Sudan Sanctions: Vote on a Draft Resolution Extending the Sanctions Regime
Tomorrow morning (11 September), the Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution renewing the 1591 Sudan sanctions regime, which includes targeted sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) and an arms embargo, for one month, until 9 October 2026. The draft text was authored by the US, the penholder on Sudan sanctions.
The draft text in blue is a “technical rollover” extending the Sudan sanctions measures last renewed by resolution 2791 of 12 September 2025. (The term “technical rollover” is commonly used by diplomats to describe a concise resolution extending a peace operation’s mandate without altering its core mandate or tasks, usually for a shorter period than is customary.) The draft text in blue also expresses the Council’s intention to review the mandate of the Panel of Experts (PoE) assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and to take appropriate action regarding the further extension of the mandate no later than 9 October.
Tomorrow’s adoption comes after several weeks of long and arduous negotiations on an earlier draft expanding the arms embargo. Divergent views among Council members on the utility of the current sanctions regime, as well as the extent and manner in which it should be adjusted to reflect evolving realities on the ground were clear during the negotiations and led to the vote being postponed from today (10 September) to tomorrow.
The US circulated an initial draft to all Council members on 13 August, after first discussing the text with the other permanent members. This was followed by three revised drafts, two rounds of negotiations, and two breaks of the silence procedure. Significant disagreements among members eventually led the penholder to propose a technical rollover to allow additional time for negotiations. The US circulated the technical rollover draft yesterday (9 September) and placed it under silence procedure until 1 pm earlier today, which was extended to 3 pm. The draft passed silence and was subsequently put in blue for a vote tomorrow.
This year’s negotiations have unfolded amid a sharply deteriorating security situation across several front lines, including in Darfur, Kordofan, and Blue Nile. There has also been growing concern about the increasing use of drones and other advanced weaponry, which has intensified civilian suffering as attacks increasingly affect populated areas and critical infrastructure. There are also continuing reports of the regional dimensions of the conflict, including external military support to the parties, the cross-border flows of weapons and fighters into Sudan, and the spillover of the conflict into neighbouring countries. Against this backdrop, the Council has continued to grapple with ineffective implementation of the sanctions regime and recurrent reports of violations. (For more information, see the brief on Sudan in our September 2026 Monthly Forecast as well as our 4 and 21 August What’s in Blue stories.)
Amid reports indicating that numerous external actors are supplying the warring parties with weapons and the spread of violence across the country, several member states and civil society organisations have advocated expanding the geographical scope of the sanctions regime beyond Darfur to encompass the entire country. (Since its inception in 2004, the regime has remained geographically limited to Darfur.) The issue has resurfaced repeatedly in the Council in recent years, most recently during the negotiations on resolution 2791. The African Council members (A3), China, Pakistan, and Russia have, however, opposed expanding the geographical scope of the sanctions measures beyond Darfur. These members are more sympathetic to the government led by Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) leader General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, underscoring its sovereign authority and its efforts to protect civilians and coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid. Some Council members, particularly the P3 (France, the UK, and the US), on the other hand, consider both the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the SAF to be responsible for the ongoing atrocities in Sudan and unfit to govern the country.
It appears that the zero draft prepared by the US sought to expand the arms embargo to cover the entire territory of Sudan and to apply to all parties operating in the country. This draft also included provisions reaffirming that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and systems (UAS), including dual-use components and associated technologies, fall within the scope of the arms embargo. It further requested the Secretary-General to increase the number of experts serving on the PoE supporting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee and strengthened cooperation between the Panel and expert groups supporting other sanctions regimes in the region.
It appears that several Council members supported the US proposal and engaged substantively on its provisions. The proposal, however, did not garner support from some members, including the A3 members—the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Liberia, and Somalia—as well as China, Pakistan, and Russia. These members apparently did not engage on the substance of the proposal and instead reiterated their preference for a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime for another year without expanding it beyond Darfur.
Additionally, divergences apparently emerged among the A3 members over whether and how to engage on the text’s substantive provisions, while some wanted a technical rollover, and others sought to provide comments. Concerns were also raised about other substantive provisions of the US draft, beyond the geographical scope of the sanctions. For example, some members, such as China and Russia, apparently maintained that there was an overemphasis on the use of UAVs and UAS in the conflict and their impact on civilians, raising concerns over the inclusion of provisions relating to dual-use components and associated technologies.
The US incorporated several suggestions put forward by some members—including Denmark, France, Latvia, Panama, and the UK—in subsequent revised drafts. For instance, the listing criteria for targeted sanctions, which had previously focused on actions impeding the peace process or threatening stability in Darfur, were expanded to encompass actions constituting a threat to the stability of Sudan more broadly. The revised criteria also included, among other things, violations of applicable international law in Sudan involving the targeting of civilians; abduction for ransom that generates revenue or provides other support for armed groups; and obstructing the delivery of, access to, or distribution of humanitarian assistance, or attacking humanitarian or medical personnel, facilities, supplies or transport. Additional proposals in revised drafts called for the arms embargo to cover armed mercenary personnel, whether or not originating in member states’ territories, and demanded that member states cease any direct or indirect support to the warring parties, be it logistical, financial or military, which enables the conflict to continue, including by taking measures to prevent the launching and operation of UAVs and UAS from their territories. Furthermore, there was a request for the PoE to submit to the 1591 Sanctions Committee a thematic report on conflict-related sexual violence in Sudan, including information relevant to possible designation by the Committee.
China and Russia apparently remained firm throughout the negotiations in their preference for a straightforward renewal of the sanctions regime and did not provide inputs on the substantive provisions of the text. When breaking silence on the third revised draft, which was placed under silence procedure until 8 September, the A3 members and Pakistan, however, submitted substantive comments on several of the proposed provisions. For instance, the A3 members sought to replace references to “warring parties” and “all parties” operating in Sudan with “all armed non-state actors”, including the RSF. They also proposed language underscoring that the measures contained in the draft resolution are not targeted at the Sudanese authorities. It appears that Pakistan supported the A3 proposals, while maintaining that the sanctions regime should remain limited to Darfur and that the Council’s focus should be on the effective implementation of the existing regime.
