Letter dated 20 January 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 2085 (2012), in which I was requested, in coordination with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the authorities of Mali, to further develop and refine options for a voluntary and a United Nations-funded logistics support package to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). I also have the honour to refer to the request by the Council that the Secretariat provide technical details for logistics support that could be provided by the United Nations.

The situation in Mali is critical. Terrorist organizations threaten the way of life of the people of Mali, and even the existence of the State. The Government of Mali has asked for assistance, and I urge countries and organizations to come to its aid. I applaud France for its courageous decision to deploy troops in order to prevent terrorist fighters from reaching the capital and to assist with the re-establishment of State authority. I further express great appreciation for the efforts of ECOWAS, the African Union and the troop contributors to AFISMA to accelerate the deployment of the Mission.

I should like to recall that in my letter of 13 December 2012 (S/2012/926), I shared some of my initial planning associated with the possible provision of a United Nations logistics support package for AFISMA. Since my letter to the Council, the security situation in Mali has evolved dramatically. Detailed planning for logistics support is challenging within this environment, and updated and robust operational plans for AFISMA will need further development. Indeed, recent developments, including military attacks by terrorist organizations on Government-controlled towns, the request by the Government of Mali for foreign military assistance, the provision of such assistance including military forces by some countries, and the initial deployment of AFISMA troops to Mali, introduce fundamental changes in the operational context.

Key among these is the accelerated timing of the deployment of AFISMA, and the force’s need for training, equipment and enablers, including in combat logistics. In order for AFISMA to perform its mandated tasks, as authorized by the Security Council, significant external support in these areas is urgently required.

As outlined in my report of 29 November 2012 (S/2012/894) and my letter of 13 December 2012, there are different options for the provision of logistics support to AFISMA, and for its funding.
One option would be for all logistics support to AFISMA to be provided through bilateral channels. This option could be funded through one or a combination of bilateral, United Nations trust fund or United Nations assessed contribution channels.

A second option would be for the United Nations to provide a logistics support package to AFISMA in all phases of its operations. Given that a finalized concept of operations for AFISMA is under development, it is currently not possible to produce a detailed plan for such a support package. Nonetheless, at the request of the Council, the Secretariat has conducted additional planning for a logistics support package. The elements of a possible United Nations support package to AFISMA are contained in the annex to the present letter. This option would be financed through United Nations assessed contributions.

A third option would be for bilateral partners to provide logistics support to AFISMA during the combat phase of operations, and for the United Nations to provide support to it during the deployment and in the stabilization phases of its operations. This option would significantly reduce some of the risks to the United Nations and the personnel that are associated with the second option.

Depending on the decision of the Council, a United Nations support package to AFISMA, whether under the second or the third option, could be similar, in level and type, to the support currently being provided to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It would exclude the provision of critical military enablers, but would include reimbursement for organic contingent-owned major equipment through assessed funding.

A United Nations logistics support package deployed in Government-controlled territory would be used to meet the life-support needs of the international forces, including the provision of rations, fuel, engineering works, communications and medical support, as well as the strategic deployment and rotation of forces and the movement of equipment and supplies. Further details are outlined in the annex to the present letter.

If the United Nations were authorized to provide a support package under the second option, then for security reasons, both in the beginning phase of deployment of AFISMA in Government-controlled areas and during the conduct of combat operations, the United Nations would only provide third- and fourth-line logistics support and would do so only in areas controlled by the Government of Mali. Troop-contributing countries and/or private contractors and/or one or more Member States would need to provide the first- and second-line logistics support in the theatre of combat operations. Depending on the decision of the Security Council, the United Nations could reimburse the provider of the first- and second-line logistics support.

United Nations logistics support would be defined and provided through a range of instruments. Provisions to allow the United Nations and its contractors to operate in Mali would be included in the wider host country agreement that is to be concluded with the Government of Mali for the United Nations multidisciplinary presence in Mali. Agreements would also be needed with countries in the region. As in the case of assistance to AMISOM, memorandums of understanding will be required both with the African Union and with ECOWAS and its troop-contributing countries to provide for fully accountable use of the Organization’s resources in
conformity with its rules and regulations and to define the roles, responsibilities and obligations of each party.

The concept of a United Nations logistics support package for AFISMA relies on certain principles and planning assumptions that are essential for the United Nations. These include the principles that the United Nations will provide support only in Government-controlled areas and will not be involved in areas of combat; that all United Nations assistance will be provided in a fully transparent and accountable manner in conformity with United Nations rules and regulations; and that all United Nations assistance will be in conformity with the United Nations human rights due diligence policy.

