What's In Blue

Posted Mon 22 Jun 2026
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Central African Republic: Briefing and Consultations

Tomorrow morning (23 June), the Security Council will hold an open briefing on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the CAR and Head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) Valentine Rugwabiza is expected to brief via videoconference (VTC) based on the Secretary-General’s latest report on the situation in the CAR and MINUSCA’s activities, which was circulated to Council members on 13 June and covers developments since 13 February (S/2026/494). The Chair of the CAR configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), Ambassador Omar Hilale (Morocco), is also scheduled to brief. The CAR is expected to participate in the meeting under rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules of procedure. Closed consultations are scheduled to follow the open briefing.

Prior to the meeting, Colombia is expected to deliver a joint statement on women, peace and security (WPS) in the CAR on behalf of the signatories to the Shared Commitments on WPS: Colombia, Denmark, France, Greece, Latvia, Liberia, Panama, and the UK.

In her briefing, Rugwabiza is likely to cover recent political developments in the CAR since the Council’s last meeting in February. These include the completion of the country’s local, legislative, and presidential elections, the inauguration of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the formation of a new government, and the installation of a new legislature.

The Secretary-General’s report notes that Touadéra, who secured a third term in the 28 December 2025 presidential elections, was sworn in during an inauguration ceremony held in Bangui on 30 March. Under the new constitution, which entered into force in August 2023, the presidential term lasts seven years. On 15 May, Touadéra reappointed Félix Moloua as prime minister. Moloua subsequently formed a new government comprising 33 members, including six women and several individuals associated with armed groups that have recently joined the peace process. Among these are Retour, Réclamation et Réhabilitation (3R) and l’Unité pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC), which in April 2025 ceased hostilities and returned to the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic (APPR-RCA).

Another likely focus of tomorrow’s meeting is the implementation of the APPR-RCA, particularly the disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme. Following the decision of 3R and UPC to rejoin the peace process, MINUSCA has supported the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants affiliated with these groups, as well as members of other armed groups and factions. The Secretary-General’s report notes that 1,331 former combatants have been disarmed and demobilised since July 2025. In this regard, Rugwabiza may highlight that at the 14 April meeting of the Strategic Committee on DDRR—a national platform chaired by Touadéra—the president called for the finalisation of the DDRR process within a defined timeframe and urged the leaders of the signatory armed groups to complete their self-dissolution.

The security situation in the CAR is also likely to be a focus of discussion at tomorrow’s meeting. The country remains relatively stable, with the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants contributing to the improved security situation, according to the Secretary-General’s report. However, the situation remains fragile in parts of the country in the north-west and east due to armed group activity, cross-border security dynamics, criminality, and transhumance-related tensions between herders and farmers.

The report also refers to continued threats in the western and central parts of the country posed by armed groups that remain outside the peace process. It cites several incidents involving these groups, which targeted the Central African Armed Forces (Forces armées centrafricaines in French, or FACA), displaced civilians, and disrupted local election campaigns. Additionally, residual UPC combatants continued to obstruct freedom of movement and transhumance-related activity in the centre of the country. In the south-east, violence perpetrated by the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG)—a predominantly ethnic Azande militia accused of committing serious human rights violations—remains a major concern. Combatants belonging to the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)—a Ugandan armed group which continues to operate in the CAR—also renewed activities in that region. In the north-east, clashes took place between local self-defence groups and Sudanese armed elements associated with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which is one of the parties in the Sudanese civil war.

Tomorrow, Rugwabiza may elaborate on MINUSCA’s efforts to reinforce its presence in areas affected by violence and insecurity and to enhance the mission’s protection activities. She might also describe the support that the mission has provided to facilitate local mediation initiatives addressing transhumance-related incidents and intercommunal tensions, help the CAR government to continue extending state authority, and strengthen border management, among other tasks. Council members may welcome progress in the peace process, which has contributed to stabilising the situation in the CAR. However, they may express concern about the continued insecurity in parts of the country, as well as persistent cross-border activities in the north-east linked to the conflict in the Sudan.

Several Council members may also raise the human rights situation in the CAR. During the period covered by the Secretary-General’s report, incidents of human rights violations and abuse decreased by 13 percent, and the number of victims fell by eight percent. Grave violations against children also “slightly decreased”, while 65 cases of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) were recorded. Despite progress in the peace process, the Secretary-General’s report notes that elements of 3R were involved in human rights abuses, including CRSV, extortion, illegal taxation, and abduction for ransom, while UPC activity was linked to intercommunal tensions. Cases of arbitrary arrest and detention during military operations conducted by the FACA and “other security personnel”—a term used by the UN to refer to the Wagner Group, a Russian private security company—remained a source of concern.

In this context, Rugwabiza may highlight MINUSCA’s continued efforts to strengthen the capacity of national institutions to promote and protect human rights, including through training, strengthening early warning and response, and enhancing community engagement. She may also describe the mission’s support to accountability and justice mechanisms, including its assistance to the Special Criminal Court (SCC)—a hybrid tribunal composed of national and international judges that has been operating since 2018 and is mandated to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate the most serious crimes committed in the country. The Secretary-General’s report covers the SCC’s recent activities, including the conclusion of its investigation into a December 2021 attack in Ouaka Prefecture, which referred 16 alleged perpetrators for trial, and the holding of four case management hearings, including one involving former President François Bozizé.

Some Council members are concerned about the detrimental impact of the UN’s liquidity crisis on MINUSCA’s operational capacity. In her briefing tomorrow, Rugwabiza may wish to update members on the contingency measures that the mission has implemented in this regard. According to the Secretary-General’s report, the mission completed the repatriation of 4,031 military personnel, reduced its police component by 755 personnel, and closed 21 operating bases during the reporting period. In addition, seven international civilian staff members departed the mission, and 38 others separated under the early separation programmes. As at 1 June, unpaid assessed contributions to MINUSCA amounted to $452.6 million of the approximately $1.17 billion appropriated for the mission’s 2025/2026 budget.

During the Council’s February meeting on the CAR, Pakistan—a major troop-and-police-contributing country (T/PCC)—drew attention to the financial burden imposed on T/PCCs by the delayed reimbursement for the costs of personnel and contingent-owned equipment (COE). According to the Secretary-General’s latest report, reimbursements for personnel and for COE have been made for the periods up to 31 December 2025 and 30 June 2025, respectively. Tomorrow, Pakistan and other Council members may reiterate their concern about the continued delay in payments and other effects of the liquidity crisis on the mission’s operational effectiveness.

The CAR’s improved security situation and the completion of the national electoral process are likely to factor into discussions about the mission’s ongoing reconfiguration process, including efforts to readjust its footprint and adopt a more agile posture. The Secretary-General’s report provides details on measures that the mission has undertaken in this regard, including handing over certain static security responsibilities to national authorities; closing several facilities, including one of its main sites in Bangui; and redeploying troops and assets to areas facing insecurity.

Council members may also signal interest in the upcoming report that resolution 2800 of 13 November 2025—which most recently renewed the mission’s mandate for another year—requested the Secretary-General to submit by 15 September to explore the opportunity and feasibility of an eventual handover of tasks to the CAR government or the UN Country Team (UNCT). During negotiations on that resolution, the US had sought a shorter, six-month extension of the mandate and a larger reduction of troop levels and eventually abstained on the vote. At the Council’s February meeting, the US maintained that MINUSCA should accelerate its efforts to cease activities that the country considers unnecessary and transfer responsibilities to the CAR authorities or other stakeholders where possible. It may reiterate this position at tomorrow’s meeting.

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