Sudan/Darfur
Expected Council Action
There is strong momentum in the Council to now move quickly on a resolution to endorse the hybrid operation. Members seem likely to see an authorising resolution as an important first step in moving through the practical difficulties which undoubtedly lie ahead, including financial discussions in the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and its Fifth Committee, stimulating troop generation and resolving the inevitable complications on command and control which remain. (At press time, the Council expected a Secretariat briefing on the operation on 27 June.)
The regular Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is due in July. The UNMIS mandate expires on 31 October. (But it may be that one of the future issues to be resolved will be differentiating the two missions and their mandates.)
Key Recent Developments
Recent reports suggest that the number of internally displaced in Darfur has increased by 140,000 in the first months of 2007, bringing the total to 2.1 million, in addition to 200,000 refugees in Chad. Some humanitarian indicators seem to have relatively improved, however attacks against civilians, limited humanitarian access and harassment of aid workers persist.
After consultations in Addis Ababa on 12-13 June among the UN, the AU and Sudan, Khartoum indicated that it accepted the hybrid operation without conditions. Sudan later said publicly that its position remained unchanged regarding the need for AU command and control and African composition. But it seems that Khartoum’s bottom line may be that the operation will have an “African character” and that operational-level decisions will be managed jointly.
Council members were briefed on the results of those consultations on 13 June in preparation for the visiting mission to Addis Ababa, Accra and Khartoum on 17 June. During the mission, Sudanese officials apparently reiterated Khartoum’s acceptance, and Council members expressed support for a resolution authorising the hybrid operation.
On 22 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorised the hybrid operation with a mandate along the lines proposed in the AU-UN plan.
Earlier in June there were public threats of sanctions against Khartoum especially from the US and the UK if Sudan did not honour its commitments. In late May, the US announced tougher unilateral measures against Sudanese companies and individuals (including one wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC). (US officials seemingly indicated that there may be side effects from the sanctions over the oil revenues for south Sudan.)
France proposed in early June a new initiative to increase security in eastern Chad-including plans to hold a meeting with key stakeholders in Paris on 25 June. Sudan, Chad and the AU did not attend the meeting. The meeting was intended to inter alia:
- address the political process under the AU and the UN and the hybrid peacekeeping plans;
- assess the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur; and
- address the regional dimension.
The mid-June AU-UN-Sudan consultations in Addis Ababa were preceded by intense efforts between the UN and the AU to come up with a command-and-control formula which in practice would accommodate some of Khartoum’s concerns.
It seems that the intention of what was agreed is to use an arrangement similar to that for the heavy support package. Day-to-day command and control would be delegated to the joint special representative and the force commander, and the UN would retain primary responsibility for overall command, given its role in force generation and funding. The relationship between the AU and the UN in overall command structure still contains significant ambiguities, however.
The AU and the UN seem now to be making progress on the mission’s concept of operations and rules of engagement. Troop generation is expected to target initially African members. (Two additional AMIS battalions are an immediate priority to enable the heavy support package, however.) But if as seems likely there are not enough pledges from Africa, wider participation will be needed especially for the force enabler components.
Special Envoy Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on the roadmap for peace talks on 8 June. He indicated that his team would be deployed in Khartoum and Darfur to undertake extensive contacts with stakeholders. Mediation strategies and modalities (including participation and agenda) are expected to be developed in June-July, with negotiations commencing in August, depending on progress with a unified rebel position.
Eritrea convened a meeting in early June including rebel representatives, Chad, Libya and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to facilitate rebel unity. The SPLM later announced that its plans to convey a rebel conference had been postponed indefinitely due to the refusal from key commanders to attend.
ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council on 7 June on the status of the Darfur case. The Prosecutor indicated the need for Council support to execute the pending arrest warrants. The US recently signalled willingness to cooperate with the Court in that regard.
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Related Developments in the Human Rights Council |
Options
The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a new resolution in effect overtaking resolution resolution 1706 and paving the way for discussions in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on funding commitment for the mission.
With force-generation issues in mind, a possible option is for the Council to issue a special call to member states to urgently consider possible contributions. A related option may be to establish a special Council working group to meet with prospective troop and police contributors and actively encourage participation and financing.
On the peace process, an option is for the Council to take new steps to support the efforts of Salim and Eliasson in particular by:
- requesting the Secretary-General to enhance the resources available to the mediation team;
- signalling to the parties that the international community is determined to work together and will not tolerate delays resulting from a proliferation of negotiation forums; and
- reminding the rebels in particular that attempts to “impede the peace process” (including the creation of obstacles to a common rebel negotiating position) could attract the imposition of targeted measures as referred to in resolution 1591.
Key Issues
The most immediate issue for the Council is its response to the recent positive developments regarding the hybrid peacekeeping option. This includes:
- the relationship of a new resolution with resolution 1706;
- the relationship between the new mission and UNMIS;
- details of its mandate;
- managing the continuing need for Khartoum to keep with its commitments and not raise practical impediments to the implementation of the heavy support package and the hybrid operation;
- managing the complications of the current ambiguity about command and control (ensuring sufficiently unified command and control for the operation to work effectively while at the same time keeping Khartoum on board but without producing so much ambiguity that potential troop and police contributors and the Fifth Committee are scared off);
- generating enough troops and assets under different frameworks for the “heavy support package” (bearing in mind the preceding need for two additional AMIS battalions) and the hybrid operation. For the heavy support package, it seems that Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan and China have already pledged troops. At press time, it seemed that the air assets, however, had not yet been pledged. Sudan will also need to consent to water and land use by the personnel deployed;
- the likely huge costs of the phased approach;
- time: heavy support deployments are only fully expected by the end of 2007, provided all requirements are in place and AMIS is reinforced. The hybrid operation could be fully deployed only in mid-next year at the earliest.
On political reconciliation, the key issues for the Council are whether there will be a credible “peace to keep” and its role in helping to generate and resource a credible process, a comprehensive ceasefire and an eventual peace agreement. Another is how best to encourage all rebel movements to fully join the peace process. There are several major additional questions, including negotiation modalities, and relationship with the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Members’ responses to Khartoum’s acceptance of the hybrid operation have widely varied from scepticism to optimism. Some, such as the US and the UK, insist on the need for the Council to maintain a close scrutiny of Khartoum’s implementation of its commitments.
On the regional dimension, members seem to accept the Tripoli format as a primary venue for discussions among key international stakeholders. For their part, regional players such as Libya and Egypt now seem more comfortable with international involvement, possibly after the renewed focus on a political process and the realisation that spillover from Darfur may become incontrollable.
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Selected Security Council Resolutions |
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Selected Presidential Statements |
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Selected Secretary-General’s Reports |
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Other |
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Other Relevant Facts
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Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur |
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Rodolphe Adada (Congo) |
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Special Envoy of the Secretary-General |
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Jan Eliasson (Sweden) |
| UNMIS: Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
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Vacant |
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UNMIS: Size, Composition and Cost |
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UNMIS: Duration |
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24 March 2005 to present; mandate expires 31 October 2007 |
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AU Special Envoy |
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Salim A. Salim |
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AMIS: Size and Composition |
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| AMIS: Duration |
| 25 May 2004 to present; mandate expires 31 December 2007. |
