Sudan Sanctions: Vote on Draft Resolution*
Today (8 March), following the meeting on Afghanistan, the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2024. The vote was initially scheduled to take place earlier this morning, prior to the meeting on Afghanistan. However, due to continued disagreements, the vote was postponed to allow for further deliberations on the draft text that was put in blue yesterday (7 March). A revised text reflecting further compromise was placed in blue this morning.*
The negotiations were apparently difficult, owing to Council members’ divergent views over the utility of the Sudan sanctions regime. A vote on the mandate of the Sudan Panel of Experts was originally scheduled for 9 February but was delayed due to a lack of consensus among Council members. It seems that disagreements during the negotiations focused on wider issues concerning the sanctions regime, including the possibility of reviewing the sanctions measures on Sudan and the prospect of establishing benchmarks to guide the Council in reviewing the sanctions measures.
Background
The decision to establish benchmarks has been contentious for some time, particularly the timeline for their consideration and their scope. Resolution 2562 of 11 February 2021 requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the issue by 31 July 2021. The subsequent report recommended four key benchmarks and related targets, namely progress on: political and economic governance issues; transitional security arrangements in Darfur; the National Plan for Civilian Protection; and transitional justice and accountability. Resolution 2562 also expressed the Council’s intention to establish benchmarks by 15 September 2021.
The US, the penholder on Sudan sanctions, proposed a presidential statement in September 2021 which endorsed all the key benchmarks and related targets proposed in the Secretary-General’s 31 July 2021 report. Council members were unable to reach consensus, preventing agreement on a product establishing benchmarks.
On 15 February 2022, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2620, extending the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2023. The resolution expressed the Council’s “intention to consider by 31 August 2022 establishing clear, well-identified, and realistic key benchmarks, with readiness to consider adjusting [sanctions] measures…to respond to the situation in Darfur in light of the evolving situation on the ground”. (For more information, see our 14 February 2022 What’s in Blue story.)
In August 2022, the US circulated a draft resolution which expressed the Council’s readiness to review the sanctions measures, including through modification, suspension, or progressive lifting of the measures, in light of progress achieved by the government of Sudan on the benchmarks and related targets as outlined in the Secretary-General’s 31 July 2021 report. Several Council members—including China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the African members (Gabon, Ghana, and then-Council member Kenya)—apparently expressed the view that the Council should only endorse those benchmarks relating to Darfur and not all four benchmarks as proposed by the penholder. It seems that some of these members argued that only the second benchmark, which relates to transitional security arrangements in Darfur, was applicable; others, however, maintained that the third benchmark on protection of civilians was also relevant. Members were therefore unable to agree on the proposed draft text, and a resolution on the matter was ultimately not adopted.
Negotiations
The US circulated an initial draft to all Council members on 27 January and convened the first round of negotiations on 1 February. Following several rounds of negotiations with all Council members, bilateral outreach with some members, and at least two revised drafts, the penholder placed a draft in blue without a silence procedure yesterday (7 March). The vote was scheduled to take place this morning (8 March) before the Council’s meeting on Afghanistan. However, disagreements persisted and the vote was postponed to allow for further deliberations. An amended draft was put in blue and a vote was scheduled for later today, following the meeting on Afghanistan.
The initial draft proposed by the penholder endorsed three of the four key benchmarks outlined in the Secretary-General’s 31 July 2021 report, namely those relating to progress on political and economic governance issues, progress on transitional security arrangements in Darfur, and progress on the National Plan for Civilian Protection.
During the negotiations, several Council members—including China, Russia, the UAE, and the A3 members (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique)—apparently argued that the Council should not endorse any benchmark, considering Sudan’s call for the full lifting of sanctions. It seems that these members echoed concerns expressed by the Sudanese government in a 27 January letter to the Security Council, which called for the immediate lifting of the sanctions without conditions or benchmarks. The letter maintained that the suggested benchmarks are “completely unrealistic” and “might have been a tool for continuing those sanctions indefinitely for foreign policy reasons that have nothing to do with current realities in the Sudan and the post-war conditions in Darfur”.
However, several other Council members, including the penholder, supported the inclusion of benchmarks in the draft resolution and expressed the view that benchmarks remain a starting point to continue the discussions about modifying, suspending, or progressively lifting the sanctions. These members have advocated a cautious approach to the removal of sanctions in light of the prevailing insecurity in the country. The final report of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee, which was transmitted to the Council on 7 February, described the security situation in Darfur as “fragile”, noting that “the proliferation of weapons and ammunition in Darfur intensified and continued to pose a serious threat to security there”. The report said that violations of the arms embargo continued as the Sudanese government did not obtain the permission of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee for the transfer of military supplies and weapons into Darfur. It added that the implementation of the travel ban and assets freeze remained a challenge because of the lack of cooperation by the Sudanese government and regional states.
