Somalia: Vote on a Draft Resolution*
Tomorrow morning (27 December), the Security Council is expected to convene a meeting to vote on a draft resolution, authored by the UK (the penholder on Somalia), regarding the successor mission to the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). The mission’s mandate was last extended by resolution 2748 of 15 August until 31 December 2024. Ethiopia and Somalia are expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure.
The draft resolution in blue endorses the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) to replace ATMIS with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) and authorises AU members to take all necessary measures in this regard for 12 months, beginning on 1 January 2025. The draft text further authorises AU members to deploy up to 12,626 uniformed personnel, including 1,040 police personnel, to AUSSOM until 30 June 2025, and to complete by this date the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM.
Background
Pursuant to resolution 2748, UN Secretary-General António Guterres submitted an AU-UN joint report to Council members on 26 November, which is not a public document. The report emphasised that the framework established under resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023, concerning the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs), presents a critical opportunity to institute a sustainable financing model for AUSSOM. It underscored the importance of making Somalia the first test case for this framework to prevent a security vacuum, that could destabilise Somalia and the broader region, and to consolidate the security gains achieved to date.
The report recommended “hybrid” implementation of resolution 2719 with streamlined responsibilities between the AU and the UN. This would entail applying the 2719 framework to the AUSSOM budget, with 75 percent funded through UN assessed contributions, and priority given to covering troop reimbursements in full. The remaining 25 percent would be mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources, with the AU funding civilian personnel costs. Regarding logistical support to AUSSOM, it recommended a reconfigured and a rightsized UN support office, financed through UN assessed contributions. Through this model of financing, the application of the new mission-specific rate of $1,000 for per capita troop allowances would be offset by the cost of the reconfigured UN support office. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our August 2024 Monthly Forecast and 15 August What’s in Blue story.)
While there had been broad agreement among Council members on the deployment of AUSSOM, members have had diverging views regarding how the mission should be financed. The US has not been keen to use the 2719 framework for Somalia, considering it a premature application. It apparently produced a non-paper arguing that the milestones in the AU-UN joint roadmap for implementing resolution 2719, endorsed at the eighth AU-UN conference on 21 October, are not expected to be completed before mid-2025. It proposed a two-year bridging mechanism to allow additional time to finalise the framework and address budgetary and logistical challenges.
Council members part of the European Union (EU)—France, Malta, and Slovenia—expressed concern that such a mechanism could imply additional obligations for financial contributors to ATMIS. These members have advocated for a sustainable financing model based on diversified contributions and a significant element of cost-sharing.
Another issue had been whether resolution 2719 could be applied exclusively to specific financing obligations or should be all-encompassing. Some Council members—such as the “A3 plus” (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana) and the EU members—supported a “hybrid” application of resolution 2719, including for troop reimbursements, while continuing the logistics support for the follow-on mission through a UN support office. The US, nevertheless, argued that support extended to AUPSOs under resolution 2719 encompasses all categories of support, including logistics.
Ahead of the formal negotiations, AU Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat sent a letter to the Council’s African members, dated 6 December. The letter emphasised that modalities outlined in the AU-UN joint roadmap for implementing resolution 2719 are not intended to constitute a pre-condition to implement the framework, but rather as guidance for the AU and the UN in its implementation. It cautioned that delaying the framework’s implementation would perpetuate the current financing model, which is unsustainable and would institutionalise a permanent deficit in funding the new mission, particularly regarding troop allowances. The letter urged the Council to make a clear decision on the immediate implementation of resolution 2719 in Somalia. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia and the In Hindsight in our December 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Negotiations on the Draft Resolution
After preliminary discussions with Council members and a “pre-zero” draft, the UK circulated the initial draft of the resolution to all Council members on 9 December. Following several rounds of expert-level discussions, four revised drafts, and two silence breaks, the penholder put an unchanged fourth revised draft text in blue earlier today (26 December), to be voted on tomorrow morning.
The negotiations were contentious and arduous, marked by underlying differences among Council members regarding the financing obligations for the new mission. The initial draft proposed by the penholder requested the Secretary-General to accelerate preparations towards applying the 2719 framework to AUSSOM, including, jointly with the AU Commission Chairperson, and mobilising the necessary extra-budgetary resources from the international community. It further requested the Secretary-General to apply, within existing resources made available by the rightsizing of UNSOS, the 2719 framework to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025, including access to UN assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of its annual total budget. The draft, however, introduced a caveat that this application would be contingent on the Secretary-General making an assessment that sufficient progress has been made on operationalising the modalities of resolution 2719.
This draft prompted different responses from Council members, consistent with their established positions. It seems that the US suggested specifying that the 2719 framework be instituted for AUSSOM and UNSOS, with access to UN assessed contributions not exceeding 75 percent of the annual total budget of the consolidated mission. It suggested implementing this framework from 1 January 2026—meaning a one-year bridging mechanism—unless any Council member submits that insufficient progress has been made on operationalising the modalities of resolution 2719. This, the US maintained, would prompt the Council to discuss alternative financing options from 1 January 2026. The US apparently argued that the discussions leading to the adoption of resolution 2719, along with its text, indicated the Council’s intent for the 2719 framework to be applied to logistical support and personnel under a “one mission, one budget” model.
In contrast, it appears that the Council’s EU and “A3 plus” members supported implementing the 2719 framework through a “hybrid” model, as recommended in the 26 November joint AU-UN report. These members apparently expressed concern that the draft text did not fully reflect the observations outlined in the joint report.
