Iran
Expected Council Action
It now seems unlikely that recent diplomatic initiatives aimed at resuming negotiations between Iran and the EU3+3 (France, Germany, UK + China, Russia and US) on Iran’s nuclear programme will produce early results. A new resolution expanding sanctions against Iran is therefore likely to be adopted in July.
Key Recent Developments
Although Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported in late May that Iran had still not complied with resolution 1747 requesting it to stop uranium-enrichment activities, the Council did not take up the issue in June and there seemed to be a willingness to allow more time.
The EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana met Iranian negotiator Ali Larijani in Spain on 31 May. Larijani suggested that Iran was ready to better cooperate with the IAEA. They met again on 23 June, but at time of writing it seemed that no encouraging development had occurred. The EU3+3 seem therefore currently to be discussing ways to strengthen sanctions.
On 8 June, in a final statement, the G8 deplored Iran’s failure to meet its obligations under Council resolutions and supported additional measures should Iran further refuse to comply.
The IAEA Board of Governors met on 11 June. ElBaradei reiterated that dialogue and diplomacy were the only ways to break the impasse with Iran’s nuclear programme and deplored the deterioration of the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s activities.
Tensions between Iran and the international community increased. Following President Ahmadinejad’s remarks on 3 June calling for “the destruction of the Zionist regime”, France and the US pushed the Council to adopt a press statement condemning these remarks, but no consensus could be reached.
Iran stated on 11 June that all American bases in the region were within reach of Iran’s missiles. It also requested the Council to condemn threats that Israel made against Iran when Prime Minister Olmert said in April that Israel could destroy the entire Iranian nuclear programme. US criticism of Iran’s role in fomenting violence in Iraq intensified. For its part, Iran accused the US of conducting covert operations on its soil.
On 21 June the Chairman of the 1737 sanctions committee briefed the Council and reported that 73 states had reported on their implementation of sanctions on Iran, of which 38 had legislation in place to ban all items that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.
ElBaradei and Larijani met in Vienna on 22 June and agreed to draw up an action plan within two months for resolving the outstanding issues and allowing broader IAEA access to Iranian sites. An IAEA delegation is visiting Iran. The plan would be part of a broader political understanding to be discussed between Larijani and Solana.
Options
A third resolution following the logic of incremental pressure seems to be the main option. The resolution could:
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replace “calls upon” with “decide” in several provisions;
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impose a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the nuclear programme;
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impose limits on flights by Iranian aircraft;
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include additional names in the list of people and entities subject to asset freeze;
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toughen current financial sanctions through restricting or even banning export credits to Iran; and
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ban additional categories of arms sales to Iran.
Key Issues
The issues remain identical to those described in our June 2007 Forecast Report:
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how long the incremental pressure approach will remain; and
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keeping the doors open for negotiation.
An underlying issue which seems to be rising closer to the surface is the level of anxiety about US intentions should it conclude that neither sanctions nor diplomacy is likely to succeed. Media reports in June of ongoing high level discussions in Washington on a military option fuel this anxiety.
Council Dynamics
It seems that the Solana-Larijani ongoing talks prompted the EU3+3 to adopt a “wait and see” position during June. But other issues have also been the focus of attention (the G8 meeting, the situations with regards to Darfur and Kosovo).
As in the past, China and Russia are likely to favour a more limited expansion of sanctions than France, the UK and the US, but consensus among the P5 has been easier to reach recently.
South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar may oppose sanctions which go beyond proliferation-sensitive activities.
| Selected Security Council Resolutions |
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| Latest IAEA Board Resolution |
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| Latest IAEA Report |
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| Selected Letters |
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