



# SECURITY COUNCIL REPORT

## MONTHLY FORECAST

### OCT 2008



29 September 2008

This report is available online and can be viewed together with Update Reports on developments during the month at [www.securitycouncilreport.org](http://www.securitycouncilreport.org)

## OVERVIEW FOR OCTOBER

China will have Security Council presidency in October. The election of five new members of the Council for the 2009-10 terms will be held on 17 October in the General Assembly. Two new members from WEOG need to be elected as well as one each for the African, Asian and Latin American seats.

An open debate on women peace and security is expected to be held in late October.

Open meetings are expected in order to consider the mandates of two peacekeeping operations both expiring on 15 October:

- UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH); and
- UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).

Other likely public meetings include:

- the **Middle East**, in accordance with the monthly practice;
- on **Afghanistan** to receive a briefing from the Secretary General's Special Representative;
- on **Nepal**, to receive a briefing from the Special Representative on the Secretary-General's latest report on UNMIN;

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## Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending for the Council include:

- The Council is yet to take up the Secretary-General's recommendations regarding **protection of civilians**, presented in his October 2007 report (S/2007/643).
- The 2005 World Summit requested that the Security Council consider reforms for the **Military Staff Committee**. This has yet to be addressed.
- In resolution 1327 on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the **Brahimi Report**, S/2000/809), the Council decided to review periodically the implementation of the provisions contained in the resolution's annex. No such reviews have occurred in the past three years.
- The quarterly reports of the International Security Assistance Force in **Afghanistan** are now routinely outdated when released. (The last report, released in September, covered the period 1 February–30 April 2008.) The next report covering the period

1 May-30 July 2008 is yet to be released.

- Similarly, **UNAMI reports on human rights**, which in the past were produced every two to three months, are now usually delayed by several months and are therefore quite outdated. (The last report, released in March, covered the period from 1 July-31 December 2007.)
- The Council requested the Secretary-General on 21 November 2006 (S/2006/928) to **update the index** to Council notes and statements on working methods. This has not been published.
- On **Western Sahara**, in April the Council in resolution 1813 called upon the parties to continue negotiations. But there have been no further talks, nor any briefing to the Council on the situation.
- On the **DRC**, the Council sanctions committee has not acted on individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children, despite MONUC reports about the problem continuing on a serious scale.

- The Secretary-General has yet to put forward proposals for the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon, especially in the **Sheb'a Farms** area, in accordance with resolution 1701, and respond to the cartographic, legal and political implications of the alternative path suggested by the Government of Lebanon in its seven-point plan.
- The Council is awaiting the PBC's response to its May request for advice and recommendations on the situation in the **Central African Republic** (S/2008/383).
- The Secretariat is yet to report to the Council on **Kenya** as requested in the 6 February presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/4).
- On 7 December 2007 the Council asked the Secretary-General to provide an outline of the mandate of the **adviser on the prevention of genocide** and of the implications of upgrading this position from an Assistant Secretary-General to Under Secretary-General (S/2007/722). At press time, no response had been released.

- on **Sudan** to renew the mandate of the **Sudan** sanctions Panel of Experts (expiring on 15 October) and the Secretary-General's report on UNAMID and UNMIS; and
- on **Côte d'Ivoire** to renew the sanctions and the Group of Experts (expiring on 31 October).

It is possible there will be meetings on:

- **Lebanon**, on recent developments and on the latest report on the implementation of resolution 1559;
- **DPRK**, to receive a briefing from the chairman of the sanctions committee and discussion of the most recent developments is also likely;

- **Kosovo**, to receive details of the planned reconfiguration of UNMIK;
- **Somalia**, to discuss a possible new sanctions resolution and possible options on piracy; and
- **Oil-for-Food** (in particular about avoiding exposing the UN to legal challenges if final payments are made without full documentation). ■

## Status Update since our September Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this *Forecast* are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments on other issues in the Council during September included:

- **Cyprus**: On 4 September the Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the launch of negotiations between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders aimed at the reunification of Cyprus. The Council also reiterated its readiness to support the process. (S/PRST/2008/34)
- **Liberia**: On 9 September the Council was briefed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Ellen Margrethe Løj, on the August report of the Secretary-General regarding progress on benchmarks for the drawdown of UNMIL. At press time, the Council was expected to adopt a resolution on 30 September extending the mandate of UNMIL for another year and possibly endorsing the Secretary-General's recommendations for adjusting the mission's troop levels (S/PV.5972). On 10 September the Council's Sanctions Committee on Liberia removed the name of one individual, Moussa Cisse, from its travel ban and assets freeze lists (SC/9442).
- **Iran**: On 11 September the chairman of the 1737 Sanctions Committee on Iran, Belgian Ambassador Jan Grauls, briefed the Council on the recent activities of the Committee (S/PV. 5973). On 15 September the IAEA Director General released a report on implementation by Iran of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and Council resolutions 1737, 1747 and 1803. The report found that Iran was making significant progress on developing and operating its centrifuges enriching uranium, and that it continued to resist efforts to address alleged nuclear-weapons work—in particular, it seems that Iran

received assistance of foreign expertise (GOV/2008/38). On 26 September a draft resolution reaffirming Iran's obligation to implement Council and IAEA resolutions was circulated. It seems that the draft was originally presented by the US to the E3+3. The resolution was sponsored by the E3+3 as well as Belgium, Croatia and Italy. It did not contain new sanctions but reaffirmed all previous Council resolutions and called upon Iran to fully comply. Indonesia and South Africa proposed some amendments to the language regarding an early negotiated solution, and Indonesia proposed reference to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. These changes were agreed and the resolution was adopted unanimously on 27 September (S/RES/1835).

- **Myanmar**: On 11 September Ibrahim Gambari, the Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Myanmar, briefed the Council in closed session on his 18-23 August trip to Myanmar. Following the briefing, Gambari said that tangible results from the trip fell below expectations and that it was important for the Government of Myanmar to deliver substantive results to key concerns. There was no formal outcome. On 27 September the Secretary-General convened the first high-level meeting of the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General on Myanmar. The members of the Group expressed continued support for the Secretary-General's Good Offices and encouraged Myanmar to use this channel to address key issues of concern to the international community.
- **DRC**: On 12 September the Council was a briefed on the situation in North and South Kivu. In a press statement (SC/9445) the Council expressed serious concern over the fighting between DRC national armed forces (*Forces Armées de la République*

*Démocratique du Congo* or FARDC) and the rebels belonging to renegade Tutsi General Laurent Nkunda's *Congrès national pour la défense du peuple*, or CNDP, and its humanitarian consequences. It stressed that the clashes were in violation of the Actes d'Engagement de Goma, signed by the CNDP and other armed groups in North and South Kivu in January this year. It also recalled that resolution 1794 demanded all illegal armed groups in the eastern part of the DRC, including the Nkunda's dissident militia, lay down their arms and condemned hostile acts against the UN Mission in the DRC.

- **Djibouti/Eritrea**: On 17 September, the Council was briefed on the border dispute between Ethiopia and Djibouti, and discussed the report of the fact-finding mission that visited the region from 28 July to 6 August (S/2008/602). In the report, the fact-finding mission called the situation "fragile, volatile and urgent." As the mission did not gain the permission of Eritrean authorities to visit Eritrea, it was only able to obtain Djibouti's view of events.
- **Middle East**: On 18 September the Council held its monthly briefing followed by consultations on the Middle East. Robert Serry, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, said that bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PLO were continuing. He added that the Palestinian Authority (PA) was making progress in implementing its security plan. The release of 198 Palestinian prisoners on 25 August by Israel was another positive development. However, obstacles to movements remained high across the West Bank. He added that settler violence had intensified and settlement activity was

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ongoing, contrary to the Geneva Convention and to Israel's commitments under the road map and the Annapolis process. In Gaza, the ceasefire has continued to hold, but the humanitarian situation remains grim. He emphasised that Hamas' actions were increasingly divorcing Palestinian institutions from the PA and interrupting basic service delivery. Efforts by Egypt to help reunify Gaza and the West Bank under the authority of the PA were welcomed. Finally, in Lebanon positive developments included the re-establishment of dialogue among all factions, but the continuation of security incidents remained worrying. (S/PV.5974)

- **Zimbabwe:** On 19 September the Council held private consultations on the situation in Zimbabwe. It was briefed during the meeting by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Haile Menkerios on the 15

September agreement on the formation of a government of national unity signed between the major opposing political parties in that country.

- **Terrorism:** The Council adopted a presidential statement on 22 September condemning the 20 September terrorist attack in Islamabad, Pakistan and underlined the need to bring those responsible to justice and urged states to cooperate with the Pakistani authorities in this respect (S/PRST/2008/35). It also issued a press statement on recent terrorist attacks in Spain (SC/9455) and Yemen (SC/9446).
- **Mediation and Settlement of Disputes:** On 23 September the Council convened a high-level meeting on mediation and settlement of disputes, chaired by Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso and current chairman of ECOWAS. In a presidential statement (S/PRST/2008/36) the

Council reaffirmed the UN's role in mediation efforts and requested a report from the Secretary-General in six months on UN mediation and possible ways to improve it.

- **Chad/CAR:** On 24 September the EU's High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, presented its mid-term review of the EUFOR operation in Chad and the Central African Republic. The Council unanimously adopted resolution 1834 renewing the mandate of MINURCAT until 15 March 2009. The resolution expresses the Council's intention to deploy a UN military component to succeed EUFOR on 15 March, and requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 15 November containing detailed planning in this regard.
- **OSCE:** On 26 September, the OSCE chairman-in-office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb briefed the Council.

## Georgia

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to consider in October a report on the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) and the mission's future. (The mission's mandate expires on 15 October.)

Russia has requested an Arria meeting with participation of representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia ahead of the Council meeting on UNOMIG's mandate. An international conference to discuss the crisis in Georgia is also scheduled to take place on 15 October in Geneva. The Council is unlikely to make any major decisions before the Geneva meeting. A technical rollover of the mandate is therefore a possibility.

At press time a Russian resolution seeking an arms embargo against Georgia, circulated in early September, had yet to be discussed. (Two draft resolutions from August, one by France and the other by Russia, are theoretically still on the table but have been overtaken by events.)

### Key Recent Developments

EU leaders met on 1 September to discuss the situation in Georgia. They expressed grave concern over the conflict in Georgia. They criticised the reaction of Russia as disproportionate and described Russia's

recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as "unacceptable". They rejected calls by some for sanctions on Russia, but did decide to suspend negotiations on a new strategic partnership with Moscow.

At the EU summit, the European Commission agreed to donate to Georgia about \$8 million. EU member states agreed to contribute another \$13 million. The US in early September announced a \$1 billion aid package to Georgia.

Russian troops remained in Georgia nearly a month after the six-point agreement of 12 August had specified the withdrawal of Russian forces to the line prior to 7 August 2008. On 8 September, an EU delegation, led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy representing the EU presidency, went to Moscow to seek agreement on Russian compliance with the commitment to withdraw troops from Georgia. Russian President Dmitri Medvedev agreed that checkpoints around Poti and Senaki would be closed within a week following a meeting with President Sarkozy. By 13 September, Russia had withdrawn troops from these areas. Medvedev also agreed that all troops would pull-out of Georgia once 200 EU monitors are deployed on 1 October. Russia has said that it will keep 3,800 troops each in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

On 9 September Russia called for a meeting of the Security Council and circulated a draft resolution calling for a UN arms embargo against Georgia. The draft resolution expresses deep concern at the "excessive increase in Georgia's military expenditures" and the acquisition of armaments beyond Georgia's national defence requirements.

Russia has said that "under the current circumstances it would be impossible" to hold a Council meeting to extend UNOMIG's mandate in Abkhazia without the participation of the official representative of Abkhazia. (In the past the US has declined visas for such representatives to come to the UN.)

On 15 September the EU foreign ministers approved an observer mission of 200 to be deployed to Georgia by 1 October as agreed between President Sarkozy and President Medvedev.

Negotiations over the deployment in South Ossetia of 100 observers from the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) broke down on 18 September. OSCE had agreed in principle to send the monitors, and twenty were immediately deployed. (There had been eight OSCE monitors on the ground before the conflict.) Russia has now said that it will not allow OSCE monitors into South Ossetia and that local authorities in South Ossetia and

Abkhazia should have a say on any OSCE mandate as the territories are independent.

