Haiti: Briefing and Consultations*
On Monday morning (20 July), the Security Council will hold an open briefing and closed consultations on Haiti. Special Representative and Head of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) Carlos Ruiz Massieu, Special Representative for the Gang Suppression Force (GSF) Jack Christofides, Executive Director of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Monica Juma, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Vanessa Frazier are expected to brief. A representative of the UN Support Office in Haiti (UNSOH) may also brief in consultations.
Ruiz Massieu will brief on recent developments in Haiti and the Secretary-General’s latest report on BINUH (S/2026/574), which was circulated to Council members on 14 July and covers developments since 14 April. Regarding the political situation, he may highlight positive steps taken by the Haitian authorities to advance the political transition as well as continuing challenges. After prolonged disputes over the electoral budget and the content of the electoral decree, amendments to the decree were published on 2 July, and the government and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) agreed on a $120 million budget for electoral operations on 3 July. While an electoral calendar has yet to be finalised, on 10 July the CEP announced a timetable for the registration of political parties and voters to participate in the elections.
Ruiz Massieu may note, among other things, that advancing the political process remains intertwined with concerns about the security situation in the country. In that regard, he is likely to note that gangs continued to exert influence over significant portions of the capital, Port-au-Prince, during the reporting period and that clashes between rival gangs in nearby areas have recently intensified. Gang violence also intensified in other areas, such as the Artibonite and Centre departments, and the previously less‑affected South-East department. As highlighted by human rights experts, gang attacks remain characterised by extreme violence against the population, including sexual violence, and the indiscriminate use of arms. The Secretary-General’s report observes that, while anti-gang operations by security forces have pushed gang members to retreat from some strategic locations and have secured some institutional sites, “these gains remain partial and fragile”.
On Monday, Ruiz Massieu might refer to the Secretary-General’s 29 May report on options for disarmament, dismantlement, and reintegration (DDR) in Haiti that the Council requested in resolution 2814, which in January renewed BINUH’s mandate. The report sets out three progressively comprehensive options, ranging from a 12-month “rapid, quick-win programme” assessed at $13.5 million annually, to a multi-year programme estimated at between $100 million and $150 million. The Secretary-General recommended the latter option and proposed establishing a multi-partner trust fund, co-chaired by the government of Haiti and the UN, to provide pooled, predictable, flexible, and multi-year financing for DDR. Council members have yet to discuss the options presented by the Secretary-General.
Regarding the humanitarian situation, Ruiz Massieu might describe the high levels of internal displacement and food insecurity in the country. A 10 July update from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that two separate waves of violence between 1 and 8 July displaced an estimated 7,168 people, marking the highest displacement event in the affected areas since February 2025. (For additional background, see the brief on Haiti in our July 2026 Monthly Forecast.)
Juma is expected to brief on the latest UNODC biannual report on sources and routes of illicit arms and financial flows in Haiti, which covers the period between January and July. She may draw attention to how the role and activities of armed gangs have evolved through the development of structured leadership and a strategic focus on controlling territory and key infrastructure—such as ports, fuel distribution, and transportation routes—to generate income through extortion, smuggling, and control over essential goods and services. The UNODC report, which has yet to be made public at the time of writing, apparently stresses that firearms—trafficked mainly from the US via maritime routes—remain a primary driver of violence. Juma may also note that drug trafficking continues to provide revenue for criminal networks in Haiti and that, despite some positive steps—including the establishment in May of two specialised judicial units to address crimes such as corruption, arms trafficking, and sexual violence—significant challenges remain in terms of enforcement and accountability.
Additionally, Juma may observe that the use of drones and other remote technologies is becoming an increasingly prominent feature of security operations, raising concerns regarding the protection of civilians and the safeguarding of human rights. Among other issues, members may be interested to hear about Juma’s recent visit to the Dominican Republic and Haiti (15 to 17 July) and any insight from her meetings on how to more effectively tackle the challenges covered in the report.
Christofides may brief on the GSF’s operations and deployment levels. Following the departure in April of Kenyan troops, who formed the bulk of the Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission in Haiti, which preceded the GSF, some contingents and personnel from new troop-contributing countries, such as Chad, Jamaica, Mongolia, and Sri Lanka, arrived in Haiti. According to the Secretary-General’s BINUH report, as at 8 July, the GSF’s military component comprised 1,083 personnel, while the civilian component comprised 16 staff members. The GSF conducted initial patrols on 1 June and its first security operation on 21 June.
On 29 June, Christofides submitted a letter to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 2793 of 30 September 2025 that authorised the GSF, which conveyed the strategy and metrics for measuring the success of the mission, as well as benchmarks towards an end state (S/2026/554). Christofides may brief Council members on the letter, which identifies three strategic objectives:
- Removal of gang control over territory;
- Securing critical infrastructure; and
- Haitian authorities having the ability to contain gang violence.
The letter describes the desired end state to be achieved by 30 September 2028. This end state will see the GSF having degraded gang ability to threaten the state and having established minimum security conditions for sustained international stabilisation efforts and for the gradual rebuilding of Haitian security infrastructure.
Some Council members may be interested in hearing from Christofides about measures to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and other violations by GSF personnel. Citing unresolved allegations of SEA of children by Sri Lankan peacekeepers during previous deployments in Haiti, on 3 July Amnesty International called on Sri Lankan authorities, the GSF leadership, and the UN to be “absolutely transparent” about the screening process for the current deployment and accountability mechanisms to address any potential new allegations.
On Monday, Council members are likely to express deep concern at the security and human rights situations in the country, including at the continued spread of gang violence beyond Port-au-Prince, the high incidence of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), and the forced recruitment and use of children by gangs. Several members may call for enhanced interventions to prevent the recruitment and use of children and to facilitate their release and reintegration. Some speakers may call for more robust action to address SGBV, including through curbing impunity and providing assistance to survivors. More broadly, several members may stress the importance of advancing and supporting DDR programmes, and justice and accountability efforts, including through the effective operationalisation of the specialised judicial units.
Several members are expected to express support for BINUH, UNSOH, and the GSF, and call for the timely implementation of resolution 2793. Some may also urge the GSF to uphold the highest standards of conduct and discipline, including a zero-tolerance policy on SEA, and comply with international human rights law. Speakers are also likely to emphasise the importance of strengthening enforcement of the arms embargo on Haiti, and might call for more robust weapons and ammunition management measures in the country.
Several members may welcome steps taken towards election preparations and encourage further efforts, including through the adoption of a realistic electoral calendar. Several members may also underscore the importance of guaranteeing women’s full, equal and safe participation in political processes. Members may stress the importance of a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned response to the country’s crisis.
Additionally, some members may highlight the need to scale up humanitarian support to Haiti. Despite the growing needs, the UN humanitarian appeal for the country this year is only approximately 38 percent funded.
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**Post-Script (20 July): The story was amended to reflect that Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict Vanessa Frazier was added to the list of speakers to brief the Council under Rule 39.