UN Peacekeeping Operations: Debate
Tomorrow afternoon (18 September), the Security Council will hold a debate on peacekeeping reform pursuant to resolution 2378 of 20 September 2017. UN Secretary-General António Guterres is the anticipated briefer. In addition to Council members, seven members states—Austria, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, and Portugal—are expected to take part in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. The African Union (AU) will also participate under rule 39.
The Secretary-General’s report on the review on the future of all forms of peace operations, which was submitted to both the Security Council and the General Assembly on 20 August, is expected to be a major focus of the meeting. The review was undertaken in line with the September 2024 Pact for the Future, which requested the Secretary-General to “provide strategic and action-oriented recommendations for the consideration of member states on how the United Nations toolbox can be adapted to meet evolving needs, to allow for more agile, tailored responses to existing, emerging and future challenges”. (The Pact, which was agreed by world leaders through intergovernmental negotiations, outlines member states’ vision for the future of multilateralism).
The review advocates for resetting peace operations in a divisive, multipolar era, with a sharper focus on peacemaking, stronger partnerships with host states, and more focused mandates. It also emphasises the importance of a networked approach that continues to capitalise on the UN’s comparative advantages, while leveraging partnerships with regional organisations, troop-and police-contributing countries, and other key stakeholders. Among its recommendations, the review calls on the Security Council to agree on a long-term strategic vision of the end state of each peace operation, to use mandate renewals as an opportunity to modify mission priorities, and to continue to distinguish between the roles, responsibilities, and mandated tasks of UN peace operations deployed alongside non-UN peace enforcement missions. (For background and more information on the review, see the brief on UN peacekeeping in our September 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 27 August What’s in Blue story.)
France, the Security Council’s president in September, has circulated a concept note to Council members in preparation for the meeting. It apparently states that the meeting will provide an occasion for the Council “to respond to the study’s recommendations, to identify the adaptations that are needed, and to outline directions for the future of peacekeeping”. It proposes several questions to help guide the discussion, including:
- What new forms can peacekeeping operations take to address the challenges of modern crises?
- How can the Security Council adapt its practices to obtain more targeted mandates and better tailor them with each renewal?
- How can the Security Council improve dialogue with host countries to foster a synergistic relationship between them and the Council in the pursuit of political solutions?
- What are the priorities when it comes to improving missions’ access to key new technological capabilities?
On 26 August, Guterres briefed the General Assembly on his report and recommendations. This briefing was followed by informal consultations of Security Council members that the “peacekeeping duo” (Denmark and Pakistan), supported by Latvia, convened on 27 August. Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo briefed during that meeting, apparently highlighting the relevant aspects of the review and its recommendations on peacekeeping and special political missions (SPMs), respectively, and members expressed their initial reactions to the review.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Guterres may note that while peacekeeping operations are an important tool for maintaining international peace and security, their effectiveness in each case is linked to a viable political strategy and the unified support of the Security Council. As in his 26 General Assembly statement, he may maintain that a peacekeeping mission should only be deployed when a robust ceasefire or peace deal has been agreed and emphasise that mandates should be adapted to align with realities on the ground. He might also note the need for member states to provide the financial and technological resources required for missions to operate effectively. In addition, the Secretary-General might discuss ways in which the UN can support peace enforcement actions pursued by non-UN actors. In this regard, he might reference resolution 2719 of 21 December 2023, which has yet to be operationalised but provides for the financing of African Union (AU)-led peace support operations (AUPSOs) from UN assessed contributions on a case-by-case basis.
Tomorrow, several Council members may reaffirm that UN peacekeeping is a key instrument in the Council’s efforts to resolve conflict and promote peace. They may welcome the review’s call for cost-effective peacekeeping missions linked to political solutions and tailored to specific contexts. Some may underscore, however, that reducing costs needs to be done in a way that does not deprive missions of the resources they need to be successful. This point was made by Pakistan during the 26 August General Assembly meeting, when it asserted that “cost cutting must not become the central logic of reform because peacekeeping is a global public good [that] requires adequate resources and sustained political backing by the Council and the wider membership”. The UN’s current liquidity crisis has resulted in large part from the failure of some member states to pay their assessed contributions in full and on time. Notable in this regard is that the US. Although it paid $125 million of its assessed contribution last week, this represents only a small fraction of US peacekeeping dues, and it is currently $2.89 billion in arrears.
Some members may emphasise the importance of addressing concerns related to women, peace and security (WPS); climate, peace and security; and other thematic issues in crafting mandates. Other members, such as the US and Russia, believe that such thematic issues are not fundamental to the core peace and security objectives of peacekeeping operations. The tension between these different perspectives may be apparent during tomorrow’s debate.
The important role that peacekeeping missions play in protecting civilians may also be raised. Some members might stress the need to give priority to protecting civilians, especially in light of the operational constraints that UN peacekeeping operations are facing in effectively carrying out their mandates due to the liquidity crisis and the resulting fund and personnel reductions.
The review calls for a new partnership with host states to help address the challenges facing UN peace operations. While host state consent is an important tenet of UN peacekeeping operations, there are differing views regarding how much deference to give to the views of the host state, especially in circumstances where the authority of the government is being challenged by other national stakeholders and the UN is expected to play an impartial mediation role.
The review reiterates the frequently quoted phrase from the 2000 Brahimi report on peace operations: “the Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear”. In this regard, another important focus of tomorrow’s discussion might be ways to enhance the UN Secretariat’s capacity to provide early warning and fine-grained analysis to the Security Council to help inform its decision-making. Members may also emphasise the importance of receiving well-considered, concrete options from the Secretariat regarding the design and potential adjustment of mission mandates, tailored to the specific contexts under consideration.
In the coming months, Council members could consider discussing the recommendations of the review in the context of the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, once they are able to break the impasse over the allocation of chairs for subsidiary bodies. As well, the wider UN membership might consider taking the review’s recommendations forward in other UN forums. For example, some may wish to discuss them during the upcoming sessions of the relevant intergovernmental committees of the General Assembly, including the Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee) and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34). Such deliberations may allow for the development of some initial ideas on the future of peacekeeping that could be discussed with the next Secretary-General in early 2027.
