Lebanon: Consultations on the Implementation of Resolution 1701
Tomorrow morning (16 July), Security Council members are expected to receive a briefing in closed consultations on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (S/2026/566), which was circulated to Council members on 9 July and covers developments from 21 February to 20 June. Adopted in 2006, resolution 1701 called for a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Jean Arnault, the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL), and Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix are the anticipated briefers.
The Secretary-General’s report describes the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah that began on 2 March, shortly after the US-Israeli attacks on Iran on 28 February. Although Israel and Lebanon announced a ceasefire on 16 April, which was subsequently extended on 23 April and 15 May, the hostilities have continued. The report notes that, as at 20 June, at least 4,106 people, including 386 women and 252 children, as well as 33 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) soldiers, had been killed by Israeli military operations in Lebanon since 2 March. It also notes that at least three Israeli civilians and 36 Israeli soldiers have been killed. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has repeatedly come under attack during the escalation, with seven UNIFIL peacekeepers killed since 2 March. During the hostilities, Israel deployed to an area of up to 10 kilometres in Lebanese territory. (For background and more information, see the brief on Lebanon in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
In his report, the Secretary-General stressed that there is no military solution to the conflict and warned that continued escalation would only “deepen instability, sow resentment, and inflict further suffering on civilians on both sides of the Blue Line”. Among other things, he reiterated his condemnation of all attacks affecting civilians and stressed that all parties must respect international law, including international humanitarian law, ensure the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure, facilitate humanitarian access, and uphold the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel. (The Blue Line is a withdrawal line set by the UN in 2000 to confirm Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. While not an international border, the Blue Line acts in practice as a boundary between Lebanon and Israel in the absence of an agreed-upon border between the two states.)
Tomorrow will be Arnault’s first briefing to Council members in his role as UNSCOL Officer-in-Charge. Among other issues, members may be interested in hearing about Arnault’s recent meetings with senior officials in Lebanon, Israel, and Iran, and how these exchanges are expected to inform UN efforts to promote stability and advance the implementation of resolution 1701.
The briefers may also provide an update on developments since the report’s cut-off date of 20 June. On 26 June, Lebanon, Israel, and the US signed a Trilateral Framework intended to establish a pathway towards a “full comprehensive peace and security” arrangement. Among other things, Israel and Lebanon committed to a process by which LAF will “restore effective sovereign authority over all Lebanese territory, pending the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups and dismantlement of associated infrastructure, enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to progressively redeploy out of the Lebanese territory”. This process will start from two initial pilot zones, with future pilot zones to be “agreed upon by mutual consent”. According to the framework, once non-state armed groups are disarmed and their infrastructure is dismantled in these zones, the LAF will assume full security responsibility, “internationally supported reconstruction efforts will begin”, and Lebanese civilians will be able to return to these areas.
Hezbollah rejected the framework, with its Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, accusing the government of surrendering Lebanese sovereignty and legitimising a prolonged Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, who is also the President of the Amal Movement, an ally of Hezbollah, has expressed reservations about the agreement on similar grounds.
Specific aspects of the framework have also drawn criticism from Amnesty International and Lebanese interlocutors. Among other things, they have noted that a provision in the agreement by which Israel and Lebanon committed “to take good faith measures”, including the “cessation of all hostile or adverse actions in international political or legal fora”, could undermine victims’ access to justice.
While informal consultations among some Council members have apparently been taking place, members have yet to hold a discussion on the post-UNIFIL options outlined by the Secretary-General in his 1 June letter to the Security Council. The Council requested the options through resolution 2790, which in August 2025 decided to terminate UNIFIL’s mandate on 31 December. They aim at preserving a UN role in support of resolution 1701 while adjusting to the Council’s decision to end the mission’s mandate.
Tomorrow’s closed consultations may provide an opportunity for Council members to broach a discussion of the options, all of which entail a significant reduction in personnel when compared to UNIFIL, which, as at 20 June, counted 8,005 military personnel and 612 civilian staff—excluding personnel serving with UNIFIL’s Maritime Task Force (MTF) and the Observer Group Lebanon of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). The Secretary-General’s options include:
- a light footprint presence of approximately 1,980 uniformed personnel with no inter-positioning capability and only limited capacity to support LAF deployment and verify violations of resolution 1701;
- a medium-sized presence of approximately 3,370 uniformed personnel; and
- a larger presence of approximately 5,525 uniformed personnel that would monitor the Blue Line, carry out verification tasks and investigations of violations of resolution 1701.
According to the letter, the latter option “would have the capacity to most credibly observe developments along the length of the Blue Line and up to the Litani River”, with inter-positioning and deconfliction capacity and the ability to support LAF deployment.
On 14 July, the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the UN transmitted to Council members a letter signed by 86 members of the Lebanese Parliament stressing that the situation on the ground requires the maintenance of UNIFIL’s presence in southern Lebanon and even the expansion of the mission’s capabilities to fulfil its mandate.
Following the signature of the Trilateral Framework, a new round of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon took place at the US Embassy in Rome yesterday and today (14 and 15 July). Media reports indicate that the talks focused on operationalising the two initial “pilot zones”.
The Trilateral Framework does not mention resolution 1701, the Security Council, UNIFIL or a successor UN uniformed presence, and it remains unclear what implications the discussions under this track could have for the post-UNIFIL architecture. According to a security annex accompanying the framework, verification of clearance of non-state armed groups in the context of the pilot zones will be carried out by “a mutually agreed-upon third-party entity”. The annex also mentions the future establishment by Israel and Lebanon of a Military Coordination Group for Lebanon tasked with managing deconfliction, verification, and overall implementation.
Monitoring mechanisms put in place in the context of previous frameworks, such as the one established under the November 2024 cessation-of-hostilities arrangement, have been inactive. The Secretary-General’s report says that, on 18 March, that mechanism informed UNIFIL that its meetings were “suspended until further notice”. (This mechanism was chaired by the US and hosted by UNIFIL. It also included the IDF and the LAF, as well as France. It was a revised version of the tripartite mechanism that was created following the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah.)
Another possible component of the post-UNIFIL landscape is a non-UN international presence in southern Lebanon. On 25 June, France and Italy announced that they will co-lead an “international coalition to support Lebanon” after UNIFIL’s termination. While in public comments on this proposal French and Italian authorities have stressed the objectives of reinforcing Lebanon’s sovereignty and of preventing a security vacuum in southern Lebanon, the contours of this initiative are yet to be defined.
The European Union (EU) is also exploring a separate EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to support Lebanon’s armed and security forces. According to media reports, the mission could have an initial duration of three years and would advise and train Lebanese armed and security forces, with a focus on border and maritime security.
More generally, Council members are also likely to continue to observe developments related to the US-Israeli war with Iran and any implications they may have for Lebanon. The US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU), agreed on 17 June, reportedly declared an “immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon”; referred to ensuring Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; and provided for the establishment of an “executive mechanism” to monitor the implementation of the MOU and of a future “final Deal”. However, the recent escalation between the US and Iran appears to have placed this negotiation track under significant strain, raising questions about the status of the MOU. Before the latest escalation, Qassem had called for the MOU to be implemented as the appropriate framework to address the situation in Lebanon.
