The Red Sea: Vote on a Draft Resolution*
On Tuesday morning (14 July), the Security Council is expected to hold a meeting under the “Maintenance of international peace and security” agenda item to vote on a draft resolution extending the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea. The draft resolution in blue extends the reporting obligation—which was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024 and last renewed through resolution 2812 of 14 January—for another six months, until 15 January 2027. Greece and the US, the co-penholders on the Red Sea crisis, authored the text. The reporting requirement has been renewed four times, in six-month intervals, with the last three renewals (2025-2026) having been co-authored by Greece and the US. (For more information and background on resolution 2722, see the brief on the Red Sea in our June 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
The draft text in blue is a short, straightforward renewal, with one preambular paragraph recalling all relevant previous resolutions, and one operative paragraph extending the reporting requirement outlined in resolution 2722.
Negotiations on the draft text were not contentious. The co-penholders shared the initial draft on 6 July and invited comments from other Council members until 8 July. No edits were proposed. The draft was put under silence procedure until the morning of 10 July, which it passed. The co-penholders then proceeded to put the draft in blue.
During the comment period, Russia apparently reiterated its position questioning the relevance of the renewal, noting that the Houthis have not conducted any attacks on vessels in the Red Sea in months. The most recent report from the Secretary-General containing information regarding confirmed Houthi attacks on merchant and commercial vessels was published on 10 October 2025. It reported on the 31 August 2025 attack on the Liberia-flagged Scarlet Ray and the 29 September 2025 attack on the Netherlands-flagged Minervagracht vessel. It further said that responsibility for both attacks was confirmed by statements from the Houthis.
According to a 6 July statement by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, however, security risks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have been on the rise, with “24 attempted and actual incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region” over the course of the last three months. Furthermore, on 5 July, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO)—a maritime security organisation—reported an attack on a cargo vessel by “unknown armed assailants” that took place 30 nautical miles off the coast of Houthi-controlled Hodeidah. Following an exchange of fire with the vessel’s security guards, the ship and crew were reported safe. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.
More broadly, China and Russia have expressed reservations about the reporting requirement on Houthi Red Sea attacks, having abstained on resolution 2722 and all subsequent resolutions renewing the reporting requirement. Following the adoption of resolution 2722, Russia argued that the language used on states’ rights to defend their vessels lacked a clear basis in international law. In a statement before the adoption of the resolution’s most recent renewal (resolution 2812), Russia said that it would not block the resolution “owing solely to the requests of regional stakeholders”. It appears that Russia adopted the same approach to the negotiations on the draft resolution in blue.
The renewal of the reporting requirement is taking place against the backdrop of complex intersecting developments, both in Yemen and in the wider region. Following the outbreak of the US-Israeli war with Iran on 28 February, the Houthis renewed their attacks on Israel and on 8 June they threatened to resume targeting Israeli-linked shipping in the Red Sea in support of Iran and the so-called “Axis of Resistance”. The Houthis had previously stopped their attacks on merchant shipping and on Israel following the October 2025 US-brokered Gaza ceasefire. After the announcement of the 17 June memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US, there have been no further Houthi attacks against Israel, and the group did not resume its assaults on maritime navigation. The resumption of hostilities this week between Iran and the US once again raises questions on whether the Houthis may re-enter the conflict.
Iran has also threatened to exploit the Houthi group’s capabilities along the Red Sea coast and the Bab al-Mandab Strait—a vital commercial shipping waterway connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden—as strategic leverage in its war with Israel and the US. On 9 June, the commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, warned that continued escalation in the region would trigger a coordinated response by the Axis of Resistance aimed at establishing a new “security belt” extending from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
The situation within Yemen has also recently escalated. On 3 July, an Iranian plane reportedly landed in the Houthi-controlled Sana’a International Airport. While the Houthis claim that the flight was humanitarian in nature, Yemen’s internationally recognised government accused Iran of using the flight to transport materials that are prohibited under UN sanctions to the group. The Houthis further said that they used air defences against Saudi fighter planes that allegedly attempted to prevent the aircraft from landing, and threatened Riyadh with a “comprehensive response” targeting Saudi airports and vital sites. In a 4 July statement, the official spokesperson of the Saudi-led Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen, Major General Turki Al-Malki, warned that the Coalition would respond with “unprecedented determination and force” to attempts to target Saudi Arabia or to violate Yemen’s sovereignty. Al-Malki further accused the Houthis of rejecting peace efforts, including through their attacks in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The Security Council is scheduled to hold an urgent briefing on the development tomorrow (13 July), following a request by Yemen in a 7 July letter to the Council. (For more information, see our 10 July What’s in Blue story.)
Although no new incidents have been reported by the monitoring mechanism established pursuant to resolution 2722 since October 2025, many Council members apparently feel that continued Houthi threats to resume attacks in the region and the IRGC’s warnings underscore that the conditions that prompted the resolution have not been resolved and that the reporting mechanism continues to serve a relevant monitoring function.
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**Post-script: On 14 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 2826, extending until 15 January 2027 the monthly reporting requirement for the Secretary-General on attacks by the Houthi rebel group in Yemen on merchant and commercial vessels in the Red Sea, which was established by resolution 2722 of 10 January 2024. The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and two abstentions (China and Russia). In its explanation of vote, China indicated that its vote was consistent with its position that, following the adoption of resolution 2722, certain countries undertook military action in Yemen which undermined the peace process and heightened insecurity in the Red Sea. Russia, for its part, said that the resolution has no added value and that the situation in the Red Sea was sufficiently calm in recent months. Both countries emphasised that the situation in the Red Sea is impacted by regional insecurity—including hostilities in Gaza and Iran—and that regional diplomatic solutions should be prioritised.
