China will have the presidency of the Council in July.

A very heavy programme of work is anticipated. No thematic debates are currently envisaged, especially in light of fact that two important thematic debates were held in June. It may be however that the recent Council mission to Africa, in particular the discussions in Addis Ababa on cooperation with the AU, may present an opportunity for a public meeting.

Open meetings of the Council required by previous Council decisions will include:

- The Monthly meeting on the Middle East (In view of the tensions and possible developments in the region, other meetings are possible);
- Meetings on the DRC to extend the mandate of the Group of Experts and address the sanctions regime;
- Extension of the mandate of the Somalia sanctions Monitoring Group (In view of concerns about the ongoing violence in Somalia and the humanitarian situation, consultations on broader issues are also likely. These will probably be triggered by the report from the Secretary General, which is now before the Council);
- Consultations and possibly open meetings to consider decisions are anticipated on:
  - Kosovo—at press time a draft resolution was under discussion informally, but a decision had not been taken as to when to inscribe the item on the formal agenda for consideration;
  - Darfur—a resolution to approve the “hybrid operation” is expected;
  - Chad—with the progress on Darfur it may be that the Council will be able to move to the next stage of consideration of a United Nations role in the regional dimension of the conflict;
  - Iran—there was no follow up in June to the 25 May report from the IAEA that Iran was still not in compliance with resolution 1747. A draft resolution further tightening sanctions seems likely;
  - Iraq—A letter from the president of the Council regarding next steps with the winding up of the residual aspects of the Oil for Food Programme is possible;
  - Lebanon—Several reports are due and in light of the ongoing tensions, one or more presidential statements are possible;
  - Nepal—a presidential statement reinforcing progress towards elections is possible;
  - North Korea—with some light now at the end of the tunnel it is possible that a statement encouraging progress may be considered;
  - Western Sahara—the conclusion of the direct talks between Morocco and Polisario in late June (which seem to have gone as positively as anyone could reasonably have hoped) may be the occasion for a statement encouraging the parties in the lead up to their second round in August.

Aide-Memoire

Important matters pending before the Council include:

- The 2005 World Summit requested the Security Council to consider reforms relating to the Military Staff Committee. This has yet to be addressed.
- The issue of small arms raised by Argentina in March 2006 is still awaiting a decision. South Africa circulated a draft presidential statement in March 2007. The issue has since been included as a footnote on the Council’s calendar but it has not yet been taken up. The absence of a Council decision may leave future periodic Secretary-General’s reports in abeyance.
- The December 2004 report by the Secretary-General on human rights violations in Côte d’Ivoire, requested by a presidential statement, has still not been made public. Also on Côte d’Ivoire, the December 2005 report by the Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has not been published.
- On the DRC, the Council is still to consider imposing individual sanctions under resolution 1698 against armed groups that recruit children. Nor is it clear whether the Security Council has abandoned the issue of natural resources in the DRC for the time being.
- On West Africa, the Council has not followed up its 16 March consultations on cross-border issues.

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Consultations are expected on Ethiopia/Eritrea and Georgia. Formal decisions are unlikely, but some members may have proposals for press statements.

Timor Leste is not scheduled for consideration, but with Parliamentary elections due on 30 June and some persistent problems on the ground, a Council statement to reinforce the need for peaceful elections is possible.

There is no doubt that the atmosphere in the Council will be influenced significantly by the way in which the Kosovo issue is played out. It will overshadow other issues for some time—whatever the outcome on the draft resolution.

But other complex and difficult situations also have a momentum of their own. Major decisions are needed on Darfur. This and the challenges presented by the situation in Lebanon also seem likely to claim a significant amount of time during the month. Somalia will probably also occupy an important place in the programme of work. Similarly, it seems inevitable that the issue of Iran and its nuclear programme will return to the Council agenda.

Sudan/Darfur

Expected Council Action

There is strong momentum in the Council to now move quickly on a resolution to endorse the hybrid operation. Members seem likely to see an authorising resolution as an important first step in moving through the practical difficulties which undoubtedly lie ahead, including financial discussions in the General Assembly’s Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and its Fifth Committee, stimulating troop generation and resolving the inevitable complications on command and control which remain. (At press time, the Council expected a Secretariat briefing on the operation on 27 June.)

The regular Secretary-General’s report on the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is due in July. The UNMIS mandate expires on 31 October. (But it may be that one of the future issues to be resolved will be differentiating the two missions and their mandates.)

Key Recent Developments

Recent reports suggest that the number of internally displaced in Darfur has increased by 140,000 in the first months of 2007, bringing the total to 2.1 million, in addition to 200,000 refugees in Chad. Some humanitarian indicators seem to have relatively improved, however attacks against civilians, limited humanitarian access and harassment of aid workers persist.

After consultations in Addis Ababa on 12-13 June among the UN, the AU and Sudan, Khartoum indicated that it accepted the hybrid operation without conditions. Sudan later said publicly that its position remained unchanged regarding the need for AU command and control and African composition. But it seems that Khartoum’s bottom line may be that the operation will have an “African character” and that operational-level decisions will be managed jointly.

Council members were briefed on the results of those consultations on 13 June in preparation for the visiting mission to Addis Ababa, Accra and Khartoum on 17 June. During the mission, Sudanese officials apparently reiterated Khartoum’s acceptance, and Council members expressed support for a resolution authorising the hybrid operation.

On 22 June, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) authorised the hybrid operation with a mandate along the lines proposed in the AU-UN plan.

Earlier in June there were public threats of sanctions against Khartoum especially from the US and the UK if Sudan did not honour its commitments. In late May, the US announced tougher unilateral measures against Sudanese companies and individuals (including one wanted by the International Criminal Court, or ICC). (US officials seemingly indicated that there may be side effects from the sanctions over the oil revenues for south Sudan.)

France proposed in early June a new initiative to increase security in eastern Chad—including plans to hold a meeting with key stakeholders in Paris on 25 June. Sudan, Chad and the AU did not attend the meeting. The meeting was intended to inter alia:

- address the political process under the AU and the UN and the hybrid peace-keeping plans;
- assess the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur; and
- address the regional dimension.

The mid-June AU-UN-Sudan consultations in Addis Ababa were preceded by intense efforts between the UN and the AU to come up with a command-and-control formula which in practice would accommodate some of Khartoum’s concerns.

It seems that the intention of what was agreed is to use an arrangement similar to that for the heavy support package. Day-to-day command and control would be delegated to the joint special representative and the force commander, and the UN would retain primary responsibility for overall command, given its role in force generation and funding. The relationship between the AU and the UN in overall command structure still contains significant ambiguities, however.

The AU and the UN seem now to be making progress on the mission’s concept of operations and rules of engagement. Troop generation is expected to target initially African members. (Two additional AMIS battalions are an immediate priority to enable the heavy support package, however.) But if as seems likely there are not enough pledges from Africa, wider participation will be needed especially for the force enabler components.

Special Envoy Jan Eliasson briefed the Council on the roadmap for peace talks on 8 June. He indicated that his team would be deployed in Khartoum and Darfur to undertake extensive contacts with stakeholders. Mediation strategies and modalities (including participation and agenda) are expected to be developed in June-July, with negotiations commencing in August, depending on progress with a unified rebel position.

Eritrea convened a meeting in early June including rebel representatives, Chad, Libya and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) to facilitate rebel unity. The SPLM later announced that its plans to convey a rebel conference had been postponed indefinitely due to the refusal from key commanders to attend.

ICC Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo briefed the Council on 7 June on the status of the Darfur case. The Prosecutor indicated the need for Council support to execute the
pending arrest warrants. The US recently signalled willingness to cooperate with the Court in that regard.

Related Developments in the Human Rights Council

The report of the group of experts on Darfur was presented on 13 June. The report reiterated the concerns with the dire human rights situation and made a number of recommendations, including on protection, humanitarian access, accountability and monitoring. It further suggested that the Human Rights Council urges Sudan to implement such recommendations and that it request the group to continue its work.

Options

The most likely option for the Council is to adopt a new resolution in effect overtaking resolution 1706 and paving the way for discussions in the General Assembly’s Fifth Committee on funding commitment for the mission.

With force-generation issues in mind, a possible option is for the Council to issue a special call to member states to urgently consider possible contributions. A related option may be to establish a special Council working group to meet with prospective troop and police contributors and actively encourage participation and financing.

On the peace process, an option is for the Council to take new steps to support the efforts of Salim and Eliasson in particular by:

- requesting the Secretary-General to enhance the resources available to the mediation team;
- signalling to the parties that the international community is determined to work together and will not tolerate delays resulting from a proliferation of negotiation forums; and
- reminding the rebels in particular that attempts to “impede the peace process” (including the creation of obstacles to a common rebel negotiating position) could attract the imposition of targeted measures as referred to in resolution 1591.

