Libya
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council will hold its bimonthly briefing on the situation in Libya. Special Representative and head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) Abdoulaye Bathily will brief the Council on recent political, security, and humanitarian developments in the country and the Secretary-General’s latest report on UNSMIL.
Key Recent Developments
Two years have passed since the indefinite postponement of the Libyan national elections that were planned for December 2021. The political impasse continues between the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), based in Tripoli and led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, and the eastern-based Government of National Stability (GNS), led by Prime Minister Osama Hamad and aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) and the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) under the command of General Khalifa Haftar. The prolonged stalemate between the rival governments is a key driver of Libya’s political, security, and economic instability.
In this context, both the UN and national actors have concentrated recent efforts on facilitating agreement on a new roadmap for national elections to unify the country’s divided government. In March, the HoR and the GNU-aligned High State Council (HSC) established a “joint 6+6 committee”—composed of six representatives from each body—to draft electoral laws to enable elections. On 7 June, the committee announced that it had reached agreement on draft legislation, which the HoR and HSC subsequently approved.
The proposed legislation proved to be controversial, with various political factions contesting several of its provisions and calling for revisions. On 29 September, the 6+6 committee submitted to the HoR an amended version of the draft legislation, which the HoR approved on 2 October. On 6 October, however, HSC President Mohamed Takala—who is considered a political ally of Dbeibah—said that the HSC had rejected the amended legislation and withdrawn from the 6+6 committee. This assertion was reportedly denied by other HSC members.
In a 12 October statement, UNSMIL said that it had completed a “technical review” of the amended legislation, which it described as a “working basis” for holding elections while finding that it still contained “[c]ontentious issues that need to be addressed and resolved through a political settlement”. The controversial provisions include:
- mandating a second round of presidential elections even if one candidate receives a majority of votes in the first round;
- making the holding of parliamentary elections contingent on the success of the presidential elections; and
- establishing a unified interim government to organise elections.
At the Council’s 16 October briefing on Libya, Bathily praised the amended legislation for incorporating some technical revisions proposed by UNSMIL and Libya’s High National Elections Commission to make it possible to hold the elections, but he reiterated the need for stakeholders to reach a compromise on the outstanding political issues. The most contentious of these remains the establishment of a unified interim government to organise elections, which Bathily said is necessary for “creating a level playing field for all candidates” but must be the consensual outcome of “political negotiations amongst major players”. He said that HSC’s rejection of the amended legislation “risks obstructing the electoral process” and urged the body to renounce that position. At the same time, he cautioned against the unilateral appointment of an interim government, which he said could trigger violent conflict. In this context, Bathily reiterated his call for all stakeholders to agree on a binding political settlement for “a peaceful electoral process, the backbone of which will be a unified Government able to lead Libya to elections”.
Since then, Bathily has continued to consult with national actors. In a 23 November statement, UNSMIL announced that Bathily had invited key Libyan institutional stakeholders to a meeting to reach a settlement on the politically contested electoral issues. To this end, the statement said that Bathily had requested the HoR, HSC, LNA, and Presidential Council to designate representatives to attend a preparatory meeting to discuss the date, venue, and agenda of the meeting of their principals. Following this announcement, the embassies of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US to Libya issued a joint statement welcoming Bathily’s invitation and urging the parties to “seize this opportunity to set Libya on the path to long-term stability”. On 27 November, however, the HoR issued a statement expressing their disappointment that the GNS—which the UN does not officially recognise—had not been invited to the meeting and reportedly reiterating its “rejection of any political dialogue or agreement failing to respect the Libyan will and elected institutions”.
On the security track, the 2020 ceasefire agreement has continued to hold despite sporadic clashes in recent months. In August, a conflict between two armed groups affiliated with different factions of the GNU led to violence in Tripoli, reportedly resulting in at least 55 people being killed. In October, the LNA’s attempt to arrest Al-Mahdi Al-Barghathi—the former Minister of Defence in the Government of National Accord, the predecessor to the GNU—led to armed clashes and several casualties in Benghazi. Most recently, forces associated with the GNU launched a military operation in November around the western city of Zuwara, a region inhabited by the Amizagh—Libya’s largest ethnic minority—that is mainly governed by the Amazigh Supreme Council (ASC), as well as some Arab militias. The GNU described the operation as a mission to secure the Ras Ijdir border crossing to Tunisia, which has allegedly been the site of illicit smuggling operations, but the ASC warned of destabilising consequences, and the GNS accused the GNU of “trying to impose its control over the country by force under the pretext of imposing security”. Some independent analysts have cited control over the illicit economic activities taking place at the border crossing as the main cause of the dispute.
Regarding the humanitarian situation, recovery and reconstruction efforts continue following the catastrophic damage wreaked by Storm Daniel, which hit the eastern city of Derna in September. According to OCHA’s latest available numbers as at 31 October, 4,300 people died in the storm, more than 8,000 people are still missing, and 43,400 people remain displaced. In a 2 October statement, UNSMIL cautioned against “the emergence of unilateral and competing initiatives from various Libyan actors and institutions” on reconstruction, instead calling for a “unified national mechanism” to coordinate efforts. The Council echoed this call in resolution 2702 of 30 October, which most recently renewed UNSMIL’s mandate, underscoring the need for “the reconstruction to be managed and distributed transparently, with effective oversight and accountability to the Libyan people”. From 1 to 2 November, the GNS held a reconstruction conference that convened 400 participants representing international donors and the private sector, but it reportedly did not include any GNU officials.
Key Issues and Options
Supporting political momentum towards national elections to unify Libya’s divided government remains the key issue for the Security Council. In this context, an important objective for the Council is to help foster common political ground between the country’s rival legislatures to agree on electoral laws—a goal that Bathily has repeatedly urged Council members to support by wielding their influence on national stakeholders. At December’s meeting, members may reiterate their call on Libyan actors to engage in good-faith negotiations to finally achieve consensus on outstanding political issues, noting that the rival governments had originally expressed their intent to finalise legislation in time to hold elections by the end of the year. In this context, some members may welcome Bathily’s proposed meeting of institutional stakeholders and urge them to productively participate in these discussions. Members may consider issuing a press statement conveying this message.
Council Dynamics
Council members remain united on the need for a Libyan-led, inclusive political process resulting in elections that will help to restore political, security, and economic stability to the country. They also remain broadly supportive of Bathily’s mediation efforts in this regard.
Broader geopolitical tensions still influence Council dynamics in respect to Libya, however. The US and other Western members remain concerned about the presence of the Wagner Group—the private Russian security organisation—in Libya and growing ties between Haftar and Russian President Vladimir Putin, who most recently met in Moscow in September and have reportedly discussed the establishment of a Russian naval base in eastern Libya. For its part, Russia routinely blames Libya’s current instability on the NATO-led military intervention in 2011 and accuses Western countries of seeking to exploit Libya’s oil reserves for economic gain.
The UK is the penholder on Libya.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 30 OCTOBER 2023S/RES/2702 | This resolution extended UNSMIL’s mandate until 31 October 2024. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 19 AUGUST 2022S/2022/632 | This report covered developments in Libya between 20 May and 19 August 2022. |
| Security Council Meeting Record | |
| 16 OCTOBER 2023S/PV.9438 | This meeting record was on Libya. |
| Security Council Press Statement | |
| 23 AUGUST 2023SC/15394 | This was a press statement in which in Council members reaffirmed their strong commitment to an inclusive, Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process, facilitated by the UN, which builds on progress achieved in negotiations thus far and addresses the issues of who will govern the country through elections. |
