Security Council Elections 2026
Tomorrow morning (3 June), the 80th session of the UN General Assembly is scheduled to hold elections for membership of the Security Council. The five seats available for election in 2026, according to the regular distribution among regions, will be as follows:
- one seat for the African Group (currently held by Somalia);
- one seat for the Asia-Pacific Group (currently held by Pakistan);
- one seat for the Latin American and Caribbean Group (GRULAC, currently held by Panama); and
- two seats for the Western European and Others Group (WEOG, currently held by Denmark and Greece).
The Eastern European Group is not contesting any seats this year, as its seat, held by Latvia through 2027, comes up for election every other year.
Seven member states—Austria, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zimbabwe—are currently running for the five available seats. Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe are running unopposed for the available seats for GRULAC and the African Group, respectively. Austria, Germany, and Portugal are contesting the two WEOG seats, while Kyrgyzstan and the Philippines are vying for the available seat reserved for the Asia-Pacific Group.
Six out of seven candidates have served on the Council previously: Germany six times, the Philippines four times, Austria and Portugal three times, Zimbabwe twice and Trinidad and Tobago once. Kyrgyzstan has never served on the Council.
The five new members elected this year will take up their seats on 1 January 2027 and will serve until 31 December 2028.
Election Process
Elections to the Security Council, as with other principal organs of the UN, require formal balloting even if the candidates have been endorsed by their regional group. Even if a country is running unopposed, it must obtain the votes of two-thirds of the member states present and voting at the General Assembly session in order to secure a seat on the Council. This means that a minimum of 129 positive votes are required to win a seat if all 193 UN member states are present and voting.
In theory, a member state running unopposed might not garner the requisite votes in the General Assembly in the first round and be challenged in subsequent rounds by a new candidate. This is possible, but highly unlikely, and has never happened.
In a contested election, if no candidate obtains sufficient votes to be elected in the first round, voting in the next round would be restricted. In this restricted ballot, the number of candidates is limited to twice the number of seats available, and the candidates are those that received the highest number of votes in the first round. For example, if one seat is available, only two countries can contest this round—the two that received the most votes in the first round. Any votes for other candidates during this restricted voting round are considered void. This restricted voting process can continue for up to three rounds of voting.
If no candidate has garnered the required number of votes, unrestricted voting commences for up to three rounds. At this point, new candidates can come into the process and those excluded after the first restricted ballot can re-enter. This pattern of restricted and unrestricted voting continues until a candidate is successful in securing the required two-thirds majority.
Potential Council Dynamics in 2027
Shifting global power dynamics and continued geopolitical uncertainty are expected to continue to shape the multilateral landscape and Security Council dynamics in 2027. Entrenched divisions among permanent members are likely to continue affecting the Council’s ability to respond effectively to several major conflicts in the coming year, highlighting the need for the Council’s elected members to build cross-regional coalitions in order to move the needle on the world’s major crises.
The new Council members will begin their term at a time when the Security Council is seen as increasingly reactive amid a growing number of emerging and unforeseen conflicts. The number of previously unscheduled Council meetings—that is, meetings that are added to the Council’s programme of work after its adoption—accounted for approximately 27 percent of the Council’s meetings in 2025, and is also expected to remain high in 2027. A significant proportion of these meetings in 2025 and during the first five months of 2026 focused on Ukraine; “The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question (MEPQ)”; Sudan; the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and Iran-related and non-proliferation issues.
Although it is unclear what course the war in Ukraine will take in the future, the situation is likely to continue to occupy an important portion of the Council’s agenda in 2027. Among the WEOG candidates, there is sustained interest in the situation in Ukraine. Together with Latvia, which will remain on the Council in 2027, the European members are likely to stay closely engaged on the file.
The positions of the 2027 candidates on Ukraine are likely to reflect differing regional and political perspectives. Kyrgyzstan and Zimbabwe abstained from the vote on the 24 February 2025 General Assembly resolution titled “Advancing a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine”, while the other candidate countries voted in favour. The abstentions by Kyrgyzstan and Zimbabwe reflect a growing reluctance among some Global South countries to take sides, which continued in 2026 and is likely to persist in 2027.
The situation in the Middle East is likely to continue to feature prominently in the Council’s work in 2027. The repeatedly violated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, instability along the Israel-Lebanon border, and the wider regional escalation triggered by the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026 and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region risk extending well into 2027.
In addition, tensions within the transatlantic alliance are likely to complicate coordination among the WEOG members on the Middle East in 2027, requiring them to strike a delicate balance between supporting collective security measures and avoiding deeper military entanglement in the region.
The Council’s work on African files is likely to remain heavily focused on mandate renewals, sanctions regimes, and protection of civilians (PoC) concerns, particularly in relation to the DRC, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya, South Sudan, and Sudan.
The new group of African members (A3) will consist of the DRC, Liberia, and Zimbabwe. The A3 in 2027 is expected to continue to align closely with African Union (AU) positions and to emphasise African ownership, sovereignty, and support for AU-led responses to conflict situations in Africa. Zimbabwe is likely to reinforce these positions, while favouring cautious approaches to sanctions and other externally driven pressure initiatives, reflecting its longstanding emphasis on dialogue, non-interference, and negotiated solutions.
It remains unclear if Trinidad and Tobago will join the African members of the Council as part of the “A3 Plus” grouping, similar to the role played by Saint Vincent and the Grenadines during its 2020-2021 Council term and by Guyana during its 2024-2025 tenure. Having an additional member from another region has benefited both the “A3” and the “plus” members in recent years and has come to symbolise the strengthening of Africa–Caribbean coordination at the UN.
The outcome of the election for the Asia-Pacific seat may likewise influence the regional perspectives represented on the Council. A Kyrgyzstan victory would return a Central Asian voice to the Council for the first time since Kazakhstan’s 2017-2018 term. The election of the Philippines, on the other hand, would restore Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) representation to the Council, absent since Viet Nam’s 2020-2021 term, and could elevate attention to Southeast Asian perspectives on issues such as Myanmar, maritime security, and regional cooperation.
Regarding thematic issues, several candidates have indicated peacekeeping as a priority, with some emphasising the need to reform peace operations in order to make them more effective, adaptable, and fit for purpose in responding to evolving global challenges. Additionally, all candidates have expressed interest in supporting UN peacebuilding efforts, with Austria also emphasising the links between peacebuilding and counter-terrorism efforts. Germany, which was the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2025, as well as other candidates who champion peacebuilding, are likely to advocate for stronger integration of peacebuilding considerations across the Council’s work and closer engagement with the PBC.
Most candidate countries have expressed an interest in advancing the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda. Several may sign on to the Shared Commitments on WPS initiative, which started in late 2021. Divisions on WPS issues are likely to deepen, fuelled by growing US scepticism towards some aspects of the agenda alongside longstanding reservations expressed by China and Russia. Against this backdrop, WPS outcomes and gender-related language in other Council products are likely to remain difficult to negotiate in 2027.
Several candidate countries have identified artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging technologies as important priorities, highlighting the need to better understand and address the implications of these technologies for international peace and security.
In an unprecedented development, in 2026 Council members have yet to agree on the allocation of subsidiary body chairs on the eve of the elections for the five vacant seats on the Security Council. Similar dynamics unfolded in 2025, when the allocation was decided on 29 May, shortly before the elections. This has created significant strains on the work of subsidiary bodies, which may be exacerbated if there are similar delays in deciding the allocations in 2027.
For a more in-depth analysis of tomorrow’s elections and potential Council dynamics in 2027, see our 2 June research report, titled “Security Council Elections in 2026”.