Key Issues

The most immediate issue for the Council is its response to the recent positive developments regarding the hybrid peacekeeping option. This includes:

- the relationship of a new resolution with resolution 1706;
- the relationship between the new mission and UNMIS;
- details of its mandate;
- managing the continuing need for Khartoum to keep with its commitments and not raise practical impediments to the implementation of the heavy support package and the hybrid operation;
- managing the complications of the current ambiguity about command and control (ensuring sufficiently unified command and control for the operation to work effectively while at the same time keeping Khartoum on board but without producing so much ambiguity that potential troop and police contributors and the Fifth Committee are scared off);
- generating enough troops and assets under different frameworks for the “heavy support package” (bearing in mind the preceding need for two additional AMIS battalions) and the hybrid operation. For the heavy support package, it seems that Nigeria, Egypt, Pakistan and China have already pledged troops. At press time, it seemed that the air assets, however, had not yet been pledged. Sudan will also need to consent to water and land use by the personnel deployed;
- the likely huge costs of the phased approach;
- time: heavy support deployments are only fully expected by the end of 2007, provided all requirements are in place

Status Update since our June Forecast

Recent developments on the situations covered in this Forecast are addressed in the relevant briefs. Interesting developments in the Council in June on other issues included:

- Middle East: The Secretary-General briefed the Council on 1 June after a meeting with the Quartet. On 20 June, Special Coordinator Michael Williams briefed the Council condemning violence in Gaza, calling for measures to avoid isolation and urgent support for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. A proposal that the Council should indicate support for Abbas, initiated by the US, was blocked by objections from Russia, South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar.
- Sierra Leone: Top officials of the Special Court for Sierra Leone attended the debate in the Council on 8 June. They indicated that funding was likely to run out by November (SC/9037).
- Iraq: On 13 June the Council reviewed the mandate of the Multinational Force (MNF) as set forward in resolution 1723. A briefing by UNMOVIC and by the IAEA, followed by a debate in which Iraq may participate, is scheduled for 29 June. A draft resolution sponsored by the US and the UK terminating the UNMOVIC and IAEA mandates in Iraq is likely to be adopted.
- Liberia: A Panel of Experts report (S/2007/340) noted that Charles Taylor still had access to considerable funds. Resolution 1760 requested the Panel to investigate violations to the sanctions regime, with special focus on Taylor.
- Cyprus: On 15 June in resolution 1758 the Council renewed the mandate of UNFICYP until 15 December, expressing concern that the process of reaching a final solution has been at a standstill for too long.
- International Criminal Tribunals: On 18 June the ICTY and ICTR briefed the Council on their respective completion strategies (S/2007/283 and 323). The ICTY noted that Serbia’s cooperation had improved, but failure to hand over Mladic and Karadzic was undermining the Tribunal’s efforts. The ICTR told the Council it had made the first request for transferring a case to Rwanda.
- Côte d’Ivoire: A Council meeting with President Laurent Gbagbo on 19 June calmed concerns that the UN would be blocked from supervising elections. Resolution 1761 renewed the mandate of the Côte d’Ivoire Group of Experts. On 29 June the Council is expected to renew the UNOCI mandate.
- Golan Heights: On 20 June the Council renewed UNDOF until 31 December in resolution 1759 and issued the standard presidential statement stating that the situation in the Middle East remains tense and will remain so until a comprehensive settlement can be reached (S/PRST/2007/20).
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: The Council held an open debate on the protection of civilians in armed conflict on 22 June (SC/9057 and S/PV.5703).
become incontrollable.
On political reconciliation, the key issues for the Council are whether there will be a credible “peace to keep” and its role in helping to generate and resource a credible process, a comprehensive ceasefire and an eventual peace agreement. Another is how best to encourage all rebel movements to fully join the peace process. There are several major additional questions, including negotiation modalities, and relationship with the north-south Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Council and Wider Dynamics
Members’ responses to Khartoum’s acceptance of the hybrid operation have widely varied from scepticism to optimism. Some, such as the US and the UK, insist on the need for the Council to maintain a close scrutiny of Khartoum’s implementation of its commitments.

On the regional dimension, members seem to accept the Tripoli format as a primary venue for discussions among key international stakeholders. For their part, regional players such as Libya and Egypt now seem more comfortable with international involvement, possibly after the renewed involvement, players such as Libya and Egypt now

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six-month postponement, were delighted with Bush’s declaration. Serbia reacted strongly, saying that the US had no right to give away Serbian territory.

The issue of independence for Kosovo provoked various proponents in similar situations to reassert their claims for independence. In early June the Abkhazians and South Ossetians adopted a joint statement stating that they have as much right to independence as Kosovo. The Transdniester Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-June signed a similar joint declaration on principles for “just settlement” of their respective situations.

A subset of the Contact Group on Kosovo consisting of Germany, the US, France, Italy and UK (known as “The Quint”) met on 12 June and confirmed their support for a UN resolution based on Ahtisaari’s proposal. On 18 June, the EU foreign ministers reiterated that an Ahtisaari-based resolution would provide the basis for a future EU presence and underlined the necessity of “rapidly finding a solution.” Macedonia and Albania also gave support for the Ahtisaari proposal.

Some voices began cautioning against a quick decision on Kosovo. Carla Del Ponte, the Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, on 19 June warned the Council that any decision on independence for Kosovo might be better postponed until Serbia had arrested wanted war criminals.

On 20 June the co-sponsors of the resolution—the US, France, UK, Belgium, Italy and Slovakia—circulated a new draft to the Council. The new text provided for a 120-day period for the two parties to reach agreement on Kosovo’s final status. Significantly, the resolution does not seek to endorse or approve Ahtisaari’s conclusions. In particular there is nothing in it which could be seen as an explicit endorsement of his conclusion about independence. Instead its operational effect is simply to implement the detailed change in governance structures and associated safeguards. But these do not of themselves confer independence. The resolution would take effect after 120 days “unless the Security Council expressly decides otherwise after conducting an evaluation.”

Russia’s immediate reaction was that this draft was also unacceptable as the period for negotiations did not provide sufficient incentive for the two parties to negotiate seriously and that the Council should not take a decision now on something that would happen in four months. Serbia’s prime minister called for the resolution to be withdrawn.

The Council held its first informal consultations on the resolution on 15 June. Russia made it clear that it rejected the current text.

**Options**

The Council’s three main options are:

- Continuing negotiations on the current draft resolution with the intention of modifying in the hope that consensus will be reached. While this is a possible option, it would require the co-sponsors to further soften elements of the current resolution, perhaps by including language which states that nothing in the resolution changes the legal status of Kosovo, but equally that nothing in the resolution diminishes the capacity of the people of Kosovo to act under the governance structure established.

- Putting the current draft resolution to vote. This option may result in a veto by Russia and possibly China. This seems likely to prompt Kosovo to declare unilateral independence, a situation likely to be recognised quite quickly by many key players. A major issue would remain regarding resolution 1244, which established UNMIK in 1999, and UNMIK itself, which would remain officially the administering authority. In dealing with UNMIK there are several possible options: the Council decides to withdraw UNMIK, or the Secretary-General draws down UNMIK and it basically ceases functioning. The Secretary-General could act based on his security assessment of the situation post-independence.

- If it seems clear that a veto is inevitable if the resolution is put to a vote, an option is simply not to table the resolution and allow Kosovo’s future status to be decided outside the Council (which would have many of the same repercussions, as described above, as a veto).

Other possible options for the Council include:

- As an interim measure adopt a barebones resolution that simply implements the governance parts of Ahtisaari’s package including those that concern the future EU presence and the protection of minorities, and decide to revisit the wider issues in six months.

**Key Issues**

The key issue is whether to seek further efforts to revise the resolution to avoid a Russian veto. While a number of Russia’s concerns have been accommodated in the latest draft, Moscow does not seem ready to engage in serious discussions on the text. What is still unclear to most Council members is exactly where the red lines are for Russia.

A related issue is whether in making the resolution more acceptable to Russia it will become too ambiguous to implement.

A unilateral declaration of independence and possible violence is still an issue. Related issues include possible efforts by the Serbian population in Kosovo to declare independence in northern Kosovo.

A major issue is the future of UNMIK if Kosovo declares independence in the absence of a Council resolution overtaking 1244, which established the mission. UNMIK would face the prospect of being in limbo unable to exercise its mandate and in a potentially hostile environment.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

There has been great fluidity in Council dynamics on this issue. For most of June non-permanent members were content to remain on the sidelines and let the Europeans and US discuss elements of the new draft resolution with Russia. This was a reversal of previous months when they were insistently on being part of all Kosovo discussions.

There has been little or no shift in Russia’s position. It continues to push for further negotiations between the parties, but does not address the question of how to avoid the inevitable failure of such negotiations. China’s position appears to have hardened.

European members and the US have worked closely on the resolution and are united on the current draft. However, differences may be emerging. US Undersecretary of State Nicolas Burns has said that the US will support a unilateral declaration of independence, but the Europeans are reluctant to give up a Council-based solution.

Over recent months a majority of Council members have made their positions clear, and although there seems to be a clear majority for accepting the resolution, some countries like Indonesia have yet to be con-
UNMIK
- Size of UNMIK mission: 483 international, 1967 national, 142 UN volunteers as of 30 March
- Size of OSCE mission: 1300 staff (310 international and 990 local as of 39 September 2006) (Pillar 3) and 447 (114 international and 333 local staff as of 31 March 2007) (Pillar 4)
- Size of EU mission: 125 international staff, 336 local staff

Cost
US$2.17 billion for fiscal year 2006-2007 (not including OSCE, EU and NATO expenditures)

KFOR (NATO FORCE)
General Roland Kather (Germany)

Size and Composition of Mission
- Size: 16,000 troops
- NATO countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK, US
- Non-NATO countries: Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Morocco, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine

Lebanon

Expected Council Action
Lebanon seems likely to produce even greater challenges in July amid conflict between the Lebanese army and Palestinian militants, reports of widespread rearming of Lebanese militias and increasing security challenges to the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). The Council seems ready to maintain momentum on resolution 1701 (which in August 2006 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL).

On 26 June the Council received the report of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT), established in April. The report on implementation of resolution 1701 will be introduced shortly after, and consultations are likely in early July. The Council is expected to take action on the LIBAT recommendations. Consensus may be harder to find on all issues connected to the 1701 report.

The next report of the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC) is due on 15 July. This is a progress report, and the Council is unlikely to take action unless new important elements are revealed.