Georgia filed a complaint at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on 12 August against Russia for violating the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination by supporting ethnic cleansing of Georgians. It is seeking a provisional order for Russia to halt such actions pending a full hearing of the case. The ICJ heard arguments on the application for provisional measures from 8 to 10 September. Russia has challenged the Court's jurisdiction and asked it to dismiss Georgia's application outright. A decision is expected in the next few weeks.

On 18 September, Russia signed treaties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia guaranteeing them protection in case of attack. (Russia had established diplomatic relations with the governments in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali on 9 September. Nicaragua is the only other country that has recognised South Ossetia and Abkhazia.)

### Options

A renewal of UNOMIG with its current mandate is a possible option but seems unlikely given the drastically changed circumstances. Russia argues that even the name of the mission is no longer accurate.

A more likely option is a technical rollover of a few months so that a new mandate for UNOMIG can be worked out. The Secretary-General has indicated that this is currently his preferred option. However, there may be problems securing agreement on the language of the rollover resolution. The usual practice with technical resolutions is to refer to past resolutions. Russia seems likely to object that the provisions of past resolutions referring to Georgia's territorial integrity are no longer valid. The US is likely to seek to retain them. An option is to craft language which is non-prejudicial to either sides' position.

If there is no agreement, even on a technical rollover, UNOMIG's mandate would lapse leading to the withdrawal of the mission soon afterwards.

A possible option is for the Council to agree to terminate UNOMIG and set up a new political mission with a mandate tailored to

the new circumstances and perhaps relating to the lines between Georgia and both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This would be a longer term endeavour and is unlikely to be achievable in two weeks.

Other options include:

- setting up a fact-finding mission to investigate the origins of the conflict;
- requesting the Secretary-General to provide a plan for reconfiguring UNOMIG to suit the current circumstances; and
- initiating a larger role for the UN in the international talks (the curious absence of UN leadership has been noted by some observers).

### Key Issues

The key issue is whether a UN mission has a role under the new circumstances and if so, overcoming the polarised positions on issues including territorial integrity.

Another issue is where any observers would be deployed. The Russians do not want EU or OSCE observers in South Ossetia or Abkhazia. The EU and OSCE feel that without access to those two regions it would be difficult for them to do their job. It remains to be seen if there would be greater flexibility regarding UN observers.

A related issue is protection for UN personnel. Security had in the past been provided by Russian peacekeepers. But now that these are no longer seen as a neutral party, this creates operational problems for the UN—at least until the Council agrees on new arrangements.

An underlying issue is the stability of the wider Caucasus region. Use of force by both sides in the Georgian conflict and Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has made former Soviet states in the region nervous. There is concern that unresolved conflicts in disputed territories like Nagorno-Karabakh could be stirred up.

Also of concern is Georgia's internal stability. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili was re-elected earlier this year. But it is unclear how, over the medium-term, the loss of the two territories will play out and whether it will lead to a consolidation of support for his nationalistic position or disillusionment.

A procedural issue is whether US visas will be given to the Abkhaz and South Ossetian

representatives to attend the expected informal Council Arria meeting. Some observers believe that the US might provide the visas in return for Russia not pushing for their participation at the formal Council meeting. (In the end this was the deal done over a similar issue regarding representatives from Kosovo when the US-Russian positions were reversed on Kosovo. Over the last couple of years the procedural issues evolved from initially having the Kosovars at Arria meetings to closed formal meetings and then to open formal meetings. Please see our July 2008 *Forecast* for more details.)

### Council and Wider Dynamics

The Council's exchanges on this issue have showed a hardening of positions with each meeting. Outside of the Council, US-Russia relations continued to deteriorate as both sides exchanged accusations. The US claimed that Russia's main aim in attacking Georgia was to overthrow the Georgian president. Russia has suggested that Georgia received the support of the US in its attack on South Ossetia.

China seems to be cautious about any action that would endorse Abkhaz or South Ossetian independence. The European members, particularly France, continue to be actively engaged. However, at this stage there does not appear to be enthusiasm for Council decisions. (Perhaps some are relishing the fact that the current situation gives the EU the leadership.)

A number of elected members seem disappointed that the Council has not been active on this issue and that the UN generally has been out of sight.

Germany as the lead country in the Group of Friends has shown keen interest in being more involved, but there appears to be a limited role for the Group of Friends at this juncture.

There seems to be some level of agreement that the UN should retain a presence in Georgia, but most members see it as too early to have firm positions on the form that any new mission should take. Russia seems to envisage a political mission that would serve to protect Abkhazians from Georgia and to help with peacebuilding issues. Members that hope to see a larger role for

the UN in the future see importance in the short-term in retaining the limited presence of UNOMIG.



### Key Recent Developments

The security and human rights situation in Darfur continues to deteriorate. Recent clashes between government forces and rebels in northern Darfur have displaced thousands of civilians and restricted the access of UNAMID and aid convoys. UNAMID condemned the use of excessive force by Sudanese government forces on 25 August, when their enforcement of a search warrant for drugs and weapons left 33 dead in Kalma camp, which houses 80,000 internally displaced persons in southern Darfur. By 10 September, UNAMID had round-the-clock patrols inside Kalma camp and was looking to establish a permanent UN police presence in other critical camps. Eighteen former rebels from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) withdrew from executive and legislative bodies in Darfur in protest over the government's actions at Kalma.

Delivery of humanitarian assistance continues to be significantly hindered by the security situation. In early September, the World Food Programme warned it would have to suspend food distribution unless security improved. Since May, attacks on WFP food convoys have reduced rations by almost half to more than 3 million people in Darfur.

The AU sponsored Dakar Agreement contact group met on 12 September to discuss deployment of a joint monitoring force along the border between Sudan and Chad. Details of the force are yet to be agreed upon.

Khartoum's cooperation with the UNAMID deployment improved in September. The government streamlined customs for UNAMID cargo, and provided security for some UNAMID convoys. The need to provide training and equipment to African contingents continues to delay the UNAMID deployment and it seems that the deployment targets will now not be met. The helicopter assets problem remains.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

- Johan Verbeke (Belgium)

#### Size and Composition

- Authorised strength as of 31 August 2008: 140 total uniformed personnel, including 126 military observers and 14 police
- Key troop-contributors: Germany, Pakistan and Bangladesh

#### Duration

August 1993 to present

#### Cost

1 July 2008-30 June 2009: \$36.08 million (gross)

#### Other Facts

Size of CIS troops: about 2,500 Russian troops

### Useful Additional Sources

Letter from French President Sarkozy to Georgian President Saakashvili of 16 August 2008

## Sudan

### Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General's report on the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is due on 30 September. Its mandate expires 31 July 2009, while the mandate for the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) expires 30 April 2009. It is unclear whether there will be any substantive discussion of Darfur issues. Little enthusiasm can be detected and it is even unclear whether any discussion of the ICC proceedings against Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir can be expected in October. The only likely issue to arise is the mandate of the current Panel of Experts for the Darfur sanctions regime. This expires on 15 October and is expected to be extended for a further year. At the time of writing, the Panel's final report, expected at the Council by 21 September, was pending.

An UNMIS report is expected in the second half of October. This may include results of an UNMIS military capability study which is expected to contain recommendations regarding the future composition and location of UNMIS assets in Sudan.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/2008/570 (21 August 2008) was the draft resolution circulated by Russia.
- S/RES/1808 (15 April 2008) extended UNOMIG until 15 October 2008.

#### Selected Letters to the President of the Security Council

- S/2008/561 (19 August 2008) was the letter from France requesting a meeting of the Council on 19 August.
- S/2008/562 (16 August 2008) was the letter from Georgia on events occurring during the conflict.
- S/2008/557 (15 August 2008) contained the appeal of the parliament of Georgia to the international community.
- S/2008/545 (11 August 2008) was a letter from Russia stating its position on the conflict.
- S/2008/544 (9 August 2008) was the letter from Georgia circulating information on its declaration of a state of war.
- S/2008/543 (9 August 2008) were the statements by the Georgian foreign ministry.
- S/2008/519 (1 August 2008) was the letter from the president of the Council informing the Secretary-General that the Council has taken note of his intention to appoint Verbeke.
- S/2008/518 (30 July 2008) was the letter from the Secretary-General informing the Council of his intention to appoint Johan Verbeke as his Special Representative for Georgia and head of UNOMIG.

#### Selected Security Council Meeting Records

- S/PV.5969 (28 August) was the meeting on 28 August.
- S/PV.5961 (19 August 2008) was the meeting on 19 August.
- S/PV.5953 (10 August 2008) was the meeting on 10 August.
- S/PV.5952 (8 August 2008) was the meeting in the afternoon of 8 August.
- S/PV.5951 (8 August 2008) was the meeting in the early hours of 8 August.

UNAMID's ability to execute its mandate will continue to be limited.

The Arab League announced a six-member committee (Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Syria, Libya and Egypt headed by Qatar) to mediate between the Sudanese government and Darfur rebels. But rebel groups opposed the initiative, rejecting the Arab League's impartiality.

In a further initiative to reinvigorate peace talks, the recently appointed Joint UN-AU Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Yipènè Bassolé, assumed his duties in El Fasher on 28 August.

A ministerial-level meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) was held on 22 September on the margins of the UN General Assembly. In the meeting's communiqué, the PSC reiterated its request for the deferral of ICC proceedings against Sudanese President Bashir. It welcomed the establishment of an African High-Level Panel to make recommendations to the PSC on how best to address accountability, impunity and reconciliation issues in Darfur. The PSC also welcomed Sudan's agreement to involve AU and Arab League lawyers in judicial proceedings of human rights violations.

### Related Developments at the Human Rights Council

On 2 September the UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan, Sima Samar, submitted her report for the period January through July to the Human Rights Council. Human rights violations and breaches of humanitarian law continue to be committed by all parties, she reported. Lack of justice and accountability for serious crimes continues, particularly in Darfur. Given the perceived inability of the UN in May to protect civilians in Abyei during fighting between government forces and the Southern Sudan People's Liberation Army, Samar's report recommends that the UN provide clearer guidance on how UNMIS protects civilians under its mandate. A resolution extending Samar's mandate for six months come December was adopted. The Sudanese had been pushing for her mandate to lapse.

An issue in the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement—Abyei's contested boundaries—has been referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The Court is to decide whether the Abyei Boundaries Commission "exceeded its mandate" in its decision defining the boundaries and, if so, to determine what they should be.

### Related Developments in the Sudan Sanctions Committee

At a meeting on 11 September the impact of violations of the arms embargo on the peace process was raised as an issue. Council members undertook to consider future recommendations of the Panel of Experts on this issue.

### Options

One option for the Council is to simply adopt a technical resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts for a further 12 months. Additional measures to strengthen the sanctions regime are unlikely.

Another option is to return to the regional dimension of the Darfur problem. In this context, after discussions with key stakeholders, the Council could adopt adjustments to the mandates of UNAMID and MINURCAT to establish UN mentoring teams to train and assist the Sudan/Chad joint border monitoring force (once established) in policing the arms embargo.

On mediation in Darfur, the Council could follow up its thematic statement on mediation of 23 September and put its weight firmly behind the recent deployment of the full-time in-country chief mediator including perhaps establishing a working group to support his activities in conjunction with the AU PSC.

Noting the AU PSC's 21 July communiqué which indicated its intention to regularly inform the Security Council on progress in Darfur peace agreement negotiations, work of the High-Level Panel and investigations into human rights violations the Council could make a formal request for the briefing on a regular basis. These briefings could be held in conjunction with the chief mediator.

On north-south issues the Council could begin discussions on possible adjustments

to the UNMIS mandate (which expires in April) to reflect its role in the elections and referendum. The Council could also consider a stronger UNMIS role in security sector reform. It could request a briefing from the Secretariat on both issues.

### Key Issues

On Darfur, a key issue is whether recent initiatives to seek a political solution, namely the appointment of a Joint Chief Mediator and the Qatar-led mediation group, can be turned into a successful new framework. A related issue is improving security and, in that context, determining how best to advance UNAMID's deployment.

