Statement by Shamala Kandiah Thompson, Executive Director, Security Council Report at the Annual Open Debate on Working Methods
Madam President, excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen,
Thank you to Denmark for convening this working methods open debate and for the opportunity to brief the Security Council once again on an issue that is critical to the effectiveness of the Security Council and core to the work of Security Council Report (SCR).
I thank Council members, other member states, UN colleagues, and our counterparts in civil society, whose support and engagement make SCR’s work possible. I would also like to express our appreciation to all our SCAD colleagues for their dedicated work, including on the issue we’re discussing today.
Security Council Report has followed the Council’s working methods closely for more than two decades. We have not just documented their evolution, but tracked how they are implemented. We have published several research reports on working methods, and maintained records of practices such as penholding and the appointment of subsidiary body chairs. SCR has made this institutional memory publicly available to all members and the wider public.
Our experience has led us to conclude that while working methods cannot resolve political differences, they are essential in helping members navigate those differences.
I will focus my remarks on three areas where working methods could be used to help bridge differences: the allocation of subsidiary body chairs; the process for selecting the next Secretary-General and the Council’s relationship with the Secretary-General; and visiting missions.
Subsidiary Body Chairs and Vice-Chairs
Let me first address the allocation of chairs and vice-chairs of subsidiary bodies.
The delay in their allocation is not a new problem. But the delays in the past two years have been of a different scale.
In 2025, the allocation was not agreed until late May. In 2026, there is still no agreement. This is now the longest period without agreed chairs and vice-chairs since the practice of recording this allocation in a presidential note began in 1979.
The current impasse is linked to disagreement over who will chair the 1737 Iran Sanctions Committee and the broader dispute over the reimposition of sanctions on Iran through the “snapback” mechanism.
The Council has a limited contingency arrangement to address this situation. A 2023 presidential note (S/2023/615) states that the responsibilities of the subsidiary body chairs devolve to the Council president if appointments have not been made by 1 January. This arrangement was first used in 2025, with Council members informally agreeing to extend the arrangement beyond January.
The experience of the past two years has shown the limits of this arrangement. The presidency already has substantial responsibilities and cannot realistically chair all subsidiary bodies.
There are also significant practical consequences.
Sanctions committees are not functioning at full capacity. Presidencies have stepped in to perform some urgent, technical tasks – including considering Panel of Experts reports and processing exemption and designation requests. But many other activities have not taken place. Working groups are not functioning. Sanctions committees have not been able to receive briefings from UN agencies and experts. The Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict has accumulated a backlog of country reports for which it has been unable to adopt conclusions, weakening an important accountability mechanism.
This is not just a procedural inconvenience. Subsidiary bodies are part of how the Council implements decisions, monitors sanctions, follows up on mandates, and upholds accountability.
There is a further consequence: incoming elected members have been able to start negotiations over the 2027 chair and vice-chair positions.
Madame President,
The current practice of negotiating chairs as a package is often viewed as an important mechanism for compromise. But this needs to be balanced by the risk of a single unresolved issue derailing agreement on the entire package.
I would like to offer some options for avoiding these delays becoming a yearly occurrence.
First, the Council could consider decoupling uncontested appointments from those that are disputed.
At present, as I mentioned, the allocation is treated as a single package. Members could agree that when a chair is not contested, the appointment can proceed while negotiations continue over the remaining positions.
Second, two-year terms for chairs could be pursued, allowing a member that continues into a second year to retain the chair without being affected by disagreements over positions available to the incoming members.
Third , the Council could strengthen the role of the vice-chairs as a genuine continuity mechanism.
At least one vice-chair of each subsidiary body could be a continuing Council member and could assume the chair’s functions if agreement on the new chair is delayed.
Finally, the Council could clarify what happens during a prolonged impasse.
A future presidential note could specify the functions that an interim chair or vice-chair could perform, and how those arrangements operate beyond January.
The Secretary-General Selection and Appointment Process and the Council’s Relationship with the Next SG
Turning to the second issue, I would like to recognise how much of the framework established during the previous Secretary-General selection process in 2015–16 has been maintained.
The joint call for candidates by the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council has continued. Candidates’ nominations and vision statements are public, and the General Assembly continues to hold webcast interactive dialogues with candidates. The current process has also included a town hall meeting with candidates as well asa other opportunities for candidates to present their views outside New York – in London, Geneva, Jeju, and Montevideo.
As was done in 2016, candidates have had the opportunity to meet informally with the Council. One innovation has been the press remarks by the Council president following these meetings, providing a public record that the meeting took place.
The Council has also maintained the use of straw polls as its principal mechanism for assessing candidates and retained largely the same modalities. The first straw poll was held on 30 July and the second will be held this Friday.