Key Recent Developments
Fighting continues between the Lebanese army and Palestinian Fatah al-Islam militants in the Nahr-al-Bared camp in northern Lebanon. By 19 June at least 163 people were reported killed, including 74 soldiers, more than 57 militants and 32 civilians. Most of the 40,000 refugees of camp fled. Humanitarian aid has been hindered by unexploded ordnance and shooting. Two Red Cross workers were killed.

Clashes also broke out on 2 June between the army and militants from another Islamist group, the Jund al-Sham, in the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Sidon. Incidents were reported elsewhere in Lebanon, including government reports of mobilisation of heavy weapons by Palestinian outposts and cross-border movements of personnel and material from Syria, as Lebanon notified the Council in a 12 June letter.

On 11 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement expressing support for the Lebanese government. It also emphasised the need to protect civilians. In the statement, the Council expressed concern at mounting evidence of illegal movements of arms into Lebanon.

This followed a briefing on the latest report by Terje Rod Larsen, the UN Special Envoy for the implementation of resolution 1559 of 2004, in which the Council had urged that foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon and militias be disarmed.

Several bombings occurred in Beirut. On 13 June a Lebanese member of parliament, Walid Eido, was killed with his son and eight others in a car-bomb attack in the capital. This was denounced by the Council in a presidential statement on 13 June, and the Council also agreed to authorise UNIIIC to add this crime to those already under investigation.

On 11 June, in the absence of domestic political action, the Lebanon special tribunal entered into force according to resolution 1757, which on 30 May established the Lebanon Tribunal under Chapter VII.

A delegation headed by Amr Moussa, the head of the Arab league, arrived in Beirut on 19 June to encourage Lebanese politicians to resume a national dialogue but left

VINCED. Indonesia has made it clear that it could not accept the idea of automatically reverting to Ahtisaari’s proposal after a period of negotiations.
without securing a political deal. France is scheduled to hold an informal meeting with rival Lebanese leaders in mid-July.

On 17 June, a rocket attack was launched against Israel, causing no casualties but damaging infrastructure. It was condemned by the Council in a press statement as a breach of the cessation of hostilities. Hezbollah denied involvement. A previously unknown group called “Jihad Badr Brigade” claimed responsibility and there are strong suspicions that Sunni extremists (perhaps trying to open a new front in support of the besieged Fatah al-Islam group) were involved.

On 24 June, a bombing incident in southern Lebanon killed six UNIFIL peacekeepers from Colombia and Spain and wounded two others. This was condemned not only by the Government but also by Hezbollah and President Emile Lahoud. The Council condemned the attack in the strongest terms in a presidential statement. The Lebanese authorities said that militants from Fatah al-Islam who were arrested had confessed a plan to attack UNIFIL in the south.

The LIBAT report noted that the current state of security on the Syrian-Lebanese border was insufficient to prevent arms smuggling, and that cross-border petty smuggling usually “accepted” was blurring the picture of more serious border crimes such as arms trafficking. Not one report of arms smuggling was provided to the team. The presence of armed Palestinian camps in the border zone also constitutes a major obstacle. The team recommended enhancing border equipment; establishing training programs; establishing cooperation with Syria at the operational level; and deploying international border security experts to reinforce a Lebanese multi-agency mobile force with an intelligence and analysis component.

**Options**

In response to the LIBAT report (and the 12 June letter from Lebanon), the Council could:

- **Confront the transfer of weapons from Syria.** Reinforcing the arms embargo is one option. Establishing a sanctions committee is another. Expanding the mandate of UNIFIL and its deployment along the Syrian-Lebanese border is less likely. This would require a Lebanese request. It is unclear if additional forces would be available or if troop contributing countries would agree.

- **Settle for the Secretary-General’s recommendations and call for enhanced bilateral technical assistance.**

The Council may wish to keep the LIBAT and 1701 consultations separate. This means it could proceed with two different texts or a single measure.

On the Sheba’s Farms, our June Forecast Report outlined options. The Council could either adopt a soft approach encouraging further cartographic work or request the Secretary-General to provide details on the next steps in view of placing the farms under interim UN jurisdiction, as requested by Lebanese Prime Minister Siniora in his “seven-point plan.”

On disarmament, the Council could:

- Reiterate calls to disarm Palestinian and other militias in the context of an inter-Lebanese dialogue and;
- Express support for Lebanon’s action against Palestinian militants;
- Link its language on disarmament with more specific action on the cross-border movement of weapons, e.g. the options set out above.
- Consider the balancing option of addressing Israeli violations of Lebanese airspace or call on Israel to stop them.

The Council could also take steps to reinvigorate the Secretary-General’s role, especially on the long-term peace process, the issue of the abducted Israeli soldiers and the emerging Palestinian-related complications.

Finally the Council could adopt specific language addressed to the enhanced risk faced by UNIFIL at this time.

**Key Issues**

A key issue is how to respond to the LIBAT report, in the light of the explicit details in Lebanon’s 12 June report on cross-border weapons transfers.

A related issue is the movement of arms within Lebanon and allegations that all militias are rearming, which directly challenges resolution 1701.

A further important issue is how to revive the Lebanese political dialogue.

The Sheb’a farms issue seems increasingly to be overshadowed by wider issues within Lebanon and between Israel and Syria. An immediate question for the Council is whether to request the Secretary-General to produce some specific recommendations.

As the first anniversary of the 2006 war approaches, continuing violations of the Blue Line attract increasing concern, as was evidenced by the Council’s reaction to the 17 June rocket attack.

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**Council Dynamics**

For the US and the UK, the major issue is the movement of weapons across the Syrian border. The Non-Aligned Movement members of the Council (Indonesia, Qatar, Panama, Peru, South Africa, Ghana, Congo, supported by China and Russia) consider that Israeli overflights should be regarded equally seriously.

The US supported a strong LIBAT mandate and may seek to reinforce the arms embargo. But others, in particular France, seem reluctant to adopt coercive measures, fearing the potential for destabilisation. At the very least they believe that it is necessary to maintain momentum on all aspects of the 1701 resolution, including steps leading to a long-term solution.

On the Sheba’s farms, the US—reflecting Israel’s position—is likely to remain cautious. The Israeli government has been in a fragile position since the publication on 30 April of the interim report of the Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of the military campaign in Lebanon in 2006. The full report was due in June, and may further weaken the government. Territorial concessions on Sheba’s farms may not be politically achievable for Israel at this time.

France sees the issue of Sheba’s farms as an integral part of the 1701 process and may link any response to the LIBAT report with progress on the farms and other issues.

**Underlying Problems**

Elements in Lebanon are rapidly rearming and this is a worrying development. While the focus is on Palestinian militias and Hezbollah, other factions may also be re-arming, which raises the prospect of widespread fighting across the political divide.

The latest events in the south seem to confirm the fears over the past months that Sunni Islamist militants are a major risk for UNIFIL. It also seems to reflect a new challenge to the traditional Hezbollah leadership in the south.
**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**
- S/RES/1757 (30 May 2007) established the Lebanon Tribunal under Chapter VII.
- S/RES/1701 (11 August 2006) called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah and authorised a reinforcement of UNIFIL.
- S/RES/1559 (2 September 2004) urged foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon and militias to be disarmed.

**Selected Presidential Statements**
- S/PRST/2007/21 (25 June 2007) condemned in the strongest terms the 24 June terrorist attack near Khiyam against UNIFIL.
- S/PRST/2007/18 (13 June 2007) condemned the terrorist attack that killed Lebanese MP Walid Eido.
- S/PRST/2007/17 (11 June 2007) expressed concern at illegal movements of arms and supported the Lebanese army’s efforts to restore stability in Lebanon.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**
- S/2007/385 (26 June 2007) was the LIBAT report.
- S/2007/262 (7 May 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1559.
- S/2007/147 (14 March 2007) was the latest report on resolution 1701.

**Selected Letters**
- S/2007/367 (18 June 2007) letter from Lebanon transmitting a position paper on implementation of resolution 1701 and including all Israeli violations since March.
- S/2007/348 (12 June 2007) letter from Lebanon on the Palestinian militias military build-up and mobilisation, and expanded confrontations with the Lebanese army.
- S/2007/318 (30 May 2007) statement by Prime Minister Siniora concerning events in the Nahr al-Bared camp, pointing out that refugees were used as human shields by Fatah al-Islam.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**LIBAT Mission**
Led by Lasse Rosenkrands Christensen (Denmark) and composed of experts from Algeria, Germany, Jamaica and Switzerland.

**Secretary-General’s Special Envoys for Implementation of Resolution 1559**
- Terje Roed-Larsen (Norway)
- Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)
- Geir O. Pedersen (Norway)

**UNIFIL Force Commander**
- Major General Claudio Graziano (Italy)

**Size and Composition of UNIFIL**
- Authorised: 15,000 troops
- Current (as of 31 May 2007): 13,225 military personnel, supported by some 210 international civilian and 353 local civilian staff
- Troop-contributing countries: Belgium, China, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, FYR of Macedonia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Tanzania and Turkey

**Cost (approved budget)**

**Useful Additional Sources**
- “Lebanon: End Abuse of Palestinians Fleeing Refugee Camp,” Human Rights Watch, 13 June 2007

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**Iran**

**Expected Council Action**
It now seems unlikely that recent diplomatic initiatives aimed at resuming negotiations between Iran and the EU3+3 (France, Germany, UK + China, Russia and US) on Iran’s nuclear programme will produce early results. A new resolution expanding sanctions against Iran is therefore likely to be adopted in July.

**Key Recent Developments**
Although Mohammed ElBaradei, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), reported in late May that Iran had still not complied with resolution 1747 requesting it to stop uranium-enrichment activities, the Council did not take up the issue in June and there seemed to be a willingness to allow more time.

The EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana met Iranian negotiator Ali Larijani in Spain on 31 May. Larijani suggested that Iran was ready to better cooperate with the IAEA. They met again on 23 June, but at time of writing it seemed that no encouraging development had occurred. The EU3+3 seem therefore currently to be discussing ways to strengthen sanctions.

On 8 June, in a final statement, the G8 deplored Iran’s failure to meet its obligations under Council resolutions and supported additional measures should Iran further refuse to comply.

The IAEA Board of Governors met on 11 June. ElBaradei reiterated that dialogue and diplomacy were the only ways to break the impasse with Iran’s nuclear programme and deplored the deterioration of the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s activities.

Tensions between Iran and the international community increased. Following President Ahmadinejad’s remarks on 3 June calling for “the destruction of the Zionist regime”, France and the US pushed the Council to adopt a press statement condemning these remarks, but no consensus could be reached.

Iran stated on 11 June that all American bases in the region were within reach of Iran’s missiles. It also requested the Council to condemn threats that Israel made against Iran when Prime Minister Olmert said in April that Israel could destroy the entire Iranian nuclear programme. US criticism of Iran’s role in fomenting violence in Iraq intensified. For its part, Iran accused the US of conducting covert operations on its soil.

On 21 June the Chairman of the 1737 sanctions committee briefed the Council and reported that 73 states had reported on their implementation of sanctions on Iran, of which 38 had legislation in place to ban all items that could contribute to Iran’s enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

ElBaradei and Larijani met in Vienna on 22 June and agreed to draw up an action plan within two months for resolving the outstanding issues and allowing broader IAEA
access to Iranian sites. An IAEA delegation is visiting Iran. The plan would be part of a broader political understanding to be discussed between Larijani and Solana.

**Options**

A third resolution following the logic of incremental pressure seems to be the main option. The resolution could:
- replace “calls upon” with “decide” in several provisions;
- impose a travel ban on Iranian officials involved in the nuclear programme;
- impose limits on flights by Iranian aircraft;
- include additional names in the list of people and entities subject to asset freeze;
- toughen current financial sanctions through restricting or even banning export credits to Iran; and
- ban additional categories of arms sales to Iran.

**Key Issues**

The issues remain identical to those described in our June 2007 Forecast Report:
- how long the incremental pressure approach will remain; and
- keeping the doors open for negotiation.

An underlying issue which seems to be rising closer to the surface is the level of anxiety about US intentions should it conclude that neither sanctions nor diplomacy is likely to succeed. Media reports in June of ongoing high level discussions in Washington on a military option fuel this anxiety.

**Council Dynamics**

It seems that the Solana-Larijani ongoing talks prompted the EU3+3 to adopt a “wait and see” position during June. But other issues have also been the focus of attention (the G8 meeting, the situations with regards to Darfur and Kosovo).

As in the past, China and Russia are likely to favour a more limited expansion of sanctions than France, the UK and the US, but consensus among the P5 has been easier to reach recently.

South Africa, Indonesia and Qatar may oppose sanctions which go beyond proliferation-sensitive activities.

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1747 (24 March 2007) imposed additional measures against Iran and reinforced the existing ones.
- S/RES/1737 (23 December 2006) imposed measures against Iran under Chapter VII, article 41, of the UN Charter and expressed its intention to adopt further measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.
- S/RES/1696 (31 July 2006) demanded that Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and expressed its intention to adopt measures under article 41 in case of Iranian non-compliance.

**Latest IAEA Board Resolution**

- GOV/2006/14 (4 February 2006) underlined the necessary steps that Iran should take to re-establish confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear programme and reported the issue to the Security Council.

**Latest IAEA Report**

- GOV/2007/22 (23 May 2007) noting that Iran had not complied with resolution 1747.

**Expected Council Action**

The improvements in the overall atmosphere in the region, as a result of the progress between Sudan and the UN as well as the AU over Darfur may encourage the Council to revisit the issue of international deployments in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

A report or briefing by the Secretariat on the results of its consultations with both Chad and CAR is likely. The French proposal of a short-term, “bridging” EU operation to protect civilians and provide humanitarian assistance and its relationship with the proposed UN peacekeeping mission may be explored.

In terms of outcome, much will depend on Chad’s position.

A briefing on the June report of the Secretary-General on the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in the CAR (BONUCA) is likely, but the case for a separate UN presence in that country seems to be fading.

**Chad/Central African Republic**

**Key Recent Developments**

Chad now has 150,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) plus 235,000 Darfuran and 46,000 CAR refugees. There are 220,000 IDPs in the CAR, but many of these are in the west, not in the eastern area bordering Darfur.

In Chad, violence continues. In addition, concerns with increasing malnutrition, disease and lack of humanitarian access are becoming acute as the rainy season approaches. France is reportedly airlifting aid into eastern Chad.

Rebel attacks in Chad have decreased apparently because of internal disputes, but insecurity persists. The government seems to rely on financial incentives and force to divide the rebels.

The Chadian government and rebel groups reportedly entered into Libya-brokered peace talks in mid-June. The talks were deadlocked at press time due to the government’s refusal to involve the Chadian political opposition.

In northwest CAR, the situation continues to deteriorate with army raids and increasing rebel activity along the Cameroon border. In the north-eastern area adjacent to Sudan, the situation seems to have improved after peace agreements earlier this year.

In early June, France unveiled a new initiative to improve protection of civilians in the region, including:
- establishing a secure corridor in eastern Chad to Darfur to allow delivery of humanitarian aid; and
- deploying an EU force with significant French presence to protect civilians in eastern Chad. This could possibly serve as a “bridging” operation until a UN peacekeeping mission is deployed.
The response from the international community has ranged from sceptical (especially about the corridor proposal) to opposed because of concerns with feasibility, the neutrality of aid workers and its effectiveness given that the corridor would not extend into Darfur.

Discussions with Chad and Sudan took place on 11-12 June during a visit by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner. Chadian President Idriss Déby signalled that Chad may not resist the idea of international forces much longer. It is unclear whether there will be a substantive change in Chad’s position.

Further discussions were held during a high-level meeting in Paris on 25 June. Some EU members attended, along with the UN, the Arab League, US, China, Russia and other players. Sudan, Chad and the AU were absent. Discussions included:

- the consultations among the UN, Chad and the CAR on the proposed UN mission; and
- the French proposal on the “bridging” EU mission.

At press time, EU members were beginning to discuss the proposed bridging mission but it is unclear whether agreement can be reached.

The Secretariat mission concluded its trip to Chad and the CAR on 26 June. At press time, it seems the Secretariat may prepare a follow-up report to the Council on the proposed UN mission. This is likely to take into account the results of the 25 June meeting in Paris and further EU discussions on the proposed “bridging” mission.

Chad President Déby visited Khartoum and Egypt in June. The meetings in Khartoum reportedly focused on deploying joint border monitoring units comprising 2,000 troops, but no timeframe was specified.

**Options**

Options include:

- continuing with the wait-and-see approach;
- signalling willingness to authorise deployment of an EU “bridging” force to be followed by a possible UN operation;
- urging Chad to consent to the proposed UN deployment, possibly in the format of the Tripoli meetings in May;
- urging deployment of the advance UN mission in the meantime;
- welcoming the Libya-brokered talks between the Chadian government and the rebels; and
- highlighting options for cooperation between the mechanisms of the Tripoli Agreement and the proposed UN and EU deployments.

Regarding the CAR, one option is to address this situation separately, but on the basis that any UN role would need to address the problems in the northwest. A second option would be to encourage an increase in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community’s military operation deployed in the CAR (FOMUC), with a clear mandate in the northwest.

**Key Issues**

The key issue remains how to encourage regional stability and contain the conflict in Darfur. A related question is Chad’s reluctance to allow substantive international deployments in its east. This raises a number of related issues:

- whether substantive support can be generated among key regional players, particularly Libya, Sudan and Eritrea, given that Sudan has now formally consented to hybrid AU-UN operation plans in Darfur;
- N’Djaména’s concerns with its domestic political situation and the absence of meaningful political reconciliation;
- which format an international presence in eastern Chad should take, including the proposed EU “bridging” force; and
- whether there will be agreement within the EU for the proposed “bridging” force.

A second key issue is that it is increasingly clear that problems in the CAR, while showing some regional aspects, are also being driven by separate domestic factors and not principally by spillover from the Darfur situation. The issue, therefore, is whether any UN deployment in the CAR should be considered as a separate matter, on its own merits involving deployment in the northwest. And again there is the related issue of the absence of a strong political reconciliation mandate.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**

There seems to be agreement within the Council that it will need to renew its attention to the regional situation. There is consensus that action must have Chad’s consent and recognition that this will require acceptance within the region. Most seem enthusiastic about the Tripoli format and the collective engagement of key regional players. It is unclear, however, to what extent recent developments on Darfur concerning the hybrid operation and the invigorated political process under Jan Eliasson and Salim Salim will be reflected on positions regarding Chad and the CAR. Observers note that regional players now seem to be revising their strategies.

Members are sensitive to the domestic political aspects, particularly in Chad. Most seem focused on the regional aspect at least in the short term. But most also seem to accept that a UN mission without a political reconciliation mandate risks repeating dangerous lessons of the past.

France has expanded its leadership on the regional issue and is likely to continue to work bilaterally with Chad, regional players and other EU members to garner support for the proposed “bridging” force to be followed by a UN operation.

**UN Documents**

- S/1706 (31 August 2006) mandated a multidimensional UN presence in Chad and the CAR and requested recommendations.
- S/PRST/2006/47 (22 November 2006) renewed BONUCA.
- S/2007/97 (23 February 2007) was a report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/1034 (28 December 2006) was the latest available BONUCA report at press time.
- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.

**Selected Secretary-General’s Reports**

- S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was a report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
- S/2006/135 (7 March 2007) was a Chad-Sudan statement on re-energising the Tripoli Agreement.
- S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was the Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement.