Members are likely to be preoccupied with determining whether judicial and political processes can advance simultaneously and independently. Another concern is whether a strategy balancing peace with justice and accountability can be identified and agreed upon.

On the north-south situation, a key issue at the halfway point of UNMIS's current mandate is whether adjustments are needed to better support the implementation of the CPA, particularly the 2009 elections and 2010 referendum on possible independence for Southern Sudan.

An issue for the Secretariat is the renewal in mid-October of the appointment of the UNAMID deputy force commander, Karenzi Karake, who had been indicted by a Spanish judge relating to events in his home country, Rwanda. Rwanda, which contributes just under half of the currently deployed military troops in Darfur, has threatened to withdraw its UNAMID contingent if his appointment is not renewed.

### Council Dynamics

The Council's lack of unity on Sudan and the increasing gravity of the situation have impeded a coherent Council strategy. China, Russia and AU members of the Council have been reluctant to implement recommendations by the Panel of Experts to strengthen the sanctions regime. Libya, Russia and South Africa, have suggested imposing sanctions also against rebels, however no formal proposal has materialised. Given the politicised dynamic, and absence of new ideas, the role of the joint

chief mediator is coming to the fore as a possible way forward.

The Council remains divided on ICC issues. Russia, China, Libya, Burkina Faso, South Africa, Indonesia and Viet Nam are understood to support the idea of suspension of proceedings against Bashir. Others, including Italy, Croatia, Belgium, Panama and Costa Rica, remain concerned with justice and accountability and oppose Council interference in the ICC proceedings.

Although they have quite different strategies and approaches it seems that the UK, US and France are willing to contemplate the conditions that would have to be accepted by Khartoum if the case against Bashir were to be suspended. But there may be widely differing views on how strong those conditions should be, including cooperating with the ICC on the two existing ICC warrants, removing all obstacles to normal UNAMID deployment, making real steps towards a Darfur peace process, and stopping Sudan's proxy war with Chad. At the time of writing it would appear none of the three members have seen any response from Khartoum that would be encouraging.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) renewed UNAMID.
- S/RES/1812 (30 April 2008) renewed UNAMIS.
- S/RES/1672 (25 April 2006), 1591 (29 March 2005) and 1556 (30 July 2004) imposed sanctions.
- S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC.

### Selected Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2008/485 (23 July 2008) was the latest UNMIS report.
- S/2008/558 (18 August 2008) was the latest UNAMID report.

### Selected Council Meeting Record

- S/PV.5956 (18 August 2008) was the recent briefing by Special Representative Ashraf Qazi.

### Other

- A/HRC/9/13 and Ad.1 (2 September 2008) were the most recent human rights reports to the Human Rights Council.

## Other Relevant Facts

### UNAMID: Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur

Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo)

### Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator

Djibrill Yipènè Bassolé (Burkina Faso)

### UNAMID: Size, Composition and Cost

- *Maximum authorised strength:* up to 19,555 military, 3,772 police and 19 formed police units
- *Strength as of 18 August 2008:* 9,622 troops, 158 observers and 1,868 police
- *Main troop contributors:* Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa and Senegal
- *Cost:* 1 July 2008-30 June 2009: \$1.5 billion

### UNAMID: Duration

31 July 2007 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2009

### UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ashraf Qazi (Pakistan)

### UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost

- *Maximum authorised strength:* up to 10,000 military and 715 police personnel
- *Strength as of 31 July 2008:* 8,710 troops, 546 observers and 622 police
- *Main troop contributors:* India, Pakistan and Bangladesh
- *Cost:* 1 July 2008-30 June 2009: \$858.77 million

### UNMIS: Duration

24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 30 April 2009

## Kosovo

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to discuss a report on the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in October. The Secretary-General's Special Representative and head of UNMIK, Lamberto Zannier, is likely to provide details of the reconfiguration of UNMIK in light of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. UNMIK is projected to shrink significantly, with personnel dropping by about 70 percent.

Serbia's proposal that the General Assembly should request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on



the status of Kosovo is likely to be debated in early October.

### Recent Key Developments

In his first briefing to the Council, Zannier on 25 July said the situation in Kosovo had changed "fundamentally" in the previous few months contributing to a "profoundly new operating reality" for UNMIK.

Zannier met with UNMIK staff in Pristina on 19 September and gave details of the mission's reconfigured role and stressed that it would evolve in light of realities on the ground. The scaled-down mission would continue facilitating dialogue and other key functions mandated by resolution 1244, which established UNMIK in 1999. It would also maintain its field presence in Mitrovica and three smaller offices elsewhere in Kosovo and increase interaction with the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Minority communities would continue to be a focus.

During talks with Pristina on 8 August, the Acting Principal Deputy Special Representative for Kosovo, Nicholas Haysom, confirmed that in conjunction with UNMIK downsizing the EU would be taking up an enhanced operational role in the area of rule of law. This would be under the wider UN umbrella proposed in the Secretary-General's 12 June report.

Since the end of July, UNMIK has been active in talks with Kosovo and Serbia trying to arrange face-to-face meetings between the two parties. These talks would address practical problems and not try to revisit the issue of status. Kosovo officials said they were ready for such discussions. However, Serbia is unwilling to engage in direct discussions with Pristina.

Addressing the OSCE on 4 September, Zannier said reconfiguring and downsizing of UNMIK opens up space for a larger OSCE role. The OSCE mission is an integral part of UNMIK and has been involved in institution building and human rights. It is expected to

be a key part of a reconfigured mission particularly in areas of protection of cultural heritage and the safe passage of families and individuals to their homes.

On 19 September the OSCE named Austrian diplomat Werner Almhofer as head of mission in Kosovo. Russia objected, claiming the appointment was made without consulting OSCE member states. Serbia says it would lobby against the decision.

Serbia, on 15 August, submitted a request to the General Assembly to include an agenda item to request an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. On 17 September the General Committee agreed to put the item on the proposed agenda of the 63rd General Assembly and to consider Serbia's draft resolution. A simple majority in the General Assembly could transmit the request to the ICJ.

On 6 August, the Council was briefed in closed consultations by Edmond Mulet, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, on the UN's review of actions of UN peacekeepers at Mitrovica on 17 March after Serbian protestors occupied a UN courthouse.

Serbia, on 17 September, announced that it had reached agreement with UNMIK to allow international judges and prosecutors to return to the northern part of Mitrovica. The court will start work on 3 October for a period of sixty days while Serbian authorities negotiate the inclusion of local judges and prosecutors in UN-run courthouses. The UN has said that it will reopen its courts in the north, but no date has been set.

UNMIK signed a technical agreement with the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) on 18 September, on transfer of various assets. The European mission had expected to be deployed and ready to work by the end of August. Serbia opposes the agreement as it has not accepted EULEX. It seems that Russia may also raise objections in the Council.

Forty-seven countries have recognised Kosovo. There is talk that Macedonia and Montenegro, Kosovo's neighbours, are poised to extend recognition.

## Options

The Council has the following options:

- discussing operational aspects of UNMIK's downsizing but taking no action;
- supporting the Secretary-General's changes to UNMIK through a presidential statement or press statement; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to ensure that the UNMIK umbrella is sufficiently well staffed and equipped to ensure the oversight envisaged in resolution 1244.

## Key Issues

Since Kosovo authorities have increasingly assumed administrative powers and responsibilities, the scope for UNMIK to exercise formal legal authority has diminished. Although under resolution 1244 the head of UNMIK still has executive responsibility, the tools to implement administrative functions are now in the hands of Kosovars. The issue that arises is not only the need to avoid resource duplication but also the extent to which the UNMIK "umbrella" remains informed and able to guide policy in accordance with UN standards.

A second issue is that Kosovo Serbs are not cooperating with the Pristina government. Kosovo-Serb police officers refuse to work in the Kosovo Police Service and Customs. Zannier suggests special autonomy within the police for Serb officers and a Hong Kong-style model of one territory with two customs areas in northern Kosovo.

A related issue is how UNMIK will maintain a neutral status in the current operating environment and what it should do with the parallel institutions set up as a result of local elections in the north on 11 May (which UNMIK declared illegal) and now operating in all Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo.

A question is UNMIK's security as it downsizes and reduces its police functions. NATO forces operating under resolution 1244 may need to provide protection capability.

Another issue is how EULEX will be brought under the UN umbrella. Discussions are ongoing. Closely related is whether EULEX will be accepted throughout Kosovo.

UNMIK's final numbers will depend on how these two issues are resolved.

## Council Dynamics

Having been preoccupied by the Georgian conflict in recent months the Council has been less focused on Kosovo. It is unclear how Russia's recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (and its involvement in the Georgian conflict) will play out in Council dynamics on Kosovo. Finding consensus is unlikely to be easy.

The US and the Europeans are now focused on the EU role in Kosovo and are not looking for much involvement from the Council. It seems likely that Russia's position will follow the line it previously adopted. In particular, given the prospect of legal proceedings of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, it is likely to want to ensure that nothing happens to prejudice the Serbian case and, if possible, to show the legal position in the best light. Other Council members seem likely to want to avoid any active role at this point.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1244 (10 June 1999) authorised NATO to secure and enforce the withdrawal of Yugoslav (FRY) forces from Kosovo and established UNMIK.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2005/51 (24 October 2005) declared it was time to begin the political process to determine the future status of Kosovo.

### Selected Letters

- S/2008/600 (10 September 2008) was the letter on the operations of KFOR from 1-30 June 2008.
- S/2008/549 (11 August 2008) was the letter on the operations of KFOR from 1-31 May 2008.
- S/2007/168 and Add. 1 (26 March 2007) was the letter transmitting UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari's report on Kosovo's future status and the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement.

### Selected Reports

- S/2008/458 (15 July 2008) was the Secretary-General's latest report.



- S/2008/354 (12 June 2008) was the Secretary-General's report on how he plans to reconfigure UNMIK.
- S/2007/723 (10 December 2007) was the report of the Troika.

#### Other

- S/PV.5944 (25 July 2008) was the discussion on the Secretary-General's July report.
- Draft resolution on Kosovo (formally circulated on 17 July 2007 but withdrawn on 20 July 2007).

#### Other Relevant Facts

##### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Lamberto Zannier (Italy)

##### UNMIK

- *Size of UNMIK mission:* 2015 police, 32 military observers as of 31 August 2008
- *Size of OSCE mission:* 999 staff (283 international and 716 local as (2007)

##### Cost

\$210.6 million for fiscal year 2007-2008 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

##### KFOR (NATO FORCE)

General Xavier de Marnhac (France)

##### Size and Composition of Mission

- *Size:* 15,900 troops
- *NATO countries:* Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK and the US
- *Non-NATO countries:* Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine

#### Useful Additional Sources

- Statement issued on 17 February 2008 by the UK, France, Croatia, Belgium, Italy, Germany and the US.
- Statement issued on 20 July 2007 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, UK and the US, co-sponsors of the draft resolution on Kosovo presented to the Council on 17 July.

## Haiti

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which expires on 15 October. Recent developments in Haiti, in particular the political crisis provoked by food shortages and the humanitarian situation worsened by a series of hurricanes, are likely to impact discussions.

At press time the Group of Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Peru, Uruguay and the US) was discussing a draft resolution renewing MINUSTAH's mandate for one year.

### Key Recent Developments

On 12 September, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Edmond Mulet briefed the Council on humanitarian issues in Haiti, which had been hit hard by a series of hurricanes. Some Council members are concerned at the consequences for the stabilisation process, especially given the already existing food crisis. The Food and Agricultural Organisation reported that most of the harvests for the current season have been wiped out.

On 5 September, the Haitian parliament approved a new government, ending a five-month impasse after the former government was dismissed in April. The new prime minister, Michèle Pierre-Louis, said that her policy priorities would be food production, job creation, security and the establishment of an environment favourable to investment.

Four consecutive hurricanes caused severe damage in Haiti in August and September. According to local authorities, at least 700 people died and about 800,000 were directly affected out of a population of 9.5 million. Eighty thousand internally displaced persons lack basic needs, such as food, shelter and sanitation. Damage to roads made humanitarian access difficult. (MINUSTAH provided technical and logistical assistance to Haitian authorities for the relief effort.) On 12 September, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator John Holmes urged donors to provide \$100 million for the next six months of humanitarian relief.

