Somalia
Expected Council Action
The Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing its authorisation for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which expires on 20 August.
It is unclear whether concrete proposals to improve security in Somalia will emerge, such as an international stabilisation force. The Council expects options in that regard from the Secretariat by 15 August.
Sanctions are also an option in the minds of members, but it seems unlikely that momentum will build up around this possibility in August. A report with recommendations from the Sanctions Committee on targeted measures, requested in resolution 1814 by 15 July, was still pending at press time.
Key Recent Developments
Humanitarian conditions in Somalia, extremely difficult in recent months, have continued to worsen and are reaching unprecedented levels. The current number of civilians in need of assistance may increase from the current total of 2.6 million—more than a third of the population—to 3.5 million by the end of year if the situation does not improve, according to the World Food Programme (WFP). Malnutrition rates are already soaring amongst children, according to media reports. In the midst of rising global food prices there are also large funding shortfalls (of about $ 400 million) for humanitarian operations in Somalia.
It also appears that a previous arrangement under which various states would take turns assisting with naval escorts of humanitarian shipments has been suspended. It seems that no member state has yet come forward to replace the Netherlands, whose deployment ended on 30 June.
It seems that discussions are ongoing within the EU on this issue, as well as on the establishment of a maritime force to combat piracy as authorised in resolution 1816.
The basic drivers behind the humanitarian crisis—violence, drought, rising food prices and piracy—continue unabated. Fighting involving insurgents, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Ethiopian forces and AMISOM troops has continued, leading to the death of dozens of civilians in July.
Little progress has been made with improving security since the Djibouti Agreement was concluded on 9 June between the TFG and some elements of the opposition. The agreement was initially supposed to be signed in Saudi Arabia in early July but as of writing this had not yet taken place. Moreover the agreement was rejected by the main groups involved in the armed insurgency in Somalia—including the Shabaab.
On 23 July, insurgent leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys reportedly claimed to have taken control over the Asmara-based Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS). This was denied by Special Representative Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah and Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, who negotiated the Djibouti Agreement and had until now been the ARS leader. Aweys also reiterated pledges to fight the TFG and Ethiopian troops.
Most recently, a string of deliberate killings and kidnappings of aid workers has severely increased the already significant risks faced by humanitarian operations in Somalia, and the likelihood that some aid organisations may pull out. On 8 July, the Council issued a press statement condemning the killing of the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP)’s office in Somalia, Ali Osman Ahmed. Humanitarian assistance has come under strong pressure as aid distribution is reportedly seen by the various parties as an opportunity for political and military gain. Insurgents have criticised UNDP’s support for Somali police and judiciary as taking sides.
On 29 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) renewed AMISOM’s mandate for six months from 17 July. The PSC also decided that AMISOM should take steps to support the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement between the TFG and members of the insurgency, and expressed hope that the agreement would lead to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation.
In late June, Nigeria reiterated plans to send 800 troops to strengthen AMISOM with US assistance. Possible plans for another Burundian contingent to join AMISOM have also been floated. However, at press time it was unclear whether and when these developments would materialise.
On 16 July, the Secretary-General reported that the Secretariat was assembling a team that will:
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plan the relocation of the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) to that country from Kenya;
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support the implementation of the Djibouti Agreement;
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plan UN support for an international stabilisation force; and
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carry forward contingency planning for a UN peacekeeping presence in Somalia.
The planning team would carry out a security assessment in the third quarter of 2008 and propose recommendations on arrangements for the relocation of UNPOS. This would also depend on the provision of security by the host country or a third party.
He informed that a human rights assessment mission would travel to Somalia to prepare a report with recommendations on strengthening the human rights capacity within UNPOS.
The Secretary-General also reported that he is consulting with key partners on how best to move forward with the planning for a stabilisation force on the basis of the commitments contained in the Djibouti Agreement.