**Other Relevant Facts**

- S/2007/135 (7 March 2007) was a Chad-Sudan statement on re-energising the Tripoli Agreement.
- S/2006/103 (14 February 2006) was the Chad-Sudan Tripoli Agreement.

- S/2006/1019 (22 December 2006) was the first report on UN peacekeeping in Chad and the CAR.
The national reconciliation conference was postponed for the second time, until 15 July, based on claims that clans needed longer to select delegates and that more time was needed to prepare a venue in Mogadishu. Reportedly this delay drew sharp criticism from the EU. Observers also note the general lack of security as insurgents aim at conference-related targets to decrease momentum for the talks.

In mid-June the TFG announced an amnesty for insurgents—except for those involved in international terrorism—and the release of prisoners. Some in Somalia have welcomed the plan. Others rejected it, noting that it needs to be accompanied by a broad cessation of hostilities and the exit of Ethiopian forces. There are also concerns with a lack of transparency on the conference’s agenda and the criteria for selection of participants.

At a meeting in early June, the International Contact Group agreed on an action plan to support efforts on reconciliation and improvements to AMISOM’s financing mechanisms.

Under Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe visited Somalia in early June. Pascoe briefed the Council on his trip on 14 June. He reportedly underscored that the Somalia situation requires an increase in international troops on the ground so that Ethiopia can withdraw, greater TFG contact with the opposition and a more constructive role by neighbours.

On 14 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement calling for the reconciliation conference to be held as soon as possible and that it should:

- address “in a comprehensive and meaningful manner issues of political reconciliation, including representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions”;
- agree on a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional political process.

The statement also emphasised the Council’s request for contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission.

Further Council discussions on the subject were held during the Council’s visiting mission to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in mid-June.

At press time, it seemed likely that, based on the contingency planning requested by members, any future UN mission would need significant robust multidimensional elements including about 20,000 troops, as well as significant air and maritime assets.

It also seemed that the Secretary-General’s recent report (which at press time had just been circulated to members) would suggest that deployments be made only after a credible political process and ceasefire are in place, AMISOM is strengthened and Ethiopia withdraws.

AMISOM continues to face funding and troop shortages. Ghana indicated in June that security concerns and lack of equipment and logistics assets prevented it from deploying troops. Burundi has signaled readiness to deploy one battalion in July.

Options
Options include:
- maintaining the essentially “wait-and-see” policy, supplemented by statements in support of the political process;
- stepping up levels of engagement for the political process by requesting the establishment of a UN advance political mission in Mogadishu or providing political advisers to the conference’s organisational committee;
- deciding on a more leading role. This could include a small Council mission to the reconciliation conference;
- instituting a series of closed meetings with key stakeholders, including the AU and regional players, to monitor progress with the conference and efforts to reach a cessation of hostilities, perhaps within the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa;
- considering options in support of AMISOM. This could include member states organising a pledging conference; and
- addressing the regional dimension more comprehensively, in particular by becoming more actively involved in improving the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how much to get involved in efforts to stabilise Somalia. Related issues are:
- Political process: what kind of contributions will help ensure that the political reconciliation process is successful. The recent presidential statement seems to have clarified the two key questions: inclusiveness and a comprehensive outcome including new power-sharing arrangements and a road map, bearing
in mind that the TFG’s tenure expires in 2009. Another is deciding how long to wait for the progress with reconciliation before becoming more involved, especially if the conference is postponed again;

- **Security**: how best to ensure a secure environment for the political process. Cessation of hostilities and Ethiopian-troop withdrawal are key questions. Related to this is ensuring that AMISOM is sufficiently resourced. Another is how much progress with security and reconciliation is necessary before considering a future UN peacekeeping role in Somalia.

- **Regional dimension**: how best to ensure that neighbours act in a constructive manner, bearing in mind their own security concerns and longstanding issues.

An unpredictable factor is the impact of the issue of counterterrorism on the political, security and reconstruction needs of Somalia.

**Council Dynamics**

There is a good deal of consensus within the Council on the appropriate measures to stabilise Somalia, including progress with the political process, and the security situation through support for AMISOM. There is also consensus that the Transitional Federal Institutions, including the TFG, could be the initial framework on which negotiations on political reconciliation can be based for future political arrangements in Somalia.

However, there is still a lack of common understanding on how to reconcile the TFG’s desire for complete ownership of the process with the needs of broad inclusiveness and meaningful power-sharing. This produces differing views on whether to openly criticise and pressure the TFG and how much time to allow before a injecting a more determined UN involvement. Some members—especially the US—have additional concerns, such as counter-terrorism, that seem to largely influence positions on the future of Somalia and the region. This may lead to reluctance to pressure the TFG, in particular on the issues of cessation of hostilities and power-sharing.

Despite the urgent tone in the recent presidential statement, it seems that the majority considers that significant progress will need to be made before a future UN peacekeeping role in Somalia can be considered. However, others are concerned about the imposition of too many conditions to UN deployments in Somalia and may see double standards vis-à-vis peacekeeping in Darfur. African members remain strongly concerned with the lack of support for AMISOM and for future prospects to transfer peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN.

**UN Documents**

**Selected Security Council Resolutions**

- S/RES/1744 (20 February 2007) authorised AMISOM.

**Selected Presidential Statement**

- S/PRST/2007/19 (14 June 2007) underscored that the reconciliation congress should be comprehensive and should agree on a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional political process.

**Latest Secretary-General’s Report**

- S/2007/204 (20 April 2007) (at press time)

**Other**

- S/2006/913 (21 November 2006) was the latest available Monitoring Group report.

**Other Relevant Facts**

**Special Representative of the Secretary-General**

François Lonseny Fall (Guinea)

**Chairman of the Sanctions Committee**

Dumisani S. Kumalo (South Africa)

**Western Sahara**

**Expected Council Action**

Western Sahara appears to have entered a new phase. Direct talks between Morocco and the Polisario have resumed in June, following Council resolution 1754. They mark an historic opportunity, and the Council is likely to encourage these negotiations to produce positive results. Finding the right mix of support and pressure for the parties to engage will be an ongoing challenge.

A report by the Secretary-General is due by 30 June and the Council is likely to adopt a presidential statement in July.

**Key Recent Developments**

Following presentation of an autonomy plan by Morocco and a plan for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara by the Polisario, the Council on 30 April adopted resolution 1754:

- taking note of both plans and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward;
- extending until 31 October the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO);
- calling on the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions, under the auspices of the Secretary-General, with a view to providing for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara; and
- requesting the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 30 June.

Morocco and the Polisario held talks on 18 and 19 June in Manhasset, outside New York, facilitated by Peter van Walsum, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara. The Moroccan delegation was headed by Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa, and the Polisario delegation by Mahfoud Ali Beiba, president of the Sahrawi parliament. Algeria and Mauritania were observers but did not participate in the talks.

This direct meeting was the first since 2000. It was essentially an opening round with no real negotiations. Both parties reiterated their positions. The Polisario stated its readiness to consider the Moroccan autonomy plan, but apparently continues to insist on a referendum on self-determination, including the option of independence. Morocco seems ready to offer self-determination only based on autonomy.

The atmosphere was reported as positive. The fact that the parties agreed to hold another round in the second week of August is seen as a good sign. However, there are no illusions that the negotiating path will be other than long and difficult. The UN welcomed the meeting as a “relative success” as it launched a “real process.”

**Options**

Council options include:

- adopt a wait-and-see approach, perhaps involving a press statement welcoming achievement of the first round;
- become more proactive (perhaps via a presidential statement) looking ahead to the second round in August and encouraging the parties; and
- include language indicating to the parties the Council’s expectation that both sides should be ready to make concessions from opening positions if the process is to succeed.

**Key Issues**

The key issue for the Council is how and when to use its authority to influence the
parties to stay with the negotiations and make fruitful progress. Since the process may be quite long, the Council may need to keep major inputs in reserve in the event of stalemate if it becomes necessary to apply pressure to avoid indefinite prolongation of the talks.

A related issue is how the Council, working with the Secretary-General or the Group of Friends (France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US), can best harmonise efforts to influence the process.

Council Dynamics
Council members (and the parties) seem to see resolution 1754 as a turning point and an important achievement contributed to by the Council, which previously had long been reluctant to engage substantively on the issue. There is a wide consensus that the Council should support this new framework for the Western Sahara issue.

However, there are still strong sympathies for the right to self-determination among many Council members. And there are still differences in terms of level of support for the parties. France traditionally backs Morocco, but Panama, Russia and South Africa seem to lean towards self-determination as envisaged by the Polisario, with independence as an option.

The Group of Friends seems satisfied that the talks occurred in a positive atmosphere. Few if any Council members had high expectations of the first round. The prevailing feeling seems to be “so far, so good.”

Underlying Problems
There is an underlying concern that both parties still believe that making any concession would involve losing too much face.

There have been calls on Spain, which is following the process with close interest, to play a larger role. The idea of Spain surrendering to Morocco its enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco’s Mediterranean coastline in exchange for a referendum on Morocco’s enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla has been suggested by one observer.

Secretary-General’s Latest Report
- S/2007/202 (13 April 2007) on the situation concerning Western Sahara

Selected Letters
- S/2007/210 (16 April 2007) was a letter from South Africa to the Council transmitting the Polisario plan.
- S/2007/206 (11 April 2007) was a letter from Morocco to the Council transmitting the Moroccan plan.

Other Related Documents
- A/1514(XV) (14 December 1960) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples
- Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (16 October 1975)

Other Relevant Facts
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Julian Harston (UK)

Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy
Peter van Walsum (Netherlands)

MINURSO Force Commander
Major General Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark)

Size and Composition of Mission
- Authourised strength: 231 military personnel and six police officers
- Strength as of 31 May 2007: 232 total uniformed personnel, including 28 troops, six police officers, 198 military observers.

