Iran: Briefing on the 1737 Sanctions Committee
Tomorrow afternoon (9 June), the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open briefing on the work of the 1737 Sanctions Committee concerning Iran. Colombia—the Council’s president in June—intends to convene the meeting under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item. No briefer is expected.
Background
The 1737 Sanctions Committee was established by resolution 1737 of 23 December 2006, which required it to report to the Council every 90 days on its activities. Prior to the agreement on the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme, which the Council endorsed through resolution 2231 of 20 July 2015, the Committee briefings took place every three months under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
Resolution 2231 suspended all prior sanctions resolutions on Iran, including resolution 1737, rendering defunct the 1737 Committee and its reporting requirement. Subsequently, the Council held biannual briefings on the implementation of resolution 2231, which also took place under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item.
In August 2025, the “E3” parties to the JCPOA—France, Germany, and the UK—triggered the deal’s “snapback” mechanism to reimpose UN sanctions on Iran that the JCPOA and resolution 2231 had suspended. China and Russia contested the E3’s legal and procedural standing to do so and argued that all sanctions were permanently lifted on 18 October 2025, when the JCPOA and resolution 2231 were originally set to expire. On that date—absent an activation of the snapback—resolution 2231 stated that the Council would end its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file and “Non-Proliferation” would be removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. China and Russia—as well as Iran—contend that this has now happened.
By contrast, the E3 and like-minded Council members have argued that the triggering of the snapback mechanism was valid and therefore that only specific paragraphs of resolution 2231 related to the suspension of sanctions have expired. As such, they maintain that all previous UN sanctions measures on Iran have been reactivated and that the 1737 Sanctions Committee and its supporting Panel of Experts (PoE) have been restored.
In March, the US, in its capacity as Council president, included the 1737 Committee’s 90-day briefing in that month’s programme of work in an attempt to resume the Committee’s reporting. Since the disagreement regarding the Committee has prevented the Council from agreeing on this year’s allocation of subsidiary body chairs, the US as Council president also assumed the functions of Committee chair and proposed a draft report that it intended to deliver at the briefing. The Committee agrees on such reports by consensus.
Given their position that UN sanctions on Iran have expired and that the 1737 Committee no longer exists, China and Russia objected to the US proposal to include the briefing in the March programme of work. They therefore blocked the adoption of the programme at the beginning of the month. For the same reason, these two members also objected to the draft report on the Committee’s activities that the US proposed to deliver.
The US still convened the briefing, however, which it sought to hold under the “Non-Proliferation” agenda item in accordance with past practice. At the beginning of the meeting, Russia requested a procedural vote on the agenda, reiterating its position that “Non-Proliferation” had been removed from the list of matters of which the Council is seized. The agenda was subsequently adopted with 11 votes in favour, two against (China and Russia), and two abstentions (Pakistan and Somalia).
Tomorrow’s Meeting
This month, it seems that Colombia is following the precedent set by the US presidency in March. It included the 1737 briefing in June’s programme of work, the adoption of which China and Russia consequently blocked at the beginning of the month. On 3 June, Colombia circulated its draft report on the Committee’s activities and put it under a no-objection procedure. The report apparently covered the entire nine-month period from 27 September 2025—when most Council members argue that the Committee was re-established—until today (8 June), since no report was presented on the Committee’s first and second 90-day periods that ended in December 2025 and March 2026, respectively.
The report apparently stated that the Committee did not hold meetings during the reporting period but did receive 13 asset freeze exemption requests, which it considered and did not object to. In each of those cases, it seems that China and Russia sent communications reiterating their position that they do not recognise the 1737 Committee and do not consider themselves bound by the sanctions regime.
The report also stated that the Committee considered a proposed update to the 1737 sanctions list, submitted by the US, as well as a letter from Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo proposing eight individuals to serve on the Committee’s PoE. The Committee did not approve either proposal, apparently due to opposition from China and Russia.
As in March, these two members also objected to the draft report itself, and there is consequently no Committee report on which to base a briefing at tomorrow’s Council meeting. The meeting will therefore consist only of interventions from Council members, who are expected to reiterate their established positions on the Iranian nuclear issue. France, the UK, the US, and other like-minded members are likely to reassert that all UN sanctions on Iran are in effect and legally binding and call on Iran to give up its stockpile of highly enriched uranium—for which they argue there is no civilian justification—and fully comply with its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They may also stress the importance of the full operationalisation of the 1737 Sanctions Committee in order to enable effective oversight of the sanctions regime.
China and Russia are expected to repeat their claim that the invocation of the snapback mechanism was invalid and that the Council has therefore concluded its consideration of the Iranian nuclear file. Similarly to what transpired in March, they may call for a procedural vote on the meeting’s agenda.
Council members are also likely to discuss the broader Middle East crisis triggered by the joint Israeli-US strikes on Iran that began in February and Iran’s subsequent retaliation across the region. On 7 April, the US and Iran agreed to a two-week ceasefire, during which they attempted to negotiate a permanent end to the war that would include an agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme and the sanctions issue. After those talks failed to achieve a breakthrough, US President Donald Trump announced an indefinite extension of the ceasefire on 21 April to allow more time for negotiations.
While the parties have still not agreed on the terms of a deal, the cessation of hostilities has broadly held despite persistent tensions. These include the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran, the blockading of Iranian ports by the US, and ongoing hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, which Iran views as a violation of the ceasefire. Yesterday (7 June), Iran and Israel exchanged fire for the first time since April, after Iran launched an attack on Israel in response to an Israeli airstrike in Beirut. Both sides appear to have halted the strikes today but have warned that they would retaliate if provoked. At tomorrow’s meeting, several Council members may stress that the recent developments demonstrate the urgency of reaching a negotiated settlement to the conflict and call on the parties to de-escalate, exercise restraint, and recommit to a diplomatic path to that end.
