In Hindsight: The Financing of AU-led Peace Support Operations: What Next?
Introduction
On 21 December, it will be one year since the adoption of resolution 2719 through which the Council authorised support for African Union-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) from UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis. The adoption of this landmark resolution is widely regarded as a significant milestone in UN-AU cooperation.
Council members are expected to receive the first report on its implementation in December. Discussions within the Council on this issue have gained momentum, particularly regarding potential test cases to be considered under resolution 2719. This month’s In Hindsight examines the prospects and challenges in this regard and anticipates what lies ahead.
Laying the Groundwork
The implementation of resolution 2719 has been a major focus for the UN and the AU over the past year. They established a joint task force involving the relevant departments of the UN Secretariat and the AU Commission organised around four key workstreams to develop a shared understanding of the resolution and its implementation. These are: joint planning, decision-making and reporting; mission support; financing and budgeting; and human rights compliance and protection of civilians. The task force held in-person meetings in Addis Ababa, the AU’s headquarters, in May, and in New York in July, to develop a joint AU-UN roadmap for implementing the resolution. The roadmap was endorsed at the 8th UN-AU High-Level Conference in Addis Ababa on 21 October, underscoring the commitment of both organisations to ensure institutional and operational readiness for any future authorisation by the Council of a new AUPSO under resolution 2719.
In their 20 May presidential statement, Council members requested an update on the implementation of the resolution ahead of their Annual Joint Consultative Meeting with the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), which was to take place in October in New York. Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations Martha Ama Akyaa Pobee provided the update on 2 October during the annual briefing on cooperation between the UN and regional and subregional organisations in maintaining international peace and security, highlighting the joint UN-AU efforts to operationalise resolution 2719.
Over the last couple of years, the financing of AUPSOs has been a recurring topic of discussion during the annual consultation between members of the two councils. This year, the topic was discussed during the informal seminar, held in a retreat format in Tarrytown, New York, from 16-17 October, preceding the annual consultation on 18 October. (For more, see the In Hindsight on UN-AU Cooperation: A Path Toward Networked Multilateralism or Fractured Responses? in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
Additionally, the Security Council’s Ad-Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa provided a platform for discussions on the implementation of resolution 2719. During its meeting in May, Council members engaged in a broad reflection on the issue, and in June, they received updates on the work of the joint UN-AU task force regarding the development of the roadmap.
Possible Test Cases
Since the adoption of resolution 2719, several potential test cases have emerged. The most attention has been given to Somalia, which appears to have the necessary conditions for the application of resolution 2719. In other cases, such as Sudan, certain conditions, such as a ceasefire or a cessation of hostilities agreement, may need to be in place before it can be considered a serious test case. Additionally, the deployment of a force in the Sahel region currently seems remote but remains under consideration.
Somalia
The AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM)—which is expected to replace the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) when its mandate expires by the end of December—has been at the top of the list of potential test cases. The Security Council, pursuant to resolution 2748, requested the UN and the AU to develop a mission design and financing options for the new mission and submit their recommendations by 15. The deadline was moved to 30 November following a request by the Secretary-General for additional time to finalise consultations with the AU. The report was eventually circulated to Council members on 26 November.
While there appears to be broad agreement on the deployment of the AUSSOM, there is a divergence of views among Council members regarding how the mission should be financed. In particular, the US appears strongly opposed to considering the mission’s financing under resolution 2719, arguing that it is premature to do so, especially given that some milestones outlined in the joint UN-AU roadmap are not expected to be implemented until mid-2025. They include those related to mission support in line with the AU Compliance Framework, which aims to ensure that AUPSOs adhere to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and applicable standards of conduct and discipline, as well as other processes related to unit requirements for contingent-owned equipment, self-sustainment, and specialised assets. It seems that the US has circulated a non-paper outlining its position on the matter and proposing a two-year bridging mechanism to allow more time to put in place the necessary conditions for the implementation of the resolution. The US has also apparently indicated that it is considering all options, including vetoing any resolution that might prematurely trigger resolution 2719 on Somalia.
The UK, the penholder on Somalia, had been amenable to considering AUSSOM under resolution 2719, but its position seems to have evolved. Apparently, the UK has argued that it might be unrealistic to trigger the resolution before the end of this year and that instead an interim arrangement for at least one year should be considered. However, the AU has argued that there is nothing in resolution 2719 to suggest that a bridging mechanism should be used.
Although the US referred to needing to fulfill some milestones of the joint roadmap in explaining its position, both the UN and the AU made it clear that “the delivery of the joint roadmap should not be understood as a prerequisite for implementing resolution 2719, but rather as a framework for continuously strengthening overall performance and impact of the African Union and United Nations, based on decades of lessons, operational experience and collaboration”[1]. Pobee also stressed this position in her 2 October briefing to the Council, reaffirming the UN and the AU’s readiness to support any specific peace support operation that the Council decides to authorise under resolution 2719.
Somalia, the host country and an incoming Council member, and the AUPSC (through its 28 October communiqué) have expressed a desire for a dedicated funding mechanism within the framework of resolution 2719 to avoid the financial challenges faced by previous missions. The AUPSC has also expressed a clear intention to “use part of the interest accrued from the AU Peace Fund investment and the Crisis Reserve Facility (CRF) to substantially contribute to the financing of AUSSOM”, demonstrating its commitment to sharing the financial burden.
Some African members have also maintained that waiting for ideal conditions to trigger resolution 2719 is neither realistic nor productive, while other members have emphasised the urgency of addressing the situation in Somalia, warning that any delay in action could lead to failure and undermine the resolution’s effectiveness.
