Iran
Expected Council Action
Iran’s nuclear programme is expected to be an active issue on the Council’s June calendar. In addition, the chair of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran is expected to brief the Council in June. An IAEA report on Iran’s compliance with previous Council resolutions is also likely. Adoption of a resolution imposing additional sanctions on Iran is a likely outcome.
Key Recent Developments
Iran’s agreement to a nuclear fuel swap plan was indicated on 17 May. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran announced the development. Brazil and Turkey had voiced reservations with regard to imposing further sanctions on Iran and had met with Iran bilaterally to seek a negotiated solution involving a fuel exchange as a first step.
A fuel swap as a confidence building measure had been offered to Iran by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in October 2009 after talks involving Iran, France, Russia and the US. The May 2010 plan brokered by Brazil and Turkey apparently calls for Iran to ship 1,200 kilograms of its low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey within one month and receive 120 kilograms of more highly enriched fuel rods for use in the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) within one year. (Which country will process the uranium and manufacture the fuel assemblies for the TRR is one of the details yet to be agreed upon.) Iran would have the right unilaterally to request that its LEU be returned and Turkey would be obliged to ship the LEU back to Iran. The head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation said that Iran’s current enrichment activities would continue.
On 18 May the US announced that the E3+3 (Germany, France and the UK and China, Russia and the US) had reached agreement on proposals for new sanctions against Iran and had circulated it to members in a Council meeting.
Elements of the draft:
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reaffirm past resolutions on Iran;
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prevent Iran from undertaking any commercial activity related to uranium mining, production or enrichment;
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prevent states from supplying Iran with heavy weapons or missiles;
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prevent Iran from undertaking any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology;
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provide for a travel ban and asset freeze on additional individuals and entities (to be provided in an annex);
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call on states to inspect the cargo of Iranian ships if information indicates a possible sanctions violation;
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establish a panel of experts to assist the Iran Sanctions Committee in carrying out its work;
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call upon states to exercise vigilance over transactions involving Iranian banks and to take measures to prohibit the opening of new branches; and
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stress the Council’s willingness to enhance diplomatic efforts and dialogue with Iran.
In comments to the press after the 18 May meeting, US Ambassador Susan Rice said that annexes to the resolution providing more detail about the targets of the sanctions were still being finalised in consultations among the full Council. The UK Ambassador Sir Mark Lyall Grant said that these consultations were beginning at the level of experts and might take weeks to complete. Rice said that it was hoped that the deal announced by Brazil, Iran and Turkey would proceed. However, she said that the fuel swap deal, even if implemented, did not address root concerns about Iran’s enrichment activities including its intention to continue enriching uranium well above the level required for fuelling a nuclear power plant. She also emphasised that the amount of LEU Iran would transfer to Turkey is now a much smaller percentage of Iran’s overall LEU stockpile than it was in October 2009.
President Lula said on 20 May that, since Iran had proven willing to engage in negotiations on the nuclear issue, the rest of the international community should also focus on negotiating a solution. Brazil’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim reiterated on 21 May that a negotiated solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme remained possible. But he also warned that continuing enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level would be an ongoing concern. However, the issue had not been part of discussions between the two countries because Brazil had been pressured by Western countries to focus its efforts with Iran on implementing a fuel swap deal. Amorim said Brazil had not been warned that the sanctions resolution would continue until Iran made concessions on its further enrichment activities.
On 21 May the US removed domestic sanctions that had been imposed on several Russian entities, including the government arms export agency, for past transfers of weapons and related technology to Iran. The US and Russian officials were also reported as stating that the draft sanctions resolution currently under consideration would not prohibit Russia from continuing with a suspended sale of anti-aircraft missiles to Iran.
On 24 May Iranian officials gave a letter to IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano outlining the fuel swap plan. It seems, however, that Iran’s ultimate position with regard to the fuel swap remains somewhat unclear. One prominent member of Iran’s parliament stated that the plan would lapse if any new sanctions are imposed by the Council, while another said Iran would proceed with implementing the agreement in any case.