On 29 August the foreign and defence vice-ministers of the nine Latin American troop-contributing countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) met in Montevideo. They issued a joint communiqué defining a common position for the renewal of MINUSTAH's mandate. They recognised that progress had been achieved by MINUSTAH, in particular in elections and security. They emphasised the need for:

- broadening MINUSTAH's activities linked to the strengthening of state institutions;
- initiatives by MINUSTAH in the socio-economic and development field, including quick-impact projects to tackle the population's immediate, basic needs;
- better coordination between the Haitian government, MINUSTAH and the donor community;
- a minimum level of human development as security gains alone are not sufficient for long term stabilisation; and
- continued international involvement to allow formation of an environment conducive to socioeconomic development.

On 27 August the Secretary-General published his latest report on MINUSTAH, outlining developments in political and security areas and progress in institutional support, structures for the rule of law, human rights, humanitarian and development activities. He said that the April street demonstrations and subsequent political vacuum during several months were a significant setback in the stabilisation process. He also recommended that MINUSTAH be renewed for one more year.

The Secretary-General also proposed a consolidation plan defining five key areas in which progress is essential for the consolidation of Haiti's stabilisation:

- resolution of political differences through dialogue (particularly via enhanced collaboration between the executive and legislative branches);
- extension of state authority;

- attainment of an appropriate overall security structure;
- establishment of an independent and credible judicial and penal system; and
- measurable progress in socioeconomic development.

Indicators in these areas should help identify a threshold of stability beyond which MINUSTAH could be progressively reduced and ultimately withdrawn.

### Options

The Council could simply decide to keep the mandate as it is. Other options include:

- reinforcing MINUSTAH's mandate to facilitate humanitarian assistance;
- emphasising the need for better coordination between development actors and the Haitian government and requesting MINUSTAH to take the lead in this;
- requesting MINUSTAH to conduct more quick-impact projects;
- encouraging the Haitian government to do more for national reconciliation and to strengthen consolidation of state institutions;
- acknowledging that socioeconomic development is an essential component of stabilization in Haiti; and
- reaffirming MINUSTAH's mandate to support the political process.

Another option might be to focus strictly on MINUSTAH's mandate in the resolution but to address the humanitarian and development issues in a separate presidential statement.

### Key Issues

A major issue is whether the Council will respond to the deterioration of the situation in Haiti and strengthen MINUSTAH's role, particularly in terms of its development and humanitarian response; or whether it will limit MINUSTAH's tasks to those directly related to security.

Another issue is whether to refer to the food crisis and the humanitarian situation in the resolution, including the structural deficiencies in the Haitian state, and why a long-term vision for international involvement is needed.

A Council visit to Haiti remains a possibility in the coming months. Costa Rica, which has the lead, supported a visit in September

but, in the absence of a Haitian government, it was postponed.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

There is a general concern for the deteriorating situation in Haiti and awareness that events of the last months constitute a setback for the stabilisation process. In particular, concerns about the political and security situation were expressed by China, Italy, France, Burkina Faso, the US and Costa Rica during Mulet's briefing on 12 September. This has led to some support for postponing action on indicators of progress for future MINUSTAH withdrawal. Likewise, the issue of whether Haiti should be placed on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission seems to have receded.

For the Latin American members of the Group of Friends, recent developments highlight the need for the international community and for the UN to do much more on humanitarian and socioeconomic development fronts. They support a stronger development mandate for MINUSTAH. Many members favour reviving the idea of a conference on coordination of development programmes, which had been scheduled for April in Port-au-Prince but was cancelled due to the food crisis. For the US there is a preference for limiting the focus to improving security and reforming state institutions.

Others (including China, South Africa and Indonesia) seem reluctant to have the Council address humanitarian issues in a Chapter VII mandate. They support a strong UN role but believe that other UN agencies are responsible for these tasks.

### UN Documents

#### Latest Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1780 (15 October 2007) renewed MINUSTAH for one year.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2008/586 (27 August 2008)

#### Latest Press Statement

- SC/9293 (8 April 2008) welcomed progress achieved in judicial and prison systems' reform, strongly deplored the 4 April violence, expressed concern at the humanitarian situation and encouraged international donors to strengthen assistance.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of MINUSTAH

Hédi Annabi (Tunisia)

#### Principal Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Luiz Carlos da Costa (Brazil)

#### Force Commander

Major General Carlos Alberto Dos Santos Cruz (Brazil)

#### Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, UNDP Representative

Joel Boutroue (France)

#### Size and Composition of Mission

- *Authorised strength as of 15 August 2006:* military component of up to 7,200 troops and police component of up to 1,951 officers.
- *Current strength as of 31 July 2008:* 9,040 total uniformed personnel, including 7,105 troops and 1,935 police.
- *Contributors of military personnel:* Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, United States and Uruguay.
- *Contributors of police personnel:* Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, DR Congo, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Grenada, Guinea, Italy, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Senegal, Serbia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, United States, Uruguay and Yemen.

#### Cost

1 July 2008-30 June 2009: \$601.58 million

### Useful Additional Sources

- *Reforming Haiti's Security Sector*, International Crisis Group, Latin America/Caribbean Report No. 28, 18 September 2008

## Nepal

### Expected Council Action

In October the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Nepal, Ian Martin, will brief the Council. A report on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) is expected. UNMIN's mandate ends on 23 January 2009.

Discussion is expected to focus on progress in completing UNMIN's mandate and perhaps some downsizing between now and the end of the mandate.

### Key Recent Developments

On 23 July, in resolution 1825, the Council extended UNMIN (which is a special political mission not a peacekeeping mission) at the request of the Nepalese government and in line with the Secretary-General's recommendations in his report of 10 July 2008. The Nepalese government's letter to the Secretary-General requested continuation "at a smaller scale". UNMIN's current role is to continue monitoring the management of arms and army personnel. Resolution 1825 called on all parties in Nepal to take full advantage of the expertise and readiness of UNMIN, within its mandate, to support the peace process.

On 23 July, Dr. Ram Baran Yadav of the Nepali Congress was sworn in as the country's first president. This was followed by formal resignation of Prime Minister Girija Koirala, also of the Nepali Congress. After the April elections for the Constituent Assembly it took four months of negotiations to form the government, mainly due to disagreements among the major parties over portfolios.

On 18 August former Maoist leader Puspa Kamal Dahal (also known as Prachanda) was sworn in as prime minister. On 22 August four ministers belonging to the CPN-Maoist and four from the Madhesi People's Rights Forum were sworn in. Ministers from the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML) refused to take the oath of office on 22 August as their party had not secured agreement that it would be given the second most senior minister slot in the cabinet. A second swearing in of 15 ministers took place on 31 August, including those from the CPN-UML, which was given the deputy prime minister post.

President Yadav on 10 September said that the integration and rehabilitation of 19,000 Maoists soldiers currently in cantonments would be completed within six months. The government will form a special committee under the interim constitution to "supervise, integrate and rehabilitate" Maoist combatants during this time.

In mid-September Prime Minister Dahal made a five-day visit to India. He stressed that Nepal's ties with India were vital. He also assured India that, although Nepal wanted to develop further ties with China, its historical relationship with India would not be ignored. (Dahal had previously visited China soon after he became prime minister to attend the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games.) India and Nepal agreed to renegotiate a 1950 Trade and Transit Treaty during Dahal's visit. This allows Nepalese goods to transit India and for Nepalese citizens to live and work in India.

On 9 September the Secretary-General approved \$10 million in assistance to Nepal from the UN Peacebuilding Fund. His Special Representative for Nepal, Ian Martin, said that the peacebuilding contribution is at the core of the UN response strategy. Assistance from the Peacebuilding Fund will go through the existing UN Peace Fund for Nepal.

The government presented its first national budget on 19 September. The new government has stressed public-private partnerships and importance of prosperity for peace. The budget focused on economic development and relief for the poorest citizens. There were protests in parts of Kathmandu over the slashing of funds in the budget for cultural festivals.

### Options

The Council has the following options:

- respond individually to the Special Representative's briefing but take no collective action; or
- agree on a press statement :
  - welcoming the formation of the government
  - highlighting the progress made by UNMIN since July;
  - promising ongoing support for the challenges still ahead in Nepal, especially ensuring that the arms and



military personnel issue resolved promptly; and

- encouraging further changes that UNMIN could make in line with the developments in Nepal to ensure that the best use is being made of UNMIN for the rest of its mandate.

### Key Issues

A key issue is whether the national and former rebel armies can be integrated as stipulated in the 2006 peace agreement. If the integration does not go smoothly in the next few months, Council members may be left with a situation in which UNMIN is due to leave but the final and most critical stages of the management of arms and personnel is incomplete. The current timeframe indicates a real risk that reintegration will not be complete by the end of UNMIN's mandate in January.

A related issue of concern is the demobilisation of 2,973 child soldiers still in Maoist cantonments. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement had called for the immediate release of all children associated with the Maoist forces once they entered the cantonments. The Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, in calling for their release in August, noted that although many children have been informally released there has been no progress in their formal discharge. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict considered the Secretary-General's report on the situation of the children and armed conflict in Nepal on 20 June and is expected to decide on recommendations soon.

Also connected is the possible issue of impunity for senior army officers. In the election campaign the Maoists called for a truth and reconciliation commission to investigate human rights violations and war crimes that took place during the conflict between government forces and the Maoist rebels. However, Dahal has suggested that he will not take action against senior figures in the Nepalese army.

Discontent is likely to grow among those whose family members were killed or forcibly disappeared. So far none of the numerous cases of human rights abuses during the ten-year conflict have been properly prosecuted. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal has expressed concern that the findings of an independent panel investigating the 16 September 2007 violence in which possibly twenty people died following the killing of local leader Mohit Khan have not been made public.

The stability of the Maoist coalition is another key issue. The resignation of the Minister for Land Reform, Matrika Yadav, in mid-September after he was criticised by the CPN-Maoist for seizing land belonging to a Madhesi party member is a sign of continuing tensions within the coalition. Cooperation among the parties is crucial to starting the drafting process for the new constitution.

Also at issue is whether the government will be able to fulfil social and economic commitments during the electoral process, particularly to marginalised groups and security promises to those that want greater representation in state bodies, including the security sector. The Maoists' election manifesto promised land reform and a federal state structure based on ethnicity.

Whether the new government will be able to rein in the Young Communist League as promised is also an issue.

Finally, security continues to be an issue in some areas given the vacuum of effective state authority at the local level.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

The situation in Nepal is an issue on which Council members basically agree. UNMIN was an experiment—a political mission was set up at the outset rather than as a follow-on from a peacekeeping mission. There is a general sense that it has been a success story. In July all members supported Nepal's request for a six-month agreement for UNMIN in a downsized form. There also appears to be a measure of agreement about the risks of impunity, and the importance of quickly integrating ex-combatants and releasing child soldiers.

Members are aware of the criticism that UNMIN has been overstaffed as a result of the tendency toward a "one size fits all"

approach in mission planning. There is likely to be support for ongoing downsizing as UNMIN reaches the halfway mark of its current mandate. Most think that the commitment to monitor arms and personnel should not be open-ended. Yet members are also aware of the dangers to stability of terminating UNMIN before this aspect is resolved.

China, as a neighbouring state, has always taken a keen interest in this issue. While supportive of UNMIN, it has been vocal about keeping it focused and has shown no appetite to expand UNMIN's mandate.

India, a neighbour with strong ties to Nepal, stated at the open meeting on Nepal in July that it supported the six-month extension. But India was critical of some aspects of the Secretary-General's last report. Observers note that India is unlikely to want UNMIN to be extended beyond January 2009.

## UN Documents

### Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1825 (23 July 2008) extended UNMIN until 23 January 2009.
- S/RES/1796 (23 January 2008) extended UNMIN until 23 July 2008.
- S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN for 12 months.

### Selected Secretary General's Reports

- S/2008/454 (10 July 2008) was the report on the request of Nepal for UN assistance in support of its peace process.
- S/2008/259 (18 April 2008) was a report on children and armed conflict in Nepal.