Critical planning assumptions include the following: AFISMA contingents will be equipped, possibly through bilateral assistance, with the combat equipment necessary to conduct their operations; the force will have the enablers necessary to conduct the operation, including in the areas of special forces, air support (combat and utility aircraft and logistic air transport), fire support, intelligence, and equipment and training to counter improvised explosive devices; the force will have the organic capability or be able to rely on the capability of others to provide the full range of logistics needs in areas not controlled by the Government; the force will have the ability to conduct casualty and medical evacuation operations; troop allowances and benefits will be provided by bilateral partners on a predictable basis; AFISMA personnel will be given the necessary training, and such training will be provided by bilateral partners; AFISMA troops have been trained on, understand and adhere to their obligations under international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law.

If the Council were to authorize a United Nations logistics support package, the Secretariat would endeavour to do its best to initiate the provision of support as quickly as possible. Some basic elements of support could be provided within a short time frame. However, it is expected that the deployment of the necessary assets and establishment of the necessary contracts and lines of supply to implement the full range of services under the logistics support package would take a minimum of 120 days.

Some of the requirements of AFISMA not financed through assessed contributions could be financed through the trust fund that I have established pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 2085 (2012). Pursuant to that paragraph, I have also taken steps to establish a separate trust fund for support to the security and defence forces of Mali. Support through the United Nations-administered trust funds will be limited to financing non-lethal equipment and support.

Also pursuant to paragraph 22 of resolution 2085 (2012), a donors’ conference will be organized by the United Nations, in coordination with the African Union and ECOWAS, for the purpose of soliciting contributions to the United Nations-administered trust funds and for commitments of bilateral support. The Secretariat will liaise in advance with other actors, including the African Union, ECOWAS and authorities of Mali, to identify priority requirements that might be best supported in this manner. On 17 January 2013, the President of the ECOWAS Commission wrote a letter to me requesting urgent and concrete measures pending a Security Council decision on a United Nations logistics support package. In this regard, I am in touch with some Member States on how best such assistance could be provided, including through the provision of bilateral assistance.
The acceleration of the deployment of AFISMA clearly poses great operational challenges. In order for AFISMA to become operational and implement its mandated tasks, the force requires critical logistical support.

At the same time, given the risks and challenges involved, the United Nations must consider with the utmost care the issue of supporting offensive military operations, in the light of the overall global mandate of the Organization. I am particularly concerned about the implications for the safety and security of United Nations personnel throughout the Sahel region and beyond. The security risks for United Nations operations in the Sahel are already high. A dramatic shift in the posture of the Organization would have a further negative impact on its ability to implement essential mandates in the humanitarian, development and human rights areas. I am obliged to bring to the attention of the Security Council the assessment of the Secretariat that, if the United Nations were to provide logistics support to military forces engaged in an offensive operation, it would place United Nations civilian personnel at grave risk and undermine their ability to carry out their current tasks in the region.

The United Nations is committed to doing its part in responding to the pressing needs of the authorities and people of Mali and to accelerate the implementation of resolution 2085 (2012). The United Nations is already present in Bamako to further consult with ECOWAS, the African Union, the Government of Mali and other stakeholders and to support the planning and preparations for the deployment of AFISMA. I have established the United Nations Office in Mali, comprising staff with expertise in political affairs, security processes (military, police and security sector reform), human rights and gender affairs, to ensure coordinated and coherent support to the ongoing political and security processes, as mandated by the Security Council in its resolution 2085 (2012). Additional staff will deploy in a second wave, comprising critical staff expected to support the extension of State authority in such areas as rule of law, security institutions, mine action, promotion of national dialogue, regional cooperation, security sector reform, human rights and the initiation of demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of former combatants. Additionally, the United Nations has provided food assistance to 400,000 people in Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal and plans to assist more than 130,000 internally displaced persons and an estimated 117,000 host families in southern Mali. The United Nations has also sent emergency supplies to Mopti, including kits of essential items for 3,600 displaced persons and emergency health supplies which will benefit at least 30,000 people over the coming month, and is registering and assisting refugees in neighbouring countries.

I look forward to continuing close consultations with the African Union, ECOWAS and other United Nations partners on support to Mali, including at the Summit of the African Union to be held in Addis Ababa from 21 to 28 January 2013.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon
Annex to the letter dated 20 January 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Support to the African-led International Support Mission in Mali

1. In developing the concept for a support package, it is assumed that the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) will be comprised of 3,300 personnel, including 2,990 troops, 30 individual police officers and two formed police units of, in total, 280 personnel. The composition of the AFISMA troops would include a force headquarters, infantry battalions and enabling companies, including in the areas of aviation, logistics, transport, engineering, medical, signal and military police. The continued validity of this assumption on the size of AFISMA, in light of recent developments, will need to be ascertained if the planning outlined in the present document is to be further developed.

