Syria: Briefing and Consultations
On Thursday morning (17 September), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on Syria. Deputy Special Envoy for Syria Claudio Cordone, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher, and a civil society representative are expected to brief. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.
The meeting will take place against the backdrop of ongoing efforts to consolidate Syria’s political transition. The Syrian interim government—led by interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa—has made significant strides in state-building and international reintegration this year, developments that are expected to feature prominently in Thursday’s discussions. Council members are also likely to address recent security incidents and external pressures, with a focus on sustaining momentum, supporting stability, and encouraging an inclusive transition.
Israel’s continued military presence in southern Syria is likely to be a key focus of the meeting. On 9 September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited a military position on Mount Hermon, inside Syrian territory, accompanied by Defence Minister Israel Katz and senior military officials. Netanyahu said that Israel had established “absolute control” over the area stretching from the mountain’s summit south to the Yarmouk River and west to the Mediterranean Sea, while Katz indicated that Israeli forces would remain there, calling the area a “security zone”. Damascus condemned the visit as a violation of Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity and called for a return to implementation of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement between the two countries. On 11 September, Syria’s Permanent Representative to the UN Ibrahim Olabi was joined by representatives of many other member states—including Council members Bahrain, China, Denmark, France, Pakistan, Russia, and Somalia—in a press stakeout condemning the incident and warning that such escalations could undermine recent progress made by the Syrian government.
Netanyahu’s visit marks an additional escalation following over a year of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) military activity east of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement ceasefire line. The Secretary-General’s 2 June report on the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) confirmed that such military activity has included sustained maintenance by the IDF of military positions within Syrian territory and the areas of separation and limitation delineated by the agreement.
Cordone and several Council members are expected to reiterate concerns regarding violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and call on Israel to withdraw from Syrian territory and to fully adhere to the 1974 agreement. While some members—such as the A3 grouping (the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], Liberia, and Somalia), China, Pakistan, and Russia—may condemn Israeli actions in stronger terms, others may put more emphasis on the need for a negotiated security arrangement, while expressing support for US mediation between the two parties. Some members may also echo concerns highlighted in an 8 September statement by the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, which noted that Israel’s continued holding of 49 Syrian individuals, including two children, who were detained by the IDF on Syrian territory, may amount to war crimes.
The situation in the southern governorate of Suweida—where tensions have persisted between government forces and armed Druze groups—is also likely to feature in Thursday’s discussions. In late August and early September, clashes were reported in Suweida, leaving one Druze militia member dead and at least ten Syrian security personnel injured. The developments illustrated that the governorate remains a flashpoint amid a lack of trust between Damascus and local Druze factions. Suweida is one of the only territories of the country that remains outside of the Syrian government’s control, and some Druze leaders continue to make statements suggesting separatist agendas. Cordone and Council members may stress that, in light of the fraught security situation in the governorate, it is critical to renew efforts to implement the September 2025 Suweida roadmap agreed by Jordan, Syria, and the US, including through accountability, dialogue, and confidence-building measures.
Regarding northeast Syria, Cordone is expected to note continued implementation of the 29 January agreement between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). On 25 August, the SDF announced its dissolution and the merging of its soldiers with those of the Syrian authorities’ forces. Cordone may brief members on pending issues in the integration process, including the future status of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), an all-female Kurdish force, which remains under discussion. Members are likely to encourage Damascus to maintain progress and engage constructively on outstanding issues.
Cordone is also expected to update members on his recent engagement with Syrian officials and civil society. During his most recent visit to Damascus in early September, he met with the Speaker of the People’s Assembly, Abdul Hamid al-Awak, and the governors of Aleppo, Idlib, Latakia, and Tartous, where he discussed UN support for the transition, including on reconstruction and recovery; the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs); transitional justice; and social cohesion.
Council members are likely to reiterate their support for a Syrian-owned and Syrian-led political transition based on the key principles of resolution 2254 of 18 December 2015. In this regard, some Council members may underscore the need for Damascus to promote inclusion and the participation of civil society and women in all transitional processes. Speakers may note or commend continued arrests by the Syrian authorities of former government officials for their involvement in war crimes during the civil war. At the same time, some Council members may stress the need for accountability for crimes committed both during the war and since the interim authorities took power in December 2024, and for transitional justice efforts to be transparent and in line with international standards. Furthermore, several Council members may reiterate calls for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria to be relocated from Geneva to Damascus, to better support the Syrian authorities on several aspects of the transition.
Some speakers may commend Syria on steps it has taken to ensure compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On 9 September, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) unanimously adopted a resolution terminating the Agency’s investigations into Syria’s non-compliance, after Damascus took steps to ensure the IAEA has access to sites suspected to be part of the former government’s nuclear programme.
Syria’s humanitarian situation is also expected to feature prominently at Thursday’s meeting. Among other issues, Fletcher is likely to highlight the deadly toll of explosive ordnance contamination across Syria. For instance, earlier this month, two significant explosions took place in Idlib governorate: on 1 September, an ammunition-laden vehicle reportedly exploded in the town of Binnish, killing five people, and on 9 September, an explosion at a temporary weapons depot near the town of Sarmada reportedly killed at least 14 people and wounded 11 others. Fletcher may underscore how such incidents reflect the severe threat that unexploded ordnance poses to civilian life across Syria, while noting that since December 2024, more than 1,400 explosive ordnance incidents have been documented, causing nearly 2,500 civilian casualties, including 800 deaths. He might note that investment in Syria’s recovery process must also include support for reducing explosive ordnance contamination, alongside efforts to ensure that returns of refugees and IDPs are safe, voluntary, and sustainable. Additionally, he may call for more funding and support for humanitarian operations, noting that the UN’s 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the country, requiring $2.92 billion, remains only 30 percent funded.
The briefers and Council members are also likely to stress the need for sustained international support for Syria’s recovery and reconstruction. Although Damascus has taken steps to rehabilitate Syria’s economy and global standing, the economic crisis continues to weigh heavily on the population, as reflected in large protests over rising fuel costs that began on 13 September. In this regard, some speakers may stress Syria’s vulnerability to regional tensions and supply route disruptions, while emphasising the importance of insulating the country from external threats to its recovery.
