Lebanon: Closed Consultations*
On Friday morning (28 August), Security Council members are expected to hold closed consultations on the situation in Lebanon. It seems that France, the penholder on Lebanon, requested the meeting in light of the deteriorating situation in southern Lebanon and in order to begin considering possible arrangements after the termination of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Jean Arnault, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), and Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix are the anticipated briefers*.
In August 2025, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2790, which extended UNIFIL’s mandate for a final time until 31 December and directed the mission to begin an orderly drawdown and full withdrawal from that date, “and within one year”. During the negotiations on the resolution, the US demanded a definite date for the mission’s termination and signalled its readiness to veto the mandate renewal if it did not contain such a date. None of the other 14 Council members had approached the negotiations seeking UNIFIL’s closure. (For background, see our 28 August 2025 What’s in Blue story.)
The situation in southern Lebanon has significantly evolved since the adoption of resolution 2790 almost a year ago. On 26 June, Lebanon, Israel, and the US signed a Trilateral Framework intended to chart a way to end the latest escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, which began on 2 March shortly after the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February. According to the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the implementation of resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006, as at 20 June, at least 4,106 people, including 386 women and 252 children, as well as 33 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers, had been killed by Israeli military operations in Lebanon since 2 March. The report also noted that at least three Israeli civilians and 36 Israeli soldiers have been killed. During the hostilities, Israel deployed to an area of up to 10 kilometres in Lebanese territory. (For background, see the brief on Lebanon in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast and our 15 July What’s in Blue story.)
Despite the signing of the Trilateral Framework, and subsequent follow-up negotiations, hostilities on the ground have continued, with recent developments heightening concerns of a potential renewed escalation. On 17 August, UNIFIL reported “a marked increase in Israeli military activity in south Lebanon” during the previous two weeks, noting that between 5 and 16 August, the mission recorded an average of 137 projectiles per day. Among other incidents, two Israeli airstrikes in southern Lebanon on 15 August killed 11 people, including three children, in what has been described as the deadliest incident since June. The airstrikes followed a drone attack by Hezbollah against Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL has subsequently continued to observe airstrikes, demolitions, and engineering works by the IDF in its area of operations.
While several options and initiatives about the post-UNIFIL framework have emerged, and informal consultations have been taking place among some Council members, there has yet to be a full discussion among all members on the post-UNIFIL arrangements.
Friday’s consultations follow the regular briefing in closed consultations on the implementation of resolution 1701, which was held on 16 July. It seems that, during that meeting, Lacroix emphasised that an early decision on the post-UNIFIL arrangements would be needed to facilitate planning for a possible transition, noting that the UN Secretariat is preparing for different scenarios but would require guidance from the Council regarding the nature of any successor presence. At that meeting, several members apparently stressed the importance of avoiding a security vacuum in southern Lebanon.
Among the options that may be discussed at Friday’s meeting are those identified by the Secretary-General’s 1 June letter, which was submitted pursuant to the Council’s request in resolution 2790. The options, which do not include the possibility of a temporary extension of UNIFIL, aim at preserving a UN role in support of resolution 1701 while adjusting to the Council’s decision to end the mission’s mandate. They range from a light footprint presence of approximately 1,980 uniformed personnel with limited capacity to support the LAF’s deployment to southern Lebanon and limited verification functions, to a medium-sized mission of around 3,370 personnel, to a larger presence of approximately 5,525 personnel with “the capacity to most credibly observe” developments along the Blue Line and up to the Litani River, with strong liaison, interpositioning and deconfliction capacity, significant ability to verify violations of resolution 1701 and any cessation of hostilities arrangement, and to support the LAF’s deployment. (The Blue Line is a withdrawal line set by the UN in 2000 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. While not an international border, the Blue Line acts in practice as a boundary between Lebanon and Israel in the absence of an agreed-upon border between the two states.)
It seems that recent statements by Lebanese officials in favour of extending UNIFIL’s mandate may prompt renewed consideration by some Council members of this option on Friday. On 17 August, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun held a meeting with some members of the Lebanese Parliament who had signed a letter in July calling for the maintenance of UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon. (The Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN transmitted the letter, which was signed by 86 parliamentarians, to Council members on 14 July.) Aoun welcomed the initiative and said that Lebanon’s preferred option would be to extend UNIFIL’s mandate, noting that the mission’s presence in the south helps to keep “residents in their villages and towns and contributes to strengthening stability in cooperation and coordination with the Lebanese Army”. Aoun added that, if the mandate is not extended, another option would be “to adopt a formula that ensures the continued presence of international forces in the south within the required legal framework”. Human Rights Watch has also recently called for delaying UNIFIL’s departure, stressing that an international presence remains necessary to protect civilians and deter human rights abuses. On Friday, Council members may be interested in hearing Arnault and Lacroix’s views regarding a possible temporary extension of UNIFIL’s mandate. While most Council members would apparently support such an extension, it seems unlikely that the US, Israel’s strongest ally on the Council, will revise its position on the mission’s termination.
There may also be discussion about other avenues for maintaining an international presence in southern Lebanon after UNIFIL’s departure. One such option is the initiative for an “international coalition to support Lebanon” after the mission’s closure, announced on 25 June by French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni. While French and Italian authorities have stressed in public comments that the initiative would aim to reinforce Lebanon’s sovereignty and help prevent a security vacuum in southern Lebanon, its precise contours are yet to be defined, although it seems that some efforts are underway to further develop the proposal.
Another possible component of the post-UNIFIL landscape is a European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to support Lebanon’s armed and security forces. This mission is not expected to take over UNIFIL’s functions in southern Lebanon, but it would reportedly focus on advising and training Lebanese armed and security forces and could have an initial duration of three years.
Friday’s discussions are also likely to be informed by the diplomatic talks that followed the signing of the Trilateral Framework and subsequent developments. The seventh round of these talks took place in Rome between 4 and 6 August, and a further round is expected in early September. It seems that the US focused on the Trilateral Framework during the 16 July closed consultations, arguing that new approaches are needed rather than a return to mechanisms that, in its view, have proven ineffective.
At the same time, the implementation of the Trilateral Framework has apparently been hampered by the IDF’s ongoing military activities in Lebanese territory and discussions about the verification arrangements related to the “pilot zones” that the framework envisages. In the Trilateral Framework, Israel and Lebanon committed to a process by which the LAF will “restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the [IDF] to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory”. According to the framework and its security annex, the LAF would gradually assume security responsibilities for “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon, following the verification by “a mutually agreed-upon third-party entity” of the absence of non-state armed groups and associated weapons and infrastructure in these areas. However, a decision on which entity, state, or states may assume this third-party function has yet to be reached, amid conflicting reports on the status of these discussions.
The Trilateral Framework has also generated broader questions regarding the future role of the UN in southern Lebanon. Notably, it contains no reference to resolution 1701, the Security Council, UNIFIL, or any successor UN presence. On Friday, Council members may be interested in an update from the US on the implementation of the framework and on any follow-up round of talks.
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**Post-script (27 August, 12:00 PM): An earlier version of this story indicated that Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo will brief in addition to Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix. The story was amended to reflect that Jean Arnault, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), was added as a briefer instead of DiCarlo.