The Council’s EU members apparently argued that the 2719 framework should be implemented starting on 1 January 2025, alongside a reconfigured, cost-efficient, and downsized support office. Furthermore, they strongly opposed any language indicating that the implementation of the 2719 framework be contingent upon any further assessment of its applicability, asserting that adequate structures are already in place to support its implementation. It seems that some of these members argued that the joint UN-AU report does not envisage any additional reporting requirement to implement the framework or any other transitional period, thereby insisting that the Council should make the decision to implement the 2719 framework in this resolution.
The “A3 plus” members apparently held a similar position on not requiring any additional assessment for triggering the implementation of resolution 2719 but seemed flexible on the start date for its implementation. They apparently stressed the need to specify in the resolution that the 2719 framework be implemented in a “hybrid” format and asked that this be reflected throughout the text at relevant sections unequivocally. Russia apparently supported this position.
While negotiations were underway, Senator James E. Risch, ranking member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent a letter on 12 December to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Permanent Representative of the US to the UN Linda Thomas-Greenfield. The letter urged the US to veto any Council resolution that commits Washington to any peacekeeping mandate for Somalia under the 2719 framework. This view was apparently reiterated by the US during the negotiations, with Washington underlining its position for maintaining a second-decision point to allow necessary modalities to be implemented and the incoming US administration to make policy decisions.
Given the diverging views of Council members on the issue of financing for AUSSOM, the UK apparently refrained from making any changes on the contentious paragraphs in the first revised text. Instead, it invited members for an in-depth discussion on a broad range of plausible financing options, beyond those set out in the AU-UN joint report.
In the second revised draft, the UK apparently amended the text on AUSSOM financing to include language on the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework, limiting its application to AUSSOM. The text was further revised to state that the framework would be implemented if the Council agrees that sufficient progress has been made and reaffirms this through a letter or resolution, based on a Secretary-General’s report requested in the resolution outlining the progress made in preparing for the framework’s implementation.
With the inclusion of language on the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework and given the US’ firm stance on the need for a second decision-making clause, the “A3 plus” members appeared willing to show flexibility on this issue. The Council’s EU members, however, were apparently reluctant to accept this language. It seems that France proposed a compromise, suggesting that the Secretary-General be tasked with implementing the 2719 framework in a “hybrid” format starting on 1 July 2025, unless the Council decides otherwise through a letter by 1 June 2025. This proposal was opposed by the US, however.
China seemed flexible on the second decision-making clause, but proposed replacing the term “agree” with “confirm” regarding the Council’s action on the Secretary-General’s assessment of the 2719 framework’s implementation, a position also supported by the Republic of Korea (ROK). China apparently argued that the Council should retain the authority to make the final decision on the matter. This suggestion was incorporated in the draft resolution in blue.
It appears that the “A3 plus” members insisted on including language addressing the mobilisation of the remaining portion of the AUSSOM budget, excluding UN assessed contributions. This was previously agreed language from resolution 2719. Its omission led them to break the first silence procedure. Their proposal was incorporated in the draft resolution in blue, which indicates that the remaining amount is to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN from the international community as extra-budgetary resources, while committing to consider all viable options in the event of significant shortfalls in resource mobilisation.
It appears that although the US softened its stance on the language pertaining to the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework, a significant point of contention arose from language that it proposed indicating the eventual transition of the application of the 2719 framework to both UNSOS and AUSSOM under one consolidated budget. Several members, including the “A3 plus” and the Council’s EU members, strongly opposed the inclusion of this language in this text. These members apparently argued that “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework remains the most suitable model to ensure predictable and sustainable financing for the mission and should be applied throughout all phases of the mission’s presence.
This prompted the US to break silence twice; however, it suggested a few options for this language to arrive at a compromise. Meanwhile, some members apparently also suggested alternative compromise language. The EU and “A3 plus” members opposed any such suggestion, asserting that a “one mission, one budget” model might increase the mission’s overall costs and could incur additional financial burdens on traditional donors and the AU.
It appears that the penholder engaged bilaterally with some members on this issue. These efforts failed to achieve consensus, however, and language addressing the transition or review of the 2719 framework was omitted from the final text.
To secure the US’ support and address concerns raised by other members, the penholder apparently proposed including language in the preambular paragraphs that would have reflected the Council’s intention to keep the implementation of this resolution, including the specific modalities of the 2719 framework, under review. Despite these efforts, the US apparently remained reluctant to vote in favour of the resolution, and the language was ultimately not incorporated in the draft text in blue.
The draft resolution in blue requests the Secretary-General to implement, using existing resources made available through the rightsizing of UNSOS, the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025. This implementation is contingent on the Council confirming the request through a decision by 15 May 2025, taking into account a report requested in this resolution. This report is mandated to include, among other things:
- timelines and actions taken for the necessary deliberations and approvals by relevant UN bodies in accordance with their mandates and the UN Charter;
- the status of the 25 percent of AUSSOM’s annual total budget to be jointly mobilised by the AU and the UN as extra-budgetary resources; and,
- an update on preparations for the orderly and practical application of the “hybrid” implementation of the 2719 framework to AUSSOM from 1 July 2025.
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**Post-script: On 27 December, the Security Council adopted resolution 2767, endorsing the decision of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with the AU Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM). The resolution authorised AU members to take all necessary measures in this regard for 12 months, beginning on 1 January 2025. It also authorised AU members to deploy up to 12,626 uniformed personnel, including 1,040 police personnel, to AUSSOM until 30 June 2025, and to complete by this date the realignment of all AU troops from ATMIS to AUSSOM. The resolution was adopted with 14 votes in favour and one abstention (the US).