Key Troop Contributing Countries
Malaysia, Egypt, Russia, France, Ghana, China, Honduras

Cost
1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007: US$44.94 million

Useful Additional Sources
- Western Sahara: Against Autonomy, Jacob Mundy, Foreign Policy In Focus, International Relations Center (IRC), 4 May 2007

North Korea

Expected Council Action
Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, the Chair of the Sanctions Committee on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the DPRK, or North Korea), will brief the Council in July. Resolution 1718, which in October established the Sanctions Committee, requires a report every 90 days.

The briefing coincides with important developments in North Korea. It may lead to consultations on wider issues including encouraging Pyongyang to proceed with the process of denuclearisation. The Council may discuss some acknowledgement of North Korea’s invitation to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors and the schedule for the shut-down.

Key Recent Developments
The sixth round of six-party talks among China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, the US and North Korea on implementing the 13 February agreement was cut short in mid-March. A major stumbling block concerned the transfer of US$25 million of frozen funds from a Macau bank to North Korea.

The February agreement committed Pyongyang to close the Yongbyon reactor within 60 days, in return for 50,000 tons of fuel aid or equivalent economic aid. Pyongyang refused to shut down until it received the funds. However, the transfer took place in mid-June following initiatives from the US and Russia that resolved technical issues. North Korea confirmed that it had received the money on 25 June.

On 18 June, North Korea invited the IAEA to discuss procedures to verify and monitor suspension of operations and a week later a team from the IAEA went to Pyongyang for a five-day visit. Christopher R Hill, the US chief negotiator for the six-party talks, also visited Pyongyang and confirmed North Korea’s commitment to shut down the Yongbyon reactor, which he indicated might be within three weeks. This is expected to open the way for the six-party talks to resume.

Resolution 1718 required UN member states to report implementation to the Council by 14 November 2006. Seventy-three
countries have complied but the process is slowing with just five countries reporting since the last Sanctions Committee report in April.

In October 2006 the Sanctions Committee adopted lists of prohibited trade items in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Standard working guidelines have finally been established and were formally adopted on 20 June. So far, no member state has proposed any entities or individuals to be designated for targeted sanctions.

North Korea conducted three separate missile tests recently. None caused any significant disruption to negotiations.

**Options**
The Council has three options:

- Receive the briefing in informal consultations and take no action;
- Agree to a Press Statement welcoming the invitation to the IAEA inspectors, looking forward to the early shutdown and recommencement of the six-party talks; and
- Agree in informal consultations that the Chair of the Sanctions Committee should begin consultations with its members on practical measures to begin implementation of the next phase of its mandate.

**Key Issues**
A key issue for the Council is to encourage North Korea to complete the shutdown promptly and to move on to the remaining stages of denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. An issue will be how best the Council can help set the scene for productive progress in six-party talks.

A related issue is how and when to recalebrate the current “carrot and sticks” policy. In this regard, an important technical question is how long the actual shutdown process might reasonably take. Hill has indicated that North Korea would need three weeks to complete the shutdown, although in the February agreement it had been assumed that 60 days might be necessary. The IAEA may have its own issues regarding the time to verify and seal the reactor after its discussions in Pyongyang. In the light of this a key issue is whether the Council should press the Sanctions Committee to intensify its work or, on the other hand, send positive signals of encouragement.

**Council and Wider Dynamics**
In the six-party talks, China and the US have been working together and met again in mid-June to revive the process. The February agreement initially led to improved working relations within the Sanctions Committee. However recently, in the Sanctions Committee, differences on how the mandate should be carried forward, seem to have emerged.

Russia has shown signs of increased involvement by helping release the funds. Russia’s foreign minister travelled to South Korea at the beginning of June in an attempt to restart the negotiation.

Most members seem comfortable with a wait and see approach on sanctions, at least for the next few months, and believe that progress at the next round of six-party talks will determine the Sanctions Committee’s next steps.

**Underlying Problems**
There is a real possibility of food shortages and starvation in North Korea. Food management may be directly affected by the suspension of several United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) projects following criticism of working methods and financial management.

**UN Documents**

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<th>Selected Security Council Resolutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>• S/RES/1718 (14 October 2006) expressed grave concern over the DPRK’s nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up a Sanctions Committee.</td>
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<td>• S/RES/1695 (15 July 2006) condemned the DPRK’s launch of ballistic missiles.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential Statements</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/PRST/2006/41 (6 October 2006) was the statement expressing concern over the DPRK’s declaration that it would conduct a nuclear test.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Letter</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• S/2006/481 (4 July 2006) was the letter from Japan requesting a meeting of the Security Council after the DPRK launched a ballistic missile.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Letters submitted from UN member states on implementing resolution 1718 can be found at: <a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstateresports.shtml">http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstateresports.shtml</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Briefing to the Security Council by the Chair of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marcello Spatarafo, 16 April 2007 (<a href="http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sect_docs.shtml">http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/sect_docs.shtml</a>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• S/PV.5618 (11 January 2007) Briefing to the UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

by Ambassador Peter Burian of Slovakia and 2006 Chair of the Sanctions Committee.

**Useful Additional Sources**

- For historical background please refer to our November 2006, January and April 2007 Forecasts.

**Ethiopia/Eritrea**

**Expected Council Action**
The Council is expected to limit its focus to the renewal of mandate of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), which expires on 31 July. Some members may raise the possible implications of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission (EEBC) deadline in November for demarcation of the border.

**Key Recent Developments**
A briefing on the Secretary-General’s progress report on UNMEE was given to the Council by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) on 8 May. The report indicated, among other things, that:

- additional restrictions had been imposed by Eritrea on UNMEE, and Ethiopia had denied access to certain Ethiopian Armed Forces posts;
- no progress had been made on the implementation of the Boundary Commission Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002 in view of the ongoing impasse between the two parties which led to rising tensions;
- the situation between the two parties remained unpredictable for the two countries, as well as the wider region; and
- the drawdown of the UNMEE force was proceeding in compliance with resolutions 1741 and 1681.

A Council press statement was issued after the meeting:

- conveying concern about stalemate in the peace process and the growing tension between the two countries;
- reaffirming of the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) and urging both parties to withdraw their troops and equipment immediately from the zone; and
- acknowledging the Ethiopian government’s acceptance of the final binding decision of the EEBC and demanding Ethiopia’s full and early implementation of the decision;
supporting UNMEE and demanding that Eritrea reverse restrictions on UNMEE and that both parties cooperate with UNMEE;

- calling on both parties to exhibit maximum restraint and refrain from hostile public statements and any threat or use of force; and

- welcoming and anticipating the Secretary-General’s continued efforts to engage with the two parties to normalise and stabilise their relations, including by appointing a new Special Representative.

Subsequent briefings by the Secretariat on 29 May and 11 June did not reveal any major changes in the situation. It remained tense with both countries engaging in heightened military activities in and around the TSZ.

In another development, the European Commission on 4 May, as part of moves to find a comprehensive solution to conflict in the region, seemed to signal a desire for better relations with Eritrea. This action has been criticized by some NGOs critical of Eritrea’s human rights record.

On 15-16 June the Council mission visited Addis Ababa. Discussions covered the importance of enhanced co-operation between the UN and the AU in the implementation of the decision of the EEBC. In contacts with the parties, Council members stressed the need for commitment by both Ethiopia and Eritrea to the Algiers process.

Options
After downsizing UNMEE earlier this year to convey its strong displeasure with the current impasse, the Council now has more limited options. These include:

- encouraging an early appointment of a new Special Representative to head UNMEE to facilitate the process of finding a solution to the stalemate;

- deciding to reassess the situation well before the EEBC’s November deadline as there is nervousness about the possible impact and implications, both prior and subsequent to November, if the current impasse persists; and

- repeating its demand that Ethiopia accepts fully and without delay the boundary decision and the immediate withdrawal of Eritrea’s troops from the TSZ and lifting restrictions on UNMEE.

Key Issues
The renewal of the UNMEE mandate is not expected to be an issue in itself. The key issue remains how best to steer Ethiopia and Eritrea towards improved relations, while keeping in view the November deadline set by the EEBC. A related issue is the relationship between bilateral tensions and instability in the wider region, especially Somalia. A major underlying issue is the lack of significant alternatives for resolving the deadlock.

Council Dynamics
At this stage the Council seems to prefer the cautious approach of keeping the parties engaged through calls for restraint and expression of concern with the ongoing tensions. No major disagreement is therefore anticipated regarding the renewal of UNMEE’s mandate. However, some members are likely to raise the possible implications of the EEBC deadline for November and possibly express concern about the increasing tensions characterizing the present impasse.

UNMEE’s renewal could potentially reopen past debates among Council members on both Ethiopia’s compliance with the decision by the Boundary Commission setting up the Ethiopia-Eritrea border and on whether UNMEE troop levels should be further reduced in view of Eritrea’s restrictions on the mission. However, it does not seem that any Council members want to push the issues, perhaps reflecting acceptance of the need for some UN presence to help deter a resumption of hostilities. (For more details, please see our May 2007 Forecast).

An element that may influence Council members are concerns of troop-contributing countries. Some are very unhappy about the current restrictions placed on the personnel of UNMEE.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions

- S/RES/1741 (31 January 2007) extended UNMEE until 31 July and approved the drawdown.
- S/RES/1312 (31 July 2000) established UNMEE.

