Democratic Republic of the Congo: Vote on MONUSCO Mandate Renewal
Tomorrow morning (19 December), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) for one year, until 20 December 2024.
France, the penholder on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), circulated an initial draft of the resolution on 4 December and convened two rounds of negotiations, on 6 and 8 December. It then placed a third revised draft of the resolution under silence until 12 December. Subsequently, the Council’s three African members (known as the A3)—Gabon, Ghana, and Mozambique—as well as the UK and the US broke silence over the issue of support to regional forces. The penholder revised the text and placed it under another silence procedure until 15 December, but the A3, China, and Russia broke silence over several aspects of the resolution. The penholder made further revisions to the draft text and put it in blue this morning (18 December).
Background
This year’s negotiations on MONUSCO’s mandate renewal took place against the backdrop of a deteriorating security situation and heightened tensions in the region. Since October, fighting resumed between the armed group Mouvement du 23 mars (M23) and the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) supported by local militias in the North Kivu province. Tensions between the DRC and Rwanda have also persisted, with mutual accusations of support for armed groups as proxies and increased cross-border incidents. On 11 December, the US announced a 72-hour ceasefire agreed by the parties to the conflict in eastern DRC, following a 19-20 November visit led by US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines to the DRC and Rwanda. On 15 December, the White House announced that the parties have agreed to a two-week extension of the ceasefire, until 28 December.
This year’s mandate renewal process also coincided with the preparations for general elections in the DRC scheduled to take place on 20 December. The electoral campaign has been marred by violence and concerns about voter registration, as well as duplication of polling stations and voter cards, among other challenges. In a 12 December letter (S/2023/981), the Congolese government requested the UN to provide support in delivering electoral materials and equipment to provinces outside of MONUSCO’s area of deployment. The Council responded to the request in a 14 December letter, authorising the mission to provide limited logistical support to provinces outside its area of operation, within existing resources, and without hindering the implementation of other aspects of its mandate.
Crucially, the mandate renewal negotiations also took place in the context of the Congolese government’s call for MONUSCO’s accelerated and progressive withdrawal. The Security Council adopted a presidential statement on 16 October requesting MONUSCO and the Congolese government to develop, by November, a comprehensive disengagement plan with a timetable for MONUSCO’s progressive and orderly withdrawal. The plan, which was developed through a joint working group comprising the Congolese government, MONUSCO, and the UN Country Team, was circulated to Council members in a 22 November letter (S/2023/904). It envisages the mission’s withdrawal to be initiated before the end of 2023 and for all uniformed personnel and military equipment to be repatriated in three distinct phases, each requiring a minimum of four to five months. In the first phase, MONUSCO will withdraw from South Kivu by 30 April 2024, and in the second phase from North Kivu (central sector), based on an evaluation of the first phase. The third phase will see the complete withdrawal of MONUSCO from the Ituri province and the remaining parts of North Kivu.
The disengagement plan, MONUSCO’s reconfiguration plan submitted by the Secretary-General on 2 August pursuant to resolution 2666 of 20 December 2022, and the revised transition plan agreed between the Congolese government and MONUSCO formed the basis for this year’s mandate renewal process. At the most recent Council meeting on the DRC, held on 11 December, several members stressed the need to ensure a gradual and responsible withdrawal of the mission, with some welcoming the plan’s flexibility. The plan emphasises the gradual and responsible transfer of security responsibilities, does not impose a strict chronology for the implementation of the disengagement process, and provides for evaluation and monitoring of each phase to allow necessary adjustments.
Mandate Renewal Negotiations
It seems that this year’s negotiations were difficult but not very contentious. The A3, supported by China and Russia, apparently initially sought a six-month extension of the mandate, reflecting the Congolese government’s position on the matter. Following a shift in Kinshasa’s position, however, these Council members eventually accepted a 12-month mandate extension. The draft resolution in blue takes note of the proposed phases of disengagement and decides that “the mission will withdraw its Force from South Kivu by the end of April 2024 and limit the implementation of its mandate to the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri from May 2024 until the end of the current mandate”.
Accordingly, the mission’s current authorised troop ceiling of 13,500 military personnel, 660 military observers and staff officers, 591 police personnel, and 1,410 personnel of formed police units will be maintained until 30 June 2024. Subsequently, it will be reduced to 11,500 military personnel, 600 military observers and staff officers, 443 police personnel, and 1,270 personnel of formed police units from 1 July 2024 onwards to reflect the abovementioned decision. The draft text in blue maintains the three key priority tasks of the mission, in line with the agreement reached with the Congolese government on MONUSCO’s revised transition plan: the protection of civilians; support for disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR) and stabilisation; and support for security sector reform (SSR).