### Selected Meeting Record

- S/PV.5941 (23 July 2008) was the meeting record to discuss UNMIN's renewal.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission

Ian Martin (UK)

### Size and Composition

Latest figures are not available as UNMIN is in the midst of downsizing.

### Duration

23 January 2007 to 23 January 2009

### Cost

\$88.8 million

## Somalia

### Expected Council Action

The Council is expecting several reports on Somalia:

- a regular report is due in mid-October;
- a plan for a "feasible international stabilisation force" and a "concept of operations" for a follow on UN peacekeeping operation have been requested by the Council; and
- a report on implementation of resolution 1816 of 2 June (which permits states to enter Somalia's territorial waters to counter piracy). France has been particularly active on this issue, proposing a new piracy resolution and calling on states with naval assets to do more in support of resolutions 1814 and 1816.

The Secretary-General may consolidate the three reports. Should this happen, the Council is likely to receive the report in early November.

It is possible that the only Council discussions in October would relate to a possible new sanctions resolution imposing targeted measures against peace spoilers and violators of the arms embargo. The Chairman of the Somalia Sanctions Committee was expected to brief the Council by 20 September. At press time, this was pending.

### Key Recent Developments

At sea, the Somali piracy problem has attracted heightened interest and reports emerging at press time of seizure by pirates of a ship carrying 32 heavy tanks and ammunition will raise the stakes even further. As of mid-September, pirates were holding over a dozen ships with more than 100 passengers for ransom. So far, around sixty ships have been attacked this year, up from 13 last year. Planning continues for a future EU-led multinational naval mission to address this. EU foreign ministers announced the establishment of a coordination cell to monitor piracy and defence in the Gulf of Aden.

On land, the warfare worsened in September. The capture of Kismayo in August was followed by an intensive assault by insurgents against both Ethiopian forces and AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu. Sustained heavy bombardments from both sides are

reported. These are said to be the most intense seen since the Ethiopian intervention. Large numbers of civilian casualties and displaced persons are also reported.

On 26 August the Council was briefed by the Secretary-General's Special Representative in Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, on the political situation. The same day, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) also briefed the Council on the military capabilities needed to address the situation in Somalia.

In the briefing from DPKO, the Council was told that the Djibouti Agreement did not include the parties in Somalia that were militarily the strongest. Somalia was awash with weapons and between 60 and 80 thousand militia personnel were estimated. The briefing indicated that the Islamist insurgency group, Al-Shabaab, intended to remove all foreign forces from Somalia, that the group's hard-line elements were proficient in most forms of insurgent-style attacks, and that it was believed to have links to Al-Qaida. Given that the threat to any UN force entering Somalia was high, the Secretariat recommended an international stabilisation force with a peace enforcement mandate combined with a maritime task force.

The proposed stabilisation force could only realistically deploy in Mogadishu and provide limited security for a peace process and secure the port and airport and some land routes facilitating the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces. It would, if security conditions permitted, eventually transition to a peacekeeping operation, which would deploy beyond Mogadishu. The Secretariat further said an international stabilisation force would require a strong lead nation with a coherent command-and-control structure and a minimum of 8,000 well equipped self-sustaining troops trained in counterinsurgency techniques.

It seems that Ould-Abdallah argued for a peacekeeping operation because a force supporting the Djibouti Agreement would not need full capabilities and because he believed it would attract funding, troops and logistics more easily than a stabilisation force. But the Secretariat advised against it, saying that peacekeeping troops would be

unlikely to possess the required capabilities to carry out the necessary enforcement/counter-insurgency operations.

On 4 September, the Council adopted a presidential statement requesting the Secretary-General to produce a detailed plan for an international stabilisation force and requested the Secretary General to begin approaching states to participate in such a coalition of the willing. Work is also to continue on the concept of operations for a peacekeeping mission.

Relations between President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and Prime Minister Nur Adde Hussein Hassan remain tense despite mediation efforts in Addis Ababa in August, which led to their signing a reconciliation agreement. After returning from Addis Ababa, the prime minister overcame a no-confidence vote. On 11 September, parliament rejected a proposal to allow the ten cabinet ministers loyal to Yusuf, who had resigned on 2 August, to return, in contravention to the terms of the reconciliation agreement. Earlier that week, in accordance with the agreement, Mohamed Dheere stood down as mayor of Mogadishu.

### Options

Adoption of a new sanctions resolution introducing targeted measures (travel bans and assets freezes) is a possibility.

A further option is a new resolution relating to anti-piracy activities off the Somali coast, perhaps with vigorous Council involvement. It might authorise establishment of a UN maritime task force, mandate the UN Military Staff Committee to coordinate the international response and call on states pursuant to resolutions 1814 and 1816 to contribute warships. However, if there is a desire to await the Secretary-General's recommendations before adopting new specific measures, an alternative may be a more generic presidential statement urging member states to contribute naval forces and to cooperate in the overall coordination of operations.

Options for the stabilisation force seem unlikely to be available for consideration in October. However, Council members could use the time available to begin expert level discussions on mandate issues including:



- military activities in support of the arms embargo and any new sanctions;
- protection of civilians, including security of internally displaced persons; and
- revisiting the 1995 Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from the UN Operation in Somalia (and perhaps requesting a Secretariat briefing on this)

### Key Issues

A key issue is whether the mandate of any intervention force should also include protecting Somali civilians rather than just supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The government's divisions, alleged corruption and lack of universal appeal make it likely that any sustainable peace process will need to reach out to the wider civilian population and therefore the interests of that population should be uppermost in the minds of those implementing the mandate from the outset. For many, TFG security forces are viewed, along with the militias, as responsible for the ongoing violence.

It remains to be seen whether, for potential troop contributors to the intervention force, sufficient progress has been made in two areas—the peace process and the security situation—to warrant them committing personnel and resources to an international force. This issue is likely to determine whether appropriate forces could be generated.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

Most members expressed bewilderment at the disparate approach provided by Ould-Abdallah who seemed out of step with the Secretariat in late August.

Some members, including the US, Italy and South Africa, had hoped that the Secretariat would provide more details for a peacekeeping operation. Others strongly support the Secretariat's assessment that only a coalition type stabilisation force would have the required capacity to address Somalia's problems.

Support for a peacekeeping operation may be influenced by scepticism that suitable forces could be generated for a stabilisation force. However, there is even greater scepticism, it seems, about generating forces for a peacekeeping operation.

Some members are yet to be convinced that any intervention would be viable.

There seems to be growing support for additional sanctions measures.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1831 (19 August 2008) renewed AMISOM for six months.
- S/RES/1816 (2 June 2008) authorised action against piracy in Somalia.
- S/RES/1814 (15 May 2008) reiterated the Council's intention to strengthen the arms embargo.
- S/RES/733 (23 January 1992) imposed an arms embargo.

### Selected Presidential Statement

- S/PRST/2008/33 (4 September 2008) requested detailed planning on an international stabilisation force and peacekeeping force.

### Selected Report of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/466 (16 July 2008) was the most recent report.

### Latest Monitoring Group's Report

- S/2008/274 (24 April 2008)

### Other

- S/PV.5942 (23 July 2008) was the most recent open Council briefing by Ould-Abdallah.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania)

### UNPOS

- *Maximum authorised size:* 44 international and 28 local civilians
- *Size as of 30 June 2008:* 16 international and 11 local civilians
- *Cost:* \$16.2 million (2008 budget)
- *Duration:* 15 April 1995 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009

## AMISOM

- *Maximum authorised strength:* 8,000 troops plus maritime and air components
- *Strength as of 16 July 2008:* about 2,650 Ugandan and Burundian troops
- *Key resource contributors:* US, EU, Italy, Sweden, China and the Arab League
- *Duration:* February 2007 to present: AU mandate expires on 17 January 2009 and Council authorisation expires on 19 February 2009.

## Additional Useful Sources

- *Somalia A Country in Peril, a Policy Nightmare*, Enough Strategy Paper by Ken Menkhaus, September 2008
- *The Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) April 1992 – March 1995*, [www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/UNOSOM.pdf](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/UNOSOM.pdf)

## DPRK

### Expected Council Action

The Chairman of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ambassador Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata of Italy, will brief the Council in informal consultations in October. The Committee must report to the Council every ninety days.

No Council action is expected. The Chairman's report will be limited as there has been no Committee activity since July 2007. (Seventy-three countries plus the EU have now reported to the Committee on steps taken nationally to implement the sanctions regime.)

### Key Recent Developments

Although the situation had been improving for a period (with North Korea making substantial progress with disabling the Yongbyon facility, permitting monitoring by the IAEA, submitting on 26 June a declaration of its nuclear programme—including a list of stockpiles of nuclear material and facilities used to produce them and destroying on 27 June the cooling tower at Yongbyon) new problems have emerged

recently. A table is attached which tracks the phases of the six-party talks.

On 24 September, North Korea removed seals and surveillance cameras at Yongbyon, saying it intended to reactivate the reprocessing plant within a week. IAEA inspectors were also barred from the site. (Using nuclear material already on site, it seems that the DPRK could reprocess sufficient plutonium for several more nuclear weapons quite quickly.)

North Korea announced on 19 September that it was reversing its position on deactivating Yongbyon because the "action for action" principle agreed in the six-party deal had not been observed as the US had not begun removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

The 3 October 2007 six-party agreement on second-phase actions on denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula stated:

*"Recalling the commitments to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK, the US will fulfil its commitments to the DPRK in parallel with the DPRK's actions based on consensus reached at the meetings of the Working Group on Normalisation of DPRK-US relations."*

Subsequent to the submission by the DPRK of the declaration on its nuclear activities, the six parties met in Beijing from 10 to 12 July. It seems that they agreed in principle that the declaration needed to be verified, but they were unable to agree on the process itself. The parties therefore deferred the issue of specifying the types of inspections to future negotiations at the working group level. The parties, however, reiterated their commitment to complete delivery of energy and economic aid as pledged in the February 2007 agreement once disablement of the Yongbyon reactor is complete. On 12 July, North Korea had said this would be completed by the end of October.

It seems that the US is interpreting the six-party deal as requiring the DPRK to accept a comprehensive method of verifying the

DPRK list of nuclear programmes before starting to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. North Korea seems to argue that:

- this was not a precondition agreed in the six-party deal;
- removing the designation should be happening “in parallel” with the Yongbyon disabling and submission of the declaration; and
- it is impermissible under the past agreements to link it to verification which was an issue to be negotiated subsequently.

Another grievance from North Korea is that although it dismantled 80 percent of its nuclear facilities, only 40 percent of the pledged aid was provided by the five other parties. At this point it is unclear whether there is a misunderstanding on one or both sides or whether there is a deeper problem.

In separate developments:

- On 15 September, South Korean sources said that North Korea conducted an engine ignition test for a long-range missile at the Tongchang-ri site.
- There was speculation in September that North Korea’s Kim Jong-il was seriously ill after he failed to appear at a parade on 9 September marking the 60th anniversary of the country.
- North Korea is experiencing its worst food crisis in a decade. On 2 September the World Food Programme announced that it would launch a major relief campaign to help 6 million people.

## Key Issues

The main issue is whether the current situation justifies discussion in the Council. At time of writing it seemed likely that for Council members a resumption of negotiations within the framework of the six-party talks would remain the preferred arena. However, in the absence of progress on the diplomatic front, and if North Korea actually does reprocess plutonium, the issue may move back to the Security Council.

Recent developments make it unlikely that the Council will discuss whether the frequency of the Sanctions Committee’s reports should be reduced.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over North Korea’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions (arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze) and set up the Sanctions Committee.

### Selected Letter

- S/2007/778 (31 December 2007) transmitted the Sanctions Committee’s activities for the year 2007 to the Council.

### Other

- S/2008/547 (11 August 2008) was a letter from North Korea claiming that the US has been undermining the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (a body supervising the implementation of the 1953 armistice agreement ending the Korea war) and has created the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula by massively supplying South Korea with nuclear weapons.
- S/2008/435 (3 July 2008) was a letter from North Korea on the US lifting of major economic sanctions against it.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Six-Party Talks Phases for the Denuclearisation Process

**Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (19 September 2005):** North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in return for energy assistance from the other parties and normalised relations with Japan and the US.

