Iran
Expected Council Action
In December, the Council is expected to convene a briefing on the Secretary-General’s biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme. The Council will also receive reports from its 2231 facilitator, Ambassador Vanessa Frazier (Malta), and the Joint Commission, which was established to oversee the implementation of the JCPOA and comprises the current parties to the agreement: China, France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and Iran. Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo, Frazier, and a representative of the EU in its capacity as coordinator of the Joint Commission are expected to brief the Council.
Background and Key Recent Developments
Efforts to revive the JCPOA remain frozen following a breakdown in negotiations last year and subsequent political developments that have led to a further deterioration in relations between the parties. In May 2018, then-US President Donald Trump announced that the US, which was originally a signatory to the JCPOA, was withdrawing from the agreement, and went on to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran. Although Iran formally remained in the JCPOA, it took steps that directly contravene its terms, including enriching uranium to levels beyond the JCPOA-mandated limits and removing cameras and monitoring equipment required by the agreement. Following the election of current US President Joseph Biden, the US, Iran, and other parties to the JCPOA began talks in April 2021 in Vienna to revive the agreement.
Those discussions progressed until August 2022, when the EU circulated what it described as a “final” draft agreement. Iran reportedly insisted as a condition for accepting the deal that the IAEA close its investigation into traces of enriched uranium it had discovered at three undeclared sites in Iran in 2019. The US and European parties to the JCPOA objected to this demand, which they viewed as a separate issue related to Iran’s obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the country’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, which every non-nuclear NPT state party is required to conclude with the IAEA to ensure that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes. In a 17 November 2022 resolution, the IAEA Board of Governors censured Iran and directed it to comply with the IAEA’s investigation. In response, Iran announced on 22 November 2022 that it had started enriching uranium to 60 percent purity at its Fordow nuclear facility, approaching the roughly 90 percent level required to produce a nuclear weapon and well above the 3.67 percent limit imposed by the JCPOA.
With negotiations to revive the JCPOA stalled, Iran has increased its production of highly enriched uranium. The IAEA’s latest quarterly verification and monitoring report, dated 15 November, estimated that Iran’s stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium totalled 128.3 kilograms, an increase of 6.7 kilograms from the agency’s previous report. In its latest quarterly report on implementation of Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, also dated 15 November, the IAEA reiterated its call on Iran to provide the agency with “technically credible explanations” for the presence of depleted uranium at the two undeclared nuclear facilities that remain under investigation. (The agency had previously suspended its investigation into a third site, Marivan, after Iran provided the agency with a “possible explanation” for the detection of uranium there.)
Cooperation between the IAEA and Iranian authorities has been strained since Iran began breaching the terms of the JCPOA. After the IAEA’s February verification and monitoring report said that the agency had detected traces of uranium enriched to 83.7 percent at Iran’s Fordow facility—which Iran claimed was accidental—the IAEA and the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran issued a joint statement on 4 March permitting the IAEA to “implement further appropriate verification and monitoring activities”, including the installation of surveillance cameras and enrichment-monitoring devices at certain nuclear facilities. According to the agency’s latest safeguards report, however, while “limited progress” was made in implementing the commitments set out in the joint statement during the March-June reporting period, “no further progress” was made in the June-September period. The report states that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi is “seriously concerned” that Iran appears to have “frozen” implementation of the agreement.
In parallel to this dispute, Grossi issued a statement on 16 September announcing that Iran had withdrawn the designation of several IAEA inspectors assigned to conduct verification activities in Iran under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Grossi said that although the measure is formally permitted by the agreement, Iran had exercised it “in a manner that affects in a direct and severe way the ability of the IAEA to conduct effectively its inspections” in the country. On 18 September, France, Germany, and the UK—known within the Joint Commission as the E3—and the US issued a joint statement calling on Iran to “immediately reverse these inspector de-designations and fully cooperate with the Agency to enable them to provide assurances that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful”.