It seems that a major area of discussion during the negotiations was an operative paragraph which encourages support to regional forces. The Secretary-General’s 2 August report on MONUSCO’s reconfiguration requested the Council to “provide MONUSCO with a clear mandate to leverage its operational and logistical capabilities” in support of regional forces. An East African Community regional force (EACRF) was deployed in November 2022 in eastern DRC as part of the Nairobi process, an ongoing regional effort spearheaded by the East African Community (EAC) to address the security situation in the region. Following the DRC’s decision to not extend its mandate, however, the EACRF contingents are currently withdrawing from eastern DRC. On 8 May, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) decided to deploy a SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) to restore peace and stability in eastern DRC and signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the DRC on 17 November to pave the way for the mission’s deployment. It seems that the SADC has already requested UN operational and logistical support for its mission.
The Secretary-General’s reconfiguration plan envisages a reduction of MONUSCO’s footprint as the Congolese government extends its state authority and regional forces reinforce their presence, but it does not provide details on how this will be implemented. Some Council members—such as the UK, the US, and other like-minded members—apparently opposed authorising MONUSCO to provide operational and logistical support to regional forces until the necessary details on their deployment are provided by the host country and the regional mechanisms. Therefore, the operative paragraph on support for regional forces required extensive discussions, with Council members twice breaking silence on this issue.
It seems that the discussion was also linked to the ongoing negotiations on a draft framework resolution on the financing of AU-led peace support operations (AUPSOs). The draft text in blue expresses the Council’s intention to consider the conditions under which “limited logistical and operational support may be provided to an AU mandated regional force deployed within the area of MONUSCO’s deployment, in furtherance of MONUSCO’s mandate, and within existing resources”. It also requests the Secretary-General to submit a report by 30 June 2024, in consultation with the AU and regional organisations, on possible logistical and operational support that the UN can provide to regional forces present in DRC.
It seems that some members wanted to include language in the text emphasising the need for regional forces to comply with international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as well as with the AU Compliance Framework (AUCF) for AUPSOs, which aims to ensure adherence to international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and UN conduct and discipline standards to prevent and combat impunity for sexual exploitation and abuse. It appears that Switzerland proposed a separate paragraph that sets out all these conditions, while adding language on the need for regional forces to comply with the UN’s Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. The A3 members, however, opposed this proposal and apparently tried to soften the language on human rights by asking for the removal of text emphasising the need to prevent, investigate, address, and publicly report violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law related to the regional forces. In an apparent compromise, the draft text in blue retains a call for regional forces to implement a robust compliance framework, in line with the AUCF, while removing the language opposed by the A3. These members also sought to remove qualifiers such as “limited” regarding the support to regional forces, which they viewed as restrictive. The penholder accommodated their concern in the text in blue but maintained language specifying that the support should be provided within existing resources.
Other areas of discussion during the negotiations related to proposed language on such issues as human rights; humanitarian principles relating to humanitarian emergency assistance; sanctions; sexual and gender-based violence; women, peace and security (WPS); and civil society. China apparently expressed reservations about an operative paragraph which authorises MONUSCO to monitor and report on human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, as well as on restrictions on political space and violence, including in the context of the elections. Although China sought to remove the paragraph, it was maintained in the draft resolution in blue over this member’s objection.
Following reported allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by a South African contingent deployed under MONUSCO, there was also some discussion on the issue during the mandate renewal negotiations. (For more information, see our 20 November What’s in Blue story.) China and Russia apparently broke silence on the issue, requesting the removal of operative text referring to allegations of “large-scale” sexual exploitation and abuse in the mission’s area of operation and calling for an investigation into the matter. In an apparent compromise, these references were removed from the draft resolution in blue.
As in past mandate renewal negotiations, language on humanitarian principles relating to humanitarian emergency assistance was an issue of discussion, with Russia and Switzerland expressing different positions on the matter. Russia usually prefers to use language from the relevant General Assembly resolution on humanitarian principles. It seems that the penholder proposed a compromise based on previously agreed language from resolution 2709 of 15 November, which renewed the mandate of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), recalling “the UN guiding principles of humanitarian emergency assistance and humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence”.
Similar to last year, references to civil society were another issue during this year’s negotiations. One iteration of the draft text requested an update on the implementation of the disengagement plan by June 2024, including in consultation with civil society. It also tasked MONUSCO to maintain a protective environment for civilians throughout the disengagement phases, including by developing integrated provincial protection plans, in close consultation with civil society. China and Russia apparently opposed the formulation “in consultation” with civil society, seeking instead to use the phrase “in liaison”, which they argued is agreed language. In an apparent compromise, the draft text in blue uses the phrase “in liaison” with civil society in connection with the update on the disengagement plan, while maintaining “in consultation” in the paragraph on the integrated provincial protection plans.
