Somalia
Expected Council Action
In December, the Security Council is expected to renew the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, including the provision for maritime interdiction, which expires on 15 December. In addition, the Council will decide on the mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting the 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee, which expires on 15 January 2025.
The Council is also expected to decide on the successor mission to the African Union (AU) Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), whose mandate expires on 31 December. In line with resolution 2748 of 15 August, which most recently extended ATMIS’ mandate, the Secretary-General, jointly with the AU Commission Chairperson, submitted his report on the overall design of the follow-on mission and a range of options for financing it, on 26 November. In a 13 November letter, the Secretary-General requested additional time to finalise consultations on the report, which was due by 15 November. Responding to this, the Council extended the deadline until 30 November.
Key Recent Developments
On 2 October, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud convened a high-level meeting of the National Consultative Council (NCC), which brings together the leaders of the federal government of Somalia (FGS) and the federal member states (FMS) to advance the Somali government’s priorities. (Puntland has not participated in the NCC meetings since January 2023, when it declared its intention to act independently until the finalisation of a new Somali constitution.) During the meeting, the FGS presented its plan to implement universal suffrage for national and regional elections to end the indirect clan-based election system. The meeting ended in a stalemate, however, after Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe withdrew from the meeting, rejecting the FGS’ plan in light of upcoming regional elections. (In July, Jubaland’s parliament approved a constitutional amendment removing the two-term limit for the presidency.)
The NCC reconvened on 27 October without the participation of Jubaland and Puntland, concluding its session on 30 October. The communiqué adopted following the meeting established a single electoral committee under federal supervision and noted that a new electoral bill would be introduced in the parliament. It said that the NCC would schedule local elections for June 2025 and regional elections for September 2025.
In a 9 November statement, the FGS condemned Madobe’s decision to appoint an electoral committee to organise indirect elections in Jubaland state. The statement asserted that the decision violates agreements reached between federal and regional leaders to unify national and regional elections, implement direct elections, and establish a single border and election commission. In response, on 10 November, Jubaland announced its decision to suspend working relations with the FGS, becoming the second FMS, after Puntland, to take such a step.
On 19 November, Somaliland’s electoral commission declared Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi of the Waddani Party as the winner of the presidential election, defeating incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi. (Somaliland is a self-proclaimed republic in northern Somalia.) The presidential elections had been delayed twice since 2022. Following the announcement of results, Somali President Mohamud reportedly expressed his commitment to reconciliation talks with Somaliland. The most recent round of discussions between Somalia and Somaliland concluded on 29 December 2023 in Djibouti. Those discussions, mediated by Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh, marked the first high-level engagement between the two parties since 2020. However, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland signed on 1 January significantly heightened regional tensions. The MoU reportedly allows Ethiopia, which is a landlocked country, to obtain access to the Gulf of Aden in exchange for formal recognition of Somaliland.
In light of this agreement, several Somali officials have expressed the view that Ethiopia should withdraw its troops deployed in Somalia by the end of December, when ATMIS is expected to complete its drawdown and exit. In October, President Mohamud visited the capitals of the other four ATMIS troop-contributing countries—Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, and Kenya—and met with their respective heads of state to discuss their potential support for Somalia’s security transition. However, he did not visit Ethiopia.
Amid strained relations with Ethiopia, Somalia has continued to strengthen its military ties with Egypt, which has offered to contribute to the elements of the follow-on mission to ATMIS. Media reports suggest that on 3 November Egypt delivered heavy weaponry to the Somali government in Mogadishu. This was the third delivery of military support since the two countries signed a defence cooperation agreement on 14 August. (For background and more information, see the brief on Somalia in our October 2024 Monthly Forecast and 2 October What’s in Blue story.)
Human Rights-Related Developments
On 10 October, the Human Rights Council (HRC) adopted a resolution (A/HRC/RES/57/27) on providing assistance and capacity-building to Somalia in the field of human rights. The resolution expressed concern about the heightened risks of violence, abuse, and human rights violations faced by internally displaced persons, particularly vulnerable groups such as women, children, young people, persons with disabilities, and marginalised communities. It urged Somalia to end the culture of impunity by holding perpetrators accountable through prompt and thorough investigations and by committing resources to justice sector reforms.
On 7 October, Isha Dyfan, the Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Somalia, presented her report (A/HRC/57/80) to the HRC. She highlighted concerns about arbitrary arrests, detentions, and extrajudicial killings by Somali security forces. For instance, on 2 March, Somali police reportedly opened fire to disperse protesters from the Abgaal/Hawiye clan in Mogadishu, killing one man and injuring three women.
Dyfan also highlighted other issues, including the lack of accountability for human rights violations and significant weaknesses in Somalia’s justice system. She recommended strengthening reconciliation mechanisms to mitigate clan violence, establishing a civilian casualty tracking system to enhance transparency, and improving women’s access to justice by enforcing the 30 percent quota for women’s representation in elected and administrative positions within the justice system.
Sanctions-Related Developments
The 2713 Al-Shabaab Sanctions Committee held informal consultations on 11 October to receive a briefing from the Panel of Experts on its final report, dated 15 October. The report noted that Al-Shabaab remains the most significant threat to the peace and security of Somalia and that its ability to carry out complex attacks against the Somali government, ATMIS, and international forces remains undiminished. The report highlighted that attacks on bases, diversion of weapons from the Somali National Army and ATMIS bases, spillovers from regional conflicts, and illicit trafficking networks remain the key sources of resupply for Al-Shabaab.