Selected Letters


Forecast

- S/2007/4 (3 January 2007) contained Eritrea’s position on certain points in the December special report of the Secretary-General.
- S/2006/1036 (28 December 2006) contained Eritrea’s position on the appointment of a Special Representative.
- S/2006/890 (15 November 2006) and 905 (20 November 2006) contained respectively Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s position on the EEBC’s intention to convene a meeting on options for moving the demarcation process forward.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports

- S/2007/250 (30 April 2007) progress report of the Secretary-General indicating the continuation of the impasse in the peace process.
- S/2007/33 (22 January 2007) it included a strong response from the EEBC to criticisms made by Ethiopia in its November 2006 letter.
- S/2006/992 (15 December 2006) contained options for UNMEE and the November EEBC decision.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of Mission

Vacant, pending appointment; acting SRSG Azowz Ennifar (Tunisia)

Size and Composition of Mission

- Authorized maximum strength: 1,700 military personnel
- Strength as of 31 May 2007: 1,681 military personnel
- Key troop contributing countries: India, Jordan and Kenya

Cost


Duration

31 July 2000 to present; mandate expires 31 July 2007
Democratic Republic of the Congo

Expected Council Action

The Council in July is expected to focus its attention on the issue of sanctions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The report by the Group of Experts is due on 10 July and the discussions on the renewal of the sanctions regime and the Group’s mandate by 31 July. The Council will also have the report of its mid-June mission to Kinshasa.

It is unlikely that there will be any major disagreement among Council members on renewing sanctions and the mandate of the Group of Experts. However, there is the possibility that specific proposals may arise from the open debate on natural resources and conflict, the content of the report of the Group of Experts, and the mission to Kinshasa.

Key Recent Developments

On 15 May the Council adopted resolution 1756 extending the mandate of MONUC until 31 December. It also decided that MONUC should assist the DRC government in establishing a stable security environment in terms of:

- protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and United Nations personnel;
- security-sector reform;
- territorial security of the DRC; and
- disarmament and demobilization of foreign and Congolese armed groups.

The resolution demanded that militias and armed groups still present in the eastern part of the DRC lay down arms voluntarily participate in their demobilization, repatriation or settlement and reintegration. It also called on the Congolese authorities to put an end the culture of impunity. The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide periodic updates on the situation in the country and to submit a report containing benchmarks and a timetable for MONUC’s gradual drawdown.

The situation in the DRC remains volatile as the nation attempts to consolidate the peace. While the continued presence of MONUC is helping the government to establish its authority throughout the country and to improve overall security, significant challenges remain especially in the security-sector reform process as well as in the protection of human rights. This has been demonstrated in the continuing conflict and human rights violations in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. The Archbishop of the eastern town of Bukavu, Monsignor François-Xavier Maroy, has cautioned that violent conflict could reoccur in the east. Serge Maheshe, a broadcaster who worked with the UN-backed Radio Okapi in Bukavu, was shot dead in June. His demise brings to three the number of journalists killed in the country since 2005. Two government soldiers have been put on trial for the killing.

Key Issues

The sanctions measures include an arms embargo as well as targeted travel and financial measures. The first issue is whether to continue them. Given the nascent stage reached in rebuilding the country, the Council is likely to be wary of lifting sanctions too soon. A second issue is whether the sanctions should be strengthened. The interim report of the Group of Experts in January (S/2007/40) voiced concerns, but indicated that there was not much of a case for imposing further sanctions.

With the adoption of resolution 1493 in 2003, the Council initially imposed an arms embargo on all foreign and Congolese armed groups and militias operating in the territory of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri, and on groups not party to the Global and All-Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC, which was signed in 2002. Subsequently, the sanctions regime was modified and strengthened from 2004 to 2006 with the adoption of resolutions 1533, 1596, 1649 and 1698. These extended the scope of the arms embargo, imposed additional targeted sanctions measures (i.e. assets freeze and travel ban), and broadened the criteria for the imposition of the measures.

Council Dynamics

The general inclination of the Council is towards reinstating sanctions until conditions are deemed more satisfactory for lifting them.

UN Documents

Selected Security Council Resolutions
- S/RES/1756 (15 May, 2006) renewed MONUC until 31 December

Selected Presidential Statement
- S/PRST/2007/9 (3 April 2007) deplored the March violence and called on the government to respect the role conferred on political parties by the Congolese constitution.

Selected Secretary-General’s Reports
- S/2007/156 (20 March 2007) was the latest MONUC report.

Other Relevant Facts

Group of Experts
- Ibra Déguène Ka (Senegal, chairman of the group)
- David Huxford (UK and Northern Ireland, arms expert)
- Enrico Carisch (Switzerland, finance expert)
- Abdoulaye Cissoko (Mali, aviation expert)
- Jean-Luc Gallet (France, customs and border-control expert)

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission (MONUC)
- William Lacy Swing (US)

Size, Composition and Cost of Mission
- Authorised strength: 17,030 military personnel, 780 military observers, 391 police trainers and 750 formed police units
- Main troop contributors: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Uruguay
- Cost: 1 July 2006 - 30 June 2007 US$1.138 billion

Nepal

Expected Council Action

The Council is scheduled to discuss the Secretary-General’s latest report on Nepal, and be briefed by Ian Martin, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative in Nepal. The report is expected to focus on preparations for the constituent assembly elections planned for November and provide an update on the recent work of the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). No formal Council action is required, but some form of encouragement for the political process and the Special Representative is a possibility, perhaps in a press statement.

Key Recent Developments

The interim government has agreed that elections will be held on 22 November. Electoral legislation could not be passed in time for June elections as initially planned, and the monsoon period meant that it would be better to reschedule elections to near the end of the year.
A new constitution to determine whether Nepal becomes a republic or keeps the monarchy will be prepared by the new body when it is elected. A recent poll indicated that 60 percent of Nepalese favour abolishing the monarchy.

The interim parliament has been active. On 13 June, it gave itself the authority to eliminate the monarchy with a two-thirds majority vote if King Gyanendra seeks to intervene in the electoral process. On 15 June, it allotted seats to ethnic groups and women in an effort to appease those involved in violent protests earlier this year.

In June, the UN’s Electoral Expert Monitoring Team (EEMT) visited Nepal to assess the election process.

On 14 June, UNMIN began the second phase of registering and verifying former Maoist combatants and their weapons. It is expected to verify that there were no Maoist soldiers under the age of 18 as of 25 May 2006. Under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, both sides committed to discharge child soldiers by that date. The first phase of registration and verification was completed in April.

Options
The most likely option for the Council is to take no formal action. However, a press statement welcoming progress, including perhaps the UNMIN findings on child soldiers, and calling on the parties to work toward holding free and fair elections, is a possible option.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is whether the peace agreement can hold until the elections. This will depend on whether all parties believe that they have a voice in shaping Nepal’s future. One positive sign is the interim government’s recent decision to allocate seats to women and ethnic minorities in the new assembly. This may encourage traditionally disenfranchised groups that they have a stake in the political process.

Another significant issue is the slow progress in electoral planning. The interim parliament has not completed drafting electoral legislation, with the prospect of disagreement over the electoral process. A clear timetable has not been established for the election.

Another key issue for the Council is ensuring that the elections are conducted freely and fairly. Here, UNMIN’s election advisors and monitors are crucial. A related issue is dealing with security concerns leading up to and during the elections.

A future issue is the Council’s role in the post-election environment. UNMIN’s mandate, which will expire in January, is to support the peace process through electoral assistance and arms registration and verification. It remains to be seen whether Nepal will seek to extend the mandate to help address disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) issues.

Council Dynamics
Council members continue to demonstrate a strong degree of unity in support of the focused UNMIN mandate that began in January and the peace process overall. Some Council members are still wary of extending the mission beyond the 12-month period and of possible mission creep.

UN Documents

Security Council Resolution
- S/RES/1740 (23 January 2007) established UNMIN for twelve months.

Secretary General’s Reports
- S/2007/235 (26 April 2007) was the report discussing the progress of UN assistance in support of Nepal’s peace process.
- S/2007/7 (9 January 2007) was the report containing recommendations on the mandate of the proposed UN mission in Nepal.

Presidential Statements
- S/PRST/2006/49 (1 December 2006) expressed support for the Secretary-General’s intention to send a technical assessment team to Nepal and noted that the Council would await formal proposals.

Other Relevant Facts

Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission
Ian Martin (United Kingdom)

Size and Composition
271 international staff, 389 national staff, 258 UN Volunteers, 155 military observers and seven police advisers.

Duration

Cost
US$88.8 million
humanitarian needs and assist with economic reconstruction. This resolution also envisaged the termination of the oil-for-food programme within six months, when surplus funds would be transferred from the Iraq escrow account to the DFI. The resolution also transferred responsibility for the administration of any remaining programme activities to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) representing the occupying powers.

The programme was officially terminated on 21 November 2003. Consultations among the CPA, Iraqi experts and the UN led to the cancellation of some contracts. About 86 percent, however, were maintained (3,168 contracts for a value of more than US$8.5 billion). Funds to cover these contracts were retained in the Iraq escrow account, with payment subject to confirmation of delivery of supplies.

However, many contracts—such as for construction projects—were long-term, so it was envisaged that letters of credit would continue.

In mid-2005, the new Iraqi government assumed responsibility from the CPA for verifying delivery and authenticating documents for disbursing money from the Iraq account.

The Secretary-General undertook to monitor progress in the completion of the programme and the UN controller regularly met with Iraqi experts. The Secretary-General regularly reports to the Council on the status of deliveries, authentication, cancellation or request for prolongation of letters by the Iraqi government, and also on payments.

The Council usually reviews developments at experts’ meetings and communicates acceptance of the Secretary-General’s recommendations in an agreed letter from the Council president. (Please see the Selected UN Documents chart below for details of the exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council from 2003 to 2007.)