**Initial Actions for the Implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement (13 February 2007):** The parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the Joint Statement in a phased manner and in line with the principle of “action for action”. DPRK consented to disable and eventually dismantle its nuclear weapons complex with a 60-day phase one (this took 4 months to complete). The other parties made pledges for normalised relations and the delivery of heavy fuel oil.

**Second Phase Actions for the Implementation of the 2005 Joint Statement (3 October 2007):** This specified the steps



each party would take during the next phase of denuclearisation process. The DPRK agreed to disable all nuclear facilities and to provide a complete declaration of all its nuclear programmes. The other parties committed to more economic, energy and humanitarian assistance and the US committed to remove the DPRK from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and to rescind economic sanctions on DPRK “in parallel” with DPRK actions.

## Useful Additional Sources

- “Six-Party Talks Move Towards North Korea’s Denuclearization”, *WMD Insights*, August 2008

## Lebanon

### Expected Council Action

The next report of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for implementation of resolution 1559 is due mid-October. The Council is expected to hold consultations. It was unclear at press time whether the Council could agree that the recent positive developments should be welcomed.

### Key Recent Developments

On 16 September, leaders of the Lebanese political factions who signed the May 2008 Doha agreement, which ended the political crisis in Lebanon, launched new reconciliation talks presided over by Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. A key focus is the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. The next round is scheduled for early November.

At press time, a new law dividing the country into smaller electoral districts to better represent each community was being prepared by a parliamentary commission for submission to parliament by 25 September. Adoption of a new electoral law was part of the Doha agreement.

On 8 September, Lebanese Alawite and Sunni factions signed a reconciliation agreement aimed at ending violence in

Tripoli, which left at least 23 people dead since fighting started in May.

After Syrian President Bashar al-Assad went to France in July, French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Syria on 3 and 4 September. It was the first time since 2002 that a French president visited Syria and the first visit by a Western head of state in five years. Leaders of Qatar and Turkey joined the dialogue on 4 September.

Syrian-Lebanese relations were at the heart of discussions between France and Syria. These were considerably improved with the visit to Syria on 13 August of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, the first since Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Syria promised to establish full diplomatic relations by the end of 2008, and an agreement was reached on 14 August to resume work formally demarcating the border. Syria maintains that the Sheb'a Farms' boundaries should not be addressed until Israel withdraws. The two presidents pledged to set up a Lebanese-Syrian committee on missing Lebanese from the Lebanese civil war allegedly taken to Syria.

On 27 August the Council extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for another year and called on all parties to cooperate with the UN to achieve a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701.

The latest report of the Lebanese Border Assessment Mission Team (LIBAT) was released on 26 August. The team was in Lebanon from 15 to 31 July to assess the work of Lebanese authorities in securing their borders to prevent illegal weapons transfer. It concluded that recommendations made after its first visit in 2007 had been insufficiently implemented with no decisive impact on overall border security. In some areas the border remained as porous as in 2007 and customs had not reported any weapons seizure. The team reiterated previous recommendations and urged Lebanese authorities to clarify objectives, ways and means to reinforce border control.

The situation south of the Litani River has remained quiet. However, there were security incidents in other parts of the country.

- Several deadly skirmishes have occurred

in the past months between opposing rival factions at the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Saida (the most populous camp in Lebanon with 45,000 refugees), apparently involving Islamists from the Jund al-Sham militant group (believed to be Al-Qaida inspired) and militants from Fatah, the main Palestinian faction in Lebanon. On 24 September, one person was killed and four wounded when a bomb exploded in the camp. On 15 September, three Palestinians were reportedly killed in fighting.

- On 10 September a car bomb near Beirut killed Saleh Aridi, a pro-Syrian Druze member of the Lebanese Democratic Party who had helped bridge differences within the Lebanese Druze minority group. On 11 September the Council issued a press statement strongly condemning this attack.
- On 13 August, a bomb killed 11 people including nine Lebanese soldiers in Tripoli. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack and recalling the need to end impunity in Lebanon. The Council also reiterated its full support for efforts to solidify democratic institutions and pursue national reconciliation.

The new Lebanese government was approved by parliament on 12 August. Ministers took several weeks to agree on a general policy statement with the question of Hezbollah's weapons being the main point of contention. Media reports indicated that, in the statement, the government recognised the Lebanese state's full authority (including over Hezbollah's weapons), but also affirmed the right of Lebanon's people, army and resistance to free the Sheb'a Farms, the Kfarchouba hills and Ghajar from Israeli occupation.

### Options

One option is to remain silent on the 1559 report as has been the case for one year now. (The most recent Council presidential statement on resolution 1559 dates from June 2007.)

A presidential statement is, however, a possibility in light of the changed situation. It could:

- welcome formation of the new government;
- support the reconciliation process underway, expressing the hope that all goals of

the Doha agreement—including disarmament—will be met;

- endorse the LIBAT recommendations;
- express concerns at any report of illegal arms transfer into Lebanon;
- welcome improvement in Syrian-Lebanese relations and supporting further progress toward full normalization;
- urge progress on the demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border; and
- reiterate the need for Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory.

### Key Issues

A major issue at this stage is whether the Council should take any action. Since August 2007 it has not addressed any political issue in Lebanon by resolution or presidential statement other than language focusing on UNIFIL. The Council did not react to the last two reports on implementation of resolution 1559, nor did it respond to the formation of the new Lebanese government (although it welcomed the Doha agreement). It has not taken up the latest LIBAT report. But the situation in Lebanon has evolved significantly.

Issues related to the implementation of resolution 1559 include the following.

- **Disarmament of Militias:** The current reconciliation talks are a positive development. Hezbollah now holds a prominent role in government, it remains to be seen whether a deal can be brokered on its arms. Non-Lebanese militias are also a concern given continuing incidents in the Ain al-Hilweh camp. There seems to be more consensus among Lebanese factions on disarming militias in Palestinian camps.
- **Weapons Transfers:** It remains to be seen if there will be UN reports of arms transfers across the Syrian-Lebanese border. Israel continues to claim that Hezbollah is rearming. The LIBAT report, which is rather critical of border control, is a relevant factor.
- **Syrian-Lebanese Relations:** Council members will be interested in further development on the issue of diplomatic representation and demarcation of the common border.
- **Israel's Presence in Northern Ghajar:** UNIFIL has submitted a proposal to resolve this issue by Israeli withdrawal



and subsequent UNIFIL deployment. It seems that the Lebanese support it, but Israel has not yet responded. The political situation in Israel may have an impact on timing of a response. There is consensus in the Council that this issue, if resolved, would be good for confidence-building.

A related issue is whether peace negotiations between Syria and Israel are making progress. Many view a peace treaty as a solution to many of Lebanon's problems, in particular if the Golan Heights issue can be resolved. A fifth round of indirect talks between the two countries, originally scheduled for 18 September, was postponed at the request of Israel on 17 September. The ruling Kadima party was voting for a new leader to replace Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

### Council Dynamics

Overall, the Council remains concerned about the situation in Lebanon. But in 2007 there was a certain loss of momentum that may be linked to several factors.

- Criticism from some (in particular, South Africa, Panama and Costa Rica) that the Council had been overactive on Lebanon while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had insufficient attention.
- Belief by many that the Council's active involvement was not at that time proving positive.
- France, which has the lead on Lebanon, preferred working to ease tensions among Lebanon, Syria and Israel and, as a result, resisted US efforts to use the Council as an instrument.
- The US (and Israel) continued to regard Syria as the main obstacle to the Lebanese political process because of its support for Hezbollah.

It remains to be seen whether France and the US can agree in the current circumstances on language welcoming the Lebanese dialogue.

Amongst the rest of the Council, there is broad support for the Lebanese dialogue. During consultations on the Middle East on 18 September, most Council members said they hoped the factions would reach a deal. Likewise, the renewal of contacts between Lebanon and Syria has been largely interpreted as a positive development.

## UN Documents

### Selected Resolutions

- S/RES/1832 (27 August 2008) extended the UNIFIL mandate until 31 August 2009.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and for a long-term solution, imposed an arms embargo on Lebanon and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1680 (17 May 2006) encouraged Syria to respond positively to the Lebanese request to delineate their common border and to establish full diplomatic relations, and called for further efforts to disarm Hezbollah and to restore the Lebanese government's control over all Lebanese territory.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon, disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias, extension of the Lebanese government's control over Lebanese territory, and free and fair presidential elections.

### Latest Presidential Statement on Resolution 1559

- S/PRST/2007/17 (11 June 2007) welcomed the report of the Secretary-General on resolution 1559, expressed concern at illegal movements of arms and supported the Lebanese army's efforts to restore stability in Lebanon.

### Latest Press Statements

- SC/9444 (11 September 2008) condemned the terrorist attack which killed Saleh Aridi and injured several other persons.
- SC/9422 (13 August 2008) condemned the 13 August terrorist attack in Tripoli.

### Latest Reports

- S/2008/582 (25 August 2008) was the latest LIBAT report.
- S/2008/425 (27 June 2008) was the latest 1701 report.
- S/2008/264 (21 April 2008) was the latest 1559 report.
- S/2007/382 (26 June 2007) was the first LIBAT report.

### Latest Letters

- S/2008/578 (22 August 2008) was a letter from Qatar transmitting the Doha

agreement and urging support from all Lebanese, regional and international parties.

- S/2008/568 (21 August 2008) was a letter from the Secretary-General providing an update on UNIFIL's activities and that its mandate be extended until 31 August 2009.
- S/2008/564 (18 August 2008) was a letter from Lebanon including a statistical table on Israel violations of Lebanese territory in July 2008.
- S/2008/516 (30 July 2008) and S/2008/517 (1 August 2008) was an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council on the appointment of Michael Williams as UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon.
- S/2008/392 (22 May 2008) was a letter from Lebanon transmitting the Doha agreement and the outcome of the Arab League's extraordinary session of 11 May 2008.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Resolution 1559

Terje Rød-Larsen (Norway)

### Secretary-General's Special Coordinator for Lebanon

Michael C. Williams (UK)

### UNIFIL Force Commander

Major-General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

### Size and Composition of UNIFIL

- *Authorised*: 15,000 troops
- **Current (31 July 2008)**: 12,334 military personnel.
- *Troop Contributors*: Belgium, China, Croatia, Cyprus, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Nepal, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, Tanzania and Turkey.

### Cost (approved budget)

1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009: \$680.93 million (A/C.5/62/30)

## Useful Additional Sources

- *Polls find broad support for UN in Lebanon*, International Peace Institute, 24 September 2008
- *The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians' Central Role*, International Crisis Group, 15 July 2008

## Afghanistan

### Expected Council Action

The Secretary-General's Special Representative for Afghanistan, Kai Eide, is expected to brief the Council in mid-October on Afghanistan. The mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) expires on 23 March 2009. The mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan was renewed on 22 September 2008 and now expires in October 2009.

The Council is also expected to adopt terms of reference (TOR) for a Council mission to Afghanistan in November.

### Key Recent Developments

Civilian casualties (especially from airstrikes by the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)), continue to fuel public anger across Afghanistan and have escalated tensions between the UN and the coalition as well as between the Afghan government and its western allies. UNAMA reports a total of 1,445 conflict-related civilian casualties in the first eight months of 2008, an increase of 39 percent compared to the same period in 2007. The distribution of these civilian deaths was surprisingly even. Fifty-five percent were attributed to the Taliban and 40 percent to pro-government forces. (Two-thirds of the latter were attributed to airstrikes.) The remaining five percent was attributed to unknown agents.

Resolution 1833 of 22 September extended ISAF's authorisation until 13 October 2009. Interestingly, it included stronger language on the protection of civilians. This followed a period of difficult discussions on a draft Russian press statement deploring civilian casualties caused by an OEF air strike in Herat province on 22 August 2008.

An Afghan government investigation into the airstrike found ninety civilians were killed. This was supported by the UN, but a separate US investigation found five to seven civilian casualties and thirty to 35 Taliban killed. In light of the discrepancies, the US has reopened its investigation. US Defence Secretary Robert Gates pledged that in the future, the US would apologise for civilian casualties and offer compensation while investigations were being carried out. Previously, the US resisted accepting any responsibility until investigations were concluded.