On 24 May the Secretary-General said that if implemented the fuel swap deal might provide an opportunity for a negotiated settlement with regard to Iran’s nuclear programme if Iran follows up with further engagement with the IAEA. He also reaffirmed, however, that Iran must comply with existing Security Council resolutions (which prohibit any enrichment).
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said on 25 May the fuel swap plan was a “transparent ploy” by Iran to avoid further Council action. Rice said the same day that while negotiations on the draft resolution are ongoing, suggestions received from elected members so far have improved the text and been welcomed as constructive.
Lula wrote to the presidents of France, Mexico, Russia and the US on 25 May arguing that Iran’s openness to a fuel swap plan showed that Iran was ready for further dialogue, and saying that Brazil continued to oppose new sanctions on the country.
On 26 May Ahmadinejad said the fuel swap deal might be the last opportunity to resolve the situation, and urged the US to accept it. He also said Russia’s support for the draft sanctions resolution was unacceptable. A Russian official said the same day that Russia’s position was determined solely by Russian interests.
Human Rights-Related Developments
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The withdrawal of Iran as one of five nations that had been bidding in the May elections for four Asian regional seats on the Human Rights Council (HRC) meant that the Asian seats, as with those in all the other regions, were ultimately uncontested. US Ambassador Susan Rice observed that Iran’s withdrawal from the race for a seat on the HRC (there had been wide spread criticism of this candidacy) constituted progress toward a stronger UN human rights body. She noted, however, that greater competition was desirable to ensure strong membership on the HRC, echoing concerns voiced by Human Rights Watch that improvements to the HRC’s membership practices were needed to avoid the practice of agreed “slates” of regional candidates and thus to give states a greater choice of candidates in all regions. |
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is whether the elected members have proposals to amend the draft sanctions resolution circulated by the P5 in major ways, and if so, to what extent the P5 are prepared to accommodate such proposals. A related issue is whether the apparent willingness on the part of Iran to accept the proposal to exchange part of its LEU stockpile for fuel rods to be used in the TRR will be reflected in some way in the draft resolution.
Underlying Problems
A key underlying problem is the continuing distrust between Iran and members of the E3+3. Iran’s past behaviour has exacerbated this distrust, for example with regard to lack of cooperation with the IAEA, concealing facets of its nuclear programme, noncompliance with Council resolutions and the manner in which it appeared to accept then reject the original fuel swap deal discussed in October 2009.
Options
Options for the Council include:
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adopting a resolution imposing new sanctions on Iran substantively in the form presented by the P5;
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adopting a sanctions resolution that includes substantive amendments to the proposed sanctions measures suggested by elected members, including addressing in some manner the implications of the Brazil/Turkey/Iran fuel swap plan; or
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holding off on the adoption of a new sanctions resolution in order to test whether the Brazil/Turkey swap plan can open the way to quick and substantive negotiations on the wider issues on Iran’s nuclear programme.
Council and Broader Dynamics
Permanent members do not hold identical views with regard to Iran, but they appear to be maintaining their joint support for the draft resolution currently under consideration. They also seem to place high value on meaningful consultation with the full Council and are prepared to give time for this to take place.
While there is a sense among elected members that the P5 might have usefully included them earlier in the drafting process, most are satisfied that the P5 are so far allowing them adequate time to examine the draft and confer with capitals on the more complicated aspects of the resolution, for example those provisions dealing with financial issues.
The response of some elected members to the draft text at time of writing was cautious, reflecting the fact that they await further instructions from capitals.
Brazil and Turkey did not appear to have actively engaged in negotiations on the draft resolution at time of writing and seemed to be opposed to imposing more sanctions on Iran. Both countries expended considerable political energy in obtaining the provisional agreement with Iran on a fuel swap plan.
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Selected Council Resolutions |
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Selected Meeting Record |
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Selected Letter |
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Latest IAEA Reports |
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Sanctions Committee Chairman |
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