2. Logistics support by the United Nations to AFISMA could be provided in areas of Mali that are reliably controlled by the Government in the functional areas of supply (rations, water and fuel); engineering, including construction, power generation, water supply and sanitation; medical support; strategic movement; strategic communications; and, to a limited extent, information technology. The actual implementation of United Nations logistics support to AFISMA would require more detailed development of the concept of operations and the mission support concept.

3. The troop-contributing countries would be reimbursed for their organic contingent-owned major equipment, in accordance with United Nations rates, from assessed contributions.

4. The United Nations could provide logistics support in the following areas, on the basis of the initial planning estimates and the strategic operational framework endorsed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union:

   (a) Supply. After an initial period of self-sufficiency, the required rations, water and fuel would be provided to AFISMA up to United Nations standards through commercial contract arrangements. Commodities would be delivered by the United Nations-arranged contractor to preselected locations up to the third logistics line in areas controlled by the Government of Mali. From there, it would be the responsibility of the troop-contributing countries to collect and distribute the supplies, using their integral first and second logistics line resources. Wherever possible and within the United Nations rules and regulations, United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) contracts would be used for the initial period, until dedicated contracts were put in place for AFISMA. Alternatively, arrangements would be made with Member States and/or other partners for interim logistics support until dedicated contracts were in place to support AFISMA;

   (b) Engineering. The initial engineering support provided by the United Nations for the deployment of AFISMA would be minimal, considering the overall conditions in the host country, and would leverage a range of enabling capabilities (military, United Nations and Member States), in addition to construction services provided by commercial companies. The overall conditions in theatre are harsh, and significant efforts and resources would be required to bring facilities and other positions for the force up to United Nations standards, in particular in the areas of
accommodation, power supply, refrigeration, sanitation and the quality and quantity of potable water. There would be an urgent need to establish key facilities, including the force headquarters. The limited engineering concept would recognize the tactical and interim nature of the international force, with 80 per cent of the force housed in camps with soft-walled accommodation (tentage) provided by the troop-contributing countries. The remaining 20 per cent could eventually be provided with modularized prefabricated facilities in semi-permanent hubs. Considering overall conditions in the host country, essential defence stores required by the force would be provided by the United Nations. The troops would be expected to deploy with full self-sustainment capacity in all the categories of self-sustainment as defined in the contingent-owned equipment manual. Bilateral assistance would be essential in bridging any gaps in the capacity of troop-contributing countries during this self-sustainment phase. Particular attention would need to be paid to minimizing the negative impact of the deployment on host communities, their resources and the environment;

(c) **Medical support.** Troop-contributing countries would be expected to deploy level I and level II medical facilities up to United Nations standards. Appropriately qualified medical personnel to staff the facilities would need to be provided by the participating contingents. The United Nations would support the establishment of additional medical facilities with equipment, pharmaceuticals, consumables, laboratory supplies and ambulances. The United Nations would establish, through commercial or bilateral arrangements, medical evacuation/casualty evacuation services from Government-controlled territory to level III and IV facilities in Government-controlled territory and to locations outside Mali. Within the broader region, level III medical facilities are located in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Other contracted level III and IV facilities in the West African region are present in Accra, Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) and Dakar. The possibility of contracting level III and IV medical facilities in neighbouring countries would be explored. Pending the completion of the requisite procurement processes, interim medical evacuation/casualty evacuation capability to meet all needs would depend on the aviation resources of troop-contributing countries, with possible support from bilateral partners. The United Nations would not provide medical evacuation/casualty evacuation capability from locations not controlled by the Government of Mali; those services would need to be provided by troop-contributing countries or partners;

(d) **Movement support.** The United Nations would provide the international force with support in the strategic transportation of cargo and the deployment and rotation of contingent personnel from the country of origin to locations under the control of the Government of Mali. It is not anticipated that the United Nations would provide tactical aviation support within the theatre of operations during the combat phase of operations. Capability and capacity enhancements to the existing transport infrastructure might be required to enable airfield, terminal and port operations. To the extent possible, the strategic movement support will rely on existing regional United Nations capacities and supply lines;

(e) **Aviation.** Under the present circumstances, the United Nations would not provide tactical aviation services within Mali. Any aviation support required by AFISMA for combat operations would need to be provided by a troop-contributing country or partner. The nature of such tactical military aviation requirements would
need to be identified by the force. The Council may wish to consider whether the costs of such aviation operations would be covered by assessed contributions. The United Nations could implement some airfield upgrades for the benefit of the force in Government-controlled areas, if required;

(f) **Information and communications technology.** The United Nations would provide the required strategic communications and information technology capability and equipment for static force deployments in Government-controlled territory. This could be achieved through the direct provision of information and communications technology services and equipment, and the establishment of a training capacity for troop-contributing countries. The information and communications technology systems are transportable and scalable by design, providing a wide range of options to support AFISMA. As with the support provided by the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA) to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations and the African Union, as well as ECOWAS, would work together to address strategic needs by providing equipment, infrastructure and services based on United Nations standards through commercial contract arrangements. The force would need to install and operate the equipment, while the United Nations could provide remote monitoring and assistance. Maintenance and repair could also be facilitated if equipment were transported to a designated United Nations facility. The United Nations would deploy and support the strategic communications needs through peacekeeping surplus equipment, strategic deployment stocks and existing commercial contracts. New contracts could be established in response to developments as required. Furthermore, network engineering, disaster recovery and application support services would be provided by the Global Service Centre. A satellite network would be established as the backbone for all communications. The establishment of an Information and Communications Technology Division command, control, training and rapid support base in a secure area outside Mali that later on could be moved into Malian territory would be considered. Such a facility could ensure proximity and flexibility to respond to the ever-changing requirements in the area of operations. The United Nations would organize training and exercises for AFISMA like those provided to AMISOM. As the United Nations is not currently in a position to provide military-grade tactical communications support, any such requirement should be addressed through bilateral agreements;

(g) **Geographic Information System (GIS).** The United Nations would support the geographic information needs of AFISMA in the form of dedicated products and applications, along the lines of the model developed in UNSOA. In addition, when camps need to be established in areas where water is scarce, GIS could support subsurface water assessment operations using satellite imagery, GIS analysis and geophysical surveys;

(h) **Mine action.** In close coordination with the expected European Union training mission, the United Nations Mine Action Service could deliver a predeployment course in the field of explosive awareness for the military personnel of AFISMA, as well as security and other law enforcement personnel. The Service could also support the deployment of AFISMA through the specialized training, equipping and mentoring of its military personnel, with specific emphasis on mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal and ammunition safety management;
(i) **Environment.** The United Nations would seek to minimize the environmental impact of the deployment of a logistics support package by integrating an environmental management system in its operations. Key aspects of the package would include proper wastewater treatment; solid waste, including hazardous waste, management; and the use of renewable energy where it makes operational and economic sense. As desertification and land degradation are serious challenges currently faced by the Sahel, especially Mali, particular attention would be focused on the careful use by the United Nations of local natural resources, such as water or natural materials used for construction, to limit or avoid further environmental degradation. GIS technology would be used to assess the environmental status of the areas of possible operations prior to deployment and for future monitoring.

**Support to troop-contributing countries**

5. The support package outlined above would offer significant logistical capability to AFISMA. However, significant bilateral, financial and material support from Member States and other partners to AFISMA or to its troop-contributing countries would be required to cover the other key aspects essential for the success of the operation, including payment of salary and allowances, payment of death and disability benefits, acquisition of contingent-owned equipment and provision of self-sustainment capability, as well as the equipping and predeployment training of the contingents.

6. AFISMA troop-contributing countries would also require a number of capabilities to achieve the objectives outlined in the strategic operational framework. ECOWAS has identified special forces, air support assets (combat and utility aircraft and logistic air transport), additional fire support capabilities, intelligence and counter-improvised explosive device equipment and training as areas that require additional support. These would also need to be addressed through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. Items of non-lethal equipment and training may be financed through the United Nations-administered fund.

7. A trust fund administered by the United Nations could cover additional limited requirements, such as procurement of United Nations-owned equipment, to bridge gaps in contingent capabilities. The use of these funds would need to adhere strictly to United Nations financial and procurement rules.

**Support to the defence and security forces of Mali**

8. A full range of support will be required for the defence and security forces of Mali, including for training and equipping requirements. This is primarily a national responsibility, but support could be provided through direct bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including by the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union and other key stakeholders, or a trust fund administered by the United Nations. However, as has been observed in the case of Somalia, there is a need to have compatible capabilities in the national forces fighting alongside the international forces.

**Costs**

9. The cost implications of the support package detailed in the present annex are broadly the same as those contained in my letter of 13 December 2012.