Counter-Terrorism: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s Strategic-Level Report on ISIL/Da’esh
Tomorrow morning (5 August), the Security Council will convene for a briefing on the Secretary-General’s 23rd biannual strategic-level report on the threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh) to international peace and security. The anticipated briefers are Oguljeren Niyazberdiyeva, the Chief of the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism (OUSG) at the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), and Carmen G. Cantor, the Deputy Executive Director of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED).
The Secretary-General’s report, which was circulated to Council members on 30 July (S/2026/638), states that ISIL and its affiliates continued to pose a persistent threat, demonstrating resilience through decentralised networks, evolving tactics, and the ability of regional affiliates to sustain operations despite leadership losses and disruptions to its central command. While the previous report, dated 2 February, described the threat as increasing steadily and intensifying in multiple theatres, the present report says that the threat has waned in some contexts.
Regarding leadership losses during the reporting period, the report highlights the 16 May killing of Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn Ali al-Mainuki in a joint Nigeria-US operation in Borno State in north-eastern Nigeria. According to the report, al-Mainuki was the deputy leader of ISIL and head of its General Directorate of Provinces, as well as the head of the Al-Furqan “office” of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). The report assesses that his death is likely to affect the group’s ability to coordinate across its global network.
Africa continues to feature prominently in the Secretary-General’s reporting. ISWAP remained the most active ISIL affiliate, carrying out more attacks than any other in the first half of the year. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), with an estimated 2,000 members, significantly enhanced its operational capabilities, particularly in Niger, which remains its primary area of operations and accounts for 75 percent of its claimed attacks in 2026—including a 29 January attack on Niamey’s international airport, which demonstrated the affiliate’s capacity to conduct complex urban operations. ISGS also expanded into north-western Nigeria, partly by recruiting individuals linked to the local group known as Lakurawa, which was blamed for the 3 February attack in Kwara State that Council members condemned in a 17 February press statement.
In Syria, the report estimates that ISIL maintained up to 3,000 fighters as the transfer of control in parts of the north-east to the Syrian government in early 2026 altered the threat landscape. Two member states reported that more than 5,700 ISIL-affiliated detainees were transferred to Iraq, while the fate of approximately 3,000 remaining prisoners was unclear. Following the closure of the al-Hol camp on 22 February, between 15,000 and 20,000 individuals previously held there—mostly women and children believed to have family links to ISIL—remained unaccounted for. Most are assessed to have moved to Idlib and its surroundings, and more than 1,000 to have joined ISIL or other armed groups. Al-Roj camp remained operational, with approximately 2,500 third-country nationals, and UNICEF has warned that thousands of third-country national children, including more than 4,000 who left al-Hol, remain vulnerable to trafficking and recruitment.
The report states that ISIL has shifted operationally from Syria’s central desert towards urban areas, prioritising hit-and-run attacks against religious, political, and military sites, and that several plots against interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and senior officials were disrupted. In Iraq, by contrast, the group is at its weakest, with a strength in the low hundreds. Iraq completed its final repatriation from the al-Hol and al-Roj camps in February, bringing to 21,536 the total repatriated since May 2021.
On Afghanistan, the report says that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan (ISIL-K) retained the intent to conduct external operations and was rebuilding its capacity for infrequent, high-profile, mass-casualty attacks, notwithstanding setbacks inflicted by the de facto authorities and Pakistan. Examples include a 19 January suicide bombing at a restaurant in central Kabul and a 6 February suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad, which killed 32 people and injured more than 150. Although a group calling itself ISIL in Pakistan claimed the latter attack—which Council members condemned in a 13 February press statement—some member states assessed that ISIL-K carried it out.
The report observes that the use of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a recurring feature of terrorist activity, with investigations uncovering its use to select targets, conduct counter-surveillance, and evade law enforcement. On financing, the report says that ISIL has relied primarily on locally generated revenue, with some affiliates increasingly turning to kidnapping for ransom and several showing greater use of cryptocurrency alongside traditional banking and informal value transfer systems.
Regarding UN efforts, the report discusses CTED’s follow-up visits on behalf of the Security Council’s Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) to Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Tajikistan, and Togo. During these visits, CTED identified, among other trends, the weaponisation of uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) as a global concern, underscoring the need for member states to implement the Abu Dhabi Guiding Principles adopted by the CTC in 2023. The report also describes the adoption by the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact of an action paper outlining measures to align the UN counter-terrorism architecture with the UN80 Initiative.
Tomorrow, Council members may recall that the General Assembly adopted the ninth review of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) on 1 July. Although the text did not include substantive updates, the US requested a vote on the review—which was adopted with 140 votes in favour and three against (Argentina, Israel, and the US)—marking the first time in the GCTS’ 20-year history that a review resolution was not adopted by consensus.
There may also be discussion on matters relating to sanctions tomorrow. At the Council’s briefing on the Secretary-General’s previous strategic report, held on 4 February, France observed that the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee had adopted only one new designation in three years, while Denmark—which chaired the Committee in 2025—said that a sanctions list which does not reflect current terrorist leadership risks losing its effect. (At the time of writing, Council members have yet to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs for 2026.) The Committee has since made revisions to its list, removing the Al-Nusrah Front—a Syrian group listed under its alias Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)—in February following the November 2025 delisting of Sharaa, and adding two Iraqi nationals allegedly associated with ISIL’s finances in March. On Thursday (6 August), Denmark is expected to chair a meeting of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL/Da’esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee in its capacity as Council President in August, during which the Committee’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team will present its biannual report.
In June, media outlets reported that France, the UK, and the US had placed a hold on a request by China and Pakistan to list the Balochistan Liberation Army and its Majeed Brigade, which claimed responsibility for a large-scale attack in the Balochistan province in late January that the Council also condemned in a 3 February press statement. When placing the hold, the three permanent members reportedly cited insufficient evidence of the group’s links to ISIL or Al-Qaida. China and Pakistan pressed for the listing at the Council’s February meeting and may raise the issue again tomorrow.
More broadly, ISIL’s resilience—particularly in Africa—remains a central concern for the Council, as does the situation following the reconfiguration of detention arrangements in north-eastern Syria. Members are expected to be united in condemning ISIL, and several are likely to emphasise whole-of-society and prevention-focused approaches to counter-terrorism; repeat the call for member states with nationals in camps in Syria to facilitate their safe, voluntary, and dignified repatriation; and reiterate concern about ISIL’s growing use of new and emerging technologies, including UAS, AI, and virtual assets. African members may underline the need for predictable support to African-led responses.
The meeting may also reflect sharpening political dynamics in the Council on counter-terrorism issues. In recent briefings on the Secretary-General’s strategic reports, Russia has argued that Western states use counter-terrorism as an instrument of geopolitical competition in Africa and called for depoliticised, results-based cooperation, while China has warned against selective approaches and double standards. Pakistan has maintained that the UN’s counter-terrorism architecture and sanctions regimes “have singled out adherents of one religion, namely Muslims”, and should be adapted to encompass far right extremists and other similar ideologies in various parts of the world. Other members have framed the issue in terms of the integrity of the sanctions regime: Panama has said that designations should be governed by technical rather than political criteria, while Denmark has stressed that sanctions must remain an effective counter-terrorism tool rather than a political instrument—a concern that France echoed in February. The loss of consensus at the ninth GCTS review may also colour the discussion at tomorrow’s meeting.
