Somalia

Expected Council Action
It seems unlikely in July that the Council will seriously consider a future UN peacekeeping role in Somalia. The security situation continues to be very dangerous and progress with political reconciliation is hesitant. It is unclear whether members will want to explore other options for UN involvement in Somalia, particularly in the political reconciliation process.

Discussions in the Council in July are likely to cover the Secretary-General’s report, the report of the sanctions Monitoring Group due in mid-July, and the future of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM’s mandate expires in August, and the Monitoring Group’s on 20 July, but both are expected to be renewed.

AMISOM’s future is also likely to be discussed during the AU Summit in Accra on 1-2 July and discussions on the renewal of its AU mandate by mid-July.

Key Recent Developments
At press time, Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi was expected to participate in a Council debate on 28 June.

The security situation in Somalia remains dire, with about 300,000 civilians still displaced by fighting in Mogadishu. (Ethiopia and the TFG dispute those numbers.) Complaints continue of obstruction of humanitarian assistance by Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, as well as a crackdown against media organisations.

Renewed violence seems to indicate that the TFG-Ethiopian forces in Mogadishu are still in difficulty. Insurgents (including remnants of the Union of Islamic Courts, UIC) are using suicide bombings, roadside blasts and assassinations.

Media reports have indicated that the US launched strikes in northern Somalia against reputed al-Qaeda targets in early June.

The national reconciliation conference was postponed for the second time, until 15 July, based on claims that clans needed longer to select delegates and that more time was needed to prepare a venue in Mogadishu. Reportedly this delay drew sharp criticism from the EU. Observers also note the general lack of security as insurgents aim at conference-related targets to decrease momentum for the talks.

In mid-June the TFG announced an amnesty for insurgents-except for those involved in international terrorism-and the release of prisoners. Some in Somalia have welcomed the plan. Others rejected it, noting that it needs to be accompanied by a broad cessation of hostilities and the exit of Ethiopian forces. There are also concerns with a lack of transparency on the conference’s agenda and the criteria for selection of participants.

At a meeting in early June, the International Contact Group agreed on an action plan to support efforts on reconciliation and improvements to AMISOM’s financing mechanisms.

Under Secretary-General Lynn Pascoe visited Somalia in early June. Pascoe briefed the Council on his trip on 14 June. He reportedly underscored that the Somalia situation requires an increase in international troops on the ground so that Ethiopia can withdraw, greater TFG contact with the opposition and a more constructive role by neighbours.

On 14 June, the Council adopted a presidential statement calling for the reconciliation conference to be held as soon as possible and that it should:

• address “in a comprehensive and meaningful manner issues of political reconciliation, including representation in the Transitional Federal Institutions”; and
• agree on a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional political process.

The statement also emphasised the Council’s request for contingency planning for a possible UN peacekeeping mission.

Further Council discussions on the subject were held during the Council’s visiting mission to the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa in mid-June.

At press time, it seemed likely that, based on the contingency planning requested by members, any future UN mission would need significant robust multidimensional elements including about 20,000 troops, as well as significant air and maritime assets.

It also seemed that the Secretary-General’s recent report (which at press time had just been circulated to members) would suggest that deployments be made only after a credible political process and ceasefire are in place, AMISOM is strengthened and Ethiopia withdraws.

AMISOM continues to face funding and troop shortages. Ghana indicated in June that security concerns and lack of equipment and logistics assets prevented it from deploying troops. Burundi has signaled readiness to deploy one battalion in July.

Options
Options include:

• maintaining the essentially “wait-and-see” policy, supplemented by statements in support of the political process;
• stepping up levels of engagement for the political process by requesting the establishment of a UN advance political mission in Mogadishu or providing political advisers to the conference’s organisational committee;
• deciding on a more leading role. This could include a small Council mission to the reconciliation conference;
• instituting a series of closed meetings with key stakeholders, including the AU and regional players, to monitor progress with the conference and efforts to reach a cessation of hostilities, perhaps within the Council’s Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa;
• considering options in support of AMISOM. This could include member states organising a pledging conference; and
• addressing the regional dimension more comprehensively, in particular by becoming more actively involved in improving the Ethiopia-Eritrea standoff.

Key Issues
The key issue for the Council is how much to get involved in efforts to stabilise Somalia.  Related issues are:

• Political process: what kind of contributions will help ensure that the political reconciliation process is successful. The recent presidential statement seems to have clarified the two key questions: inclusiveness and a comprehensive outcome including new power-sharing arrangements and a road map, bearing in mind that the TFG’s tenure expires in 2009. Another is deciding how long to wait for the progress with reconciliation before becoming more involved, especially if the conference is postponed again.
• Security: how best to ensure a secure environment for the political process. Cessation of hostilities and Ethiopian-troop withdrawal are key questions. Related to this is ensuring that AMISOM is sufficiently resourced. Another is how much progress with security and reconciliation is necessary before considering a future UN peacekeeping role in Somalia.
• Regional dimension: how best to ensure that neighbours act in a constructive manner, bearing in mind their own security concerns and longstanding issues.

An unpredictable factor is the impact of the issue of counterterrorism on the political, security and reconstruction needs of Somalia.

Council Dynamics
There is a good deal of consensus within the Council on the appropriate measures to stabilise Somalia, including progress with the political process, and the security situation through support for AMISOM. There is also consensus that the Transitional Federal Institutions, including the TFG, could be the initial framework on which negotiations on political reconciliation can be based for future political arrangements in Somalia.

However, there is still a lack of common understanding on how to reconcile the TFG’s desire for complete ownership of the process with the needs of broad inclusiveness and meaningful power-sharing. This produces differing views on whether to openly criticise and pressure the TFG and how much time to allow before a injecting a more determined UN involvement. Some members-especially the US-have additional concerns, such as counter-terrorism, that seem to largely influence positions on the future of Somalia and the region. This may lead to reluctance to pressure the TFG, in particular on the issues of cessation of hostilities and power-sharing.

Despite the urgent tone in the recent presidential statement, it seems that the majority considers that significant progress will need to be made before a future UN peacekeeping role in Somalia can be considered. However, others are concerned about the imposition of too many conditions to UN deployments in Somalia and may see double standards vis-à-vis peacekeeping in Darfur. African members remain strongly concerned with the lack of support for AMISOM and for future prospects to transfer peacekeeping responsibilities to the UN.

Other Relevant Facts

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