Deliberate Taliban attacks on humanitarian aid workers fuelled concerns about neutrality being compromised by a blurring of military and civilian assistance. Three UN staff were killed in Kandahar on 14 September 2008, bringing the total number of aid workers killed in 2008 to thirty. Calls from NGOs and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) to separate OCHA from the UNAMA mission structure were rejected leading to the resignation of the three international OCHA officers in Afghanistan. Humanitarian NGOs argued the neutrality of OCHA was compromised while it operated under the mandate of the UN integrated mission which had a clear political mandate to support the Afghan government.

On 9 September, Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Pakistan's new president, Asif Ali Zardari, pledged to work together to resolve long-standing tensions between their countries and to fight the rising Taliban insurgency on both sides of the border. The next day, Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he was commissioning a "more comprehensive" strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan which would see the US military helping Pakistan remove the threat from insurgents in cross-border tribal areas.

### Options

No formal Council action is expected at the briefing but Eide's comments may lead to follow-up action and are likely to inform the content of the TOR for the planned mission.

## Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is whether UNAMA is attracting the necessary expertise to lead and coordinate international civilian efforts. A further issue is whether it is making sufficient progress with the Afghan government on a comprehensive implementation plan to capitalise on the \$20 billion pledged by donors at the Paris Conference in June. A related issue in this regard is whether the recent decision to restructure the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board will be effective in streamlining decision-making processes.

Another important issue is the growing number of civilian casualties as a result of coalition military activity. The Afghan Cabinet has called for a review of agreements governing the presence of international troops and for regulating their presence with a status-of-forces agreement. Ministers have reportedly demanded an end to airstrikes on civilian targets, uncoordinated house searches and illegal detention of Afghan citizens. A related question is the impact of the UN's public rejection of the US assessment of civilian casualty figures in Herat.

An underlying issue is the deteriorating security situation and the resurgent Taliban. A related issue is the possibility of a complete overhaul of the OEF/ISAF configuration and unifying the command structure of ISAF and OEF under the UN mandate.

(Please see our September 2008 Forecast for further elaboration of key issues.)

## Council Dynamics

Council members including Russia, South Africa and Indonesia were disappointed the Council could not reach agreement in August on a statement regarding civilian casualties.

During the ISAF authorisation negotiations in September, Russia's proposal to strengthen the language used in the previous resolution on protection of civilians was supported by several members, including the US, UK and NATO members. However, there were differences over the strength of the wording and whether it should have an

operative or preambular position in the resolution, and this delayed its adoption.

Russia also proposed introducing language into the operative section of the resolution on the need for ISAF to take a more active role in counternarcotics initiatives. A compromise was reached after some members expressed concern that the proposed text went beyond ISAF's mandate. Consistent with the previous year's negotiations, Russia also expressed concern about the inclusion of a reference to the maritime interception component of OEF, given this element operated outside the context of the UN. A compromise on this language was also reached.

It seems that negotiations on the ISAF resolution were affected by the current strained relations between the US and Russia.

## UN Documents

### Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1833 (22 September 2008) extended ISAF's authorisation until 13 October 2009.
- S/RES/1817 (11 June 2008) restricted the trafficking into Afghanistan of chemical precursors for narcotics production.
- S/RES/1806 (20 March 2008) extended UNAMA's mandate until 23 March 2009.
- S/RES/1401 (28 March 2002) created UNAMA.

### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/26 (11 July 2008) welcomed the outcome of the Paris conference, recalled the strengthened role of UNAMA and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and endorsed the increase of resources of UNAMA to fulfil this role.

### Selected Letters

- S/2008/603 (12 September 2008) was a letter from the Afghan government supporting the extension of ISAF.

### Selected Reports of the Secretary-General

- S/2008/617 (24 September 2008) was the latest UNAMA report.

## Other Relevant Facts

### Special Representative of the Secretary-General and UNAMA's Chief of Mission

Kai Eide

### UNAMA

- *Current strength:* 226 international civilians, 1,078 local civilians, 16 military observers, three civilian police, 39 UN volunteers
- *Duration:* 28 March 2002 to present; mandate expires on 23 March 2009

### ISAF Military Commander

General David D. McKiernan (US)

### ISAF

- *Total strength:* about 52,700 troops
- *Contributors of military personnel:* forty NATO and non-NATO countries
- *Current top contributors:* US, UK, Germany, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands
- *Duration:* 20 December 2001 to present; mandate expires on 13 October 2009

### OEF

- *Current strength:* approximately 18,000
- *Top contributor:* US. Other contributors include the UK, France, Canada, Germany, Japan and New Zealand.
- *Duration:* 7 October 2001 to present

## Useful Additional Source

- *Troops in Contact: Airstrikes and Civilian Deaths in Afghanistan*, Human Rights Watch, September 2008

## Côte d'Ivoire

### Expected Council Action

The Council expects to receive a report from the Secretary-General on Côte d'Ivoire's electoral process by 15 October. Keeping the 30 November presidential election on track is expected to be a priority for the Council. The mandate of the UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI), which ends on 31 January, is not expected to be discussed. However, a review of the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire is likely. Both are due to expire on 31 October. The Group's report on the implementation of the sanctions measures is also due by 15 October.



## Key Recent Developments

On 10 July the Secretary-General submitted a report on progress achieved in implementing the major objectives set out in the Ouagadougou peace accord and its supplementary agreements. (The Ouagadougou Agreement of March 2007 and its subsequent political accords signed in November 2007 serve as a basis for reconciling the Ivorian government and the former rebel *Forces nouvelles*. Major objectives include identifying and registering voters, disarming former rebels and dismantling militias, and unifying and restructuring of the defence and security forces.)

The Secretary-General's report noted that the Ivorian government had adopted all of the decrees for the electoral process required under the Ouagadougou Agreement. While describing the overall security situation as stable, the report indicated that there could be setbacks to the peace process if adequate resources were not made available, for example for the cantonment of former combatants. Other concerns included the lack of progress on disarming and dismantling militias. The Secretary-General called on international donors to help close crucial funding gaps confronting both the identification and electoral processes.

On 29 July the Council unanimously adopted resolution 1826 renewing the mandate of UNOCI until 31 January and requesting an update report on the electoral process by 15 October.

On 15 September preparations for voter identification and registration for the presidential elections were launched in Yamoussoukro, with Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Côte d'Ivoire, Choi Young-jin. At their quarterly meeting on 26 August, the heads of UN peacekeeping operations in West Africa (the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau or UNOGBIS, the UN Mission in Liberia or UNMIL, the UN Office in West

Africa or UNOWA, as well as UNOCI) welcomed the progress made in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement. However, they also expressed concern over delays in electoral preparations and emphasised the need to start identification and registration processes for the presidential elections. Choi reportedly noted some important progress, including the completion of financing for the electoral process, airlifting of identification and registration material and for the cantonment of former combatants.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council in October will be progress with the electoral process. Council members will be conscious of the fact that the election has already been postponed three times previously.

Other issues for discussion include the sanctions regime on Côte d'Ivoire (on arms and diamonds, and also a targeted asset freeze and travel ban on certain individuals) and the renewal of the mandate of the Group of Experts. Resolution 1782 of 29 October 2007 extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 October 2008. It requires the Council to review the sanction measures "in light of progress achieved in the implementation of the key steps of the peace process" before they expire.

### Options

Options for the Council include:

- a simple renewal of the sanctions regime as well as the mandate of the Group of Experts without modifications, which is a likely option;
- modifying the sanctions regime as an incentive for progress already made by reducing its scope of application (this is more likely to be considered after a successful election); and
- adopting a separate statement urging the parties to maintain their commitment to the terms of the Ouagadougou Agreement, stressing the critical importance of keeping the electoral process on track and requesting a subsequent update report from the Secretary-General on the situation in early November.

### Council Dynamics

There is general consensus among Council members that monitoring the electoral situation closely and proactively is important in order to keep it on track. They have shown interest in keeping informed about the process, highlighting particularly early identification of impediments to the electoral timetable. There also seems to be general agreement on the need to lend support to efforts to ensure the electoral process remains on track.

There is a very strong view that the presidential elections must be held as currently scheduled on 30 November. Council members are against any politically motivated delays. They also want to do everything possible to avoid delays caused by purely technical or logistical reasons and to ensure free, fair and credible elections.

Council members appear to agree on the need at this stage to keep the sanctions regime in place and renew the mandate of the Group of Experts. The successful holding of elections seems to form a key requirement in the judgment of many Council members on when sanctions might be modified.

France is the lead country in the Council on this issue together with African members.

### Underlying Problems

Other major problems remain. These include socioeconomic hardships resulting from civil war, including run-down national institutional structures, lack of basic health care, deficient infrastructure, unemployment, human rights violations and problems in the rule of law. All this suggests that a major peacebuilding agenda lies ahead once the election is successfully held.

### UN Documents

#### Latest Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1826 (29 July 2008) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 31 January 2009.
- S/RES/1795 (15 January 2008) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 30 July 2008 and requested a report on the preparation of the electoral process no later than 15 April 2008.
- S/RES/1782 (29 October 2007)

extended the sanctions regime and the mandate of the sanctions monitoring Group of Experts until 31 October 2008.

- S/RES/1765 (16 July 2007) extended the mandate of UNOCI until 15 January 2008.
- S/RES/1761 (20 June 2007) extended the mandate of the Group of Experts until 31 October 2007.
- S/RES/1727 (15 December 2006) renewed the sanctions regime until 31 October 2007.
- S/RES/1721 (1 November 2006) prolonged by one year the transitional period in Côte d'Ivoire and reinforced the powers of the prime minister.

#### Selected Presidential Statements

- S/PRST/2008/11 (29 April 2008) welcomed the approval by the Ivorian authorities of the Independent Electoral Commission's proposal to postpone the presidential elections to 30 November 2008.
- S/PRST/2007/8 (28 March 2007) endorsed the Ouagadougou Agreement, supported the appointment of Guillaume Soro as prime minister and requested a report from the Secretary-General on the UN's future role in the peace process.

#### Selected Council Debate

S/PV.5915 (18 June 2008) was the Council debate on the visiting mission to Africa from 31 May to 10 June 2008.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Report

- S/2008/451 (10 July 2008) was the Secretary-General's latest update report on UNOCI.

#### Other

- S/2008/460 (15 July 2008) was the report of the Council's latest mission to Africa.
- S/2008/347 (30 May 2008) were the terms of reference for the Council visiting mission to Africa from 31 May to 10 June.
- S/2008/235 (9 April 2008) was the latest report of the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire.
- S/2007/515 (30 August 2007) was the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire.

- S/2007/223 (19 April 2007) was an International Working Group communiqué, requesting its two co-chairs to consult with ECOWAS and the AU on its future role and recommendations to Security Council.
- S/2007/144 (13 March 2007) contained the Ouagadougou Agreement.

### Other Relevant Facts

#### Special Representative of the Secretary-General

Choi Young-jin (Republic of Korea)

#### Group of Experts

Grégoire Bafouatika, Republic of Congo (aviation)

Agim de Bruycker, Belgium (diamonds)

Lipika Majumdar Roy Choudhury, India (finance/Coordinator of the Group)

Claudio Gramizzi, Italy (arms)

Vernon Paul Kulyk, Canada (customs)

#### Size and Composition of UNOCI

- *Strength as of 31 July 2008:* 9,119 total uniformed personnel, including 7,830 troops, 192 military observers and 1,097 police
- *Key troop-contributing countries:* Bangladesh, Ghana, Jordan, Morocco and Pakistan

#### Approved Budget

1 July 2008 - 30 June 2009:  
\$497.46 million

## Iraq (Oil-for-Food)

### Expected Council Action

The Council is facing a difficult decision over residual issues from the Iraq oil-for-food programme. The issue seems minor in that the amount involved (\$273 million) is small relative to the \$44 billion the programme managed throughout its 13 year life. However the spectre of the scandals raised in 2004-05 still looms. The UN Independent Inquiry Committee (the Volcker Committee) found evidence that Saddam Hussein had manipulated the programme and evidence of corruption involving numerous companies and government officials. There were also unproved—but very damaging—allegations against UN officials.

