



Security Council

Distr.: General
30 January 2023

Original: English

Letter dated 27 January 2023 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

As you are aware, the sanctions imposed on the Sudan under resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) are no longer relevant to the magnificent reality on the ground in Darfur today compared with the situation in 2005, when they were imposed in very different security and political contexts. Darfur has, for the most part, overcome the state of war, as well as previous security and political challenges. The Sudan's transitional Government has made significant efforts to improve security, peace and stability in Darfur and will continue to do so, as our country's reality has shown. The Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan of October 2020, the provisions of which the Government is keen to implement in collaboration with the Juba Agreement partners, is at the forefront of these efforts. This would undoubtedly contribute to the maintenance of peace in Darfur. Moreover, the former regime, under which those measures were imposed, has been overthrown following the 2018 revolution that set to change the political order and dynamics. This would pave the way for the gradual establishment of a genuine and lasting peace.

The Sudanese Government is committed to addressing the remaining social and security issues, such as the sporadic tribal clashes in some parts of Darfur. In the historical and social context of Darfur, these intercommunal clashes were known for decades and are typically addressed within the framework of traditional dispute resolution mechanisms reinforced by official efforts through transitional and restorative justice arrangements. In this context, the Government has developed and is currently implementing a plan for the protection of civilians. Moreover, efforts are being made by the Ministry of the Interior to form and deploy the Joint Security-Keeping Force for the protection of civilians. All of these qualitative actions will contribute to the steady improvement of conditions in Darfur, given the graduation of the second cohort of the Security-Keeping Force last week.

In July 2021, at the request of the Security Council, the Secretary-General proposed four benchmarks by which these sanctions could be reviewed. Nonetheless, it is disappointing to us that some of the benchmarks and subtargets are completely unrealistic and cannot be met, neither in the Sudan nor elsewhere in the majority of developing nations. Furthermore, despite the Sudan's willingness and openness to engage positively with the Security Council, we have noted the insistence of some Security Council members on refraining from engaging sufficiently and constructively in order to achieve realistic, applicable and measurable benchmarks. As is well known, twice in the past negotiations to set these benchmarks abruptly stopped without regard for the views of the other members of the Council. Therefore,



we have concluded that the suggested benchmarks might have been a tool for continuing those sanctions indefinitely for foreign policy reasons that have nothing to do with current realities in the Sudan and the post-war conditions in Darfur, but stem from sheer national self-interest.

The continuous imposition of this regime of sanctions has had a detrimental impact and negative consequences that extend beyond the arms embargo in Darfur and the targeted sanctions on some individuals. The sanctions, to mention but a few examples, prevent the Sudan from becoming a member of some important United Nations organs, such as the Security Council, thereby impinging on its rights enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations as a State Member of the United Nations. Furthermore, owing to the confusion between these sanctions and the unilateral sanctions previously imposed on the Sudan, these sanctions contribute to discouraging investors that intend to invest in the country. They encourage the rogue armed transboundary bands to disrupt peace and order in Darfur, owing to the imbalance of hard power.

For all of the foregoing remarks, the Sudan will accept nothing less than the immediate lifting of these sanctions without conditions or benchmarks, as the Security Council did in the past in resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#). Lifting the sanctions imposed under resolution [1591 \(2005\)](#) and related resolutions will allow the Sudanese Government to further play an active regional role, as evidenced by the Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic in 2019 and the Revitalized Peace Agreement in South Sudan in 2018 and 2022. The Sudan aspires to be an effective partner of the international community in maintaining peace and security arrangements in the Horn of Africa and the wider region after these sanctions are lifted. Therefore, it is clear that, rather than becoming an instrument of choice, the sanctions have become an instrument of compulsion and obstruction. The Sudan has cooperated willingly with the United Nations and the international community in the post-revolution period, and it deserves to be treated in a dignified manner.

Having brought this matter to your attention, I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Al-Harith Idriss Al-Harith **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative
