No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. On 15 November 2000, the Security Council, in an open debate, undertook a critical examination of how and why it decides to close a peacekeeping mission, or significantly change the mandate of a mission so that it enters a new phase in its operational history. In the course of the open debate, statements were made by all 15 Council members and 19 non-members, testimony to the great deal of interest generated by this topic (see S/PV.4223 and Resumption 1).

2. In a letter from its President dated 30 November 2000 (S/2000/1141), the Security Council requested me to submit a report on this issue, including an analysis and recommendations, taking into account the responsibilities of different organs of the United Nations system and the views expressed at the 4223rd meeting of the Security Council. The present report has been prepared in pursuance of that request.

3. The question at the heart of this discussion is what factors the Security Council should assess in deciding to launch, close or significantly alter a United Nations peacekeeping operation. As Security Council members will appreciate, drawing hard and fast conclusions is difficult, given the unique circumstances of each conflict and the varying degrees of international support each peace operation evokes. This notwithstanding, broad lessons and guidelines are relevant to these difficult decisions. The question is of central importance for both the Council and, more broadly, other organs and agencies of the United Nations system as a whole.

II. Two issues

4. Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations has faced many difficult and complicated conflicts. While it is possible to point to several successes during this past decade, it must also be acknowledged that there have been cases where efforts fell short of objectives. As is noted in the non-paper on this question (S/2000/1072, annex, para. 1), more than once during the last 10 years the United Nations has withdrawn a peacekeeping operation, or dramatically altered its mandate, only to see the situation remain unstable, or sink into renewed violence.

5. In order to address these issues, I divide this report into two sections. The first, building on the useful and frank debate held in the Security Council in November 2000 on no exit without strategy, contains questions and guidelines, drawn from the experience of peacekeeping and peace-building of the last decade, which the members of the Council may wish to consider as they decide to launch, close or significantly alter the mandate of a peace operation. This section will conclude with observations on cooperating with regional organizations and some conditions for a successful exit from Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and East Timor.
6. In the second and concluding section, key aspects of the roles of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other United Nations organs and agencies are considered. These roles begin well before an operation is actually established. As a number of members remarked during the Council’s deliberations in November, a good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy.

III. Guidelines for an exit strategy

7. Discussions on whether to “exit” or significantly alter a peacekeeping operation may be prompted by three circumstances: successful completion of the mandate, failure or partial success. In all of these instances, there are a number of issues to be considered when debating the closure of a mission, or passing responsibility to another United Nations or regional body.

Completion of the mandate

8. As many members of the Security Council noted in the November debate, the ultimate purpose of a peace operation is the achievement of a sustainable peace. An international peace is sustainable when two States have arrived at a mutually agreed settlement to their conflict, respecting each other’s political independence and territorial integrity and recognizing common borders, which they have demarcated or have agreed to have demarcated. I would encourage Member States to make greater use of the International Court of Justice to settle those disputes, as has been done very effectively by Honduras and Nicaragua to settle a dispute concerning the Mosquito Coast. Another example is the decision of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to submit their dispute over the Aouzou Strip to the Court, for judgement, a judgement whose implementation was supported by deployment of the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG).

9. Even with a full commitment of the political will needed for an international settlement, the United Nations plays an essential role in facilitating both the restoration of mutual confidence and the rehabilitation that help make an agreed border and a negotiated peace work. As in the case of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), peace-building activities include monitoring the separation of forces and technical assistance in humanitarian mine action, while coordinating with other international actors and agencies of the United Nations system that are assisting in the return and resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced.

10. A sustainable domestic peace presents even more complex challenges. It becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance. In many cases, an effective strategy for realizing that objective is to help warring parties to move their political or economic struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged and future disputes can be addressed in a similar fashion. To facilitate such a transition, a mission’s mandate should include peace-building and incorporate such elements as institution-building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, by assisting the parties to develop legitimate and broad-based institutions.

11. As discussed in the Security Council on 5 February 2001, peace-building is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Strengthening State institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land reform, strengthening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all are seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance. The aim of peace-building is to build the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts. In effect, peace-building is also the front line of preventive action.

12. Domestic peace has typically been most sustainable when it has gone beyond a stable truce or the mere capacity to deter armed rebellion. Successful cases have often included reformed systems of governance that are responsive to people’s basic needs at the local, regional, and national levels. Sustainable development is indispensable to such a peace. This can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development.
13. Peace-building strategies for United Nations engagement should therefore be “strategic” in the ordinary sense of that term, matching means to ends. Although a peace-building strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local sources of hostility by coupling local capacities for change with whatever international commitment is available to assist the process. It is this interaction of international commitment, or its absence, with local capacities and factional hostility that shapes the prospects for successful peace-building. Few peace-building plans work unless regional neighbours and other significant international actors desist from supporting war and begin supporting peace. The end of cold war competition was thus an important precondition for the blossoming of major peace-building components within the peacekeeping operations of the early 1990s.

14. The characteristics of the parties must be taken into account in planning peace-building activities. For example, the more hostile and numerous the factions, the greater the numbers of displaced, and the larger the presence of vulnerable groups (conditions prevalent, for example, in Somalia in 1992), the more difficult the peace process will be and the more international assistance and authority will be needed if peace is to be established.

15. In less hostile circumstances, international monitoring might be sufficient to establish a self-enforcing peace. Monitoring helps to create transparency among partners lacking trust but having compatible incentives favouring peace. Peacekeeping and related assistance can also reduce tradeoffs — helping, for example, to fund and certify the cantonment, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as was done in El Salvador with the assistance of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and in Mozambique with the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In these circumstances international coordination and assistance can be crucial to overcoming hostility and solving implementation problems.

16. The best signal that peacekeeping will succeed is a comprehensive peace settlement. Going beyond a simple agreement to stop fighting, it should address the root causes of the conflict and establish either the semi-sovereign institutions that are needed to manage a peaceful transition — as the Supreme National Council did in Cambodia — or itself embody the agreed terms of reformed sovereign institutions — as, for example, the Salvadoran peace treaties did. In these favourable circumstances, an international peacekeeping presence itself can deter violations, because of the possible costs of abrogating international agreements and triggering further international involvement in domestic affairs.

17. In more hostile circumstances, operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can help to solve commitment and cooperation problems by directly implementing agreements, or raising the costs of violating peace agreements. In these cases the use of force to resist attempts by the parties to prevent the operations from fulfilling their mandates should be — and typically is — authorized and resourced in support of or as a substitute for a comprehensive peace treaty, as in the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia or the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively. Such robust support may be required to overcome deep sources of distrust and powerful incentives to violate agreed provisions of the peace. As in Kosovo, the existence of hostile, multiple factions that lack coherent leadership complicates the problem of achieving self-enforcing peace. Instead, conscious direction by an impartial international agent to guarantee the functions of effective sovereignty and respect for human rights can become temporarily necessary.

18. War-torn countries also vary in economic and social capacity. Some war-torn countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, started out with considerable economic development. Even after the war, they may still have considerable social capacity in the form of an educated population. Others began poor and the war impoverished them further (Angola, Cambodia, the Sudan). In both cases, reconstruction is vital; the greater the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must become. International economic relief and productive jobs are the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to truly disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics. Local populations will benefit from international assistance in the reconstruction of institutions, including a unified army and police force and the even more challenging development of a school system that can assist in the reconciliation of future generations.
19. The strengthening of legitimate institutions as a simultaneous and/or follow-on element of a peacekeeping operation, therefore, is often central to United Nations involvement in countries trying to put a civil conflict behind them. This raises another important issue related to the success of such a transition: the availability of the resources required to implement the mandate, ensuring that the operation and its partners have the necessary technical and administrative tools and capacity to address critical elements of the programme, such as re-establishing civil administration and basic civil infrastructure, as well as effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

20. The United Nations system has recently identified three key objectives whose fulfilment has often brought about successful, comprehensive peace-building:

   (a) **Consolidating internal and external security.** This involves the deployment of peacekeepers and/or military observers to ensure security or negotiate access in order to promote security sector reform, including the creation of a neutral police force broadly representative of the community; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; judicial and penal reform; and mine clearance and capacity-building for mine action.

   (b) **Strengthening political institutions and good governance.** This requires the creation or strengthening of national democratic institutions, political parties and other participatory mechanisms, including the media; capacity-building for government and civil society; technical assistance in human rights; civic education and training; electoral assistance, including the development of electoral law, a code of conduct, and electoral councils; and support for the fight against corruption.

   (c) **Promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation.** This involves fostering conditions for resumed economic and social development; sustainable return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees; confidence-building measures conducive to national reconciliation; stimulation of maximum involvement of civil society, especially women, and of national non-governmental organizations; attention to the needs of youth, especially young men; providing social services (health education, water and sanitation); providing sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilized soldiers and returning refugees and displaced persons; job creation, microcredit schemes and the promotion of income-generating activities; reconstructing roads, bridges and railways to provide access to war-devastated areas for resettlement and agricultural production; and psychosocial trauma counselling for war-affected groups.

21. Given the potentially large challenges and costs such comprehensive peace-building often encompasses, it is essential to ensure that all key parts of the United Nations system are fully engaged in a collaborative and constructive fashion. I wish to highlight this point because no single department or agency can be expected to devise and implement, on its own, all the elements of a comprehensive peace strategy. As a number of Security Council members said last November, a successful peacekeeping exit depends on a collaborative and inclusive United Nations system and the effectiveness of other international actors, including the international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations that are not part of the operation.

22. The work of these actors, including United Nations agencies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank and various bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and developmental agencies (governmental and non-governmental) must continue long after the peacekeeping operation has withdrawn. In order to ensure a smooth handover to these entities, preparations should be made from the early stages of a peacekeeping operation. The closer these partners are associated with the peacekeeping operation throughout its presence in the mission area, the greater the likelihood that they will be well placed to carry the peace-building process forward. The practice of appointing the United Nations Resident Coordinator as Deputy Special Representative or Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General facilitates this transition, allowing an early revival of development programming and a smooth handover from the peace operation personnel to the United Nations country team, composed primarily of representatives of operational agencies. Likewise, at Headquarters, the forging of closer institutional links between the intergovernmental and internal United Nations entities responsible for peace and security and development,
respectively, should enable policymakers to maintain the strategic direction of a peace-building process. Considerable progress has been made within the United Nations in improving institutional coordination and further efforts towards this objective are ongoing.

23. Frequently, the improved security situation that accompanies a peacekeeping deployment results in a dramatic improvement in the economy of the mission area. Both public and private investment tends to rise, as does the flow of non-military foreign assistance. However, when a large operation withdraws, this can have a highly visible, negative effect, both on businesses that had thrived by providing goods and services to the mission and on local personnel who had worked for it. In many cases, these effects are limited to specific sectors and do not outweigh overall improvements in the economy, but they are real nonetheless. This is another reason why a carefully planned transition is essential, so that the gains made during a peacekeeping deployment can be sustained.

24. It must be acknowledged, however, that a comprehensive strategy, such as that advocated above, is not always possible in the short run. There are occasions when the most that can be hoped for is to establish a stabilizing presence based on a limited agreement. When for example the opportunity arises to consolidate a ceasefire and thereby contain the conflict and reduce human suffering, that opportunity should not be lost. In those circumstances, once a modicum of stability has been achieved, and the passions of the war have subsided, the improved political environment can enhance the chances of forging and implementing a lasting peace.

25. Even when a mandate has been successfully completed, the Security Council may still wish to review the situation. Are current achievements sustainable in the wake of a withdrawal? Could they be consolidated in a follow-on mission by the United Nations or a regional organization? Are the requisite capacity and resources assured? Will the next phase leave the situation better than the previous one?

**Failure to complete the mandate**

26. In other cases, the Security Council may determine that the situation on the ground has fundamentally changed, or that the mission is not making a positive contribution and that there are no apparent prospects for its doing so. Withdrawal might be made in recognition of the fact that failure sometimes occurs because conditions for an orderly transition to post-conflict peace-building do not materialize. The experiences of the United Nations in Angola and Somalia, for instance, illustrate that, while peacekeeping operations can make the difference between war and peace under the right conditions, they are not the appropriate tool under other circumstances, especially when the parties concerned adamantly refuse to cooperate or to abide by their own commitments. In such cases, however, other tools, such as authorized action by regional organizations, or multinational operations with the consent of the host State, or governmental or non-governmental initiatives to mediate a peace, might prove fruitful. Mission closure, as a result of the failure of the parties to abide by their agreements, does not represent an end to the responsibility of either the United Nations system or the Security Council, nor need it signal an end to the Council’s involvement. Council members individually and collectively should consider what forms of leverage are available to address the conflict, including the recruiting of “Friends of the Secretary-General” to lend their influence to the restoration of peace. Given the stakes inherent in outright failure and withdrawal, the Council may wish to visit the crisis area, to signal its continuing interest; to gather first-hand information; and to promote new thinking and strategies among Council members about possible next steps.

27. When the members of the Security Council themselves are unable for a variety of reasons to maintain their commitment to seeing the mission through to a successful completion, the questions to be asked should focus on what alternatives to a United Nations peace operation are available for making a positive contribution. In this regard the continuing engagement of the humanitarian agencies, when their activities can be pursued in a fashion that does not endanger the lives of their personnel, will not be an adequate substitute for peacekeeping but can be essential for mitigating the effects of the withdrawal of the peace operation.

28. In the past decade, the experiences of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), one inter-state and one intra-state but both exiting without a follow-on strategy, have shown that closure can be costly in both financial and human terms. UNPREDEP was fulfilling its mandate,
monitoring the volatile borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and seemingly successfully deterring both cross-border attacks and lesser destabilizing incursions, when the Security Council chose to end it in 1999. Current border challenges by armed insurgent groups operating with bases in Kosovo might have been avoided had UNPREDEP been permitted to continue, albeit in reduced form. The genocide in Rwanda that followed the Council decision to radically reduce, rather than reinforce, the capacities of UNAMIR has occasioned soul-searching and painful assessments of responsibility, including those made by the Independent Inquiry. Failure by both the Secretariat and the Security Council to prevent or halt the genocide once its extent became known has been documented. It is also worth noting that when the international community belatedly accepted responsibility for addressing the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region, the consequent costs of refugee assistance vastly exceeded the largest estimates of the costs of a reinforced UNAMIR. For example, in financial terms, the actual cost of UNAMIR was $4.37 million; the annual cost of the additional 5,000 soldiers the Force Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, thought were needed to prevent or stop the genocide has been estimated at $500 million; the cost of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and the region consequent on the genocide was in excess of $4.5 billion.

**Partial success**

29. Between clear-cut success and failure there lies a large grey area. When confronted with an ambiguous situation, the Security Council may consider withdrawing an operation that is making a positive contribution in some respects but is being stymied in others. In this uncertain realm, it might be helpful to ask the following: Has the peace operation had a positive impact on the lives of those caught in the crisis? Is the country better off than it would have been without a United Nations peacekeeping operation? Fundamentally for the purposes of this report, are the gains sustainable if the operation were to be withdrawn? These types of question may be appropriate when a mission has achieved many aspects of its mandate but is unable to meet all of its goals.

30. The decision-making process is further complicated in situations where the mission has a less encouraging record and an uncertain outlook, and/or casualties or other costs have exceeded expectations. In such cases, the Security Council should critically re-evaluate the mission’s mandate. Is a lower-profile but open-ended mission the best alternative in the absence of a political solution? If the decision is to stay the course, is there a capacity to deter emerging war entrepreneurs or spoilers and/or to counter them through political means? What re-designs in the exit strategy might, as discussed above, successfully assist a transition to a more stable situation or a sustainable peace?

31. The experience in Haiti in 1993 illustrates just such a situation. It was found that the terms of the Governors Island Agreement could not be implemented, given the intransigence of the Cédras regime. The United States of America and the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, then approached the Security Council with a view to authorizing a multinational intervention. Following the transition from the multinational force to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the United Nations took over the peacekeeping and peace-building functions, providing security, helping to build an effective police force, and assisting in reconstruction and rehabilitation. UNMIH and its successor operations supported the Haitian elections and cooperated with the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which promoted human rights, and the Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission. These activities together contributed to a restoration of the legitimately elected Government.

32. In this connection, I wish to highlight a critical hindrance to the ability of the United Nations to implement successfully and efficiently the type of long-term, multiphase mandate that has been suggested throughout this report. It is the weak link of voluntary funding to support programmes which are not part of the peacekeeping operation per se, but on which the ultimate success of the mission may depend. Such voluntary contributions often materialize late or not at all, leaving the peacekeeping operation as an insufficient single prong in what was intended to be a multi-pronged strategy. For example, if an operation is ultimately to hand over its functions to national authorities who require training and equipment, are donors prepared to provide the means? If the operation is to provide stability while the boundary is being demarcated, as in the cases of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and UNMEE, is
there money for the boundary commission? If there is a window of opportunity to remove the war option by demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, are there resources to move this process past the point of no return? Understanding the inherent problem of moving major, long-term expenditures to assessed contributions, Council members may wish to exercise their influence individually and collectively to help muster the requisite voluntary contributions in a timely manner.

33. This is important at the outset of a peacekeeping operation, as well as at the time when it is phased out and replaced with a follow-on presence, such as a peace-building mission. This funding gap will have to be addressed if the Security Council is to enjoy a record of achievement in helping to foster successful peacekeeping exits as well as a self-sustaining peace in their aftermath.

34. Resources can never be a substitute for the political will of the parties. When the parties are prepared to cooperate, however, an adequately resourced United Nations presence can be crucial to the consolidation of peace. Action to remedy this funding gap in future cases of transition would constitute a highly positive and tangible result of the debate that was initiated by the Council on 15 November 2000, and that will continue with consideration of the present report.

Operations under Chapter VIII of the Charter

35. While provision for cooperation with regional organizations is made in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, this has become an important aspect of peacekeeping only in the last decade. By bringing together the motivation and knowledge of local actors with the legitimacy, expertise and resources of the world Organization, in certain situations these partnerships have enhanced the international community’s work for peace.

36. At the same time, the ability of regional organizations to contribute may be limited by a number of factors. Conflicts will continue to erupt in areas where regional organizations lack the resources or expertise to respond effectively; where there are no compelling interests that could spur intervention by major powers; or, alternatively, where major powers have strongly opposed interests that can be reconciled only within a universal forum. There may be political opposition to regional deployment in a particular case, either within the organization or from a host country. Even where regional organizations are capable of contributing, the use of multiple organizations in a single mission area can cause problems of coordination, and greater difficulty in constructing a coherent end-strategy for an operation.

37. For the United Nations, there are concerns that delegation to others can imply a lesser degree of commitment or engagement on the part of the international community; that it could lead to unequal response to conflict in different places; or that inappropriate actions could be taken in the name of the United Nations. The Security Council’s continuing will to act, including through deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations, is crucial.

38. Four specific lessons can be extracted from this experience:

- First, those who will be responsible for implementing a peace agreement should be present during the negotiation phase.
- Second, it is important for the main actors in negotiations to assess realistically the capacity and comparative advantage of different implementing bodies.
- Third, the lines of reporting and division of labour must be unambiguous; otherwise what would ideally be strength in diversity of contributions becomes weakness because of incoherent or self-cancelling efforts.
- Finally, for the potential of these partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations to be enhanced, it is desirable that regional organizations seek to develop their capacity to bring to the field not only military peacekeepers but also other relevant personnel, such as police and judicial or penal experts. These efforts may require support by the wider international community.

Kosovo and East Timor

39. The cases of Kosovo and East Timor reflect important differences in circumstances and illustrate well the challenges of a successful exit strategy. In the case of Kosovo, the mandated benchmark for the exit of UNMIK is tied to a determination of the final status of the territory. No agreement which would command
the necessary support of the parties and the international community appears in sight on this question at this time.

40. In keeping with the mandate, the operation has begun to devolve increasing autonomy and self-government to Kosovo, while avoiding any actions that would prejudice the outcome on final status. This requires my Special Representative to retain certain powers, and an operation capable of supporting him in that role.

41. In the meantime, there is an unavoidable tension between the aspirations of people in Kosovo and the mandate given by the Security Council. There seems no alternative, in these circumstances, to a continuing UNMIK presence, and the strict implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), until such time as an agreement on final status can be reached.

42. In the case of East Timor, the situation is much clearer. The mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is to prepare East Timor for independence, which will be granted, after which UNTAET will be closed. In order to ensure that independence is successful and viable, a follow-on peacekeeping mission will be required to support the new State. The new operation should include military and police components. In addition, the international community will still need to provide substantial civil administration expertise to support the East Timorese.

43. The essential requirement in the case of East Timor is to ensure that the enormous sacrifices of the East Timorese, the substantial investments of the international community, and the cooperation of the parties required to bring about a successful transition to independence are not squandered for lack of international attention and support for the new State. At the same time, it is important to move towards a normal development assistance framework as quickly as is responsibly possible.

IV. The roles of the Security Council and other principal organs

44. In conclusion, I will address the particular roles of the Security Council and other principal United Nations organs and agencies in formulating and implementing these vital decisions. A good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy. In this connection, the Security Council is expected to reach agreement on a clear and achievable mandate based on a common understanding of the nature of the conflict. The Secretariat should provide the candid and well-informed analysis that the Security Council’s decision on an effective peace strategy will require. The members of the Council are expected to use their influence to ensure from the outset that the necessary means of implementation are available, and it is up to the General Assembly to authorize a timely budget allocation. Perhaps most importantly, as a mandate approaches its expiration date or if there are calls for the operation to be closed, it is especially useful for the Security Council to engage in a thorough and frank discussion, both among its members and with troop-contributing countries, of the rationale for renewing the mandate, withdrawing, or significantly downgrading the United Nations presence. In making that decision, the Council may wish to continue and to expand its practice of visiting conflict areas, because of the obvious benefits reaped by decision makers from such first-hand experience. This can be an essential complement to reports by the Secretariat and information that each Council member may obtain through its own channels.

Designing a strategically informed mandate

45. An effective response to a conflict depends on the Security Council members developing a common understanding of the nature of the problem. I endeavour to provide in my reporting the best, most pertinent information available to the Secretariat, including that obtained through the dispatch of fact-finding and technical missions to the area. Analysis of this information is inherent in the preparation of my reports, the purpose of which is to provide all Council members with a common point of departure for discussion and decision-making, identifying options for action as appropriate, coupled with a realistic appraisal of the risks and opportunities of each.

46. This appraisal should assist the Council in deciding on a realistic scope for United Nations involvement. For example, does the situation lend itself to an operation that can assist the parties to achieve a self-sustaining peace, as was the case, for example, in El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia? Or is it more appropriate to think in terms of a longer-term, stabilizing presence, because no self-sustaining political solution is in sight as was the case, for
example, upon the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)? As discussed above, does the proposed authority of the international mandate — whether monitoring, multidimensional assistance, or enforcing — fit the nature of the conflict and the local resources available and ensure sufficient capacity to develop a sustainable peace? Should the Council’s response be confined to one country, or can the situation be meaningfully addressed only on a subregional basis?

47. At this critical point in the decision-making process, there is a particular pitfall to be avoided. When the situation is extremely difficult and the Security Council cannot muster the collective will to address it, there may be a temptation to use the instrument of peacekeeping in circumstances for which it is not suited, as it was used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This can alleviate political pressures in the short run but dooms the operation to eventual failure. There are also broader repercussions, not least the damage that is done to the credibility of the Organization itself, of the Security Council in particular, and of peacekeeping as a viable tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

48. Given that decisions made at this early stage are fundamental to an operation’s success, it is crucial to strengthen the Secretariat’s capacity to provide credible, impartial analysis to support the Council’s deliberations. With this in mind, I wish to note with appreciation the support extended thus far for the reform initiatives set in motion by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The task is unfinished, and I look forward to a continuation of this support so that we can quickly build a Headquarters capacity that is prepared to meet the demands of the early twenty-first century.

49. I wish to stress that sound and efficient information gathering and analysis must be an ongoing process, throughout the life span of any United Nations involvement; it cannot be limited to only the earliest stages of Security Council deliberation and action. After a course is decided upon by the Security Council, events on the ground may change or new information may come to light which affect the assumptions and calculations upon which earlier decisions were made. The Security Council must have the same quality of supporting analysis when undertaking periodic reviews or when contemplating a substantial change in a mission’s mandate.

Implementation

50. Once the Security Council has settled on a course of action, it often has a major role to play in consolidating support for the plan among the parties, regional actors, troop-contributing countries, and Member States more generally. Each of these can be crucial to the mission’s ultimate success or failure. The support of the parties, however, remains a fundamental element in this regard. As deployment proceeds, Council members are often in the best position to shore up that support and, in the process, to gauge the possibility of the emergence of spoilers. Both the Security Council and the Secretariat must resist the temptation to identify and frame a mission’s objective in an optimistic light; they must instead be prepared for worst-case scenarios. While this sort of planning mindset rarely leads to lower budget estimates, it is a matter of public record that, on many occasions, when significant complications arose in the field, United Nations forces have been caught under-staffed, under-equipped and limited in their range of action by mandates that were too narrowly defined.

51. Gaining the support of potential troop contributors is likely to be an easier task if they are effectively consulted on the mandate that the Council eventually adopts, or on the mandate changes that may become necessary as the operation unfolds. In this regard, I am encouraged by the spirit of cooperation signalled by the establishment of a Security Council working group to address this and related issues.

52. No matter how carefully a mission is conceived and tailored to the circumstances, it cannot succeed — and thereby withdraw on the basis of an accomplished mandate — without the timely contribution and deployment of personnel, material and funds. The increasing complexity of mandates, while a necessary response to the types of challenge facing the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, has compounded this problem. It has become critically important that Governments provide specialized units and individuals capable of implementing these mandates. Recent examples would include provisions for judicial and penal services, civil administration or civil engineering tasks and executive policing. While there will almost always be a need for the timely contribution of well-trained and equipped
troops, these are not by themselves sufficient for the success of most operations. Member States must be prepared to supply the specialized capacities, military and non-military alike, to see these mandates through.

53. The General Assembly can play a crucial role in implementing a recommendation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations regarding peacekeeping budgets. The Panel suggested that a small percentage of the operation’s first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission for the design — with the advice of the United Nations country team’s resident coordinator — and funding of quick impact projects in the area of operations. I hope the General Assembly, through its Fifth Committee, will support this recommendation, on a case-by-case basis, when budgets for future peace operations are presented. Likewise, the Panel recommended that the Assembly consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of multidimensional peace operations for the first phase of an operation. Accordingly, I intend to include comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in my plans for future peace operations, as appropriate, so that the Security Council can consider including aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the operations’ mandates and the General Assembly can review proposals for funding demobilization and reintegration programmes, in the start-up phase, in mission budgets. I am pleased, in this connection, to note the willingness of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to explore the concept of earmarking a small percentage of a mission’s first-year budget for quick impact projects and its call for the timely provision of adequate resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes when they are mandated by the Security Council as part of a peacekeeping operation.

54. At the request of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council has recently created an ad hoc advisory group on countries emerging from conflict, with a special focus on Africa. As one representative of a Member State suggested during the Security Council debate, this work should also yield important results in informing the smooth handover from peace operations to the longer-term efforts of the United Nations to promote durable peace and sustainable development.

Rationales for leaving, staying, or altering the mandate

55. At what point in a peace process should the Security Council consider closing a mission, or significantly downgrading its involvement in a situation? In the simplest of terms, any such decision would appear to be influenced by success or failure as judged in relation to the mandate given to the operation by the Council. However, it is in the grey area between clear success and failure that a decision becomes complex.

56. In some cases, the Security Council has determined that the mission achieved its mandate. In Mozambique, it was concluded that ONUMOZ had accomplished its objectives, and that there was no need to renew the mission’s mandate. In the case of El Salvador, similarly, ONUSAL succeeded in helping the parties towards a lasting peace. At the time of the Mission’s withdrawal, however, there were still some aspects of the accords that had not been implemented. As a result, and at the request of the parties, the United Nations maintained a smaller presence after ONUSAL was withdrawn in 1995. In other circumstances, as noted by Council members in the November debate, follow-on peace-building missions, such as the Peace-building Support Offices in the Central African Republic and Tajikistan, have been established to assist the Governments concerned in consolidating the stability achieved through the peacekeeping operation.

57. More challenging than these situations, however, is deciding upon a course of action when success is proving elusive. Given the unpredictability of conflicts, this is by no means an unusual circumstance. How long should the operation remain? Would the alternative be renewed fighting? Is there a reasonable prospect for progress resulting from a continued United Nations presence? Is this the “least bad” option? If the answer to those questions were yes, the argument for persevering would be strong. During the Council’s November debate one representative aptly noted that, if the Security Council does not deal with the causes of conflict, the United Nations will be reduced to dealing with the consequences of conflict, meaning that agencies … such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme will end up paying the consequences.

58. In other circumstances, finally, the Security Council may determine that, in the absence of sufficient commitment and cooperation on the part of the parties, there is no rationale for maintaining the peacekeeping operation in place. In Angola and Somalia, for example, the Council concluded that withdrawing the missions was the only viable course of action. Reconciliation cannot be imposed. A peacekeeping operation is the wrong instrument if the parties are bent on war and its presence may become a hindrance to conflict resolution. In the latter circumstances, however, adequate provision must be made for continuing progress already made towards a self-sustaining peace, or, should a premature closure of a mission become necessary, mitigating the humanitarian consequences of the decision reached by the Council.
### Key questions in the life of a peacekeeping operation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate formation</th>
<th>Periodic or episodic review</th>
<th>Consideration of withdrawal</th>
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<td>What is a realistic scope for United Nations involvement? A multidimensional effort with the appropriate level of authority to achieve a self-sustaining peace? A longer-term stabilizing presence?</td>
<td>Is satisfactory progress being made, and is it anticipated that existing trends will continue?</td>
<td>If the mandate’s objectives were met, should they be reviewed in new circumstances?</td>
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<td>How will we know that the mandate has been achieved? What are the benchmarks by which to judge success?</td>
<td>Do parties and troop-contributing countries continue to support the mission and its objectives?</td>
<td>What are the views of parties and troop-contributing countries?</td>
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<td>If success (and hence a successful exit) depends on activities not funded through assessed contributions, can we be assured that voluntary funding will be available in time?</td>
<td>If spoilers have surfaced, what leverage does the Security Council have at its disposal to induce them back to the peace process?</td>
<td>Are current achievements sustainable in the wake of a withdrawal?</td>
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<td>Why have the parties agreed to the proposed mandate?</td>
<td>Do donors continue to support the elements funded by voluntary contributions?</td>
<td>Could these achievements be consolidated in a follow-on mission? (United Nations or regional organization? Is funding assured?)</td>
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<td>Does their consent and cooperation result from war weariness; from the conclusion that they can get as much or more through the peace process than on the battlefield; from pressures from key internal constituencies; from pressures brought to bear by erstwhile supporters or other external players?</td>
<td>If fundamental problems exist, are they the result of inappropriate objectives?</td>
<td>If the mission’s impact has been very limited, should the Security Council revisit the original objectives?</td>
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<td>Whatever the factors involved, are consent and cooperation sustainable as For those elements lagging in implementation, how can they be assisted?</td>
<td>Have any political alternatives appeared since the mission’s launch?</td>
<td>If there is little prospect of achieving the mandate, is the mission nevertheless making a necessary contribution which warrants its extension? Should the original objective be revised to reflect this reality?</td>
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<td>With a mixed record, and dim prospects, what are the costs and benefits of remaining and withdrawing?</td>
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<td>If the mission is deemed a failure, what other</td>
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the peace process moves forward? (For example, if a party enters the process on the assumption that it will win an election, and it later becomes apparent that it will lose, will it still be in a position to pursue the war option? If so, will the Security Council have leverage with which to forestall this possibility?)

What will be the alternatives in the event that spoilers emerge, or parties who may have accepted a ceasefire for the sole purpose of buying time within which to rebuild their war capacity?

How viable is the war option for the parties, and how can it be made less attractive or practical?

Are the necessary troops, police and other personnel available in the short term? or in the medium term? If this mission is to provide a longer-term, stabilizing presence, is it likely that personnel contributors will be available throughout the life of the operation?

Have we prepared our respective publics for the risks and costs, or promoted an understanding of why these are warranted?

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<td>means does the Security Council have to play a positive role in this situation?</td>
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