One of the main criticisms of the 2016 process was the limited transparency around the straw polls. During the negotiations on the modalities in May, members were again unable to agree on publicly releasing the results.
And as in 2016, the results were quickly circulated.
The intense interest in the results—from the wider membership, the media and the public is a good thing. But as we saw in 2016, there is the risk of inaccurate information being circulated with no easy way of verifying it.
There is therefore a case for the Council to consider whether official disclosure could provide greater certainty about the accuracy of the results and create a reliable public record for future analysis.
It would also help to better align the Council’s public messaging with the realities and expectations around the process.
I understand that there may be little appetite to reopen the question in the current selection process. I would, nevertheless, encourage members to carefully consider the downside of not being the source of this information.
A related issue is the sequencing of meetings with candidates ahead of the straw polls. In 2016, all the candidates, including those who entered the race later, took part in the General Assembly’s interactive dialogues, and then met with Council members before being included in the straw polls.
This time that sequence was not maintained. One candidate included in the first straw poll had not gone through the same sequence of engagement with the General Assembly and Security Council.
I recognise that participation in the General Assembly’s interactive dialogues and meeting with Council members are not formal prerequisites for inclusion in a straw poll. But candidates should have comparable opportunities to present themselves to the General Assembly and the Security Council.
This is not simply a question of fairness to the candidates. It is in the interest of Council members.
The Council is making a consequential assessment. Before assessing their standing through straw polls, members should ideally have an opportunity to hear from the candidates.
In this context, I am pleased to hear that the latest candidate, whose nomination was received yesterday, will engage with the General Assembly and informally meet the Council tomorrow.
The Council and the Secretary-General
Madam President,
The relationship with the Secretary-General obviously extends well beyond the selection and appointment process.
As the selection process advances, the Council should consider how it intends to work with the next Secretary-General, especially on conflict prevention, an area most of the candidates have shown an interest in.
At times when the Council lacks the unity to act decisively, the Secretary-General’s ability to balance discreet engagement with assertive action can make a critical contribution to conflict prevention and early warning.
The UN is present in many countries. Through good offices, mediation, Special Representatives and Envoys, regional political offices and country teams, the UN is able to identify emerging risks and support efforts to prevent escalation.
Recently there has been an increased interest in conflict prevention in the Council. Resolution 2788, adopted in 2025, on peaceful settlement of disputes, emphasised preventive diplomacy and early warning as part of the Council’s and the UN system’s preventive toolkit. Last month, in line with this resolution, the Secretary-General presented recommendations for strengthening mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The relationship with the Secretary-General matters not only when the Council is responding to a crisis, but before a crisis comes to the Council.
The Secretary-General should be able to provide the Council not just with information but concrete options for acting in the face of an impending crisis.
In turn, the Council needs to be responsive to early warning signals and be willing to engage and act.
Existing working methods, including informal interactive dialogues and infomal consultations could be better utilised to create regular opportunities for the Secretary-General to brief Council members on emerging risks. The Secretary-General’s lunches with members are also a good venue for discreet discussions.
In addition, reports of the Secretary-General could, where relevant, include a distinct section on early warning to alert Council members to potential deterioration in situations where the UN is present. Such a section could also include concrete recommendations for possible Council action.
Council Visiting Missions
There is one other Council tool that is particularly relevant to prevention but is being underutilised: the visiting mission.
The Council has used visiting missions for more than six decades for a range of purposes, including preventive diplomacy, gathering first-hand information, supporting peace processes and mediation.
But visiting missions are being used less frequently. While there had been between 3 and five missions a year leading up to 2020, in the six years since there have only been four formal visiting missions.
There are a number of reasons for the decline in the use of this tool, including budgetary constraints and political divisions. This may be the time to consider reviving mini-missions involving a subset of members – a format last used in 2010 when the UN mission in Timor-Leste was shutting down.
For greater impact, visiting missions need to be used strategically. Members could decide at the start of the year where it would be most useful for them to go – for example, to better assess if conditions are suitable for a mission to scale down or if a mandate needs to be revised.
A visiting mission could also be useful at a critical stage in a peace process or ahead of elections.
With the insights gained from interactions in the field, Council members may be able to work more closely with the Secretary-General in the area of early warning and preventive diplomacy.
Conclusion
Madame President,
Working methods can act as a bulwark during times of uncertainty and change. But for working methods to be useful, implementation, evaluation and adaptation are needed.
Working methods cannot resolve poltiical differences. But they can help the Council manage those differences, preserve its ability to function, and make better use of its tools.
I hope that this open debate will provide some new ideas towards this end.
Thank you.