As of 31 July 2005, funding was being retained for 549 letters of credit and 249 of these had expired by 31 December 2004. Subsequently, 253 expired between 1 January and 31 July 2005. A further 33 were due to expire between 1 August and 31 December 2005, and 14 during 2006 and 2007 (S/2005/535). Because authentication could not be made for expired letters despite claims of delivery, funding was retained in the account.

The Iraqi government made numerous requests for cancellations and extensions of letters of credit. The absence of delivery authentication by the Iraqi government has now become a major problem. In 2006, the Secretary-General urged prompt resolution, fearing that delays in Baghdad could affect perceptions of the UN by suppliers (S/2006/510). Another consequence of the delay is that the UN is unable to transfer the funds for Iraqi development to the DFI. There is a risk that the issue may not be resolved before the last letter of credit expires on 31 December 2007.

The last time that the UN controller consulted with Iraqi authorities to resolve pending issues was on 6 March (S/2007/241). At that point, 55 letters of credit were cancelled at Iraq’s request. The Iraqi government requested cancellation of 59 other letters, but this was accepted because of claims by vendors of delivery. The Iraqi government requested the extension of 85 letters. The Council agreed but stipulated 31 December as the final date.

Options
At this stage, no specific Council action is required. When outstanding issues are resolved, the Council may consider a press statement or a presidential statement.

If it seems that pending issues cannot be resolved quickly, the Council could extend further the letters of credit for which authentication of delivery has not been provided. Alternatively, it could allow the letters to expire and simply transfer all remaining funds on the Iraq account to the DFI.

In the short term, the Council has the option in its letter to the Secretary-General to include strong encouragement to Iraq to resolve authentication problems.

Council Dynamics
Council members are keen to conclude remaining activities as soon as possible. The issue may become contentious if, by the end of the year, deliveries are not completed or authentications remain outstanding. Countries where companies involved in the programme are based (including France, Russia and China) may support a further extension of letters of credit. US and British companies, on the other hand, have not contracted with the Iraqi government under the oil-for-food programme. They may be more inclined to let the letters expire and transfer the money to the DFI. Any subsequent litigation between suppliers and the Iraqi government would therefore become a bilateral matter not involving the UN.

Underlying Problems
The problem of authentication may be connected to the deteriorating security situation and lack of capacity in the Iraqi ministries receiving the goods. The accusations of improper withholding by several companies prompted the Council to request explanations, but the Iraqi government has not yet responded.

UN Documents

Selected resolutions
- S/RES/1483 (22 May 2003) recognised the occupying powers, requested the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq, created the DFI and envisaged the termination of the oil-for-food programme within six months.
- S/RES/986 (14 April 1995) established the oil-for-food program.
- S/RES/687 (3 April 1991) Iraqi sanctions were now linked to removal of weapons of mass destruction.
- S/RES/661 (6 August 1990) imposed economic sanctions on Iraq after it invaded Kuwait, providing for a full trade embargo, excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, to be determined by a sanctions committee.

Selected letters from the Secretary-General and the Council
- S/2007/46 (8 December 2006)
- S/2006/646 (11 August 2006)
- S/2006/510 (10 July 2006)
- S/2005/713 (11 November 2005)
- S/2005/656 (17 October 2005)
- S/2005/536 (19 August 2005)

Reports of the Board of Auditors on the UN Iraq Escrow Account
- S/2006/673 (21 August 2006) report for the biennium ended 31 December 2005
- S/2006/672 (21 August 2006) report for the financial year ended 31 December 2004

Useful Additional Sources
- Website of the oil-for-food programme (includes historical background) http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/index.html
Georgia

Expected Council Action
In July the Council is expected to receive the Secretary-General’s quarterly report on the situation in Abkhazia and a briefing by the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Georgia, Jean Arnault. Discussions are expected to be limited. Some members may raise the report of the Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG) which investigated the firing in the Kodori Valley on 11 March. This could lead to discussions on possible ways to reduce the risk of further escalation this summer. No formal action is expected at this stage.

The UN Observer Mission in Georgia’s (UNOMIG) mandate expires on 15 October.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, the JFFG’s report was expected to be released at the end of June. The JFFG, which was formed to investigate a report by Georgian officials that three Russian helicopters fired into the Kodori Gorge on the night of 11 March, is headed by UNOMIG and comprises representatives from the Georgian government, the Abkhaz de facto government and peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

At the Russian and Georgian leaders meeting ahead of the informal summit of CIS leaders on 10 June, Russia agreed to lift sanctions on Georgian products on a “step-by-step” basis.

The leaders of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova met in Baku on 18 June 2007 at a summit of the Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development (OED), more commonly known as GUAM. The creation of a joint peacekeeping force which could be deployed in the breakaway regions was among the issues discussed.

In early June the Abkhazians and South Ossetians adopted a joint statement stating that they have as much right to independence as Kosovo. The Transdniestra Republic, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh in mid-June signed a joint declaration on “principles for peaceful and just settlement” of their respective situations.

On 4 May three Georgian students detained by the Abkhaz authorities for illegally crossing “Abkhaz borders” on 1 March were released. In return, Sergey Bagapsh, the de facto Abkhaz leader, called on Georgia to release Abkhaz official Davit Sigua, but so far there has been no response.

This summer Georgia will run two “patriotic” youth camps on the border of Abkhazia. There is concern that locating the camp so close to Abkhazia could increase tension between the two parties.

At press time the Group of Friends (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, the US, and in New York, Slovakia) was scheduled to meet with representatives from Georgia and Abkhazia in Geneva and Austria at the end of June.

Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the risk of increased tension along the ceasefire line. In past years, the potential for violence has increased in summer.

A related issue is whether there are any initiatives to restart dialogue between the two parties.

Another issue is Georgia’s reaction if the findings of the JFFG are inconclusive. Georgia may once again push to replace Russian CIS forces with international peacekeepers as it believes Russia was involved in the helicopter attacks. It has also said that it will ask the Council to take up this issue if it is not satisfied with the conclusions of the JFFG.

Given the number of incursions into the Kodori Valley in recent years, a key issue is how to lower their frequency. UNOMIG has been looking into reopening its team base in Adjara, in the Upper Kodori Valley, but has not moved particularly quickly on this.

A future issue is how Abkhazia will react to any decision on Kosovo. A Council decision to give Kosovo independence may spur the Abkhaz authorities to push for independence.

Council and Wider Dynamics
With the Council focusing on Kosovo, most members prefer Georgia to be low key at the moment. Members are watching carefully signals coming out of the Abkhaz capital Sukhumi. Recent developments like the youth camps have heightened concerns.

UN Documents

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latest Security Council Resolution</th>
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<tr>
<th>Selected Secretary-General’s Report</th>
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<tr>
<td>S/2007/182 (3 April 2007) was the latest Secretary-General’s report.</td>
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For historical background and a more complete list of documents please see our...
### Notable Dates for July

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reports Due for Consideration in July</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>late June</td>
<td>The Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team (LIBAT) report</td>
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<tr>
<td>late June</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (Lebanon)</td>
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<tr>
<td>late June</td>
<td>SG report on Somalia including progress on a national reconciliation conference and contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG progress report on terminating Iraq's oil-for-food programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG report on the status and progress of the negotiations on Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>30 June</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Liberia including drawdown plans (UNMIL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 July</td>
<td>Group of Experts report to the DRC Sanctions Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</td>
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<tr>
<td>mid-July</td>
<td>Monitoring Group report of the Somalia Sanctions Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>Commissioner’s report on the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), every four months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July</td>
<td>SG report on the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN), every four months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>SG quarterly report on the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>SG monthly report on Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<th>July 2007</th>
<th>Mandates Expire</th>
<th>Relevant Document</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 July</td>
<td>Monitoring Group of the Somalia Sanctions Committee</td>
<td>S/RES/1724</td>
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<td>S/2006/986</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>S/RES/1741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 July</td>
<td>Group of Experts of the DRC Sanctions Committee and the DRC sanctions regime</td>
<td>S/RES/1698</td>
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<tr>
<th>June 2007</th>
<th>Other Important Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2 July</td>
<td>AU Summit in Ghana</td>
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<tr>
<td>2-3 July</td>
<td>An International Peace Conference on Afghanistan will be held in Rome, the Secretary-General will attend.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5-6 July</td>
<td>The UN Global Compact Leaders Summit will be held in Geneva.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 July</td>
<td>A Somali national reconciliation conference in Mogadishu is tentatively scheduled for mid-July, previously postponed twice from 14 June and 16 April.</td>
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Also expected in July:
- The Chair of the North Korea Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Marcello Spatafora of Italy, will brief the Council in mid-July.
- The sixth round of six-party talks is expected to resume in July if North Korea shuts down its Yongbyon reactor.
- In mid-July France will host an informal meeting between Lebanese factions to revive the political dialogue.
- There are media reports that the Government of Sudan has promised demarcation of the north-south border, perhaps as early as July.

### Important Dates over the Horizon

- Presidential and legislative elections in Sierra Leone are expected 11 August.
- UN-sponsored talks on Western Sahara between Morocco and Frente Polisario are expected to resume in the second week of August.
- The General Assembly will convene on 25 September.
- There are media reports that Nabih Berri, the parliamentary president, will convene the Lebanese parliament on 25 September to elect a new president of Lebanon.
- The Secretary-General’s next reports on the thematic issues of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict and Women, Peace & Security are expected by October.
- The constituent assembly elections in Nepal are expected 22 November, postponed from 20 June.
- Parliamentary elections in Kosovo are expected in late 2007.
- A workshop on security sector reform, a joint initiative of Slovakia and South Africa, is being planned for later in 2007 in Africa.
- Presidential elections in Côte d’Ivoire are now expected by January 2008, postponed from 31 October.

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