On 23 July, Special Representative Ould-Abdallah briefed the Council. Expressing hope about the prospects of the Djibouti Agreement, he presented a range of options for the Council’s consideration to improve security in support of the accord, including:
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re-hatting and strengthening AMISOM as a UN operation;
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authorising the deployment of an international stabilisation force; and
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establishing a UN peacekeeping operation.
During comments to the media, Ould-Abdallah also expressed support for justice and accountability measures, including a possible referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Options
The most likely option for the Council in August is a resolution renewing AMISOM’s Council authorisation for six months and including:
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support for political reconciliation, perhaps with a specific mention of the Djibouti Agreement;
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concern with the humanitarian situation and strong condemnation of the recent string of attacks against humanitarians;
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references to the need to increase humanitarian access and respect for international humanitarian law;
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language signalling that contingency planning for an international stabilisation force or UN peacekeeping should continue; and
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support for strengthening UNPOS and relocating it to Somalia. (One additional option in this regard would be to start discussions on options for the provision of security for UNPOS.)
A further option would be to call for a coalition of states to provide an international stabilisation force as requested in the Djibouti Agreement. A related option could be to request the Secretariat to draw up plans, a concept of operations and military requirements. But in the absence of a lead country willing to commit significant forces to such a coalition this option may be thought premature.
Re-hatting AMISOM as a UN operation and establishing a UN mission are also alternatives, but increasingly they look very unlikely.
Another option might be greater UN assistance of a non-military kind to AMISOM and perhaps a request for some recommendations from the Secretary-General in that regard.
Strengthening the sanctions regime is another option, possibly through a resolution establishing targeted measures, in line with the intention expressed by the Council over a number of years and most recently in May in resolution 1814. This would involve mandating the Sanctions Committee to adopt a list of individuals and entities for targeted measures. The new resolution could also include a request to member states to report directly to the Sanctions Committee on measures taken to implement the arms embargo.
Key Issues
Since re-hatting AMISOM and establishing a UN peacekeeping operation do not seem plausible at present, the key question is whether the deployment of an international stabilisation force is a feasible alternative. Other key issues include:
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re-energising the Djibouti process with a view to early signature of the agreement and perhaps securing wider participation than was previously possible; and
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how best to encourage troop contributors and generate sufficient assets for a Council-authorised coalition.
A fundamental related issue is whether it will ever be possible to attract elements from the armed insurgency into a peace process and whether there is anything the Council can and should do—including sanctions—to encourage this.
Other issues include:
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the ongoing problems associated with the presence of Ethiopian troops not authorised under any UN mandate;
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the regional dimension, including concerns about terrorism and the impact that these have on political reconciliation efforts;
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ensuring UNPOS’ security and relocation;
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addressing violations of international humanitarian law and lack of humanitarian access; and
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action on human rights and justice issues.
Council Dynamics
Members initially seemed encouraged by the recent Djibouti Agreement and supportive of the initiatives of Special Representative Ould-Abdallah. There is painful awareness, however, that the Agreement has not contributed to improving security and that more support—possibly in the shape of an international military presence—will be needed. Some are sceptical about re-hatting AMISOM as a UN operation, seeing it as an option that is not likely to meaningfully contribute to strengthening the mission or improving security.
An international coalition is seen as in line with the Council’s support for the Secretary-General’s strategic phased approach, which called for a coalition to assist in improving security and creating conditions for progress in the political track. However, in the absence of concrete plans and expressions of interest from potential lead countries, there is still scepticism about the viability of this option.
Members may adopt a wait-and-see approach until the Secretary-General submits his further recommendations in August.
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Selected Security Council Resolutions |
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Selected Reports of the Secretary-General |
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Latest Monitoring Group’s Report |
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Other |
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Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
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Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah (Mauritania) |
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UNPOS: Size and Cost |
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UNPOS: Duration |
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15 April 1995 to present; mandate expires on 31 December 2009 |
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AMISOM: Size, Composition and Cost |
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AMISOM: Duration |
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February 2007 to present: AU mandate expires on 17 January 2009 and Council authorisation expires on 20 August 2008 |
