DPRK (North Korea)
Expected Council Action
In March, the Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution to renew for another 13 months the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 1718 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) Sanctions Committee.
Key Recent Developments
On 11 February, the DPRK conducted its first ballistic missile launch since October 2016. DPRK leader Kim Jong-un had declared in his New Year’s speech that preparations for the first test-firing of an intercontinental ballistic missile were in the final stages, and Pyongyang since then has repeatedly warned about its readiness to test such a missile at any time and any place. The latest launch, however, involved an intermediate-range rocket. It nevertheless demonstrated that the DPRK is continuing to make progress in developing its prohibited missile programme. According to the DPRK’s own news reports, the missile was an upgraded, extended-range version of the submarine-launched missile it tested last August and was propelled by a solid fuel engine. Solid fuel engines can be launched more quickly than those using liquid fuel and are more mobile, making them harder to detect.
In response to the missile launch, Council members held consultations on 13 February at the request of Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the US, with a briefing by Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs Miroslav Jenča. In a subsequent press statement, members condemned the 11 February and October missile launches as grave violations of the DPRK’s international obligations and relevant Council resolutions. It reiterated the language of previous statements, including a call on states to redouble their efforts to implement the sanctions imposed by the Council, in particular the comprehensive measures of resolutions 2270 and 2321 adopted last year in response to the DPRK’s nuclear tests. In a 15 February letter to the Secretary-General asserting that the missile launch was a “self-defensive measure”, the DPRK “categorically” rejected the press statement.
In other developments, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis on 2 and 3 February travelled to Japan and the ROK for his first trip abroad since taking office. Mattis confirmed the US commitment to defend the ROK and maintain their strong alliance, while highlighting the deployment of the US anti-ballistic missile system THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System) as a necessary defensive response to the increasing threat posed by the DPRK. Without referring explicitly to China, which has repeatedly objected to the deployment, Mattis said that “no other nation” should be concerned about THAAD.
On 7 February, OCHA listed the DPRK as one of 12 “forgotten crises to remember”. According to OCHA, 15 million people, or about 60 percent of the population, are considered food insecure, 25 percent do not have access to essential health services and 1.7 million children are at risk of deadly childhood diseases.
Sanctions-Related Developments
On 2 February, the chair of the Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi (Italy), held a briefing open to all UN member states, with the Panel of Experts’ coordinator, Hugh Griffiths. Cardi explained the new sanctions measures in resolution 2321 and reminded member states of their upcoming reporting obligations, while Griffiths spoke about the work of the Panel. (Cardi’s presentation is posted on the Committee’s website.)
The Committee met on 16 February to discuss the Panel’s final report under resolution 2276. According to the report, sanctions implementation remains insufficient and inconsistent, with the DPRK retaining access to the international banking system, and designated entities on the sanctions list continuing to operate. Despite the new sectoral sanctions imposed by the Council last year, the report found that the DPRK has continued to export banned minerals and that coal exports increased from 2015 to 2016. The Panel concluded that support for strengthening the sanctions had not been matched by political will and resources to ensure effective implementation. Among other things, it recommended the designation of additional individuals and entities and the creation of a separate list of designated vessels, to be updated on a regular basis. The Panel also recommended that the Committee issue an Implementation Assistance Notice to clarify which minerals are covered by the import ban.
On 18 February, China announced that it would suspend all import of coal from the DPRK. According to information posted on the Sanctions Committee’s website on 20 February, China imported nearly 1,442,000 tons of coal during the month of January, representing 19 percent of the annual total volume permitted under resolution 2321. During the month of December 2016, both the volume and the value of the coal imported by China exceeded by far the limits set by the resolution. According to China’s foreign ministry, this was due to a time lag between the adoption and implementation of the resolution.
At press time, Cardi was scheduled to brief Council members on the work of the Committee on 27 February.
Human Rights-Related Developments
During its 34th session in March, the Human Rights Council plans to hold an interactive dialogue with its Special Rapportuer on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, Tomás Ojea Quintana, to discuss his most recent report. The report noted that while the DPRK’s international isolation deepened in 2016 due to its repeated nuclear and missile tests, it did take some steps towards fulfilling its international human rights obligations, such as ratifying the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the submission of treaty reports to the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The report also noted, however, that growing tensions had hindered attempts at engaging in a human rights dialogue with the DPRK and that UN human rights mechanisms were not granted access to the country. The Special Rapporteur continued to advocate a two-track strategy encouraging engagement, while also seeking to address human rights violations and hold perpetrators accountable.
Key Issues
A key issue for the Council is the serious escalation in the threat posed by the DPRK as Pyongyang continues to make progress in its prohibited programmes, in direct defiance of the Council’s demands. A further issue is whether the tightening of sanctions will eventually induce the DPRK to change its behaviour or whether a different approach would be more effective.
An immediate issue is the renewal of the Panel of Experts’ mandate and whether any revisions are required to reflect recent changes in the sanctions regime.
In the Sanctions Committee, ensuring implementation of the new sanctions provisions and responding to the findings of the Panel’s latest report are the key issues. A further issue is the potential humanitarian impact of the sanctions.
Options
The main option for the Council is to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts for another 13 months.
In the Committee, the main option is to implement the Panel’s recommendations.
Council Dynamics
While Council members appear united in their concern about the threat posed by the DPRK and in calling for strict sanctions implementation, frustration about the limited impact that the current approach has had so far seems to be mounting. There are also continuing questions about the position of the new US administration and what might come out of its announced policy review on the DPRK, amid emerging calls from within the US for a resumption of talks with Pyongyang. For now, however, the Council is likely to remain focused on sanctions implementation and the Panel of Experts’ report, as discussions about any major policy shift will take place elsewhere.
Council members had an initial exchange of views on the Panel’s report at the 16 February Sanctions Committee meeting. It seems that several members did not yet have instructions and said they needed more time to study the report, but those who spoke generally praised the high quality of the Panel’s work. A more detailed discussion of the report’s recommendations is expected at the next Committee meeting, most likely to be held in March.
The US is the penholder on the DPRK.
| Security Council Resolutions | |
| 30 November 2016 S/RES/2321 | strengthened sanctions on the DPRK in response to its 9 September nuclear test. |
| 24 March 2016 S/RES/2276 | extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for 13 months. |
| 2 March 2016 S/RES/2270 | strengthened sanctions on the DPRK in response to its 6 January nuclear test. |
| Other | |
| 22 February 2017 A/HRC/34/66 | was the most recent report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the DPRK. |
| 15 February 2017 S/2017/139 | was the DPRK letter rejecting the press statement. |
| 13 February 2017 SC/12716 | was the Council press statement condemning the DPRK’s 11 February missile launch. |
| 12 February 2017 S/2017/128 | was an ROK letter on the missile launch. |
