Democratic Republic of the Congo: Briefing and Consultations
Tomorrow morning (29 September), the Security Council will convene for an open briefing and closed consultations on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), including the work of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the DRC and Head of MONUSCO James Swan and a civil society representative are the anticipated briefers. Rwanda is expected to participate under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. France (the penholder on the DRC) is expected to propose press elements following tomorrow’s closed consultations.
Swan is expected to brief on recent political developments in the DRC based on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the mission, which was circulated to Council members on 19 September and covers developments since 19 June (S/2026/748). He may highlight the debate surrounding the constitutional review, as DRC President Félix Tshisekedi has indicated his interest in seeking a third term—which would require constitutional changes—a move that has been denounced by the Congolese opposition. Swan might refer to Tshisekedi’s 27 August announcement launching a “National Dialogue for Peace, Cohesion and State Renewal”, which opposition actors criticised as insufficiently inclusive. Instead, they called for a consensual process to address the country’s political, security, and social challenges. On 15 September, the Coalition Article 64 pour la défense de l’ordre constitutionnel (C64)—which was launched in May by opposition leaders Martin Fayulu, Delly Sesanga, and Jean-Marc Kabund—organised demonstrations across several cities to protest the proposed constitutional changes.
Swan is also likely to describe the deteriorating security situation in eastern DRC, where clashes between the Congolese armed forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo in French, or FARDC) and the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group have persisted in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. He may draw particular attention to the intensification of drone warfare and indiscriminate strikes across different parts of the two provinces, which the Secretary-General’s report notes has significantly heightened the risk to civilians.
At tomorrow’s meeting, Council members are likely to be interested in hearing the latest developments regarding the ongoing mediation efforts, including those carried out as part of the Doha process spearheaded by Qatar; the Washington process under US auspices; and the African-led peace process under the leadership of the African Union (AU) mediator, Togolese President of the Council of Ministers Faure Gnassingbé, and other co-facilitators. (For more information on the co-facilitators, see our 11 April 2025 What’s in Blue story.) Swan may elaborate on MONUSCO’s support for and participation in these processes, including his recent engagements with regional leaders, together with Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region Huang Xia.
The Secretary-General’s report covers the 17-21 August meeting that took place in Switzerland between representatives of the Congolese government and M23 under the Doha process. According to the communiqué released after the meeting, the parties assessed the progress and challenges encountered in implementing their commitments under the Doha process and agreed to establish a mechanism tasked with reviewing progress and addressing challenges in this regard. They also developed a roadmap with sequenced steps and timelines for negotiations on the remaining protocols under the Doha Framework for Peace signed between the Congolese government and the M23 in November 2025.
Tomorrow, Swan may describe the progress in operationalising the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism Plus (EJVM+), which is run by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and is considered a key component of the Ceasefire Oversight and Verification Mechanism (COVM) agreed by the parties in Doha. This included the establishment of its secretariat and the conduct of reconnaissance missions to Minembwe and Masisi, two areas in South Kivu and North Kivu provinces, respectively, which have been experiencing intense fighting recently. Swan may describe the support provided by MONUSCO to the EJVM+ ahead of the mechanism’s first and second ceasefire verification missions conducted in these towns on 24 and 25 August and between 10 and 12 September, respectively. He may also mention his visit to Goma (the capital of North Kivu) last week and his various meetings—including with the EJVM+, which is based in the city—that had a particular focus on ceasefire monitoring.
Another development mentioned in the Secretary-General’s report is the seventh meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM), one of the structures set up under the Washington process, which was held in Geneva on 16 and 17 September. Swan may cover MONUSCO’s participation in this meeting, while highlighting its role in the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process, including the processing and repatriation of former combatants. In this regard, the Secretary-General’s report indicates that 120 former combatants from the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), an ethnic Hutu armed group active in eastern DRC that was implicated in the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda, and other foreign ex-combatants and dependents who remained at the MONUSCO transit camp since 14 May were repatriated to Rwanda on 8 September. At the time of writing, no formal communiqué has been issued in connection with the meeting. According to the communiqué of the last JSCM meeting, which was held on 12 and 13 August, the DRC and Rwanda are expected to hold a trilateral planning conference with the US in October.
Despite the JSCM meetings, tensions between the DRC and Rwanda persist, with both sides alleging violations of commitments undertaken under the Washington Accords that the two countries signed in December 2025 under US auspices. On 24 August, the DRC sent a letter to the Security Council, alleging that “grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” were committed during June and July in “territories occupied by the Rwanda Defence Force and its proxies from Alliance Fleuve Congo/Mouvement du 23 mars (AFC/M23)”. The DRC maintains that these included summary executions, massacres, and bombardments that resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people. An Amnesty International report released on 21 September stated that “Rwanda-backed [M23] fighters have committed horrific human rights abuses against artisanal miners in eastern [DRC] while facilitating the trafficking of gold and coltan to neighbouring Rwanda with the help of Rwandan authorities”. In response, Rwanda sent a letter to the Security Council on 8 September, rejecting the allegations contained in the DRC’s 24 August letter and rejecting its characterisation of the situation in the eastern DRC.
At tomorrow’s meeting, the DRC may highlight a protocol that its government signed with the FDLR on 28 July focused on the disarmament, demobilisation, and cantonment of FDLR combatants, in line with the Washington Accords. On 23 September, the DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation, and Francophonie, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, sent a letter to the Security Council, providing an update on the protocol’s implementation. Tshisekedi also sent a 23 September letter to the Secretary-General, apparently calling for the Secretary-General to recommend that the Security Council explicitly assign the role of monitoring this process to MONUSCO in the mission’s upcoming mandate renewal resolution in December. Rwanda, however, has characterised the move as a delaying tactic, arguing that the Washington Accords call for the FDLR’s neutralisation rather than negotiations with the group, and has accused the Congolese government of intensifying its support to the FDLR and integrating its members into the FARDC.
Swan may also brief Council members about the African-led mediation effort, which has once again become more active. In this regard, he might refer to a meeting that took place in Gaborone, Botswana, between 24 and 26 July, which apparently resulted in the development of a political roadmap outlining the AU’s core objectives and key priorities in support of finding a negotiated solution to the crisis in eastern DRC.
Council members welcome progress in the ongoing mediation efforts to address the situation in eastern DRC, but they remain concerned that the various agreements signed by the parties have not translated into reduced hostilities on the ground and eased tensions in the region. Members are also broadly supportive of MONUSCO’s role in ceasefire monitoring. DRC Prime Minister Judith Suminwa Tuluka also underscored this issue in her 23 September statement during the general debate of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. Nonetheless, China and Russia have maintained that any potential MONUSCO deployment in South Kivu would require prior authorisation by the Security Council. This issue was apparently a key factor preventing agreement on a draft presidential statement proposed in March by France that sought to facilitate a review and adjustment of the mission’s posture and footprint in accordance with resolution 2808 of 19 December 2025, which most recently renewed MONUSCO’s mandate.
The Ebola outbreak in the DRC is another issue that is likely to feature in tomorrow’s meeting. According to the Secretary-General’s report, this is the country’s most severe Ebola outbreak on record, affecting seven provinces, including Ituri and North Kivu, where MONUSCO continues to operate. As at 14 September, 7,200 confirmed cases and 3,475 deaths were recorded. The report notes that the outbreak has sharply increased needs, placing additional strain on already fragile health systems and humanitarian operations.