Sudan
Amid the ongoing conflict in Sudan and growing concerns for the protection of civilians, there have been calls for the deployment of an independent force with a mandate to protect civilians, including by the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan in its early September report. In this context, some Council members have been considering a range of options, including the possibility of deploying an AUPSO, potentially authorised under resolution 2719.
The US, which opposes triggering this resolution in the case of Somalia and has voiced a preference for the first test case of resolution 2719 to be a new mission, appears to be a strong proponent of such action in Sudan. It has emphasised that “the international community should, in close collaboration with African partners, begin considering options to establish a compliance and monitoring mission—one that could strengthen the protection of civilians and support the implementation and durability of any future local or nationwide cessation of hostilities”. However, the Secretary-General, in his report to the Council pursuant to resolution 2736 of 13 June, which requested him to make recommendations for the protection of civilians in Sudan, stated that “at present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a UN force to protect civilians.”
Following the Secretary-General’s report, the UK and Sierra Leone co-facilitated Council negotiations on a draft resolution that, among other things, encouraged the Secretary-General to strengthen planning to support a ceasefire agreement, including through monitoring and verification together with other international stakeholders, particularly the AU. While several Council members supported this proposal, others expressed reservations, arguing that it is premature to discuss such mechanisms in the absence of a ceasefire agreement. The text went through several iterations before being tabled for a vote on 18 November, but it was not adopted due to a veto by Russia, which argued, among other things, that the resolution was based on a flawed understanding of who holds primary responsibility for protecting civilians in Sudan. (For more, see our 17 November What’s in Blue story.)
Sahel
Another potential test case under discussion is the deployment of a regional force in the Sahel region. One of the key reasons the Secretary-General has strongly supported a new generation of AUPSOs under Chapter VII of the UN Charter—with guaranteed and predictable funding, including through assessed contributions—is the relevance of such potential initiatives for West Africa and the Sahel, which are facing severe security challenges.
On 25 September 2022, the UN, AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (FC-G5S) jointly launched a high-level independent Panel, led by the former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, to conduct a strategic assessment of “the underlying challenges in the Sahel”. The Panel’s report was expected to provide recommendations, including the possibility of an AU-mandated regional response. However, its work was complicated by the coup in Niger and other subsequent regional developments, such as the dissolution of the FC-G5S and the formation of a new alliance of military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
Meanwhile, on 7 July, the ECOWAS summit in Abuja discussed the possibility of activating a regional force to combat terrorism, including the establishment of a 5,000-strong force. In this regard, the summit directed the President of the ECOWAS Commission to consult with the AU, particularly within the framework of resolution 2719 and the outcomes of the review conducted by the Issoufou panel. Subsequently, the Panel’s report and recommendations were considered by the UN-AU High-Level Conference in Addis Ababa on 21 October, where both sides agreed to jointly advance the Panel’s key recommendations through their respective organs and institutional mechanisms. However, to date this case has not gained traction in the Security Council.
What Lies Ahead?
Prior to the expiration of the ATMIS mandate on 31 December, members will need to decide whether its follow-on mission (that is, AUSSOM) will be authorised under resolution 2719. The upcoming negotiations will be informed by the joint UN-AU report, which recommended a hybrid implementation of resolution 2719 to support AUSSOM. First, this would entail a reconfigured and streamlined UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which will continue to be financed through UN assessed contributions, providing logistical support to AUSSOM. Second, 75 percent of the AUSSOM troop reimbursements would be covered from UN assessed contributions. According to the joint UN-AU report, this option not only reduces the overall cost (it does not exceed the current cost for UNSOS and ATMIS), but troop reimbursements would be offset by the savings generated from the reconfigured UNSOS.
Based on the report, the UN and the AU hope this will persuade Council members, especially some financial contributors, who believe that applying resolution 2719 could increase the overall cost. A key issue is whether the US will continue to oppose a decision authorising AUSSOM under resolution 2719. Although the US has maintained the view that AUSSOM is not a good candidate for the application of resolution 2719, it supported resolutions 2741 of 28 June and 2748 of 15 August, thereby clearing the way for discussions on authorising AUSSOM under resolution 2719.
If the US position is inflexible, the penholder is likely to lean towards proposing a compromise that would maintain the current status quo at least until mid-2025. There are, however, serious concerns that with a change in the US administration taking place in January 2025, postponing this decision until next year could result in the fate of resolution 2719 remaining in limbo for the next four years.
The discussion regarding the case of Sudan is likely to continue over the coming months. Despite the 18 November veto by Russia, some Council members, such as the US, appear keen to continue shining a spotlight on Sudan. Members may also continue to pursue an outcome on the humanitarian situation. (For more, see the brief on Sudan in our November 2024 Monthly Forecast.)
While the Secretary-General’s first annual report on the implementation of resolution 2719, due by 21 December, may not provide much new information—since Council members already received oral updates in October—it could provide an opportunity to call for a meeting to discuss the resolution’s future and the challenges ahead.
Resolution 2719 was a milestone towards acknowledging the need for more reliable and sustainable funding for AU-support peace operations. While there are several obstacles still to be overcome, only once a test case is chosen will members be able to determine if this is a model that has the potential to move the UN towards a new regional partnership in peace operations. In this regard, December may be another watershed moment as members decide if they are willing to take that critical step.
[1] Joint AU-UN Roadmap for the Operationalization of UN Security Council Resolution 2719 (2023)