On 15 October, the Secretary-General released a report indicating that progress on achieving the indicators on the ten benchmarks outlined in his 15 September 2022 technical assessment report on Somalia’s weapons and ammunition capacity had been incremental at the federal government level. It noted that an urgent challenge is extending the weapons and ammunition management frameworks, processes, and structures to the federal member state level, considering the different needs, priorities, and perspectives of each state. It added that countering the illicit flow of arms and ammunition into Somalia also remains a critical issue.
Key Issues and Options
One of the key issues for Council members in December is the extension of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime and the mandate renewal of the Panel of Experts supporting the committee. Members may draw on the findings of the 15 October progress report and the recommendations contained in the panel’s 15 October final report. The likely option for Council members is to renew the measures outlined in resolution 2713 and extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another year.
An important issue for Council members is Somalia’s security transition—the drawdown of ATMIS and the establishment of the follow-on mission, which is expected to assume responsibilities from 1 January 2025. A related issue is the financing for the follow-on mission, given the divergences among Council members on the possible funding options. At press time, members had just received the Secretary-General’s report and were considering the various options. Members will need to make a decision ahead of ATMIS’ mandate expiry on 31 December. If they are unable to agree to the post-ATMIS security arrangements by then, one option would be to extend ATMIS for a limited period of time.
Also, a pertinent issue is the escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which may undermine regional peace and security, including Somalia’s ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, and the ATMIS transition process. One option for Council members would be to issue a press statement encouraging the parties to exercise restraint and make efforts to de-escalate tensions, while expressing support for initiatives in this regard. Another option is for members to request a briefing in consultations from the Secretary-General on the potential for this situation to undermine Somalia’s security transition and regional peace and security.
Another issue is how to continue supporting the Somali government in achieving its national priorities, including the constitutional review and electoral processes. Additionally, addressing the increasing tension between the federal government and some federal member states is a matter of concern for several Council members.
Council and Wider Dynamics
Council members support the Somali government’s priorities and recognise the many challenges the country faces, including the persistent insecurity caused by the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab. They also support ongoing efforts to fight the group, including the implementation of sanctions to degrade Al-Shabaab.
Although Council members agree on the need to provide security support for Somalia post-ATMIS, views differ on how such efforts should be financed. Somalia, an incoming elected Council member for the 2025-26 term, and several current members have suggested financing the follow-on mission under resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023 on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). However, other Council members, such as the US, are apparently not keen on this option. In its remarks at the 3 October Council briefing on Somalia, the US emphasised the importance of establishing the necessary mechanisms to effectively implement the framework outlined in resolution 2719. It cautioned against what it views as the “premature application” of this framework.
It appears that the US has produced a non-paper to explain its position. Apparently, it notes that the milestones outlined in the AU-UN joint roadmap for implementation of 2719 are not expected to be completed before mid-2025. (The roadmap was endorsed at the eighth annual AU-UN conference, convened on 21 October.) Against this backdrop, the US has proposed a two-year bridging mechanism to provide additional time to develop the 2719 framework and address budgetary and logistical challenges. This proposal, however, has elicited differing views. The UK appears to support the view that applying the 2719 framework in Somalia before the end of the year would be premature and has therefore supported the establishment of a bridging mechanism. It seems that the Council’s EU members (France, Malta, and Slovenia) are concerned that such a mechanism could imply additional obligations for financial contributors to ATMIS. The AU has apparently argued that resolution 2719 does not envisage a bridging mechanism.
Another area of debate is whether resolution 2719 could be applied exclusively to specific financing obligations or should be all-encompassing. Some Council members and the AU seem to be supportive of selective application of resolution 2719, such as for troop reimbursements, while continuing the logistics support for the follow-on mission through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), which is financed through UN-assessed contributions. It appears that the range of options for financing developed by the AU outlines a set of approaches through which resolution 2719 could be applied in Somalia. The US non-paper, on the other hand, apparently argues that support extended to AUPSOs under 2719 encompasses all categories of support, including logistics. (Please see this month’s In Hindsight for more information on the application of resolution 2719.)
Council members remain concerned about the escalating tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia. At the 3 October Council meeting, several members, including Slovenia, Switzerland, and the US, expressed deep concern over the increased tensions. In its remarks, the US stressed the need to ensure that regional strains do not disrupt the planning and deployment of a post-ATMIS mission. It cautioned against security gaps that could aggravate the humanitarian crisis and alluded to the additional costs associated with changes in troop contributors. (For background, see the brief on Somalia in our October Monthly Forecast.)
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 15 August 2024S/RES/2748 | This resolution extends the authorisation for the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) until 31 December, and requests the Secretary-General, jointly with the AU Commission Chairperson and in consultations with Somalia and international stakeholders, to report on the overall mission design for the proposed successor mission by 15 November. |
| 21 December 2023S/RES/2719 | This was a resolution on the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). |
| 1 December 2023S/RES/2713 | This resolution renewed for one year the sanctions regime on Al-Shabaab, including the authorisation for maritime interdiction to enforce the embargo on illicit arms imports, the charcoal exports ban, and the improvised explosive device components ban. |
| Security Council Letters | |
| 15 October 2024S/2024/751 | This was the progress report on the benchmarks set out in the 15 September 2022 technical assessment report. |
| Sanctions Committee Documents | |
| 15 October 2024S/2024/748 | This was the final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions committee. |