While JCPOA negotiations remain dormant, Iran and the US concluded a bilateral agreement on 18 September under which Iran released five US citizens imprisoned in Iran in exchange for access to $6 billion dollars in frozen oil revenue. The funds, held in South Korean banks, were transferred to a restricted account in Qatar, from which Iran could withdraw them for humanitarian needs. The deal reportedly also included informal commitments to reduce tensions between US forces and Iran-backed militias in Syria, which had clashed in previous months. However, following the 7 October attack on Israel by Hamas—which Iran supports politically and financially—the US and Qatar agreed to temporarily block Iran’s access to the funds, and tensions between the US and Iranian proxies in the region have since escalated.
Pursuant to resolution 2231, restrictions on Iran’s ballistic missile program expired on 18 October. In a 14 September joint statement, the E3 announced that they would retain the restrictions past this date through their national sanctions regimes because of “Iran’s consistent and severe non-compliance with its JCPoA commitments since 2019”. On 17 October, the EU announced that it would take similar measures under the EU non-proliferation regime on Iran. On 18 October, the US announced new sanctions on several individuals and entities linked to Iran’s ballistic missile and uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) programmes, citing Iran’s alleged transfer of these weapons to Hamas and Russia. The same day, 46 countries participating in the Proliferation Security Initiative—a group of states promoting non-proliferation efforts—issued a statement affirming their “commitment to take all necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale, or transfer” of ballistic missile-related items to and from Iran.
Key Issues and Options
As the prospects for a revival of the JCPOA grow increasingly remote, the key issue for the Security Council is how to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Analysts have suggested that Iran’s steps since the US’ withdrawal from the agreement, including its uranium-enrichment activities, are likely to make a return to the original terms of the agreement and full compliance with those terms difficult, particularly given the institutional knowledge acquired by Iran’s nuclear programme and the IAEA’s diminished monitoring capabilities, which prevent it from establishing a new baseline against which to measure compliance with a future agreement. The Iranian government’s apparent support for Hamas and the Russian war effort in Ukraine have also made reviving the JCPOA politically difficult for Western countries.
Given Iran’s non-compliance with the JCPOA, Council members could initiate the “snapback mechanism” in resolution 2231 if they decide the agreement is no longer viable. This process—which is not subject to the veto—would reinstate the UN sanctions that were in place before the JCPOA was agreed upon. It does not appear that such a measure is imminent, however, as the P3 countries—France, the UK, and the US—maintain that their “red line” for initiating the snapback remains the detection of weapons-grade uranium in Iran. In the E3’s joint statement announcing the retention of national sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, they underscored that their decision “does not amount to…triggering the snapback mechanism”.
An alternative means by which the P3 and like-minded countries could apply pressure on Iran is to adopt a resolution censuring the country at the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors. Since Iran ceased to comply with the JCPOA, however, the board has adopted three such resolutions, most recently in November 2022. In a joint statement during the most recent board meeting this November, France, Germany, the UK, and the US said that “if Iran fails to implement the essential and urgent actions” contained in that resolution, the board will have to be prepared to take further action, “including the possibility of additional resolutions”.
Council Dynamics
A revival of the JCPOA has grown increasingly unlikely given current geopolitical dynamics.
The P3 and other Western countries remain concerned about Iran’s activities that contravene the JCPOA and its lack of cooperation with the IAEA. Some may call on Iran to re-certify the agency’s inspectors and to fully implement the March joint statement on verification and monitoring measures. The US and European members might reiterate allegations that Iran has supplied UAVs to Russia for use in Ukraine and express concern at what they view as Iran’s destabilising behaviour in the region, including through its support for Hamas in Gaza and proxy militias in Iraq and Syria.
China and Russia are more supportive of Iran. Both states have previously blamed the US for the collapse of the JCPOA, criticising it for withdrawing from the deal and imposing unilateral sanctions on the Iranian regime. In September, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu met in Tehran with Iran’s top security official, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian. During his visit, Shoigu said that “sanctions pressure on Russia and Iran shows its futility, while Russian-Iranian interaction is reaching a new level.” On 28 November, Iran announced that it had finalised a deal to purchase Russian-made Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets.
| Security Council Resolution | |
| 20 JULY 2015S/RES/2231 | This was a resolution that endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran. |
| Secretary-General’s Report | |
| 29 JUNE 2023S/2023/473 | This was the biannual report on the implementation of resolution 2231. |
