League three-point plan proposal, which stipulated that no party should have veto power within the government and that the president should be elected immediately (not mentioning the need to agree on a unity government). It meets Hezbollah’s 18-month long demand for more political inclusiveness and constitutes a landmark development—although difficulties in government decisions are likely given the opposition’s veto power. Also, it does not address the crucial issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, but it seems that dialogue among all Lebanese factions will continue in Beirut to discuss other contentious issues, including disarmament.
It appears that the significant show of force by the Hezbollah-led Shi’a opposition from 7 to 14 May played an important role in producing conditions for the agreement. In street clashes with followers of the ruling majority led by the Future Movement (a Sunni Muslim organization) approximately 69 were killed and more than 180 wounded, including civilians. Hezbollah prevailed in the military showdown.
On 14 May, an Arab League delegation went to Beirut to discuss a way out of the crisis with the parties. After 48 hours of talks, the delegation was able to broker a six-point agreement leading to the Doha conference. This initial agreement included the following provisions:
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All arms must be withdrawn from the streets and roads, Beirut’s international airport and seaport must be reopened, and the Lebanese army must take charge of national security;
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There must be an agreement to return to dialogue on the national unity government and electoral law. This should lead to the end of the 18-month long sit-in of the opposition in camps in the heart of Beirut and to the election of General Suleiman as president;
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A dialogue among Lebanese factions in Doha will begin as soon as clause 1 is implemented;
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All parties must promise to refrain from returning to arms or violence to achieve political ends;
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The dialogue is to reinforce the rule of the Lebanese government on Lebanon’s entire territory; and
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Political leaders will end the use of political and sectarian incitement to violence.
Subsequently, the Lebanese government agreed to withdraw two decisions it took on 6 May. It had dismissed the chief of Beirut airport’s security, who was allegedly close to Hezbollah, and declared illegal a telecommunications network allegedly developed by Hezbollah. These actions had triggered Hezbollah’s violent reaction. After the government withdrew these decisions, the opposition removed all road and airport blockades.
There also appeared to be some recent progress in UN-mediated talks between Hezbollah and Israel on prisoners’ exchange, in particular for the release of the two Israeli soldiers captured by Hezbollah in 2006.
On 28 March, Daniel Bellemare, head of UNIIIC, submitted a report on progress in the activities of the Commission. He confirmed that a network of individuals acted in concert to carry out the assassination of Hariri and that this network, which is connected to other cases of bombings within UNIIIC’s mandate, continues to be operational. He added that indictments would be submitted for confirmation by the pre-trial judge only after he, in his capacity as prosecutor, had reviewed all materials transmitted to him by the Commission and the Lebanese judicial authorities—a process that could take some time. During a briefing to the Council on 8 April, Bellemare requested the Council to consider extending UNIIIC’s mandate beyond its 15 June deadline, as this would give the Commission the necessary time to complete this phase of the investigation.
Options
The Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing UNIIIC’s mandate without change for six months.
Key Issues
An issue which remains is the timing of transfer of UNIIIC’s role to the tribunal’s prosecutor. Lebanese authorities seem increasingly impatient that the tribunal should begin functioning. However, prolonging UNIIIC’s mandate will mean that the tribunal is unlikely to become operational for several months at least.
Another issue for some Council members is the continued expansion of the Commission’s mandate to incorporate assistance to the Lebanese authorities on additional bombings in Lebanon. There are concerns that this could dilute the main focus of the Commission: the Hariri case.
Security remains an issue. While the Commission’s personnel appeared unaffected by the recent clashes, there may be a need for additional staff and witness protection if the environment remains volatile.
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the new power sharing arrangements will have any impact, in the medium term, on the tribunal—in particular, whether Lebanese support and financial contributions will be sustained.
Council Dynamics
It seems that there is a wide consensus on a further—and probably last— renewal of the UNIIIC mandate.
Underlying Problems
Despite the Doha agreement, the risk of escalating sectarian tensions remains. Events of the last weeks in Lebanon have shown again Hezbollah’s military capability. Frustration, accompanied by radicalisation within Sunni groups, could potentially lead to further problems if Hezbollah misuses its new veto power in the cabinet.
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Selected Resolutions |
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Latest Presidential Statement |
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Latest Secretary-General’s Reports |
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Latest Press Statement |
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Bellemarre’s Latest Briefing to the Council |
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UNIIIC Commissioner and Future Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal |
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Daniel Bellemare (Canada) |
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Special Tribunal’s Registrar |
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Robin Vincent (UK) |
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Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Implementation of Resolution 1559 |
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Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway) |
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Secretary-General’s Special Coordinator for Lebanon |
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Johan Verbeke (Belgium) |
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“Lebanon: Hizbollah’s Weapons Turn Inward“, International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing N°23, 15 May 2008
