Lebanon

Expected Council Action

The next report of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for implementation of resolution 1559 is due mid-October. The Council is expected to hold consultations. It was unclear at press time whether the Council could agree that the recent positive developments should be welcomed.

Key Recent Developments
On 16 September, leaders of the Lebanese political factions who signed the May 2008 Doha Agreement, which ended the political crisis in Lebanon, launched new reconciliation talks presided over by Lebanese President Michel Suleiman. A key focus is the disarmament of all militias in Lebanon. The next round is scheduled for early November.

At press time, a new law dividing the country into smaller electoral districts to better represent each community was being prepared by a parliamentary commission for submission to parliament by 25 September. Adoption of a new electoral law was part of the Doha agreement.

On 8 September, Lebanese Alawite and Sunni factions signed a reconciliation agreement aimed at ending violence in Tripoli, which left at least 23 people dead since fighting started in May.

After Syrian President Bashar al-Assad went to France in July, French President Nicolas Sarkozy visited Syria on 3 and 4 September. It was the first time since 2002 that a French president visited Syria and the first visit by a Western head of state in five years. Leaders of Qatar and Turkey joined the dialogue on 4 September.

Syrian-Lebanese relations were at the heart of discussions between France and Syria. These were considerably improved with the visit to Syria on 13 August of Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, the first since Syrian troops withdrew from Lebanon in 2005. Syria promised to establish full diplomatic relations by the end of 2008, and an agreement was reached on 14 August to resume work formally demarcating the border. Syria maintains that the Sheb’a Farms’ boundaries should not be addressed until Israel withdraws. The two presidents pledged to set up a Lebanese-Syrian committee on missing Lebanese from the Lebanese civil war allegedly taken to Syria.

On 27 August the Council extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for another year and called on all parties to cooperate with the UN to achieve a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701.

The latest report of the Lebanese Border Assessment Mission Team (LIBAT) was released on 26 August. The team was in Lebanon from 15 to 31 July to assess the work of Lebanese authorities in securing their borders to prevent illegal weapons transfer. It concluded that recommendations made after its first visit in 2007 had been insufficiently implemented with no decisive impact on overall border security. In some areas the border remained as porous as in 2007 and customs had not reported any weapons seizure. The team reiterated previous recommendations and urged Lebanese authorities to clarify objectives, ways and means to reinforce border control.

The situation south of the Litani River has remained quiet. However, there were security incidents in other parts of the country:

• Several deadly skirmishes have occurred in the past months between opposing rival factions at the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in Saida (the most populous camp in Lebanon with 45,000 refugees), apparently involving Islamists from the Jund al-Sham militant group (believed to be Al-Qaida inspired) and militants from Fatah, the main Palestinian faction in Lebanon. On 24 September, one person was killed and four wounded when a bomb exploded in the camp. On 15 September, three Palestinians were reportedly killed in fighting.
• On 10 September a car bomb near Beirut killed Saleh Aridi, a pro-Syrian Druze member of the Lebanese Democratic Party who had helped bridge differences within the Lebanese Druze minority group. On 11 September the Council issued a press statement strongly condemning this attack.
• On 13 August, a bomb killed 11 people including nine Lebanese soldiers in Tripoli. The Council issued a press statement condemning the attack and recalling the need to end impunity in Lebanon. The Council also reiterated its full support for efforts to solidify democratic institutions and pursue national reconciliation.

The new Lebanese government was approved by parliament on 12 August. Ministers took several weeks to agree on a general policy statement with the question of Hezbollah’s weapons being the main point of contention. Media reports indicated that, in the statement, the government recognised the Lebanese state’s full authority (including over Hezbollah’s weapons), but also affirmed the right of Lebanon’s people, army and resistance to free the Sheb’a Farms, the Kfarchouba hills and Ghajar from Israeli occupation.

Options
One option is to remain silent on the 1559 report as has been the case for one year now. (The most recent Council presidential statement on resolution 1559 dates from June 2007.)

A presidential statement is, however, a possibility in light of the changed situation. It could:

• welcome formation of the new government;
• support the reconciliation process underway, expressing the hope that all goals of the Doha agreement—including disarmament—will be met;
• endorse the LIBAT recommendations;
• express concerns at any report of illegal arms transfer into Lebanon;
• welcome improvement in Syrian-Lebanese relations and supporting further progress toward full normalization;
• urge progress on the demarcation of the Syrian-Lebanese border; and
• reiterate the need for Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory.

Key Issues
A major issue at this stage is whether the Council should take any action. Since August 2007 it has not addressed any political issue in Lebanon by resolution or presidential statement other than language focusing on UNIFIL. The Council did not react to the last two reports on implementation of resolution 1559, nor did it respond to the formation of the new Lebanese government (although it welcomed the Doha agreement). It has not taken up the latest LIBAT report. But the situation in Lebanon has evolved significantly.

Issues related to the implementation of resolution 1559 include the following.

• Disarmament of Militias: The current reconciliation talks are a positive development. Hezbollah now holds a prominent role in government, it remains to be seen whether a deal can be brokered on its arms. Non-Lebanese militias are also a concern given continuing incidents in the Ain al-Hilweh camp. There seems to be more consensus among Lebanese factions on disarming militias in Palestinian camps.
• Weapons Transfers: It remains to be seen if there will be UN reports of arms transfers across the Syrian-Lebanese border. Israel continues to claim that Hezbollah is rearming. The LIBAT report, which is rather critical of border control, is a relevant factor.
• Syrian-Lebanese Relations: Council members will be interested in further development on the issue of diplomatic representation and demarcation of the common border.
• Israel’s Presence in Northern Ghajar: UNIFIL has submitted a proposal to resolve this issue by Israeli withdrawal and subsequent UNIFIL deployment. It seems that the Lebanese support it, but Israel has not yet responded. The political situation in Israel may have an impact on timing of a response. There is consensus in the Council that this issue, if resolved, would be good for confidence-building.

A related issue is whether peace negotiations between Syria and Israel are making progress. Many view a peace treaty as a solution to many of Lebanon’s problems, in particular if the Golan Heights issue can be resolved. A fifth round of indirect talks between the two countries, originally scheduled for 18 September, was postponed at the request of Israel on 17 September. The ruling Kadima party was voting for a new leader to replace Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Council Dynamics
Overall, the Council remains concerned about the situation in Lebanon. But in 2007 there was a certain loss of momentum that may be linked to several factors.

• Criticism from some (in particular, South Africa, Panama and Costa Rica) that the Council had been overactive on Lebanon while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had insufficient attention.
• Belief by many that the Council’s active involvement was not at that time proving positive.
• France, which has the lead on Lebanon, preferred working to ease tensions among Lebanon, Syria and Israel and, as a result, resisted US efforts to use the Council as an instrument.
• The US (and Israel) continued to regard Syria as the main obstacle to the Lebanese political process because of its support for Hezbollah.

It remains to be seen whether France and the US can agree in the current circumstances on language welcoming the Lebanese dialogue.

Amongst the rest of the Council, there is broad support for the Lebanese dialogue. During consultations on the Middle East on 18 September, most Council members said they hoped the factions would reach a deal. Likewise, the renewal of contacts between Lebanon and Syria has been largely interpreted as a positive development.

Other Relevant Facts

Useful Additional Sources

• Polls find broad support for UN in Lebanon, International Peace Institute, 24 September 2008
• The New Lebanese Equation: The Christians’ Central Role, International Crisis Group, 15 July 2008

Full forecast