Somalia
Expected Council Action
The Council is expecting several reports on Somalia:
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a regular report is due in mid-October;
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a plan for a “feasible international stabilisation force” and a “concept of operations” for a follow on UN peacekeeping operation have been requested by the Council; and
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a report on implementation of resolution 1816 of 2 June (which permits states to enter Somalia’s territorial waters to counter piracy). France has been particularly active on this issue, proposing a new piracy resolution and calling on states with naval assets to do more in support of resolutions 1814 and 1816.
The Secretary-General may consolidate the three reports. Should this happen, the Council is likely to receive the report in early November.
It is possible that the only Council discussions in October would relate to a possible new sanctions resolution imposing targeted measures against peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. The Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee was expected to brief the Council by 20 September. At press time, this was pending.
Key Recent Developments
At sea, the Somali piracy problem has attracted heightened interest and reports emerging at press time of seizure by pirates of a ship carrying 32 heavy tanks and ammunition will raise the stakes even further. As of mid-September, pirates were holding over a dozen ships with more than 100 passengers for ransom. So far, around sixty ships have been attacked this year, up from 13 last year. Planning continues for a future EU-led multinational naval mission to address this. EU foreign ministers announced the establishment of a coordination cell to monitor piracy and defence in the Gulf of Aden.
On land, the warfare worsened in September. The capture of Kismayo in August was followed by an intensive assault by insurgents against both Ethiopian forces and AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu. Sustained heavy bombardments from both sides are reported. These are said to be the most intense seen since the Ethiopian intervention. Large numbers of civilian casualties and displaced persons are also reported.
On 26 August the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, on the political situation. The same day, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also briefed the Council on the military capabilities needed to address the situation in Somalia.
In the briefing from DPKO, the Council was told that the Djibouti Agreement did not include the parties in Somalia that were militarily the strongest. Somalia was awash with weapons and between 60 and 80 thousand militia personnel were estimated. The briefing indicated that the Islamist insurgency group, Al-Shabaab, intended to remove all foreign forces from Somalia, that the group’s hard-line elements were proficient in most forms of insurgent-style attacks, and that it was believed to have links to Al-Qaida. Given that the threat to any UN force entering Somalia was high, the Secretariat recommended an international stabilisation force with a peace enforcement mandate combined with a maritime task force.
The proposed stabilisation force could only realistically deploy in Mogadishu and provide limited security for a peace process and secure the port and airport and some land routes facilitating the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. It would, if security conditions permitted, eventually transition to a peacekeeping operation, which would deploy beyond Mogadishu. The Secretariat further said an international stabilisation force would require a strong lead nation with a coherent command-and-control structure and a minimum of 8,000 well equipped self-sustaining troops trained in counterinsurgency techniques.
It seems that Ould-Abdallah argued for a peacekeeping operation because a force supporting the Djibouti Agreemnt would not need full capabilities and because he believed it would attract funding, troops and logistics more easily than a stabilisation force. But the Secretariat advised against it, saying that peacekeeping troops would be unlikely to possess the required capabilities to carry out the necessary enforcement/counter-insurgency operations.
On 4 September, the Council adopted a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to produce a detailed plan for an international stabilisation force and requested the Secretary General to begin approaching states to participate in such a coalition of the willing. Work is also to continue on the concept of operations for a peacekeeping mission.
Relations between President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Nur Adde Hussein Hassan remain tense despite mediation efforts in Addis Ababa in August, which led to their signing a reconciliation agreement. After returning from Addis Ababa, the prime minister overcame a no-confidence vote. On 11 September, parliament rejected a proposal to allow the ten cabinet ministers loyal to Yusuf, who had resigned on 2 August, to return, in contravention to the terms of the reconciliation agreement. Earlier that week, in accordance with the agreement, Mohamed Dheere stood down as mayor of Mogadishu.
Options
Adoption of a new sanctions resolution introducing targeted measures (travel bans and assets freezes) is a possibility.
A further option is a new resolution relating to anti-piracy activities off the Somali coast, perhaps with vigorous Council involvement. It might authorise establishment of a UN maritime task force, mandate the UN Military Staff Committee to coordinate the international response and call on states pursuant to resolutions 1814 and 1816 to contribute warships. However, if there is a desire to await the Secretary-General’s recommendations before adopting new specific measures, an alternative may be a more generic presidential statement urging member states to contribute naval forces and to cooperate in the overall coordination of operations.
Options for the stabilisation force seem unlikely to be available for consideration in October. However, Council members could use the time available to begin expert level discussions on mandate issues including:
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military activities in support of the arms embargo and any new sanctions;
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protection of civilians, including security of internally displaced persons; and
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revisiting the 1995 Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from the UN Operation in Somalia (and perhaps requesting a Secretariat briefing on this)
Key Issues
A key issue is whether the mandate of any intervention force should also include protecting Somali civilians rather than just supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The government’s divisions, alleged corruption and lack of universal appeal make it likely that any sustainable peace process will need to reach out to the wider civilian population and therefore the interests of that population should be uppermost in the minds of those implementing the mandate from the outset. For many, TFG security forces are viewed, along with the militias, as responsible for the ongoing violence.
It remains to be seen whether, for potential troop contributors to the intervention force, sufficient progress has been made in two areas—the peace process and the security situation—to warrant them committing personnel and resources to an international force. This issue is likely to determine whether appropriate forces could be generated.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Most members expressed bewilderment at the disparate approach provided by Ould-Abdallah who seemed out of step with the Secretariat in late August.
Some members, including the US, Italy and South Africa, had hoped that the Secretariat would provide more details for a peacekeeping operation. Others strongly support the Secretariat’s assessment that only a coalition type stabilisation force would have the required capacity to address Somalia’s problems.
Support for a peacekeeping operation may be influenced by scepticism that suitable forces could be generated for a stabilisation force. However, there is even greater scepticism, it seems, about generating forces for a peacekeeping operation.
Some members are yet to be convinced that any intervention would be viable.
There seems to be growing support for additional sanctions measures.
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Selected Security Council Resolutions |
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Selected Presidential Statement |
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Selected Report of the Secretary-General |
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Latest Monitoring Group’s Report |
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Other |
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Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
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Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) |
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UNPOS |
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AMISOM |
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- Somalia A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare, Enough Strategy Paper by Ken Menkhaus, September 2008
- The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) April 1992 – March 1995
