Iran: Briefing on the Implementation of Resolution 2231 on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)*
On Friday morning (10 July), the Security Council is scheduled to hold a briefing under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran‘s nuclear programme. The meeting was requested by Bahrain and the Council’s five European members (E5): Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, and the UK. A UN Secretariat official is expected to brief on the Secretary-General’s most recent report on the implementation of resolution 2231, which is dated 19 June and covers developments since the previous report of 15 December 2025.
Background
Resolution 2231 requested the Secretary-General to submit a biannual report to the Security Council on the resolution’s implementation. A related presidential note, issued in January 2016, decided that the Security Council would annually select a Council member to serve as facilitator for its 2231-related work. Since then, the Council has held biannual meetings to receive briefings from a Secretariat official on the Secretary-General’s report, as well as from the 2231 facilitator on its activities during the reporting period. These meetings have typically been held in June and December under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
In August 2025, the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the JCPOA’s “snapback” mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran that the agreement and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to do so and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. On that date—absent an activation of the snapback—resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.
By contrast, the E3 and like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and therefore that only specific paragraphs of resolution 2231 related to the suspension of sanctions have expired. As such, they maintain that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been reactivated and that the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored. They further contend that other provisions of resolution 2231 and the related presidential note remain in effect, including those mandating the Secretary-General’s reporting and establishing the position of 2231 facilitator.
The first biannual briefing on the implementation of resolution 2231 since the invocation of the snapback took place in December 2025. Due to members’ diverging positions on the file, Slovenia—the Council’s president that month—did not include the briefing in the Council’s provisional programme of work. Instead, several Council members requested the meeting under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item after receiving the Secretary-General’s report later in the month. Following the adoption of the agenda at that session, China and Russia raised a point of order to object to the agenda item under which the meeting had been convened, reiterating their argument that resolution 2231 had expired and that the Council had therefore concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file.
Colombia, the Council’s president in June, similarly did not include the 2231 briefing in the Council’s programme of work for the month. Although the Secretary-General’s most recent report was circulated to Council members on 19 June, the members who called for Friday’s meeting did not submit their request until 27 June. Colombia therefore deferred the meeting request for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to address as July’s Council president.
Contentious dynamics have also affected the functioning of the 1737 Sanctions Committee. Following the invocation of the snapback mechanism, which most members believe to have reactivated resolution 1737 and thereby restored the Committee, the presidencies of March and June (the US and Colombia, respectively) scheduled briefings to the Council on the Committee’s work, as mandated by the resolution. These two sessions were also convened under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item, prompting Russia, supported by China, to request procedural votes on the agenda. In both cases, the agenda was adopted with 11 votes in favour, two against (China and Russia), and two abstentions (Pakistan and Somalia). (For more information, see the brief on Iran in our June 2026 Monthly Forecast and our What’s in Blue stories dated 11 March and 8 June.)
Notably, the difficult dynamics concerning the snapback have been at the heart of the impasse in the allocation of subsidiary body chairs, preventing Council members’ agreement on the appointment of a chair of the 1737 Committee and of a 2231 facilitator. (For more information, see the In Hindsight in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Friday’s Meeting
The briefer is expected to cover the Secretary-General’s latest report on the implementation of resolution 2231. The report mainly summarises the most recent quarterly report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the implementation of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and on “relevant provisions” of Security Council resolutions on Iran.
The IAEA’s report, dated 4 June, states that the Agency remains largely unable to verify Iran’s implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement or its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Since the June 2025 Israeli-US strikes on Iran, the Agency has been unable to access the nuclear facilities damaged in those attacks, including the most proliferation-sensitive sites at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. It continued to inspect Iran’s unaffected declared facilities until the second round of US-Israeli strikes that began in February, after which all verification ceased. The only exception during the current reporting period was the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, where the Agency conducted an inspection in June with Iran’s cooperation. It received neither information nor access for all other declared nuclear facilities.
As a result, the IAEA cannot verify whether Iran has suspended enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy-water activities; cannot account for the size, composition, or whereabouts of Iran’s enriched-uranium stockpile; and cannot verify Iran’s centrifuge inventories. The report reiterates that Iran is the only NPT non-nuclear-weapon state to have produced uranium enriched to 60 percent purity, stressing that the Agency’s loss of continuity of knowledge over previously declared nuclear material—now approaching a year—is a “matter of proliferation concern” that “needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency”.
On 10 June, the IAEA Board of Governors responded to the report by adopting a new resolution calling on Iran to disclose detailed information about its enriched uranium stockpiles and to immediately allow the Agency access to verify these materials. The resolution was co-sponsored by France, Germany, the UK, and the US, receiving 21 votes in favour, ten abstentions, and three votes against (China, Niger, and Russia). Iran reportedly described the resolution as “politically motivated” and “legally flawed”, warning that it could have a negative impact on diplomatic engagement with the US to end the conflict.
On 17 June, the two countries nevertheless signed an interim ceasefire agreement. Among other provisions, the memorandum of understanding (MoU) ended hostilities and called for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, for a waiver of US sanctions on Iranian oil, and for a 60-day negotiation period on a final agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme that will eventually be endorsed by the Security Council. On 21 June, Iran and the US met in Switzerland for the first round of negotiations on the final agreement.
The MoU has subsequently come under increasing strain. In late June, the countries accused each other of violating the ceasefire and exchanged fire, prompting an emergency Council briefing on 2 July at the request of Bahrain, which had been a target of Iranian strikes. Although the parties briefly returned to the ceasefire and continued indirect technical talks in Qatar, hostilities erupted again this week after three ships were struck in the Strait of Hormuz. The US attributed those attacks to Iran and responded yesterday (7 July) by revoking the sanctions waiver on Iranian oil and launching new strikes against the country. This prompted further retaliation from Iran against US facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait. Today (8 July), US President Donald Trump reportedly said that the ceasefire was “over”.
At Friday’s meeting, Bahrain, the US, the E5, and other like-minded Council members may express concern about the IAEA report’s findings, particularly the Agency’s continued inability to verify the size and whereabouts of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium. Echoing the 10 June Board of Governors resolution, they may call on Iran to disclose information about its stockpile and grant immediate access to inspectors, stressing that there is no credible civilian justification for its accumulation of uranium enriched to 60 percent. These members are also likely to maintain that the snapback mechanism was validly invoked and urge the appointment of a chair for the 1737 Committee and a new 2231 facilitator. While emphasising that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, some of these members may also welcome the 17 June MoU and call on the parties to return to the ceasefire and conclude a final agreement.
By contrast, China and Russia are likely to repeat their argument that the E3 lacked standing to trigger the snapback and that resolution 2231 expired in its entirety in October 2025, rendering any reinstated measures null and void. They may again object to the meeting’s convening under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item—potentially raising a point of order or requesting a procedural vote—and reiterate criticism of the Secretariat, arguing that it no longer has a mandate to produce a report on the implementation of resolution 2231. While also professing support for diplomacy, they may argue that the US bears responsibility for the crisis owing to its 2018 withdrawal from the JCPOA and its subsequent military action against Iran.
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Post-script: On Friday (10 July), the Security Council held a briefing under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item to discuss the implementation of resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran‘s nuclear programme. Prior to the meeting, Russia, supported by China, requested a procedural vote on the adoption of the agenda. It was subsequently adopted with 11 votes in favour, two against (China and Russia), and two abstentions (Pakistan and Somalia).