The Iraq oil-for-food programme was finally terminated on 31 December 2007. When the programme was terminated a residual issue that remained was the existence of several hundred contracts under the programme where suppliers claimed to have delivered goods to the Saddam regime but were unpaid because of lack of evidence of receipt. Currently there are 132 such contracts and they are understood to include companies from three permanent members, Russia, China and France, as well as some other countries.

Russia, with general support from the P5, has been pushing for the Council to make an exception to the rules and pay out on all the contracts in the absence of receipts. The Secretariat is concerned that it will be left with legal responsibility and (bearing in mind how much it was criticised after the Volcker report) also a huge political risk.

Costa Rica is opposing adoption of a Russian draft letter from the Council to the Secretary-General. Some P5 members seem to be contemplating a voted resolution to override Costa Rica's objections.

### Background

The UN is holding funds in escrow to cover the costs of these residual contracts. Current rules require the Secretariat to release payments only upon receipt of documentation confirming delivery. Any final balance is to be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).

Under the oil-for-food programme, payment to a company that had entered into a contract with the Saddam regime to supply humanitarian goods was guaranteed through a letter of credit.

After receiving advice from the Secretary-General in March that payment was not possible on a number of letters of credit because of the slow processing of authentication documents by the Iraqi government, Russia circulated a draft letter for approval by the Council. This draft in effect proposed, after a 45 day pause, that all outstanding letters of credit would be automatically paid regardless of whether there was documentation. (For more detail, please see our May 2008 *Forecast*.)

Costa Rica opposed approving the draft letter, which under Council working methods requires consensus. It argued that in light of the deficient handling of the oil-for-food programme in the past and the conclusions of the independent inquiry in 2005 it was all the more important for the Council either to stick to the rules or put proper legal mechanisms in place to protect the UN.

The Secretary-General reported to the Council in May and reiterated that the problem continued. Payment of just four out of 167 outstanding letters had been possible in the reporting period. The Iraqi government also wrote to the Council requesting that the deadline to provide the authentication documentation for outstanding letters of credit be extended to 30 June. The Council, in response, decided to delay the transfer of unencumbered funds associated with the oil-for-food programme from the UN Iraq account to the DFI until all outstanding issues were resolved. The Council also requested an update report in July.

The July report revealed that as of 30 June 132 letters of credit with claims of delivery but no authentication documents remained. These had an approximate value of \$273 million. The UN/Iraq Working Group suggested three possible options:

- continue to monitor progress and process the remaining letters of credit as evidence was provided by Iraq;
- establish a dispute-resolution mechanism (as has been proposed by the Secretary-General in December 2007 but rejected by the Council as too cumbersome); or
- agree with Iraq to transfer all funds in the escrow account to the DFI, and for Iraq to assume the responsibility for administering the remaining letters of credit.

In July Costa Rica requested that any solution include:

- measures to ensure there are no conflicts of interest, surcharges or other irregularities for operations in which it is

- recommended that outstanding payments be settled;
- verification measures to authorise payment where there is no confirmation that goods have been received by the government; and
- an indication of whether any companies claiming payment without confirmation of receipt of goods were also mentioned in the Volcker Committee report.

In late August, Costa Rican Foreign Minister Bruno Stagno wrote to the Secretary-General requesting a list of companies with outstanding letters of credit. Stagno also expressed concern about the Working Group's option of transferring funds in the escrow account to the DFI, in light of recent reports from the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of deficiencies and weaknesses in the administration of this Fund.

### Options

Previously suggested options include:

- continuing with current arrangements;
- establishing a dispute resolution mechanism;
- transferring funds and the responsibility for administering the remaining activity of the programme to the Iraqi government; and
- adoption of the letter drafted in March by Russia proposing the payment of outstanding letters of credit with claims of delivery but without authentication documentation.

Another possible option is for the Council to approve the Iraqi government assuming responsibility and itself authorising payment of outstanding letters of credit from the escrow account subject to Iraq providing an indemnity to the UN against any future claims.

### Key Issues

A key issue for the Council is the legacy of the Volcker report on the UN administered oil-for-food programme, which found misadministration and evidence of corruption, and the risks associated with, again, being seen to improperly administer the programme. (The Secretary-General's July report asks that the UN be comprehensively protected from any claims resulting from administration, operation and management

of the programme. The main issue for the Council is to ensure proper processes are applied to resolve outstanding letters of credit thereby safeguarding the UN from future legal action.)

A further issue arises from the fact that traditionally P5 members have dominated this issue—and some have been major beneficiaries of the programme. A related issue is whether to proceed by consensus or put the matter to a public debate and vote, inevitably drawing attention to the rift on this issue between permanent members and an elected member.

A major issue has been the Iraqi government's difficulty in issuing authentication documents. Underlying the government's failure to transmit authentication documents to pay suppliers, or documentation contesting claims of delivery, may be genuine problems of capacity or the sheer absence of information in the aftermath of the war.

### Council and Wider Dynamics

For the P5, issues relating to Iraq have been difficult and divisive. There seems to be a strong sense among them that the Council should just take a political decision and move forward. Companies from France, China and Russia have outstanding unpaid contracts. The US and UK appeared supportive of the Russian draft. There is also some P5 sympathy for the view remaining companies have now been waiting for payment for over six years.

Historically the elected members of the Council have tended to pay only limited attention to these issues. Often they have been all too happy to leave hard decisions on this to the P5. However, well before its election to the Council Costa Rica was active on oil-for-food programme issues. It called, in the General Assembly, for effective follow-up of the recommendations made in the Independent Inquiry Committee in 2005. Since becoming a member of the Council in January Costa Rica has repeated its concerns with the handling of the oil-for-food programme.

The proposal to simply pay outstanding creditors without any authentication documents raised serious concerns for the Secretariat and Costa Rica about exposing

the UN to claims. Some Council members seem sympathetic to these concerns, and are keen to find an alternative arrangement. Some members are anxious to ensure that whatever measures are selected, they are final and neither the Iraqi government nor the companies in question have an opportunity to criticise the UN.

The Iraqi government has expressed support for any decision by the Council to resolve outstanding issues. Most members seem to agree that a formal dispute settlement mechanism would be unnecessary, expensive and complicated, and would only further delay the conclusion of outstanding elements of the programme. Despite the Iraqi government expressing its willingness to accept responsibility for administering the remaining process, there also seems to be reluctance among some P5 members to transfer responsibility of the programme to the government, perhaps fearing slow processing. Some elected members also put some blame on Iraq for lack of cooperation in the past.

There is a general sense that the Council has been generous with time and support for concluding the oil-for-food programme and that it is time for a compromise solution that is both quick and protects the UN.

### UN Documents

#### Selected Security Council Resolution

- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) requested that the Secretary-General terminate within six months the ongoing operations of the oil-for-food programme, transferring responsibility for the administration of any remaining activity to the Coalition Provisional Authority.

#### Latest Secretary-General's Reports

- S/2008/492 (25 July 2008) was the Working Group report with three alternatives to conclude all outstanding issues.
- S/2008/318 (9 May 2008) contained the results of the Working Group meeting in May.
- S/2007/725 (7 December 2007) included a proposal for the establishment of a Claims Settlement Committee.

### Selected Letters

- S/2008/588 (26 August 2008) was a letter from the Costa Rican foreign minister notifying its intention to “hold” the final closure of the programme.
- S/2008/521 (25 July 2008) was a letter from Costa Rica highlighting necessary measures to ensure the closure of the programme does not expose the UN.
- S/2008/341 (23 May 2008) was a letter from the Council president to the Secretary-General requesting an update report in July.
- S/2008/369 (13 May 2008) was a letter from Iraq requesting an extension of the deadline to provide authentication documents to 30 June 2008.
- S/2007/661 (8 November 2007) was a letter by the Council president requesting the Secretary-General to develop proposals to address unresolved issues.

### Useful Additional Source

- 2005 Independent Inquiry Committee into the UN Oil-for-Food Programme, [www.iic-offp.org](http://www.iic-offp.org)

## Security Council Elections 2008

### Expected Action

On 17 October the General Assembly will hold elections for five non-permanent seats on the Security Council. The new members will take their seats on 1 January and will serve for the period 2009-2010.

Please see our *Special Research Report* of 29 August for a detailed description of the electoral process.

### Background

The candidates are:

- Uganda for the one African seat;
- Iran and Japan for the one Asian seat;
- Mexico for the one Latin American seat; and
- Austria, Iceland and Turkey for the two seats in the Western European and Others (WEOG) Group.

Uganda and Mexico seem assured of being elected to the Council as they are candidates endorsed in their regional groups and face a “clean slate” situation with no other contenders. Nonetheless, since these are elections to a principal organ of the UN, formal balloting and a two-thirds majority are required.

There will be a contest for the remaining three seats: Iran and Japan are seeking the one Asian seat, while Austria, Iceland and Turkey are competing for the two WEOG seats. The WEOG election is being watched with interest as a close fight is expected among the three candidates.

The candidates this year range from one that has never served on the Council to another that has had nine terms. The table below illustrates the number of seats available to each region in the election, the declared candidates, and their previous experience on the Council.

More details about the established practices of the regional groups can be found in our *Special Research Report* of 29 August.

### UN Documents

#### Selected General Assembly Documents

- A/63/251 (19 September 2008) was the programme of the plenary for the 63rd General Assembly.
- A/62/PV.26 (16 October 2007) was the record of the 2007 elections of non-permanent members.
- A/RES 1991 A(XVIII) (17 December 1963) was the resolution adopting amendments to the Charter increasing the number of non-permanent seats on the Council from six to ten, and establishing current allocation of seats to various regions.
- GAOR 1st Session, Part 1, 14th Plenary Session and Part II (12 January 1946) was the first election of non-permanent members.

#### Other

- UN Charter
- A/520/Rev.15 and Amendments 1 and 2 are the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly including amendments and additions.

## Notable Dates for October

Reports Due for Consideration in October	Document Requesting Report
21 September	<i>Panel of Experts' final report on the Darfur sanctions regime</i> S/RES/1779
22 September	<i>SG semi-annual report on UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)</i> S/RES/1806
by 30 September	<i>SG quarterly report on UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS)</i> S/RES/1580
by 30 September	<i>SG report on UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</i> S/RES/1244
by 30 September	<i>SG report (every sixty days) on UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</i> S/RES/1828
by 15 October	<i>SG oral report on UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)</i> S/RES/1794
15 October	<i>SG report on UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)</i> S/RES/1826
15 October	<i>Côte d'Ivoire Group of Experts report</i> S/RES/1782
by mid-October	<i>SG report on UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</i> S/RES/1808
by mid-October	<i>SG quarterly report on UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)</i> S/RES/1812
October	<i>SG report on the implementation of resolution 1325 (Women, Peace and Security)</i> S/PRST/2007/40
21 October	<i>SG report on the implementation of resolution 1559 (Lebanon)</i> S/PRST/2004/36
28 October	<i>SG report on implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</i> S/RES/1773
by 31 October	<i>SG report on UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)</i> S/RES/1825
October/early November	<i>SG quarterly report on Somalia</i> S/PRST/2001/30

October 2008	Mandates Expire	Relevant Document
15 October	<i>UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</i>	S/RES/1780
15 October	<i>UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</i>	S/RES/1808
15 October	<i>Sudan Panel of Experts</i>	S/RES/1779
31 October	<i>Côte d'Ivoire Group of Experts and sanctions</i>	S/RES/1782

October 2008	Other Important Dates
15 October	An international conference on the situation in Georgia is scheduled to be held in Geneva.
17 October	The General Assembly is expected to hold elections for five of the ten non-permanent seats on the Security Council.

Also expected in October:

- The Council may take up the oil for food programme.
- Ambassador Giulio Terzi di Sant'Agata of Italy, the chairman of the 1718 Sanctions Committee on the DPRK (North Korea), is expected to brief the Council.
- Ian Martin, the Secretary-General's Special Representative, is expected to brief the Council on Nepal.
- An open debate on the thematic issue of Women, Peace and Security is expected to be held in late October.

## Important Dates over the Horizon

- Legislative elections have been scheduled for 16 November 2008 in Guinea-Bissau.
- Presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire are now scheduled for 30 November 2008.
- Council missions to Afghanistan and Haiti are currently being discussed for later this year.
- The next round of the Lebanese National Dialogue is scheduled for 5 November.

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