As Council members were negotiating the draft resolution, several regional groups and inter-governmental organisations addressed letters to the Council to express support for Sudan’s call for the lifting of sanctions. On 3 February, Qatar sent a letter on behalf of the Group of Arab States at the UN, which called for an end to the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and for the lifting of the Sudan sanctions regime. The letter argued that the sanctions imposed on Sudan are not commensurate with the facts on the ground, adding that lifting such measures would allow the Sudanese government to “rebuild the capacity of its security forces and law enforcement agencies to maintain and promote peace”. Similar letters were also addressed to the Council on 10 February by Pakistan as chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Egypt in its capacity as the chair of the Group of African States at the UN. The letters note that the “the imposition of sanctions has directly and negatively affected the stabilization process”.
Disagreements on the issue of benchmarks persisted throughout the negotiations. It seems that, to achieve compromise, the A3 together with the UAE proposed introducing a “sunset clause” for the measures of the Sudan sanctions regime, which have hitherto been open-ended. This proposal was apparently supported by some Council members—including Brazil, China, and Russia—whereas several other members indicated an interest in having further discussions on the issue. The draft text that was placed in blue yesterday decided to renew the measures of the Sudan sanctions regime for 24 months, until 12 February 2025, and “to make a decision regarding their further renewal” no later than that date. It seems that several members, including the A3 and the UAE, called for a shorter period of one year. As a compromise, the draft text that was put in blue this morning (and will be voted on after the Afghanistan meeting) decided to renew the measures of the Sudan sanctions regime for 18 months, until 12 September 2024, and to make a decision regarding their renewal by that date.
The draft text in blue also reflects compromise among Council members on the scope of the benchmarks. It expresses the Council’s intention to review the regime’s measures by 12 February 2024, including through modification, suspension, or progressive lifting of these measures in light of progress achieved by Sudan’s government on only two benchmarks, namely those relating to progress on transitional security arrangements in Darfur and progress on the National Plan for Civilian Protection. The draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to conduct an assessment of progress achieved on the key benchmarks established in the resolution by 1 December and asks Sudan’s government to report to the committee on progress achieved on such benchmarks by the same date.
The draft resolution in blue extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2024 and requests that the Panel submit its interim report to the Council by 12 August and its final report by 13 January 2024.
In its preambular paragraphs, the draft text in blue welcomes the signing of the Sudan Political Framework Agreement on 5 December 2022 and commends the trilateral mechanism—comprised of the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS)—for supporting Sudan’s efforts to restore an inclusive and democratic political settlement. It also encourages the signatories of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and other political opposition from Darfur which have not signed the Political Framework Agreement to join the accord.
The draft resolution placed in blue yesterday also included new language proposed by the penholder noting the Council’s concern that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), and the signatory Darfurian armed movements were engaged in aggressive recruitment campaigns. However, this language was amended in the draft that was put in blue today at the request of the A3 and the UAE. The current draft text in blue does not name these elements, instead only expresses concern that “armed actors” were engaged in aggressive recruitment campaigns. It also encourages Sudan’s government to accelerate the process for the full implementation of the JPA, including by establishing the Darfur regional disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) commission. (For background on recent political developments in Sudan, see our March Forecast Brief.)
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*Post-script (8 March, 11:30 am)—An earlier version of this story reflected a vote that was scheduled to take place this morning (prior to the meeting on Afghanistan) on a draft that was put in blue yesterday (7 March). Following the issuance of the story, the vote was postponed and a new draft was put in blue. The story was amended to reflect these developments.
**Post-script (8 March, 3:00 pm)—The Security Council adopted resolution 2676, renewing the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee until 12 March 2024. The resolution decides to reaffirm and renew the measures of the Sudan sanctions regime until 12 September 2024, and to make a decision regarding their further renewal no later than that date. It was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia).
***Post-script (13 March)—Several Council members made statements following the vote. Ambassador Lana Nusseibeh (United Arab Emirates) delivered a joint explanation of vote on behalf of the A3 (Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique) and the UAE. In her remarks, she noted that the A3 and the UAE voted in favour of the draft resolution in the spirit of compromise. Nusseibeh also highlighted that the adoption of a sunset clause that changes the sanctions regime from open-ended to time-bound is “an important development as we chart a pathway for the lifting of sanctions”. She expressed regret that the proposal advanced by the A3 and the UAE to include a sunset clause of 12 months was not adopted.
In his explanation of vote, Ambassador Dai Bing (China) noted that the proposal for a 12-month sunset clause could have been a compromise proposal to bridge the gaps. Bing argued that the Council needs to conduct periodic reviews of relevant sanctions regimes and subsequently lift or adjust them if the criteria are met. In this regard, he added that the discussion on the Sudan sanctions regime should be used to “reflect seriously on what measures to take to improve the design and implementation of Council sanctions”.
On the other hand, Political Counselor John Kelley (US), noted in his remarks that robust monitoring and reporting by the Sudan Panel of Experts remain essential as the situation in Darfur remains fragile, “fundamental causes of conflict persist, proliferation of small arms and light weapons continues, and the Sudanese authorities are often unable to provide security for civilians”. He added that the benchmarks included in the resolution are anchored in the commitments made by Sudan’s government in the Juba Peace Agreement and the National Plan for Civilian Protection.
